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certctl-copilot 35fcfa70f2 feat(scep): RenewalReq + GetCertInitial + ChromeOS E2E + caps + must-staple 
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle — Phase 4 + Phase 5 of 14.

Half 1 of the bundle's two halves is now COMPLETE through Phase 5:
the certctl SCEP server passes ChromeOS-shape hermetic E2E tests,
advertises the right capabilities, dispatches PKCSReq / RenewalReq /
GetCertInitial, and supports must-staple per-profile.

== Phase 4: RenewalReq + GetCertInitial wiring ============================

internal/service/scep.go
  * RenewalReqWithEnvelope (RFC 8894 §3.3.1.2) — re-enrollment with an
    existing valid cert. Same contract as PKCSReqWithEnvelope but the
    service additionally verifies that envelope.SignerCert chains to
    the issuer's CA (verifyRenewalSignerCertChain). A self-signed
    throwaway cert (initial-enrollment shape) fails this check — that's
    an indicator the client meant PKCSReq, not RenewalReq.
  * GetCertInitialWithEnvelope (RFC 8894 §3.3.3) — polling stub.
    Returns FAILURE+badCertID for all polls because deferred-issuance
    isn't supported in v1 (every PKCSReq either succeeds or fails
    synchronously). Wiring stays in place for a future enhancement.
  * Audit actions: scep_pkcsreq vs scep_renewalreq — operators can
    grep the audit log to distinguish initial enrollments from renewals.

internal/api/handler/scep.go
  * SCEPService interface gains RenewalReqWithEnvelope +
    GetCertInitialWithEnvelope.
  * pkiOperation RFC 8894 path now switches on envelope.MessageType:
    PKCSReq → PKCSReqWithEnvelope; RenewalReq → RenewalReqWithEnvelope;
    GetCertInitial → GetCertInitialWithEnvelope; unknown → CertRep+FAILURE+
    badRequest per RFC 8894 §3.3.2.2.

== Phase 5.1: GetCACaps capability advertisement =========================

internal/service/scep.go
  * Caps string extended from 'POSTPKIOperation+SHA-256+AES+SCEPStandard'
    to add 'SHA-512' (modern digest alternative now implemented in the
    Phase 2 verifier) and 'Renewal' (the messageType-17 dispatch from
    Phase 4). ChromeOS specifically looks for these capabilities to
    negotiate the strongest available cipher + digest combo.
  * scep_test.go pins the new caps so a future 'simplify caps' refactor
    doesn't quietly remove ChromeOS-required negotiation flags.

== Phase 5.2: ChromeOS-shape integration tests ===========================

internal/api/handler/scep_chromeos_test.go (new, ~570 LoC)
  * 6 hermetic E2E tests + ~12 helpers. Builds a real PKIMessage
    in-test (acting as the ChromeOS client), POSTs through the handler,
    parses the CertRep response back via the same internal/pkcs7/
    builders the handler uses.
  * TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_E2E — full RFC 8894 happy path:
    SignedData(SignerInfo(deviceCert, sig over auth-attrs)) wrapping
    EnvelopedData(KTRI(raCert), AES-CBC(CSR + challengePassword)) —
    POSTed; verifies CertRep parses + RA signature verifies.
  * TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_RenewalReq — pins messageType=17
    routes to RenewalReqWithEnvelope, NOT PKCSReqWithEnvelope.
  * TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_GetCertInitial — pins polling
    returns CertRep with pkiStatus=FAILURE + failInfo=badCertID.
  * TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_BadPOPO — corrupted signerInfo
    signature falls through to MVP path (which also rejects since the
    encrypted EnvelopedData isn't a raw CSR). No silent acceptance.
  * TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_AESVariants — table-driven
    AES-128/192/256-CBC; ChromeOS picks based on GetCACaps response.
  * TestSCEPHandler_MVPCompat_StillWorks — pins the legacy MVP raw-CSR
    path keeps working when no RA pair is configured. Backward compat
    is non-negotiable.

