4 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
shankar0123	56e2ea1ad7	docs: v2.1.0 release polish — strip internal bundle/phase tags, update status for OIDC ship ... README: - Rewrite Status block: drop the stale 'federated identity not yet shipped' line; flag v2.1.0 OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout + break-glass as early-access; encourage GitHub issues for IdP rough edges. (A1 framing — keep early-access umbrella, no SAML/WebAuthn/JIT roadmap teaser.) - Add OIDC SSO bullet to 'What it does' covering per-IdP runbooks, group-claim → role mapping, AES-256-GCM client_secret encryption, JWKS auto-refresh, PKCE-S256, RFC 9700 §4.7.1 pre-login binding, RFC 9207 iss check, __Host- cookies, CSRF rotation, idle+absolute expiry, BCL, break-glass admin. - Update Security paragraph: three auth paths (API keys / OIDC / break-glass), HMAC-signed sessions, CSRF rotation, RFC OIDC BCL. - Correct CI coverage thresholds against .github/coverage-thresholds.yml (service 70%, handler 75%, crypto 88%, auth packages 85-95%); 'static analysis' replaces the inflated '11 linters' claim (actual count is 4 active). Docs B3 sweep — strip operator-facing 'Bundle N' / 'Phase N' tags: - docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md — rewrite intro; rename 5 H2 sections (API-key + RBAC defenses / OIDC + sessions + break-glass defenses / OIDC + sessions threat catalogue / Closed federated- identity threats / Future-work threats); clean ~12 H3/prose hits. - docs/operator/rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from intro, scope_id deferral note, MCP tools section, day-0 bootstrap, and 'Where to look next'. - docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md — drop 'Phase 14' framing from title intro, hardware floor caption, result table caption, methodology, and pre-merge audit section. - docs/operator/security.md — already cleaned earlier this session (RBAC / day-0 / approval-bypass / OIDC federation / sessions / OIDC first-admin / break-glass H3s). - docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/{index,keycloak,authentik,okta, azure-ad}.md — strip Auth Bundle 2 framing + Phase 10/3/4 references; replace with feature-name prose. - docs/operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md — drop Bundle F / M-023 audit-reference framing; keep CWE-326. - docs/operator/database-tls.md — drop Bundle B / M-018 framing from intro + Helm section. - docs/operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md — drop 'Production hardening II Phase 10' status callout. - docs/migration/oidc-enable.md — retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO'; strip Bundle 1/2 framing from prereqs, troubleshooting, related docs; update __Host- cookie callout from 'audit MED-14' to v2.1.0-BREAKING. - docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from intro, migration table, IsAdmin section, and cross-references. - docs/migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md — strip residual 'Phase 5' tags from cert-manager integration test references. - docs/reference/configuration.md — retitle Auth section. - docs/reference/profiles.md — strip Bundle 1 Phase 9 framing from RequiresApproval section + Related list. - docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md — rewrite intro (API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout + break-glass); rename 'Bundle 1 (RBAC) standards covered separately' H2; clean per-row Phase references. - docs/README.md — rewrite nav-table entries to drop Bundle 1/2 parentheticals; retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO' migration entry. No code or test changes; pure operator-facing prose polish for the v2.1.0 tag.	2026-05-11 16:54:07 +00:00
shankar0123	5313cd8492	auth-bundle-1 Phase 13 follow-up: em-dash sweep + broken-link fix ... Self-audit on e7a94b6 flagged the prompt's 'zero em dashes' discipline rule. The four new Phase 13 docs and the v2.1.0 CHANGELOG section had 97 em-dash hits between them; this commit sweeps them all to ASCII hyphens. Counts before -> after: docs/operator/rbac.md 28 -> 0 docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md 36 -> 0 docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md 16 -> 0 docs/operator/security.md 8 -> 0 docs/reference/profiles.md 3 -> 0 CHANGELOG.md 6 -> 0 Mechanical: ' - ' (spaced em dash) and bare em-dash both replaced with spaced ASCII hyphen, then double-spaces collapsed. Markdown list bullets ('^- ', '^ - ', '^ - ') verified intact across all six files. Internal-link sweep also re-run. Also fixes a pre-existing broken link the audit caught: docs/operator/security.md:70 referenced '../internal/crypto/encryption.go' which is a 1-level-up jump from docs/operator/, not the 2-level-up jump it actually needs ('../../internal/crypto/encryption.go'). Pre-Bundle-1 link rot; fixed in lockstep so the merge gate's docs validation passes cleanly. Final state across the Phase-13 docs + CHANGELOG: - 0 em dashes - 0 broken internal links - Last-reviewed: 2026-05-09 header on every new doc Bundle 1 documentation is now ready for the operator-side merge gate review.	2026-05-10 00:15:30 +00:00
