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24 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
|
ff3f1cd864 |
harden(auth): demo-mode residual-grants detector + cleanup endpoint + CI guard (A-8)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-8 closure. Closes the deferred Phase 2 leg of the
2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure (
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shankar0123
|
192351e253 |
fix(api/cors): narrow Bundle-2 routes from wildcard to NewCORS(corsCfg)
Closes CRIT-3 of the 2026-05-10 audit. Bundle 2's OIDC handshake +
back-channel-logout + logout + bootstrap + breakglass-login routes were
wrapped by middleware.CORS — a hard-coded
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * middleware that ignored the operator's
CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS knob (CWE-942). The properly-configured
middleware.NewCORS(corsCfg) exists right next to it but wasn't used here.
The deprecation comment on middleware.CORS said "Kept for health endpoints"
but Bundle 2 added four additional call sites without converting them.
This commit:
- Renames middleware.CORS -> middleware.CORSWildcard with a stronger doc
block making the security tradeoff explicit at every remaining call
site. The doc references the CI guard + the 2026-05-10 audit closure.
- Adds a CorsCfg middleware.CORSConfig field to router.HandlerRegistry
and threads it from cmd/server/main.go using the existing
cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins value. The same config that drives the global
corsMiddleware now also drives the per-route NewCORS wraps for the
auth-exempt direct r.mux.Handle blocks.
- Swaps middleware.CORS -> middleware.NewCORS(reg.CorsCfg) for the 7
credentialed auth-exempt routes:
- GET /auth/oidc/login
- GET /auth/oidc/callback
- POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout
- POST /auth/logout
- POST /auth/breakglass/login
- GET /api/v1/auth/bootstrap
- POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap
- Keeps middleware.CORSWildcard for the 4 credential-free probe routes:
- GET /health
- GET /ready
- GET /api/v1/version
- GET /api/v1/auth/info
- Adds scripts/ci-guards/cors-wildcard-allowlist.sh — pins the 4-route
allowlist; fails CI when a new middleware.CORSWildcard wrap appears
outside the allowlist. Adding a new wildcard call site requires
updating the allowlist AND documenting why in the commit body.
Operators who configured CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS=https://admin.example.com
expecting the OIDC + BCL + breakglass-login routes to honor it now do.
Previously those routes ignored the knob and emitted ACAO: * regardless.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt -l . clean
- go vet ./... clean
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/... ./internal/auth/...
./internal/domain/auth/ ./internal/service/auth/ ./cmd/server/ pass
- go build ./... clean
- scripts/ci-guards/cors-wildcard-allowlist.sh passes (4 allowlisted
routes; zero violations)
CRIT-1 + CRIT-2 from the same audit are already closed on this branch
(commits
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shankar0123
|
abfa73cf64 |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 13: negative-test backfill (OIDC PreLoginAdapter) + OIDC client_secret encryption invariant + multi-tenant query CI guard + coverage floors held at 90 across 4 Bundle-2 packages + E2E coverage map
Closes Phase 13 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Ships the
Phase-13-mandated test infrastructure + the explicit "floors held
at 90 across all four Bundle-2 packages" anti-Bundle-1-mistake
invariant.
Files
=====
internal/auth/oidc/prelogin_test.go (NEW, +375 LOC):
* PreLoginAdapter coverage backfill. The adapter shipped at 0%
coverage in Phase 5 (HandleAuthRequest + HandleCallback used a
stub PreLoginStore in service_test.go); this file lifts the
package's coverage from 78.8% to 93.7%.
* 14 tests covering: constructor + test helper, CreatePreLogin
error paths (GetActive failure, Decrypt failure, RNG failure,
repo.Create failure, happy path), LookupAndConsume error paths
(malformed cookie, unknown signing key, decrypt failure, HMAC
mismatch, repo not-found, repo expired, repo other-error,
happy path including single-use enforcement).
internal/repository/postgres/oidc_encryption_invariant_test.go (NEW,
+208 LOC, integration test gated by testing.Short()):
* Three Phase-13-mandated invariants pinned against the live
schema via testcontainers Postgres:
- (a) client_secret_encrypted column never contains the
plaintext (substring-search defense rejecting any 8-byte
prefix of the plaintext too).
- (b) blob shape is v2 OR v3 (magic byte 0x02 / 0x03 +
salt(16) + nonce(12) + ciphertext+tag); accepts either
version because the prompt's spec was written when v2 was
current and Bundle B / M-001 introduced v3 as the new
write format. Sanity-checks that salt + nonce regions are
non-zero (RNG-failure detection).
- (c) round-trip via DecryptIfKeySet recovers plaintext;
wrong-passphrase MUST fail (AEAD tag check).
* Plus rotate-produces-fresh-ciphertext (two encrypts of the
same plaintext under the same passphrase emit different bytes
due to per-row random salt + per-encryption random AES-GCM
nonce).
* Plus empty-passphrase-fails-closed (both EncryptIfKeySet AND
DecryptIfKeySet return ErrEncryptionKeyRequired; the CWE-311
fix from Bundle B's M-001).
scripts/ci-guards/multi-tenant-query-coverage.sh (NEW, ratchet-style):
* Greps every SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE FROM / INSERT INTO in
internal/repository/postgres/*.go (excluding *_test.go) that
targets a tenant-aware table. Counts queries that lack
tenant_id in the surrounding 7-line window.
* Compares count against BASELINE_COUNT pinned in the script
(initial baseline 32 at Phase 13 close). Regression (count >
baseline) → FAIL with line-by-line violation list. Improvement
(count < baseline) → also FAIL until the script's BASELINE is
ratcheted down (forces the win to be made visible).
* Tenant-aware tables (10): roles, role_permissions, actor_roles
(Bundle 1) + oidc_providers, group_role_mappings, sessions,
session_signing_keys, oidc_pre_login_sessions, users,
breakglass_credentials (Bundle 2). The `permissions` table is
global (canonical permission catalogue) — NOT in the list.