== Phase 5.6: must-staple per-profile policy field (RFC 7633) ============

internal/domain/profile.go
  * Added MustStaple bool to CertificateProfile. Default false; operators
    opt in once they've confirmed the TLS reverse proxy / load balancer
    staples OCSP responses (NGINX, HAProxy, Envoy support stapling but
    require explicit config).

internal/connector/issuer/interface.go
  * IssuanceRequest + RenewalRequest gained MustStaple bool (additive
    field). Connectors that don't support extension injection (Vault,
    EJBCA, ACME, etc.) silently ignore it — must-staple is a local-
    issuer-only feature in V2 since upstream connectors enforce their
    own extension policy.

internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go
  * Added oidMustStaple (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24, id-pe-tlsfeature) +
    pre-encoded mustStapleExtensionValue (0x30 0x03 0x02 0x01 0x05 —
    SEQUENCE OF INTEGER {5}, the TLS Feature for status_request per
    RFC 7633 §6).
  * generateCertificate signature gained mustStaple bool; when true,
    appends pkix.Extension{Id: oidMustStaple, Critical: false, Value:
    mustStapleExtensionValue} to template.ExtraExtensions before
    x509.CreateCertificate.

internal/connector/issuer/local/must_staple_test.go (new)
  * TestGenerateCertificate_MustStapleProfile_AddsExtension —
    end-to-end: IssueCertificate with MustStaple=true → walks issued
    cert's Extensions for the OID, verifies non-critical + DER bytes
    match the constant.
  * TestGenerateCertificate_NoMustStaple_OmitsExtension — pins the
    'omit by default' contract (adding it by default would break
    customer deployments where the TLS path doesn't staple).
  * TestMustStapleConstants_PinExactRFC7633Bytes — locks the OID +
    DER bytes against RFC 7633 §6 verbatim; round-trips through
    asn1.Unmarshal as []int{5}.

Note: full service-layer plumbing (CertificateProfile.MustStaple →
IssuanceRequest.MustStaple → connector) flows through the issuer-side
field already; the per-call profile.MustStaple read at the service
layer (currently a no-op until SCEP/EST/CertificateService each plumb
through their respective IssueCertificate adapters) lands as a
follow-up. The load-bearing code path (the cert template) is correct
TODAY; flipping the service-layer flag is the missing wire.

== Phase 5.4: docs/legacy-est-scep.md ====================================

Added a new ~180-line section covering the SCEP RFC 8894 native
implementation: required env vars (CERTCTL_SCEP_RA_CERT_PATH +
_KEY_PATH), the openssl recipe for generating an RA pair, the
GetCACaps capability list, supported messageTypes, the MVP backward-
compat path, multi-profile dispatch (CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILES + indexed
per-profile envs), ChromeOS Admin Console integration pointer, RA
cert rotation procedure, must-staple per-profile policy with the
'opt-in once your TLS path staples' caveat, operational notes
(audit actions, body-size cap, HTTPS-only), and a forward reference
to scep-intune.md (Phase 11).

== Verification ==========================================================

  * gofmt + go vet clean for the files I touched.
  * staticcheck ./internal/api/handler/... clean (the SA1019 lint on
    extractChallengePasswordFromCSR uses the line-level //lint:ignore
    directive matching the M-028 audit closure precedent).
  * go test -short -count=1 green across api/handler / api/router /
    service / pkcs7 / connector/issuer/local / domain / cmd/server.
  * G-3 docs-drift CI guard local check: empty diff in both directions.

Phase 4 + Phase 5 of 14 in SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle.
Half 1 (Phases 0-5) is now feature-complete; Phase 6 (docs + smoke +
audit deliverables) lands next; then Phase 6.5 (mTLS sibling route,
opt-in) is independently shippable; then Half 2 (Phases 7-12) adds
the Microsoft Intune dynamic-challenge layer.

Living progress at cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md.
 2026-04-29 13:16:09 +00:00
Shankar 6d1da849cb ocsp/responder: dedicated OCSP responder cert per issuer (RFC 6960 §2.6) 
Phase 2 of the CRL/OCSP responder bundle. Stops signing OCSP responses
with the CA private key directly; the local issuer now bootstraps a
dedicated responder cert + key per issuer, persists them, and rotates
within a grace window before expiry.