shankar0123	e7a94b6080	auth-bundle-1 Phase 13: docs (rbac.md + threat model + migration guide + security.md update) ... Closes the last Phase before the Bundle 1 Exit gate. Operators now have authoritative reference + threat model + migration guide covering every behavior change Bundles 0-12 introduced. # New docs * docs/operator/rbac.md (340 lines) — operator how-to: - Mental model (actors / roles / permissions / scopes) - 7 default roles seeded by migration 000029 + the 5 admin-only fine-grained perms seeded by 000030 - Permission catalogue table by namespace - Scope semantics (global beats specific) + the Bundle-2 deferral on scope_id FK enforcement - Granting / revoking access from GUI + CLI + HTTP API + MCP - The auditor pattern (audit-only, no resource read) - Day-0 bootstrap flow (CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN → curl → HTTP 410 thereafter) - Demo-mode (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none) caveat for production * docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md (180 lines) — what the controls defend against: - 5 threat actors (external, wrong-role, compromised key, insider operator, compromised auditor) - Per-defense walk-through (API-key auth, RBAC, bootstrap, approval workflow + Phase 9 closure, audit trail, protocol-endpoint allowlist) - 9 explicit deferrals (OIDC, sessions, local accounts, JIT elevation, MFA, etc.) — Bundle 2 / future scope - Compliance mapping (SOC 2 CC6.1/CC6.3, HIPAA §164.312(b), NIST SSDF PO.5.2, FedRAMP AU-9, PCI-DSS §10) - 5 operator-runnable sanity checks (e.g., 'SELECT FROM audit_events WHERE actor=system-bypass' MUST return 0 in production) * docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md (200 lines) — v2.0.x → v2.1.0 upgrade flow: - The SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS callout - Migration list (000029-000033) + what each does - 4-mode scope-down flow (interactive / non-interactive JSON / --suggest / --suggest --apply) - What changes for code that called auth.IsAdmin - Helm-specific upgrade flow with example post-upgrade Job - Docker Compose upgrade flow + the 5 examples folders that ride demo mode unchanged - Verification queries + rollback flow # Updated docs * docs/operator/security.md — Last-reviewed bumped to 2026-05-09; existing Authentication-surface section extended to call out the Bundle 1 RBAC primitive, day-0 bootstrap path, and approval-bypass closure with cross-references to the new docs. * docs/reference/profiles.md — Last-reviewed header formatting fixed (added the > blockquote prefix used consistently across the docs tree). # docs/README.md navigation * Operator section gains 2 new rows (RBAC + auth-threat-model) and Approval-workflow row updated to mention Phase 9 closure. * Reference section gains the Profiles row. * Migration section gains the api-keys-to-rbac row with the AUDIT YOUR API KEYS callout in the link description. # CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 section refreshed The Phase 7 commit landed the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS callout. This commit appends the missing Phase 9-12 highlights: - Approval-bypass closure (profile-edit gate + flip-flop loophole + ErrApproveBySameActor invariant) - GUI: Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings / Approvals queue - 12 new MCP RBAC tools - Coverage gates on internal/auth + internal/service/auth - Protocol-endpoint allowlist pinned at 3 layers Trailing cross-reference block now points at all 4 new docs. # Verifications * Every internal link in the 4 new/modified docs validated by shell sweep (find broken links → 0 hits). * Every new doc carries 'Last reviewed: 2026-05-09' header with the > blockquote prefix matching the docs-tree convention. * go vet ./... clean. * staticcheck across every Bundle-1-touched Go package clean. * gofmt -l clean repo-wide. * go test -short -count=1 green across internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service (incl. auth), internal/domain/auth, internal/mcp, cmd/cli (cmd/server has 1 environmental failure on the sandbox virtiofs-tmp: TestPreflightSCEPRACertKey_KeyWorldReadable_Refuses depends on tmpfs file-mode semantics that virtiofs propagates differently — pre-existing, unrelated to Bundle 1). * Frontend: 19 Vitest tests across src/pages/auth/ + AuditPage all pass; tsc --noEmit clean.	2026-05-10 00:10:15 +00:00