* Why ratchet not zero: the current single-tenant codebase has
many Get-by-PK queries where the primary key is globally
unique and lack of tenant_id is not a leak. Going to zero
would either require mechanical churn (add `AND tenant_id =
$N` to every PK query) or a sprawling exception list. The
ratchet captures the current state as a baseline; multi-
tenant activation work then drives the count down. New code
that ADDS to the count without operator review is what we
catch.
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml (MODIFIED):
* Added internal/auth/breakglass + internal/auth/breakglass/domain
+ internal/auth/user/domain entries at floor 90.
* Phase 13 prompt's anti-lying-field rule held: floors at 90
across all four Bundle-2 packages (oidc / session / breakglass
/ user). NO held-low-with-rationale entry.
* internal/auth/user/domain entry documents the prompt's
internal/auth/user/ floor: the parent (non-domain) directory
has no Go source — upsertUser lives in
internal/auth/oidc/service.go alongside group resolution +
role mapping (cohesive sequence within the OIDC callback).
Splitting upsertUser into a separate internal/auth/user/
service package would harm cohesion without adding test value;
the domain layer's invariant coverage is where the floor
actually applies.
web/src/__tests__/e2e/README.md (NEW):
* Documentation-only stub satisfying the prompt's structural
`web/src/__tests__/e2e/` directory deliverable. Maps each of
the 15 Phase-8 prompt-mandated flow checks to its current
coverage location (Vitest mocked-API + Go service-layer +
Phase 10 live-Keycloak integration + Phase 11 runbook). Pins
the explicit deferral of a Playwright/Cypress suite with the
rationale (no customer-reported bug today escaped the existing
layered coverage; ~3 days effort + ongoing flake triage cost
not justified pre-v2.1.0).
Coverage results
================
internal/auth/oidc/ 93.7% ≥ 90 ✓ (was 78.8%, lifted by prelogin_test.go)
internal/auth/oidc/domain/ 96.2% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/oidc/groupclaim/ 100.0% ≥ 95 ✓
internal/auth/session/ 94.9% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/session/domain/ 100.0% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/breakglass/ 91.5% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/breakglass/domain/ 100.0% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/user/domain/ 96.4% ≥ 90 ✓
PRE-MERGE-AUDIT STATEMENT (per Phase 13 prompt's anti-Bundle-1-
mistake invariant): floors held at 90 across all four Bundle-2
packages. No held-low-with-rationale entry. Bundle 1's existing
internal/auth/ + internal/service/auth/ floors at 85 stay 85
(already-shipped-and-accepted) per the prompt's explicit
inheritance rule.
Verification
============
* gofmt -l on the new test files: clean.
* go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/repository/postgres/...:
clean.
* go test -short -count=1 across all 8 Bundle-2 packages: green
with the percentages above.
* multi-tenant-query-coverage.sh: PASS (count 32 == baseline 32).
Phase 13 deviation notes
========================
* The encryption invariant test lives at
internal/repository/postgres/oidc_encryption_invariant_test.go
rather than the prompt's literal
internal/auth/oidc/secret_storage_test.go. Reasoning: the
test exercises the LIVE Postgres schema via testcontainers,
and the package convention is integration tests live in the
postgres_test package alongside the schema-aware fixtures.
Putting the test in internal/auth/oidc/ would require
duplicating the testcontainers harness or introducing a
dependency cycle. The semantic content is identical to the
prompt's spec.
* The multi-tenant query CI guard ships in ratchet form rather
than as a zero-tolerance check. The 32 current
tenant_id-less queries are all Get-by-PK or GC-sweep queries
where the lack of tenant_id is operationally safe under the
single-tenant invariant. The ratchet ensures multi-tenant
activation work drives the count down without re-introducing
silent regressions.
* The full Playwright/Cypress E2E suite is deferred. The
web/src/__tests__/e2e/README.md documents the deferral with
the rationale + the operator-runnable rebuild plan.
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shankar0123
|
98cb3780d8 |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 6: session middleware + CSRF token plumbing +
chained-auth combinator + AuthInfo OIDC providers extension + 2 CI
guards (Bundle-1-compat + Bundle-1-to-2-upgrade)
Phase 6 wires the Phase 4 session service + Phase 5 OIDC handlers into
the request path. Three middlewares + one combinator land in
internal/auth/session/middleware.go:
1. SessionMiddleware reads `certctl_session` cookie, validates via
SessionService.Validate, populates the legacy UserKey/AdminKey
+ Phase 3 RBAC context keys (ActorIDKey/ActorTypeKey/TenantIDKey)
so downstream RequirePermission + audit-attribution see a
consistent caller. Best-effort UpdateLastSeen keeps the idle-
expiry sliding window fresh. CRITICALLY: never 401s on validate
failure — defers to the next middleware so the chained-auth
combinator can fall back to Bearer.
2. CSRFMiddleware gates state-changing methods (POST/PUT/DELETE/
PATCH) for session-authenticated requests. API-key actors are
EXEMPT (no session row in context => CSRF doesn't apply; they're
not browser-driven). Constant-time-compares SHA-256(X-CSRF-Token
header) against the session row's stored hash via
SessionService.ValidateCSRF. Mismatch returns 403.
3. ChainAuthSessionThenBearer is the load-bearing chained-auth
combinator: tries the session cookie first; on miss/invalid,
falls back to the API-key Bearer middleware; if neither
authenticates, 401. The composition uses bearerSkipIfAuthenticated
so a request with both a valid session AND a valid Bearer uses
the session (cookie wins per the Bundle 2 contract).
Middleware chain order in cmd/server/main.go (per Phase 6 spec):
RequestID → Logging → Recovery → CORS → RateLimit → AUTH (chained:
session → Bearer) → CSRF (state-changing only; API-key exempt) →
Audit → Handler
The chained authMiddleware replaces the bare Bundle-1 bearerMiddleware
at the chain entry point; csrfMiddleware lands immediately after so
session-authenticated requests pass through CSRF before audit. Both
new middlewares are pass-throughs when sessionService is nil
(pre-Phase-4 builds).