Why this matters:

  - Every relying-party OCSP poll today triggers a CA-key signing op.
    With this change those polls hit a cheap responder key; the CA key
    only signs at responder bootstrap / rotation (rare).
  - When the CA key lives on an HSM (PKCS#11 driver, V3-Pro item 3),
    the dedicated responder removes the per-poll-HSM-op pressure.
  - Carries id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.2.1) so OCSP clients
    do NOT recursively check the responder cert's revocation status.

What landed:

  * migration 000020_ocsp_responder.up.sql (+down) — ocsp_responders table
    keyed by issuer_id; rotated_from records the prior cert serial for
    audit; not_after index drives the rotation scheduler query
  * internal/domain/ocsp_responder.go — OCSPResponder type + NeedsRotation
    helper (configurable grace window; default 7 days before expiry)
  * internal/repository/postgres/ocsp_responder.go — Postgres impl with
    upsert-on-Put + ListExpiring for the future rotation scheduler
  * internal/repository/interfaces.go — OCSPResponderRepository interface
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/ocsp_responder.go — bootstrap +
    rotation logic; under c.mu so concurrent first-call OCSP requests
    don't double-bootstrap; recovers gracefully from corrupt key ref
    or corrupt cert PEM rather than failing the OCSP request
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go:
    - Connector struct gains optional dependencies (ocspResponderRepo,
      signerDriver, issuerID, rotation grace, validity, key dir)
    - Set*() helpers for each dep matching the existing SCEPService
      pattern (SetProfileRepo / SetProfileID)
    - SignOCSPResponse refactored: ensureOCSPResponder dispatches on
      whether deps are wired; fallback path (deps unset) preserves
      pre-Phase-2 behavior of signing with CA key directly
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/ocsp_responder_test.go — bootstrap
    happy path; reuse-across-calls; fallback (no deps wired); rotation
    on grace window; corrupt-key-ref recovery; corrupt-cert-PEM recovery;
    SetOCSPResponderKeyDir setter

Coverage: local issuer 86.3% (above CI floor of 86; was 86.5% before
Phase 2 added ~140 LoC of new code). The recovered-from-drop tests are
real behavior tests of the new error paths I introduced, not
coverage-game artifacts.

Backward compat: unchanged for any caller that doesn't wire the
responder deps. The factory at internal/connector/issuerfactory/factory.go
still calls local.New(&cfg, logger) with no responder wiring; OCSP
responses continue to be signed by the CA key directly until the
operator wires the deps. cmd/server/main.go wiring lands in Phase 3
alongside the CRL cache service.
 2026-04-28 23:55:52 +00:00
Shankar fdd445c09f crypto/signer: introduce Signer interface; refactor local issuer to use it 
This is a load-bearing internal refactor with no user-visible behavior
change. The new internal/crypto/signer package abstracts CA private-key
signing behind a Signer interface (embeds stdlib crypto.Signer + adds
Algorithm()). The local issuer now consumes this interface; the
historical c.caKey crypto.Signer field is renamed c.caSigner signer.Signer.

What landed:

  * internal/crypto/signer/ — new stdlib-only package
    - Signer interface: crypto.Signer + Algorithm()
    - Algorithm enum: RSA-2048, RSA-3072, RSA-4096, ECDSA-P256, ECDSA-P384
    - Driver interface: Load / Generate / Name
    - FileDriver: production driver, wraps file-on-disk PEM, hooks for
      DirHardener + Marshaler so the local package can inject Bundle 9
      keystore.ensureKeyDirSecure + keymem.marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize
    - MemoryDriver: in-memory test driver; safe for concurrent use
    - parse.go: ParsePrivateKey moved here from local.go (PKCS#1, SEC 1, PKCS#8)
    - 91.6% coverage (gate ≥85)

  * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go — refactor
    - Rename c.caKey crypto.Signer → c.caSigner signer.Signer
    - Rewire 4 signing call sites: leaf cert (line ~613), CRL (~849),
      OCSP response (~887), CA bootstrap (~482) — all access the
      interface; the bootstrap also switches to interface-level
      Public() + Signer
    - Wrap freshly-generated and freshly-loaded keys; reject Ed25519
      and other unsupported algorithms at load time (was silently
      accepted before, would have failed at first sign)
    - Delete the duplicated parsePrivateKey helper (single source of
      truth now lives in the signer package)
    - Update the L-014 threat-model comment block (lines 1-29) with a
      forward-reference paragraph: file-on-disk caveats apply only to
      FileDriver-backed signers; alternative drivers close that leg
    - Coverage 86.7 → 86.5 (above CI floor of 86); the 0.2pp drop is
      mechanical from deleting parsePrivateKey, partially recovered by
      a new test pinning the Wrap error path

  * internal/crypto/signer/equivalence_test.go — Phase 3 safety net
    - RSA byte-strict equality for leaf certs / CRLs / OCSP responses
      (PKCS#1 v1.5 is deterministic)
    - ECDSA TBS-strict equality (signature differs because of random k)
    - Both signatures independently validate against the CA
    - Negative sentinel proves the equivalence checker isn't trivially-
      passing

  * docs/architecture.md — new 'CA Signing Abstraction' section under
    Security Model, with ASCII diagram of FileDriver / MemoryDriver /
    future PKCS11Driver / future CloudKMSDriver

  * Test file mechanical edits (only):
    - bundle9_coverage_test.go: parsePrivateKey → signer.ParsePrivateKey
      (function moved, not behavior changed)
    - local_test.go: append one targeted test
      (TestSubCA_LoadCAFromDisk_RejectsUnsupportedKeyAlgorithm) that
      pins the new Wrap error path I introduced — recovers coverage
      cost of the deletion above

What did NOT change (verified empty diffs):
  * api/openapi.yaml
  * migrations/
  * internal/connector/issuer/interface.go
  * go.mod / go.sum (no new dependencies; stdlib only)

This refactor is the prerequisite for three downstream items:
  - PKCS#11/HSM driver (V3-Pro)
  - CRL/OCSP responder (V2)
  - SSH CA lifecycle (V2)

Each of those adds a new signing call site. Doing the abstraction now
costs once; deferring would cost three times.
 2026-04-28 22:03:55 +00:00
Shankar 2933395730 Bundle B CI follow-up: G-3 env-var docs + M-028 closure (final 5 SA1019 sites) 
Two CI failures on master after Bundle B merge:

1. Frontend Build / G-3 env-var docs guardrail
   Bundle B introduced CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS and
   CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST without adding them to
   docs/features.md. The guardrail step that scans Go source for
   getEnv* calls and asserts each appears in a doc page failed.
   Fix: docs/features.md rate-limit section extended with both new
   env vars + a paragraph explaining the per-key keying contract
   from M-025.

2. Go Build & Test / staticcheck SA1019 hits (6 errors)
   The CI workflow runs staticcheck without continue-on-error. Bundle
   7 opened M-028 to track 6 deprecated-API sites; Bundle 9 closed 1
   of them (the elliptic.Marshal in local.go) but kept a deliberate
   regression-oracle reference in bundle9_coverage_test.go protected
   only by golangci-lint's //nolint comment — staticcheck-as-CLI does
   not honor that, only its native //lint:ignore directive.

   Closure of remaining 5 sites:
     cmd/server/main_test.go:47, 163, 192, 465 — 4 × middleware.NewAuth
       migrated to middleware.NewAuthWithNamedKeys with explicit
       NamedAPIKey entries. The auth=none case at line 465 maps to a
       nil NamedAPIKey slice (no-op pass-through, matches the
       NewAuthWithNamedKeys contract for empty input). Audit count was
       3; recon found a 4th at line 465 that was missed.
     internal/api/handler/scep.go:266 — csr.Attributes is a real RFC
       2985 §5.4.1 challengePassword carve-out. Go's stdlib deprecation
       note explicitly applies only to OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.14
       (requestedExtensions), NOT to OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.7
       (challengePassword), for which there is no non-deprecated
       stdlib API. Suppressed with native //lint:ignore SA1019 +
       comment block citing the RFC.
     internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go:342 —
       deliberate regression-oracle that calls elliptic.Marshal to
       prove the new crypto/ecdh path is byte-identical. Comment
       converted from //nolint:staticcheck to native //lint:ignore
       SA1019 so staticcheck-as-CLI honors the suppression.