shankar0123	69a508dfcf	auth-bundle-1 Phase 9 + 10: approval-bypass closure + RBAC GUI ... # Phase 9 — approval-bypass closure (Decision 9, option a) * Migration 000033_approval_kinds.up.sql: ALTER TABLE issuance_approval_requests ADD COLUMN approval_kind + payload JSONB; relax certificate_id + job_id to nullable; CHECK (approval_kind IN ('cert_issuance','profile_edit')) + CHECK (per-kind nullability invariant) + index on approval_kind. Idempotent throughout via DO blocks. * domain.ApprovalKind enum (cert_issuance / profile_edit) + IsValidApprovalKind. ApprovalRequest gains Kind + Payload []byte for the pending profile diff. * postgres.ApprovalRepository.Create + scanApprovalRow extended to round-trip the new columns; certificate_id + job_id switched to sql.NullString so profile_edit rows persist cleanly. Default Kind=cert_issuance preserves back-compat for every Phase-7-2026-05-03 caller. * ApprovalService.RequestProfileEditApproval: new entry point that creates a pending profile-edit row carrying the serialized profile diff. Bypass mode (CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS) short-circuits the same way it does for cert_issuance. * ApprovalService.SetProfileEditApply hook: cmd/server/main.go registers a closure that deserializes req.Payload + persists via profileRepo.Update + emits a profile.edit_applied audit row with category=auth. The hook avoids the Approval ↔ Profile import cycle. * ProfileService.UpdateProfile: gates when (a) the live profile carries RequiresApproval=true, OR (b) the proposed edit would set it true. Returns ErrProfileEditPendingApproval with the new approval ID; ProfileHandler maps to HTTP 202 Accepted + {pending_approval_id}. Both arms close the flip-flop loophole because every transition through an approval-tier profile fires the gate. * TestProfileEdit_RequiresApprovalLoopholeClosed pins all 3 bypass attempts (flip-off / kept-on / flip-on) gated; nil- approval-service preserves pre-Phase-9 direct-apply for test fixtures. * Approval service tests gain 4 profile_edit rows: pending row shape; same-actor self-approve rejected with ErrApproveBySameActor (load-bearing two-person integrity); approve fails-closed when apply callback unwired; apply callback invoked on approve. * docs/reference/profiles.md (new) explains the gate + edit response shape (202) + same-actor invariant + bypass + audit hooks. # Phase 10 — RBAC management GUI * useAuthMe hook (web/src/hooks/useAuthMe.ts): TanStack Query fetches /api/v1/auth/me on app boot, caches for 60s, exposes hasPerm(p) + hasAnyPerm + isAdmin predicates. Every Phase-10 page consumes this on mount + gates affordances against the cached effective_permissions slice. Server-side enforcement is the load-bearing gate; client-side hide/disable is UX. * New routes: - /auth/roles — list (auth.role.list); create-role modal (auth.role.create) hidden when missing. - /auth/roles/:id — detail + permissions; edit (auth.role.edit), delete (auth.role.delete), add/remove permission affordances each gated. - /auth/keys — list of every actor with role grants; assign + revoke modals (auth.role.assign). actor-demo-anon flagged system-managed; mutation buttons hidden for it. - /auth/settings — stub showing /v1/auth/me identity + bootstrap-endpoint availability via /v1/auth/bootstrap. * AuditPage extended with category filter ('All categories' + the 3 enum values from migration 000032). Selection flows to the API call params + the URL-driven query state. * Layout: 3 new nav entries (Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings). * api/client.ts: 12 new exported functions for the RBAC surface (authMe, list/get/create/update/delete role, list/add/remove role permissions, list keys, assign/revoke key role, bootstrap-availability probe). * data-testid attributes on every interactive element so a future Playwright suite can assert behavior without brittle CSS selectors. * Empty state, error state, and unsaved-changes warnings on every form per the prompt's implementation rules. # Frontend tests * RolesPage.test.tsx (6 tests): list render, empty state, error state, hide-create-button-without-perm, show-create-button-with-perm, submit-create-modal. * KeysPage.test.tsx (3 tests): demo-anon flagged system-managed (no buttons), permission-gated affordance hide for auditor caller, assign-modal-POST contract. * AuthSettingsPage.test.tsx (2 tests): identity surface, bootstrap-OPEN-status surface. * AuditPage.test.tsx (+1): category-filter select renders with the 4 documented options. 15 frontend tests total in src/pages/auth/ + the audit category-filter test; all pass via npx vitest run. # Verifications * go vet ./... clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * gofmt -l clean repo-wide. * go test -short -count=1 green across internal/service, internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/auth, internal/auth/bootstrap, internal/service/auth, internal/domain/auth, cmd/server, cmd/cli, internal/cli. * npx tsc --noEmit clean. * npm run build green (vite build produces dist/index.html + 946KB JS bundle; chunk-size warning is pre-existing). * npx vitest run src/pages/auth/ src/pages/AuditPage.test.tsx green (15 tests, 4 files).	2026-05-09 21:03:59 +00:00