AuthInfo extension (Category E): GET /api/v1/auth/info now returns the
list of configured OIDC providers (id + display_name + login_url
where login_url = `/auth/oidc/login?provider=<id>`) so the GUI Login
page renders the correct "Sign in with X" buttons. Endpoint stays
auth-exempt; the providers list is public configuration. Wired via
HealthHandler.OIDCProvidersResolver + a new OIDCProvidersListResolver
projection interface; the cmd/server adapter
oidcProvidersListAdapter projects the postgres OIDCProviderRepository
into the public-safe shape. Resolver lookups are best-effort: failures
fall back to the minimal payload rather than 500-ing the GUI's auth
probe. Nil resolver preserves the pre-Phase-6 minimal shape so test
fixtures + no-db deploys keep compiling.
Bypass list preserved (Category E): the existing public-route
allowlist in router.AuthExemptRouterRoutes is preserved by virtue of
those routes registering via direct r.mux.Handle (they bypass the
entire chain). The protocol-endpoint allowlist (ACME/SCEP/EST/OCSP/
CRL) bypasses via cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler URL-prefix
dispatch — those routes never reach the auth middleware at all. Both
preservations are pinned by the Bundle-1 compat CI guard below.
Tests (internal/auth/session/middleware_test.go):
All 7 Phase 6 spec-mandated middleware-chain tests pass:
1. Session cookie + correct CSRF → 200.
2. Session cookie + wrong CSRF → 403.
3. Bearer-only (no session) + no CSRF → 200 (API-key actors are
CSRF-exempt by design).
4. No cookie + no Bearer → 401.
5. Expired cookie + valid Bearer → fall back to Bearer succeeds.
6. Tampered cookie → 401 (no Bearer to fall back to).
7. Bypass-list awareness — state-changing method, no auth, no
session row → uniform 401 (NOT a CSRF 403; the CSRF check is
gated on session-row presence and never fires for unauth
requests).
Plus coverage-lift tests covering nil-service pass-through, safe-
methods bypass, SessionFromContext nil + populated, isStateChangingMethod
matrix, clientIPFromRequest variants (RemoteAddr / XFF first-hop /
XFF single / no-port), nil-bearer chain branches.
Coverage on internal/auth/session/middleware.go: 100% per-function
across the 9 entry points (SessionValidator interfaces +
NewSessionMiddleware + NewCSRFMiddleware + ChainAuthSessionThenBearer +
bearerSkipIfAuthenticated + SessionFromContext + isStateChangingMethod
+ clientIPFromRequest + lastIndexByte). Package coverage 94.9%.
Two new CI guards:
scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-compat-regression.sh — Bundle-1-only
compat invariants. Static-source checks that protect the Bundle-1
path since spinning up docker-compose + running the integration
test suite is sandbox-infeasible:
1. SessionMiddleware MUST defer-to-next on missing/invalid cookie.
2. CSRFMiddleware MUST be pass-through on missing session row.
3. cmd/server/main.go MUST wire ChainAuthSessionThenBearer.
4. The 4 public OIDC routes MUST be in AuthExemptRouterRoutes.
5. AuthInfo MUST guard on OIDCProvidersResolver != nil.
scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-to-2-upgrade-regression.sh — Bundle-1 →
Bundle-2 upgrade invariants:
1. Migrations 000034..000037 use CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS.
2. Migrations are wrapped in BEGIN; ... COMMIT;.
3. NO DROP TABLE / ALTER ... DROP COLUMN against any of the 19
protected Bundle-1 tables (api_keys, audit_events, certificates,
certificate_versions, profiles, issuers, targets, agents, jobs,
owners, teams, agent_groups, notifications, roles, permissions,
role_permissions, actor_roles, tenants, approvals,
intermediate_cas, issuance_approval_requests).
4. 000037 INSERTs use ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING (idempotent re-apply).
5. ChainAuthSessionThenBearer is wired (Bundle-1 Bearer keys
continue to authenticate post-upgrade).
6. Bootstrap handler is registered (fresh-deployment bootstrap
still works).
Both guards are sandbox-feasible static analysis. When the operator
gets a Linux VM with docker-in-docker, promote both to real `docker
compose up` integration tests against a v2.1.0 baseline DB dump.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet ./internal/auth/... ./internal/api/...
./cmd/server/... clean, go test -short -count=1 -race green across
internal/auth/session (94.9% coverage), internal/api/handler,
internal/api/router, no regressions in Bundle 1 packages, both new
ci-guards green.
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shankar0123
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2896008fd1 |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 5: OIDC + session HTTP surface (13 endpoints),
pre-login store, OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0, cookieAuth
scheme, 7 new auth permissions, CI guard, handler tests
Phase 5 of the bundle puts the Phase 3 OIDC service + Phase 4 session
service on the wire. 13 HTTP endpoints split into three logical groups:
Public OIDC handshake (auth-exempt; protocol-mediated):
GET /auth/oidc/login?provider=<id> -> 302 to IdP authorization URL
+ sets certctl_oidc_pending cookie
(10-min TTL, Path=/auth/oidc/,
SameSite=Lax)
GET /auth/oidc/callback?code=...&state=... -> consume pre-login row,
run Phase 3's 11-step token
validation, mint post-login
session, 302 to dashboard
POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout -> OpenID Connect BCL 1.0 — IdP
POSTs logout_token JWT; certctl
validates signature against IdP
JWKS via Phase 3 alg allow-list,
required claims (iss/aud/iat/jti/
events; exactly one of sub/sid;
nonce ABSENT per spec §2.4),
revokes matching sessions,
returns 200 with
Cache-Control: no-store
POST /auth/logout -> revoke caller's session
Session management (RBAC-gated auth.session.*):
GET /api/v1/auth/sessions -> auth.session.list (own / all)
DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions/{id} -> auth.session.revoke (own bypass)
OIDC provider + group-mapping CRUD (RBAC-gated auth.oidc.*):
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers -> auth.oidc.list
POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers -> auth.oidc.create
(client_secret encrypted
at rest via
internal/crypto.EncryptIfKeySet)
PUT /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} -> auth.oidc.edit
DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} -> auth.oidc.delete
(refused via
ErrOIDCProviderInUse → 409
when users authenticated
via this provider)
POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh -> auth.oidc.edit
(re-runs IdP downgrade
defense via
OIDCService.RefreshKeys)
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings -> auth.oidc.list
POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings -> auth.oidc.edit
DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings/{id} -> auth.oidc.edit
Migration 000037 ships:
- oidc_pre_login_sessions table (10-min absolute TTL, FK CASCADE on
oidc_provider_id, FK RESTRICT on signing_key_id; index on
absolute_expires_at for the GC sweep);
- 7 new permissions seeded into r-admin only:
auth.session.list, auth.session.list.all, auth.session.revoke,
auth.oidc.list, auth.oidc.create, auth.oidc.edit, auth.oidc.delete
CanonicalPermissions extended in lockstep at internal/domain/auth/
validate.go.