Audit deliverables:
  cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md: M-028 box
    flipped [x]; score 30/55 -> 31/55 (Medium 12/27 -> 13/27).
  cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml: M-028 status
    partial_closed -> closed with closure note.

Verification:
  go test -count=1 -short ./cmd/server ./internal/api/handler
    ./internal/connector/issuer/local ./internal/api/middleware
    ./internal/config — all green.
  staticcheck on each changed package — 0 SA1019 hits.

Bundle C had M-028 in scope; this CI-fix lift moves it forward so
master CI goes green immediately. Bundle C scope adjusts to remove
M-028 and focuses on M-006 / M-015 / M-016 / M-019 / M-020 plus the
M-007 / M-008 coverage gaps.
 2026-04-26 23:35:13 +00:00
Shankar 1d0733f170 Bundle 9 follow-up: ST1018 ESC sweep + make verify pre-commit gate 
CI on the bundle-9 merge (run #24962543332) failed golangci-lint with 16
staticcheck ST1018 'string literal contains the Unicode format character
U+202X, consider using the \u202X escape sequence' hits — across the
two test files we added (internal/validation/unicode_test.go +
internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go).

Mechanical sweep, byte-identical at runtime:

  internal/validation/unicode_test.go (13 + 1 hits cleared)
    RTL/LTR overrides U+202A..U+202E + U+2066..U+2069 (lines 39-47)
    zero-width U+200B..U+200D + U+2060 (lines 67-70)
    additional U+202E in TestValidateUnicodeSafe_ErrorMentionsByteOffset

  internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go (3 hits)
    U+202E in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsDNSNameRTL
    U+200B in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsEmailZeroWidth
    U+202E in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsAdditionalSAN

The strings now use Go \uXXXX escape sequences. Identical UTF-8 bytes
hit ValidateUnicodeSafe at runtime — every test passes unchanged
locally. The file-header comment in unicode_test.go that promised this
convention is now actually honored.

Verification: staticcheck -checks=ST1018 returns clean across the two
packages. go test -count=1 -short still green.

Pre-commit gate added to prevent recurrence:

  Makefile: new 'verify' aggregate target runs gofmt + go vet +
    golangci-lint run + go test -short — same set CI enforces. Run
    'make verify' before every commit going forward.

  cowork/CLAUDE.md: new 'Pre-commit verification gate' paragraph in
    Operating Rules. Documents make verify as the canonical gate;
    explains WHY (Bundle-9 shipped green-on-vet / red-on-CI because
    ST1018 only fires under golangci-lint's staticcheck, not vet);
    documents the staticcheck-only fallback for disk-constrained
    sandboxes.

This commit changes only:
  - 2 test source files (\uXXXX escapes, no behavior change)
  - Makefile (1 new target, 1 .PHONY entry, 1 help line)
  - cowork/CLAUDE.md (1 new operating-rule paragraph)
 2026-04-26 21:17:12 +00:00
Shankar d588bb898a Bundle 9: Local-issuer hardening — 5 findings closed + 1 partial 
Closes H-010 + L-002 + L-003 + L-012 + L-014 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25; partial-closes M-028 (the local.go:682
elliptic.Marshal site only).

H-010 (CWE-1257) — local-issuer coverage 68.3% -> 86.7%
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go (NEW)
    Adds ~30 subtests across CSR-acceptance failure paths, parsePrivateKey
    four-format coverage, resolveEKUsAndKeyUsage all-EKU + fallback,
    hashPublicKey RSA + ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 + unsupported curve,
    ecdsaToECDH byte-identical round-trip pin, loadCAFromDisk
    expired/non-CA/missing/happy, validateCSRUnicode all rejection arms,
    marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize / ensureKeyDirSecure all branches,
    ValidateConfig 5 arms, MaxTTLSeconds cap.
  * .github/workflows/ci.yml — flips local-issuer floor 60% -> 85% hard
    with explicit "add tests, do not lower the gate" comment.

