Mechanical sed across the main go.mod's module declaration, the f5-mock-icontrol
sub-module's go.mod, every Go file's import path (361 files), and a rebuild of
the checked-in f5-mock-icontrol binary so its embedded build-info reflects the
new module path. No behavior change.
Choice B from cowork/transfer-certctl-to-org.md, executed 2026-05-04. Choice A
(keep module path declared as github.com/shankar0123/certctl regardless of
repo URL) shipped on the day of the org transfer (2026-05-03) since we had no
external Go consumers; this commit closes that deferral.
Backward-compat: GitHub HTTP redirects continue to forward
github.com/shankar0123/certctl → github.com/certctl-io/certctl at the URL
level, but Go's module proxy uses the path declared in go.mod as the
canonical name. Pre-fix, anyone trying `go get github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
hit a "module path mismatch" error because go.mod said
github.com/shankar0123/certctl and the URL they fetched it from said
certctl-io/certctl. Post-fix, the canonical name and the URL agree, so
go get / go install / external Go consumers / Go-tooling integrations
work cleanly via either the new path (preferred) or the old path (which
redirects and Go follows the redirect for source fetch).
Anyone still importing the old path inside their own code keeps working
provided they update their go.mod's `require` line to match — the module
path declared in their consumer's go.sum / go.mod is the authoritative
import name, so a mass sed across their import statements is the migration
on the consumer side. No external consumers exist today.
Diff shape:
361 *.go files — import path replacement only
2 go.mod — module declaration replacement only
1 binary — deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt
so embedded build-info reflects the new path (8618965 vs
8618933 bytes; 32-byte diff is the build-info change)
Total: 364 files, 730 insertions / 730 deletions, net-zero size, pure
mechanical substitution.
Verification:
gofmt: 17 files needed re-alignment after sed (the new path is one char
shorter than the old, so column-aligned import groups drifted). Applied
`gofmt -w` to fix.
go mod tidy: clean exit on both modules.
go vet ./...: clean exit.
go build ./...: clean exit.
go test -short -count=1 on representative packages: all green
(internal/domain, internal/validation, internal/crypto, internal/crypto/signer,
cmd/agent). Test output now reads `ok github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
confirming the module path resolves correctly.
binary: f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt; `strings | grep shankar0123` returns
nothing; `strings | grep certctl-io/certctl` shows the new module path
embedded in build-info.
Files intentionally NOT touched in this commit:
README.md / CHANGELOG.md / docs/ / etc. — already swept to certctl-io
URLs in commit 0729ee4 (the post-transfer URL refresh). This commit is
purely the Go-tooling layer.
Scarf pixels (`shankar0123.docker.scarf.sh/...`) — Scarf-account
namespace, not a Go import or GitHub repo URL. Stays.
This is a non-blocking, non-customer-impacting change. Operators pulling
container images, running `make verify`, hitting the API, or installing the
agent see no functional difference. Only Go-tooling consumers (none today)
are affected, and they're enabled — not broken — by this commit.
H-3 in certctl-audit-report.md: caller-supplied From/To/Subject were
interpolated directly into the SMTP DATA payload and handed to
client.Mail / client.Rcpt with no sanitization, allowing an attacker
who controls any of those values to inject extra headers (Bcc:,
Reply-To:), split the message body (CRLFCRLF), or tamper with the
SMTP envelope. CWE-113.
Fix:
- New package helper internal/validation.ValidateHeaderValue(field,
value). Rejects CR ("\r"), LF ("\n"), and NUL ("\x00") with an error
that names the offending field but does NOT echo the raw value,
so log readers cannot be attacked with injected content. Silent
stripping was considered and rejected: authentication-relevant
headers must fail visibly.
- Two-layer defense in internal/connector/notifier/email/email.go:
(1) primary guard at the top of sendEmail / sendHTMLEmail, which
blocks tampering of the SMTP envelope (client.Mail, client.Rcpt)
since net/smtp does not sanitize those arguments; and
(2) defense-in-depth guard inside formatEmailMessage /
formatHTMLEmailMessage, catching any future caller that
bypasses sendEmail. Both format functions now return an error.
- Body content is intentionally NOT validated — CR/LF in body is legal
RFC 5322 content and net/smtp handles dot-stuffing.
Tests:
- internal/validation/headers_test.go: 3 functions (AcceptsSafeInput,
RejectsControlCharacters, DefaultFieldName) covering plain ASCII,
UTF-8 multibyte, tabs, typical email addresses, CRLF injection,
lone CR, lone LF, NUL, CRLFCRLF body split, trailing CR, leading LF.
Each reject case asserts the field name IS in the error and the
raw offending value IS NOT (anti-log-injection).
- internal/connector/notifier/email/email_test.go: added
TestEmail_FormatEmailMessage_RejectsCRLFInjection and
TestEmail_FormatHTMLEmailMessage_RejectsCRLFInjection. Existing
format tests updated for the new (bytes, error) signature.
Wire-format invariants preserved:
- SMTP DATA headers still use CRLF separators and RFC 1123Z Date
(unchanged).
- Content-Type headers unchanged (text/plain for plain, text/html +
MIME-Version: 1.0 for HTML).
- No change to message encoding or transport.
Verification (Go 1.25.9 linux-arm64, parent e9947dc):
- go build ./... clean
- go vet ./... clean
- go test -race ./internal/validation/... ok
- go test -race ./internal/connector/notifier/email/... ok
- go test -race ./internal/connector/notifier/webhook/... ok
- Per-layer coverage gates all pass:
validation 95.1% (+0.7 vs baseline 94.4%)
email 39.7% (+1.4 vs baseline 38.3%)
service 67.8% (unchanged)
handler 78.6% (unchanged)
middleware 80.0% (unchanged)
domain 92.7% (unchanged)
- govulncheck ./... No vulnerabilities found
- golangci-lint run ./internal/validation/... ./internal/connector/notifier/email/...
0 issues
Operational note: SMTP sends that would previously deliver a
tampered message now fail fast at the notifier with a clear error.
Operators who were relying on header-injection-shaped inputs (there
should be none in practice — all callers are internal certctl code)
will see "failed to format message: <field> contains disallowed
control character" in logs.
Scope: H-3 only. H-4 (webhook SSRF) follows in a separate commit.
Replace fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d") with net.JoinHostPort() for IPv6 compatibility.
Bump setup-go action to v5 to resolve Node.js 20 deprecation warnings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
shankar0123