Pre-login machinery:
- internal/repository/oidc.go gains PreLoginRepository interface +
PreLoginSession struct + ErrPreLoginNotFound / ErrPreLoginExpired
sentinels.
- internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go ships the impl;
LookupAndConsume uses DELETE ... RETURNING for atomic single-use.
- internal/auth/oidc/prelogin.go is the PreLoginAdapter that bridges
the OIDC service's Phase 3 PreLoginStore interface to the new
repository, signing the cookie value under the active
SessionSigningKey via the same v1.<id>.<key>.<HMAC> wire format
Phase 4 uses for post-login cookies. Defense-in-depth: the
pre-login `pl-` prefix is enforced by ParseCookieValue(prefix);
a stolen pre-login cookie cannot be replayed against the
post-login Validate path (pinned by
TestService_Validate_RejectsPreLoginCookieAtPostLoginGate).
Session package extension:
- internal/auth/session/service.go gains exported SignCookieValue,
ParseCookieValue (with caller-supplied id-1 prefix), ComputeCookieHMAC,
DecryptKeyMaterial wrappers so the OIDC pre-login adapter shares
the same length-prefixed HMAC math without code duplication.
- parseCookie no longer hardcodes the `ses-` prefix check (moved to
Validate as defense-in-depth; pre-login cookie verification uses
the `pl-` prefix via ParseCookieValue).
Cookie attributes (all Phase 5 endpoints honor CERTCTL_SESSION_SAMESITE
+ Secure=true via SessionCookieAttrs from Phase 4 config):
- certctl_oidc_pending: Path=/auth/oidc/, MaxAge=600s, SameSite=Lax
(cannot be Strict because the IdP-initiated callback is a top-level
navigation from a different origin).
- certctl_session: Path=/, Expires=8h, SameSite=Lax|Strict, HttpOnly.
- certctl_csrf: Path=/, Expires=8h, HttpOnly=false (intentional —
GUI must read it to echo into X-CSRF-Token header).
Audit logging on every mutating operation (event_category="auth"):
auth.oidc_login_succeeded / failed / unmapped_groups
auth.oidc_back_channel_logout / failed
auth.session_revoked
auth.oidc_provider_{created,updated,deleted,refreshed}
auth.group_mapping_{added,removed}
OpenAPI updates:
- cookieAuth security scheme added to api/openapi.yaml under
components.securitySchemes (apiKey / cookie / certctl_session).
- The 13 Phase 5 routes are added to SpecParityExceptions with a
deferral note: full per-endpoint OpenAPI rows land in a follow-on
commit alongside the GUI work (Phase 8) so the ergonomic shape can
be validated against the live GUI client.
CI guard: scripts/ci-guards/N-bundle-2-security-empty-preserved.sh
asserts api/openapi.yaml has ≥ 14 'security: []' occurrences (the
pre-Bundle-2 baseline). Reducing the count below 14 would silently
force a Bearer-or-cookie requirement onto an endpoint that legitimately
runs without certctl-issued credentials; the guard fires before that
regression lands.
Handler tests (internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go):
- All 6 prompt-mandated negative cases:
BCL with missing events claim -> 400
BCL with nonce present -> 400 (per spec §2.4)
BCL with sig signed by an unknown key -> 400
Callback with replayed state -> 400
Callback with PKCE verifier mismatch -> 400
Callback with expired pre-login row -> 400
- Plus happy paths for every endpoint, edge cases (missing-cookie,
duplicate-name, in-use-409, wrong-tenant), and the Helper-function
coverage (peekIssuer, classifyOIDCFailure, defaultIfBlank,
defaultIntIfZero, clientIPFromRequest, encryptClientSecret).
Coverage on internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go: 80.9% per-function
(above the Phase 5 spec's ≥ 80% floor).
Server wiring (cmd/server/main.go):
Wired AFTER sessionService (Phase 4) so the OIDC PreLoginAdapter can
sign pre-login cookies under the active SessionSigningKey:
oidcProviderRepo + oidcMappingRepo + oidcUserRepo + oidcPreLoginRepo
-> preLoginAdapter -> oidcService -> authSessionOIDCHandler.
sessionMinterAdapter shim bridges *session.Service.Create to the
oidcsvc.SessionMinter port the OIDC service consumes.
Router wiring (internal/api/router/router.go):
4 public OIDC routes via direct r.mux.Handle (auth-exempt; pinned in
AuthExemptRouterRoutes); 9 RBAC-gated routes via r.Register +
rbacGate(checker, perm, h). Routes only register when
reg.AuthSessionOIDC != nil so pre-Phase-5 builds skip the block
entirely.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet clean across all touched packages,
go test -short -count=1 green across internal/api/handler (74 tests +
new Phase 5 batch), internal/api/router (parity + auth-exempt
allowlist), internal/auth/oidc + session (no regressions), full domain
+ scheduler + config sweeps green, ci-guard
N-bundle-2-security-empty-preserved.sh green (17 ≥ 14 baseline).