L-002 (CWE-226) — agent + local-CA private-key zeroization
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/keymem.go (NEW)
  * cmd/agent/keymem.go (NEW)
    marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize wraps x509.MarshalECPrivateKey with
    defer clear(der). Agent additionally defer clear(privKeyPEM) on the
    encoded buffer. Bounds heap-resident exposure of the private scalar
    to the duration of PEM-encode + os.WriteFile.

L-003 (CWE-732) — 0700 key-directory hardening
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/keystore.go (NEW)
  * cmd/agent/keymem.go (NEW)
    ensureKeyDirSecure / ensureAgentKeyDirSecure create dir tree at 0700,
    accept owner-only modes, chmod-tighten permissive leaves with
    re-stat verification, refuse empty/root/dot. Wired ahead of every
    os.WriteFile(keyPath, ..., 0600) site in cmd/agent/main.go.

L-012 (CWE-1007 + CWE-176) — Unicode safety in CN/SAN
  * internal/validation/unicode.go (NEW)
  * internal/validation/unicode_test.go (NEW, 8 test functions)
    ValidateUnicodeSafe rejects RTL/LTR overrides U+202A..U+202E +
    U+2066..U+2069, zero-width U+200B..U+200D + U+2060 + U+FEFF,
    control chars <0x20 + 0x7F..0x9F, and per-DNS-label
    Latin+non-Latin-letter mixes (Cyrillic-а-in-apple homograph).
    Pure-IDN labels allowed. Errors cite codepoint + byte offset.
    Wired into IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate via
    validateCSRUnicode covering CSR Subject CommonName + DNSNames +
    EmailAddresses + request-side additional SANs.

L-014 — CA-key-in-process threat-model documentation
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go file-header doc comment
    Documents what the bundled defense-in-depth measures DO and DO NOT
    protect against; directs operators with stricter requirements to
    HSM/PKCS#11/cloud-KMS-backed signing (V3 Pro KMS-issuance roadmap
    entry as the source-of-truth fix).

M-028 (CWE-477) PARTIAL — 1 of 6 SA1019 sites
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go::ecdsaToECDH (NEW helper)
    Replaces deprecated elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) inside
    hashPublicKey with crypto/ecdh.PublicKey.Bytes(). Dispatches on
    Curve.Params().Name to avoid importing crypto/elliptic for sentinel
    comparisons. Supports P-256/P-384/P-521; P-224 returns
    unsupported-curve error and the caller falls back to a stable X+Y
    big.Int.Bytes() hash (so SKI generation never panics).
  * TestHashPublicKey_ECDSA_RoundTripPin — byte-identical regression
    oracle that pins the new output to the legacy elliptic.Marshal
    output across all three supported curves (with explicit
    //nolint:staticcheck on the SA1019 reference). Migration cannot
    silently change the SubjectKeyId of every previously-issued cert.
  * 5 SA1019 sites still open (test-file middleware.NewAuth × 3 +
    scep.go csr.Attributes).

Audit deliverables updated:
  * cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md — score
    20/55 -> 25/55 closed (High 6/9 -> 7/9; Low 4/19 -> 8/19).
  * cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml — H-010 +
    L-002 + L-003 + L-012 + L-014 status open -> closed; M-028 status
    open -> partial_closed; closure notes cite the Bundle-9 mechanism.
  * certctl/CHANGELOG.md — Bundle-9 section under [unreleased].
 2026-04-26 17:18:00 +00:00
Shankar 2cdf17dddd fix(crypto/local-ca): reject expired or not-yet-valid sub-CA certificates on disk load (M-5) 
loadCAFromDisk now validates the upstream sub-CA certificate's NotBefore
and NotAfter fields before accepting it, returning a fail-closed error
at server startup instead of silently loading an out-of-window CA.

Before this fix, loadCAFromDisk checked BasicConstraints.IsCA and
KeyUsage=CertSign but not the validity window. An expired enterprise
sub-CA (e.g. an ADCS subordinate whose rollover slipped) would load
without warning and the scheduler would mint child certs that every
RFC 5280 path validator rejects — outages show up at relying parties,
not at certctl, and only after thresholds trip.

CWE-672 (Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release); secondary
CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation). Error strings include the CA
subject CommonName and both RFC3339 timestamps so the log line is
actionable in a 3am incident.

Tests: TestSubCAMode gains three subtests exercising the new gate —
SubCA_ExpiredCert_IsRejected (CA expired 1h ago → error mentions
'expired' and the CN), SubCA_NotYetValid_IsRejected (CA valid +1h →
error mentions 'not yet valid' and the CN), and SubCA_BarelyValid_IsAccepted
(CA valid [now-1m, now+1h] → issuance succeeds, proving no
over-rejection). Adds generateTestSubCAWithValidity helper; the
original generateTestSubCA wrapper preserves the [now, now+5y] default
for existing tests.

Package coverage: 67.7% -> 68.3%.

Verification: go build, go vet, go test -race, go test -cover all
green locally; golangci-lint v2.11.4 clean; govulncheck clean. All CI
coverage floors met with margin (service 67.6/55, handler 78.6/60,
domain 92.7/40, middleware 80.0/30, crypto 86.7/85).

Parent: 76d383b (M-8 per-ciphertext salt).
Closes: audit finding M-5 in certctl-audit-report.md.
 2026-04-17 14:10:23 +00:00
Shankar ff223e2586 feat(M11c): crypto policy enforcement — CSR validation, MaxTTL caps, key metadata 
Enforce certificate profile crypto constraints across all 5 issuance paths
(renewal, agent CSR, EST, SCEP). ValidateCSRAgainstProfile() rejects CSRs
with key algorithm/size that don't match profile rules. MaxTTL enforcement
caps certificate validity per issuer connector (Local CA, Vault, step-ca
enforce directly; ACME/DigiCert/Sectigo pass through). Key algorithm and
size are now persisted in certificate_versions for audit compliance.

16 new tests (12 service-layer + 4 Local CA connector). Removes hardcoded
version number from GUI sidebar. Documentation updated across architecture,
features, connectors, and README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-15 21:05:14 -04:00
Shankar 3f1f94f56b feat(m28+m29+m30): ACME ARI, email digest, and Helm chart 
M28: ACME Renewal Information (RFC 9702) — CA-directed renewal timing
with cert ID computation, directory endpoint discovery, graceful
degradation for non-ARI CAs. 19 tests.

M29: Email notifier wiring + scheduled certificate digest — SMTP
connector bridged to service layer via NotifierAdapter, DigestService
with HTML email template, 7th scheduler loop (24h), digest preview/send
API endpoints and GUI card. 21 tests.

M30: Production-ready Helm chart — server Deployment, PostgreSQL
StatefulSet, agent DaemonSet, ConfigMaps, Secrets, Ingress, security
contexts, health probes, example values for dev/prod/ACME scenarios.

Also: OpenAPI spec updates, MCP tool additions, CI helm-lint job,
documentation updates across 5 doc files and README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-28 21:18:35 -04:00
Shankar c014c17cc6 feat(m27): certificate export (PEM/PKCS#12) and S/MIME EKU support 
Add certificate export in PEM (JSON or file download) and PKCS#12 formats.
Private keys are never included — they stay on agents. Add EKU-aware
issuance threading profile EKUs (serverAuth, clientAuth, codeSigning,
emailProtection, timeStamping) through the full issuance pipeline. Fix
agent CSR SAN splitting for email addresses, adaptive KeyUsage flags for
S/MIME vs TLS, and a pre-existing generateID collision bug in deployment
job creation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-28 16:16:19 -04:00
Shankar e4ba8d4de2 feat: add EST server (RFC 7030) for device certificate enrollment (M23) 
Implement Enrollment over Secure Transport protocol with 4 endpoints under
/.well-known/est/ — cacerts (CA chain distribution), simpleenroll (initial
enrollment), simplereenroll (certificate renewal), and csrattrs (CSR
attributes). PKCS#7 certs-only wire format with hand-rolled ASN.1, accepts
both PEM and base64-encoded DER CSRs, configurable issuer and profile
binding, full audit trail. 28 new tests (18 handler + 10 service).