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shankar0123
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f683df1266 | |||
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shankar0123
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b216de9d57 | |||
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shankar0123
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4ac41c5007 |
ci: restore +x bit on scripts/ci-guards/*.sh (sandbox stripped exec bit)
Pure mode-change commit. The previous
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shankar0123
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a3599ad8fb |
ci: post-Phase-2-docs-overhaul cleanup of stale guards + missing config doc
CI run on the
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shankar0123
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478c75dffe |
web, docs: IssuerHierarchyPage + sysadmin runbook + connectors row (Rank 8 commit 5)
Final commit of the 5-commit Rank 8 chain. Operator-facing surface
on top of the service + handler layers shipped in commits 1-4.
Frontend (web/src):
- api/client.ts: 3 new functions + IntermediateCA interface
(listIntermediateCAs, getIntermediateCA, retireIntermediateCA).
- pages/IssuerHierarchyPage.tsx: recursive nested <ul> render of
the hierarchy tree at /issuers/:id/hierarchy. buildHierarchyTree
is a pure helper that walks the flat list and groups children
on parent_ca_id; the dendrogram view is parking-lot work tracked
in WORKSPACE-ROADMAP. Two-phase retire UX surfaces 'Retire…'
then 'Confirm retire (terminal)' when the row is in retiring
state. Admin gate is enforced at the API; the page renders the
backend's 403 as ErrorState for non-admin callers.
- main.tsx: register the new /issuers/:id/hierarchy route.
CI guard update:
- scripts/ci-guards/T-1-frontend-page-coverage.sh: add
IssuerHierarchyPage to the deferred-test allowlist with the
standard 'why deferred' comment. Admin-gate + recursive build
semantics are already pinned at the backend layer
(intermediate_ca_test.go service tests + intermediate_ca_test.go
handler triplet). Vitest test deferred until next feature
change touches the page.
Docs:
- docs/intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md: new operator runbook
covering:
Concepts (HierarchyMode 'single' vs 'tree', defense-in-depth
on key bytes never persisting on rows).
Lifecycle states + drain-first semantics
(active → retiring → retired with active-children gate).
Three deployment patterns: 4-level FedRAMP boundary CA,
3-level financial-services policy CA, 2-level internal
PKI.
RFC 5280 enforcement (§3.2 self-signed, §4.2.1.9 path-length
tightening, §4.2.1.10 NameConstraints subset).
Migration from single → tree using the load-bearing
TestLocal_HierarchyMode_SingleVsTree_ByteIdentical pin as
the canary.
API reference + observability (IntermediateCAMetrics
Prometheus exposure).
Known limitations + Rank-8 follow-on roadmap.
- docs/connectors.md: extend the Built-in Local CA section with
a 'Tree mode (Rank 8)' paragraph describing the new chain
assembly path + cross-link to docs/intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md.
Roadmap:
- WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md: 5 follow-on items under a new
'Intermediate CA hierarchy extensions (Rank 8 V2 follow-ons)'
bullet block:
HSM-backed roots (PKCS#11 / cloud KMS drivers via existing
signer.Driver interface — no service-layer change needed).
Automated CA rotation (parallel-validity windows ahead of
expiry).
Intra-hierarchy CRL chaining (per-CA CRL endpoints stitched
at issue time).
NameConstraints policy templates (FedRAMP / financial /
internal PKI declarative templates instead of hand-rolled
JSON).
D3 dendrogram visualization (separate page so the existing
list view stays the default + the dep stays opt-in).
Verified locally:
gofmt: clean.
go vet ./...: exit 0.
tsc --noEmit (web/): exit 0 (no TypeScript errors).
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... + service +
local: ok across all three packages, 4-5s each.
All 24 CI guards: clean
(T-1 frontend-page-coverage with the new
IssuerHierarchyPage allowlist entry; openapi-handler-parity,
M-008 admin-gate, every other guard untouched).
Rank 8 chain complete:
|
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shankar0123
|
4f42dfb053 |
ci: fix Phase 1b post-push CI failures (3 guards)
Phase 1b push (commit
|
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shankar0123
|
27fb68501d |
ci(digest-validity): exclude Windows IIS digest — image is doc-only, not pulled by Linux CI
CI run #376 (commit
|
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shankar0123
|
58ddf19cbe |
fix(deploy/test) + ci(guard): drop dead SCEP profile from test compose
The deploy-vendor-e2e job has been failing with the certctl-test-server container restarting endlessly. Diagnostic dump (added in |
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shankar0123
|
4bb7a748ac |
fix(deploy/test) + ci(guard): unblock deploy-vendor-e2e — encryption-key length
Two-part complete-path fix for the deploy-vendor-e2e failure that has
been firing since the ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 5 matrix collapse
started actually booting the certctl-test-server:
Failed to load configuration:
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY too short (29 bytes; minimum 32).
Surfaced via the diagnostic-dump step landed in commit
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shankar0123
|
3f4f8bbe36 |
refactor(scripts): move CI helpers out of scripts/ci-guards/
The 'Regression guards' loop step in ci.yml runs:
for g in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh; do bash "$g"; done
Per the directory's own contract (scripts/ci-guards/README.md), every
script there MUST be runnable bare with no args / no env. Three files
violated that contract — they're helpers consumed by specific CI job
steps with arguments, not regression guards. They were misplaced.
Moved (git mv):
scripts/ci-guards/vendor-e2e-skip-check.sh → scripts/
scripts/ci-guards/vendor-e2e-skip-allowlist.txt → scripts/
scripts/ci-guards/coverage-pr-comment.sh → scripts/
Updated ci.yml call sites:
- deploy-vendor-e2e job: bash scripts/vendor-e2e-skip-check.sh $LOG
- go-build-and-test job: bash scripts/coverage-pr-comment.sh
Tightened scripts/vendor-e2e-skip-check.sh arg parse from a silent
default ('LOG=${1:-test-output.log}') to a mandatory-arg form
('LOG=${1:?usage: ...}') so misuse fails loud at parse time rather
than at the missing-file check.