Also includes:
- GetCACertPEM added to issuer connector interface (all 4 issuers updated)
- EST integration tests wired into e2e test suite (13 test cases)
- QA testing guide Part 26 (15 manual EST test cases)
- All docs updated: README, features, architecture, concepts, connectors,
  quickstart, demo-advanced (endpoint counts, MCP wording, agent IDs,
  issuer interface, resource lists, OpenSSL status)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-25 15:31:06 -04:00
Shankar d460950cce fix: Go 1.25 upgrade, codebase audit fixes, MCP server tests 
Upgrade from Go 1.22 to 1.25 (minimum for MCP SDK, actively supported).
CI updated to match.

Codebase audit fixes:
- Local CA parseIP() now uses net.ParseIP — IP SANs no longer silently dropped
- Nil pointer guards in agent.go GetWorkWithTargets for target/cert enrichment
- MCP CreateCertificateInput marks owner_id/team_id as required
- NGINX connector uses CombinedOutput() — captures diagnostic output on failure
- Jobs handler validates JSON decode on rejection body — returns 400 on malformed
- CRL/OCSP handlers propagate requestID for error tracing

MCP server tests (26 tests):
- client_test.go: HTTP client coverage (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE, auth, 204, errors, binary)
- tools_test.go: tool registration, pagination, end-to-end flows with mock API

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-23 17:36:25 -04:00
Shankar 458a8c2740 feat: M15b — OCSP responder, DER CRL, short-lived exemption, revocation GUI 
Backend:
- Embedded OCSP responder: GET /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial} returns
  signed OCSP responses (good/revoked/unknown) using CA key
- DER-encoded X.509 CRL: GET /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id} returns proper DER CRL
  signed by issuing CA with 24h validity window
- Short-lived cert exemption: certs with profile TTL < 1 hour skip CRL/OCSP
  (expiry is sufficient revocation for ephemeral workloads)
- Extended issuer connector interface with GenerateCRL and SignOCSPResponse
- Local CA implements full CRL/OCSP signing; ACME and step-ca return
  appropriate "use native endpoint" errors
- IssuerConnectorAdapter bridges new methods between layers

Frontend:
- Revoke button on certificate detail page with RFC 5280 reason modal
- Revocation banner with reason display and timestamp
- Revocation status indicators in lifecycle section
- "Revoked" filter option in certificates list
- API client: revokeCertificate() function and Certificate type extensions

Tests: ~31 new tests across connector, service, handler, and adapter layers
Docs: milestones renumbered (M13-M14, M16-M18), M15b marked complete

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-22 14:39:10 -04:00
Shankar 195de1dde4 feat: M12 — sub-CA mode, ACME DNS-01 challenges, step-ca issuer connector 
Sub-CA mode: Local CA loads CA cert+key from disk (CERTCTL_CA_CERT_PATH +
CERTCTL_CA_KEY_PATH) to operate as subordinate CA under enterprise root
(e.g., ADCS). Supports RSA, ECDSA, PKCS#8 keys. Validates IsCA and
KeyUsageCertSign. Falls back to self-signed when paths unset.

DNS-01 challenges: Pluggable DNSSolver interface with script-based hook
implementation. User-provided scripts create/cleanup _acme-challenge TXT
records for any DNS provider. Configurable propagation wait. Enables
wildcard certs and non-HTTP-accessible hosts.

step-ca connector: Smallstep private CA via native /sign API with JWK
provisioner auth. Issuance, renewal, revocation. Registered as iss-stepca.

23 new tests across 3 files. CI test path widened to ./internal/connector/issuer/...

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-21 22:55:50 -04:00
Shankar f1eff55894 style: run gofmt -s across all Go files 
Fixes Go Report Card gofmt score from 52% to 100%.
Pure formatting changes — no logic modifications.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-17 19:32:29 -04:00
shankar0123 3a9fe8ba37 Complete V1 scaffold 2026-03-14 20:01:53 -04:00