Updated scripts/ci-guards/README.md contract to spell out the
guard-vs-helper distinction explicitly; lists current helpers under
scripts/ for future-author guidance.
Verified locally: 'for g in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh; do bash $g; done'
returns clean (22 guards pass) on HEAD post-move.
Closes the regression-guards-loop failure that surfaced in CI run
25192163943 (job 73864471346 'Frontend Build').
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shankar0123
|
ce987cc550 |
ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 11: make verify-docs + verify-deploy targets
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phase 11 / frozen decision 0.13.
Two new operator-side Makefile targets:
make verify-docs — pre-tag gate. Runs the QA-doc Part-count +
seed-count drift guards that Phase 1 dropped
from CI. Operator invokes pre-tag.
make verify-deploy — optional pre-push gate. Runs digest-validity +
OpenAPI parity + Docker build smoke (server +
agent only — fast subset for local; CI builds
all 4 Dockerfiles).
NEW scripts/qa-doc-part-count.sh + scripts/qa-doc-seed-count.sh —
extracted from the original ci.yml steps verbatim, only difference is
the 'qa-doc-* drift guard' label updated to '*: clean.' in the success
output (matches the scripts/ci-guards/ contract).
Sandbox verification:
bash scripts/qa-doc-part-count.sh → clean
bash scripts/qa-doc-seed-count.sh → clean
Three-tier convention now documented in 'make help':
verify (required pre-commit)
verify-deploy (optional pre-push)
verify-docs (required pre-tag)
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shankar0123
|
3a69600c2c |
ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 10: coverage PR-comment action
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phase 10 / frozen decision 0.9. Self-hosted alternative to Codecov / Coveralls. Posts a per-package coverage delta as a PR comment on every PR; updates the same comment in place on subsequent pushes (avoids duplicate noise). scripts/ci-guards/coverage-pr-comment.sh: - Reads coverage.out from the prior Go Test step - Builds per-package coverage table (mirrors check-coverage-thresholds averaging logic) - Searches existing PR comments for the '**Coverage report' marker and PATCHes the existing one if found, else POSTs a new one - No-op on non-PR builds (push to master, scheduled, etc.) Wired into go-build-and-test job after 'Upload Coverage Report' step with if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' guard. Operator can swap to Codecov/Coveralls later by replacing this script + step with a third-party action — the YAML manifest at .github/coverage-thresholds.yml stays unchanged either way. |
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shankar0123
|
19a5e438f2 |
ci-pipeline-cleanup Phases 7-9: image-and-supply-chain job
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phases 7-9 / frozen decisions 0.8 + 0.10 + 0.11.
NEW image-and-supply-chain job (Ubuntu, ~3 min). Three steps:
PHASE 7 — Digest validity
scripts/ci-guards/digest-validity.sh resolves every @sha256:<digest>
ref in deploy/**/*.{yml,Dockerfile*} against its registry. Closes the
H-001 lying-field gap that Bundle II hit (11 fabricated digests passed
H-001's regex-only check and failed docker pull in CI).
Sandbox verification: 16/16 digests in deploy/* + Dockerfiles all
return HTTP 200 from registry-1.docker.io / ghcr.io / mcr.microsoft.com.
PHASE 8 — Docker build smoke (all 4 Dockerfiles)
Per frozen decision 0.10: build Dockerfile, Dockerfile.agent,
deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/Dockerfile, deploy/test/libest/Dockerfile.
Catches syntax errors + COPY path drift before tag-time release.yml.
The test-sidecar Dockerfiles are load-bearing for vendor-e2e — a
syntax error there silently breaks the e2e suite.
PHASE 9 — OpenAPI ↔ handler operationId parity
scripts/ci-guards/openapi-handler-parity.sh extracts router routes
(r.mux.Handle / r.Register "METHOD /path" syntax — Go 1.22+ ServeMux),
extracts OpenAPI operations (paths × HTTP methods), and fails if any
router route has no operationId AND is not documented in the new
api/openapi-handler-exceptions.yaml.
Verified gap at HEAD
|
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shankar0123
|
6f6de639a0 |
ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 5+6: collapse vendor matrix; delete Windows matrix
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phases 5+6 / frozen decisions 0.4 + 0.5 + 0.6. Revises Bundle II decisions 0.4 (Windows matrix) and 0.9 (per- vendor granularity). PHASE 5 — Linux vendor matrix collapsed (12 jobs → 1): The previous per-vendor matrix produced 12 status-check rows for ~1 real assertion (115/116 vendor-edge tests are t.Log placeholders per Bundle II Phase 2-13 design). Granularity was fake signal. Single-job version: brings up all 11 sidecars at once via docker compose --profile deploy-e2e up -d, runs go test -run 'VendorEdge_' once, tears down once. Critical caveat: requireSidecar() in deploy/test/vendor_e2e_helpers.go uses t.Skipf() when a sidecar isn't reachable — silent test skip, not CI failure. The new Skip-count enforcement step (scripts/ci-guards/vendor-e2e-skip-check.sh) counts SKIP lines and fails the build if it exceeds the allowlist at scripts/ci-guards/vendor-e2e-skip-allowlist.txt (15 windows-iis- requiring tests legitimately skip on Linux per Phase 6). PHASE 6 — Windows matrix deleted entirely: The deploy-vendor-e2e-windows job removed. Two reasons: 1. Can't physically work on windows-latest today (Docker not started in Windows-containers mode by default; bridge network driver missing on Windows Docker — see CI run 25183374742 failure logs). 2. Even fixed, validates nothing — all 16 IIS + WinCertStore tests are t.Log placeholders that exercise no IIS-specific behavior. Per Bundle II frozen decision 0.14, the third criterion for "verified" status in the vendor matrix is operator manual smoke against a real instance. IIS + WinCertStore now satisfy that via the playbook (Phase 6 follow-up adds docs/connector-iis.md:: Operator validation playbook). The windows-iis-test sidecar STAYS in deploy/docker-compose.test.yml under profiles: [deploy-e2e-windows] for operator local use. Linux CI never activates this profile. Operator-required action before merge: RAM headroom verification on prototype branch (per frozen decision 0.14). If peak RSS > 12 GB on ubuntu-latest with all 11 sidecars up, fall back to bucketed matrix per cowork/ci-pipeline-cleanup/decisions-revised.md. ci.yml: 417 → 383 lines (-34 net; -1105 cumulative since baseline 1488). Status checks per push: 19 → 7 (collapse 12 vendor + 2 windows = -14; add image-and-supply-chain in Phase 7-9 = +1; net 19-12-2+1 = ~7). Operator action for Phase 13: update GitHub branch protection rules (required-checks list 19 → 7 entries). Documented in cowork/ ci-pipeline-cleanup/decisions-revised.md. |
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shankar0123
|
60f368ef33 |
ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 2: coverage thresholds → YAML manifest
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phase 2 / frozen decision 0.3. Move 9 hardcoded coverage thresholds from inline bash to a YAML manifest at .github/coverage-thresholds.yml. The load-bearing per-package context (Bundle reference, HEAD measurement, gap rationale) survives in the YAML's `why:` field instead of in inline bash comments. Adding a new gated package: one YAML entry instead of ~30 lines of bash + 50 lines of comment. Coverage check logic extracted to scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh so the operator can run the same check locally: bash scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh ci.yml dropped 557 → 417 lines (-140, total Phase 1+2: -1071, -72% from baseline 1488). Same 9 floors, same fail-on-miss semantics — pure relocation: internal/service: 70 (was: 70) internal/api/handler: 75 (was: 75) internal/domain: 40 (was: 40) internal/api/middleware: 30 (was: 30) internal/crypto: 88 (was: 88) internal/connector/issuer/local: 86 (was: 86) internal/connector/issuer/acme: 80 (was: 80) internal/connector/issuer/stepca: 80 (was: 80) internal/mcp: 85 (was: 85) Sandbox verification: - ci.yml YAML-parses cleanly - coverage-thresholds.yml YAML-parses cleanly with all 9 entries - scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh extracts the (pkg, floor) table correctly from the YAML |
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shankar0123
|
5b7a022767 |
ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 1: extract 20 regression guards to scripts/ci-guards/
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phase 1. Pure relocation — no behavior change. Each guard's bash logic is byte-identical to the prior inline version; the only changes are: (a) the guard becomes a sibling script under scripts/ci-guards/<id>.sh, (b) ci.yml's per-guard step is replaced by a single loop step that iterates all scripts. 20 scripts extracted (alphabetized): B-1-orphan-crud.sh, D-1-D-2-statusbadge-phantom.sh, G-1-jwt-auth-literal.sh, G-2-api-key-hash-json.sh, G-3-env-docs-drift.sh, H-001-bare-from.sh, H-009-readme-jwt.sh, L-001-insecure-skip-verify.sh, L-1-bulk-action-loop.sh, M-012-no-root-user.sh, P-1-documented-orphan-fns.sh, S-1-hardcoded-source-counts.sh, S-2-strings-contains-err.sh, T-1-frontend-page-coverage.sh, U-2-plaintext-healthcheck.sh, U-3-migration-mount.sh, bundle-8-L-015-target-blank-rel-noopener.sh, bundle-8-L-019-dangerously-set-inner-html.sh, bundle-8-M-009-bare-usemutation.sh, test-naming-convention.sh Plus scripts/ci-guards/README.md documenting the contract: - Each script must exit 0 on clean repo, non-zero with ::error:: prefix on regression - Runnable from repo root via 'bash scripts/ci-guards/<id>.sh' - Adding a new guard: drop a new <id>.sh; CI auto-picks it up ci.yml dropped 1488 → 557 lines (-931, -63%). Single CI loop step now collects ALL guard failures before failing the build instead of fail-fast — UX win for regressions that hit two guards at once. Two guards (QA-doc Part-count + seed-count, ci.yml lines 868-917) deliberately NOT extracted — they move to 'make verify-docs' in Phase 11 because they protect docs-the-operator-reads, not the product itself. Verification (sandbox): - All 20 scripts pass against HEAD (chmod +x; for g in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh; do bash $g; done) - New ci.yml YAML-parses cleanly - Job boundaries preserved: go-build-and-test, frontend-build, helm-lint, deploy-vendor-e2e, deploy-vendor-e2e-windows - Loop step appears twice (once at end of go-build-and-test, once at end of frontend-build) so both jobs continue running their set of guards |
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|
Shankar
|
b566355d6f |
fix(bundle-7): Verification & Tool Suite Execution — wire mandatory scans + first-run evidence
Closes Audit-2026-04-25 D-001..D-002 + D-006 (partial) + H-005 (partial). Opens new tracker IDs H-010, M-028, L-020, L-021 (see closure document in cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/tool-output/_BUNDLE-7-CLOSURE.md). What changed - scripts/install-security-tools.sh (NEW) — idempotent installer for the Go-based subset (govulncheck, staticcheck, errcheck, ineffassign, gosec, osv-scanner). Used locally + by both CI workflows. - .github/workflows/security-deep-scan.yml (NEW) — daily + workflow_dispatch scans for tools that need docker/network: trivy image, syft SBOM, ZAP baseline, schemathesis, nuclei, testssl.sh, gosec, osv-scanner, full-suite race detector at -count=10. Every step continue-on-error; artefacts uploaded for triage. - .github/workflows/ci.yml — staticcheck added as a soft (continue-on-error) gate alongside the existing govulncheck hard gate. Soft until M-028 closes the 6 remaining SA1019 deprecated-API sites; flip to fail-on- non-zero then. Per-package coverage gates extended: pkcs7 hard ≥85% (currently 100%), local-issuer soft ≥65% transitional floor (H-010 raises to 85%). - staticcheck.conf (NEW) — suppresses 4 style-only rules (ST1005, ST1000, ST1003, S1009, S1011, SA9003) with documented justifications. Real defects (SA1019) NOT suppressed. - .govulnignore (NEW) — empty placeholder with the suppression contract (one OSV ID + justification + review-by date per line). Bundle-7's 5 deferred-call advisories don't need entries because govulncheck's default exit code already passes. Local tool-run evidence (cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/tool-output/2026-04-26/): - govulncheck.txt + govulncheck-verbose.txt — clean (0 affected; 5 deferred-call) - staticcheck.txt + staticcheck-after-suppressions.txt — 6 SA1019 → M-028 - errcheck.txt — 1294 sites, all defer-Close / response-write convention → triaged - ineffassign.txt — 15 unique sites → L-020 - helm-lint.txt — clean (1 INFO-level icon recommendation) - go-test-race.txt — clean across scheduler/middleware/mcp at -count=3 (CI runs -count=10 against the full suite) - go-test-cover.txt — crypto 86.7% ✓, pkcs7 100% ✓, local-issuer 68.3% ✗ → H-010 Closures in this bundle - D-001 partial — 4 of 6 Go-based tools ran locally; remainder wired in CI - D-002 closed — race detector clean - D-006 partial — helm lint passes; kube-score / kubesec deferred to CI - D-007 deferred — semgrep p/react-security wired in CI (needs docker) - D-003 / D-004 / D-005 deferred — wired in security-deep-scan.yml - H-005 partial — crypto + pkcs7 meet 85%; local-issuer at 68.3% → H-010 New tracker IDs opened (next-bundle scope) - H-010 — local-issuer coverage gap (68.3% vs 85% target). 2-3 days. - M-028 — 6 deprecated-API sites (SA1019). Migration coordinated. - L-020 — ineffassign cleanup sweep, 15 mechanical sites. - L-021 — 5 transitive Go-module CVEs (deferred-call). Monitor + bump. NOT addressed in this bundle (deferred to a future Bundle 7-bis) - M-007 bulk-operation partial-failure tests - M-008 admin-gated role-gate tests - L-010 mock.Anything overuse audit - L-018 defect age analysis on remaining High findings Verification - go vet ./... → clean - go build ./... → clean - go test -short -count=1 ./... → all packages pass - go test -race -count=3 ./scheduler/middleware/mcp → clean - go test -cover ./crypto/pkcs7/local-issuer → see go-test-cover.txt - govulncheck ./... → clean - staticcheck ./... → 6 SA1019 (tracked as M-028) - helm lint → clean - yaml lint .github/workflows/*.yml → clean - python3 yaml.safe_load(api/openapi.yaml) → 89 paths Bundle 7 of the 2026-04-25 comprehensive audit. Tool-output evidence preserved at cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/tool-output/2026-04-26/. |
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|
Shankar
|
3155b9475f |
v2.0.47: HTTPS Everywhere — TLS-only control plane, agents/CLI/MCP
Breaking change release. Plaintext HTTP listener removed. The certctl control plane now terminates TLS 1.3 on :8443 via http.Server.ListenAndServeTLS. No CERTCTL_TLS_ENABLED=false escape hatch. No dual-listener mode. One-step cutover per docs/upgrade-to-tls.md. Server - cmd/server/tls.go: certHolder with SIGHUP hot-reload + atomic cert swap, buildServerTLSConfig (TLS 1.3 min, GetCertificate callback), preflightServerTLS validation - cmd/server/main.go: ListenAndServeTLS in place of ListenAndServe, watchSIGHUP wiring, cert/key path config threading - tls_test.go: 418-line regression coverage of reload, preflight, callback behavior, SAN validation Config - CERTCTL_TLS_CERT_PATH / CERTCTL_TLS_KEY_PATH (required) - Plaintext rejection: agents/CLI/MCP pre-flight-fail on http:// URLs with a pointer to docs/upgrade-to-tls.md Agents, CLI, MCP - All three pre-flight-reject http:// URLs with fail-loud diagnostic - CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH for private-CA trust - CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY for dev-only bypass (loud warning on startup) - install-agent.sh emits both vars as commented template lines docker-compose - certctl-tls-init sidecar generates SAN-valid self-signed cert into deploy/test/certs/ on first boot - All demo-stack curls pin against ca.crt with --cacert Helm chart - Three TLS provisioning modes, exactly one required: - server.tls.existingSecret (operator-supplied) - server.tls.certManager.enabled (cert-manager integration) - server.tls.selfSigned.enabled (eval only — not for production) - server-certificate.yaml template for cert-manager mode - helm install without a TLS source fails at template render with a pointer to docs/tls.md CI - .github/workflows/ci.yml Helm Chart Validation step renders the chart in both existingSecret and cert-manager modes, plus an inverse guard-regression test that asserts helm template MUST refuse to render when no TLS source is configured. Previously the single `helm template` invocation hit the certctl.tls.required fail-loud guard and exit-1'd CI. Four invocations now: lint (existingSecret), template (existingSecret), template (cert-manager), template (no args — must fail). Integration tests - deploy/test/integration_test.go stands up the Compose stack over HTTPS, extracts the CA bundle, and exercises every certctl API over https://localhost:8443 - All 34 integration subtests green (per Phase 8 local CI-parity) Documentation - New: docs/tls.md (provisioning patterns, rotation, SIGHUP reload) - New: docs/upgrade-to-tls.md (one-step cutover, no-downgrade warnings, fleet-roll sequencing) - CHANGELOG.md: v2.2.0 "HTTPS Everywhere — The Irony" entry (file heading unchanged; release tag is v2.0.47) - All curls in docs/, examples/, deploy/helm/ guides use https://localhost:8443 --cacert Verification - grep -rn "ListenAndServe[^T]" cmd/ internal/ → 0 hits - grep -rn "\"http://" cmd/ internal/ → 2 benign hits (Caddy admin API default, SSRF doc comment) — zero certctl endpoints - Tasks #197–#206 (Phases 0–8) all closed in the tracker Files: 65 changed, 3489 insertions, 372 deletions (pre-CI-fix). |
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shankar0123
|
d395776a95 | Initial scaffold: certificate control plane v0.1.0 |