6 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
shankar0123	3287e174dc	Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001) ... Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006) on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests, and the React client. M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash, principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel. * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware, bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer now read the principal off the context and persist it on every audit_events row. * Regression coverage: - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation, principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for unauthenticated endpoints. - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go, job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions. M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B) * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403 when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field. * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and viewers receive 403. * Regression coverage: - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf, TestRejectJob_NotSelf. - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go — TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds. M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto: GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id} Content-Type: application/pkix-crl (RFC 5280 §5) GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial} Content-Type: application/ocsp-response (RFC 6960) * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served. * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial. * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404. * Regression coverage: - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer. - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP. - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are mounted on the unauthenticated branch. M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002 EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in. Verification (all gates green): * go vet ./... — clean * go build ./... — ok * go test -short ./... (55+ packages) — all pass * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests) — all pass * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit — clean * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits, all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments. Documentation: * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 → Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.) * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification closure note. * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md, docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md, docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named API keys. * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths. .gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session- scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.	2026-04-18 18:17:41 +00:00
shankar0123	eef1db0f0a	fix(policies): stop 400ing the "+ New Policy" button + add per-rule severity (D-005, D-006) ... Coverage Gap Audit findings D-005 (P0) + D-006 (P1) fixed together in a single commit because they share the same root cause — policy CRUD sending values the backend silently rejects — and splitting them would leave a half-working UI between commits. ## D-005 (P0): PoliciesPage dropdown 400s every Create Policy Root cause ---------- `web/src/pages/PoliciesPage.tsx` populated the Type `<select>` from a hardcoded `['key_algorithm', 'ownership', 'allowed_issuers', ...]` array. The backend's `internal/api/handler/validators.go::ValidatePolicyType` enforces the TitleCase allowlist `AllowedIssuers`, `AllowedDomains`, `RequiredMetadata`, `AllowedEnvironments`, `RenewalLeadTime` — defined in `internal/domain/policy.go`. Every Create Policy request was rejected with `400 invalid policy type`. The error surfaced only as a transient toast; the modal closed anyway. Silent user-visible failure. Fix --- - `web/src/api/types.ts`: added `POLICY_TYPES` and `POLICY_SEVERITIES` tuples with `as const` and narrowed `PolicyRule.type`, `.severity`, and `PolicyViolation.severity` to the literal-union types. Dropdown is now sourced from the tuple; casing drift becomes a compile error. - `web/src/pages/PoliciesPage.tsx`: rekeyed `severityStyles` / `severityDots` to the TitleCase values, added `humanize()` for display (AllowedIssuers → "Allowed Issuers"), removed the `badge-neutral` fallback that was papering over the mismatch. - `web/src/api/types.test.ts` (new): pins both tuples exactly. If anyone edits one side of the frontend/backend contract without the other, CI fails with a clear assertion. Pure-TS vitest, no RTL dependency. ## D-006 (P1): `severity` field silently dropped on create/update Root cause ---------- `PolicyRule` had no `Severity` field in `internal/domain/policy.go`. The frontend has always sent `severity` on create/update, but Go's `json.Decoder` (default settings, no `DisallowUnknownFields`) silently dropped it. The value never reached PostgreSQL. Every rule rendered with the same severity because there was no severity — just a display computation downstream. Fix: option (b), full-stack schema add (not delete-the-field) ------------------------------------------------------------- - Migration `000013_policy_rule_severity` (up + down): adds `severity VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Warning'` to `policy_rules` with CHECK constraint `severity IN ('Warning', 'Error', 'Critical')`. No index — three-value column on a low-thousands-rows table, planner will seq-scan regardless. PG 11+ metadata-only ADD COLUMN, safe on live data. - `internal/domain/policy.go`: added `Severity PolicySeverity` field. - `internal/repository/postgres/policy.go`: plumbed `severity` through ListRules SELECT + Scan, GetRule SELECT + Scan, CreateRule INSERT, UpdateRule UPDATE (4 queries). - `internal/service/policy.go::UpdatePolicy`: if the client omits severity on a PUT (zero-value empty string), fetch the existing rule and preserve its severity. Without this, partial updates would trip the NOT NULL CHECK and 500. Preserves pre-existing behavior for Name/Type (out of scope). - `internal/api/handler/policies.go::CreatePolicy`: default empty severity to `'Warning'`, then validate via `ValidatePolicySeverity`. 400 with clear message instead of 500 on CHECK violation. `UpdatePolicy`: validates severity only when provided. - `internal/mcp/types.go` + `internal/mcp/tools.go`: added optional `severity` on the MCP `create_policy` / `update_policy` tool inputs so LLM callers stay in sync with the wire contract. - `api/openapi.yaml`: added `severity` to the `PolicyRule` schema with the enum and default. Acceptance criterion (user-defined) ----------------------------------- "Create a rule with severity=Critical, reload the page, and still see Critical — no silent drops." Verified end-to-end: frontend sends `severity: "Critical"`, handler validates, service persists, DB stores, GET returns, React renders the correct badge. Seed data --------- `migrations/seed.sql`: four demo rules now have differentiated severities — `pr-require-owner` → Warning, `pr-allowed-environments` → Error, `pr-max-certificate-lifetime` → Critical, `pr-min-renewal-window` → Warning. The user called out that seeding all four at the same severity makes the feature look decorative; differentiation demonstrates the column carries real signal. ## Integration test fix (side effect of D-006) `internal/integration/e2e_test.go::TestCrossResourceWorkflow/CreatePolicy` was sending `"severity": "High"` — a value from the pre-audit severity vocabulary that the new `ValidatePolicySeverity` correctly rejects with 400. Changed to `"Error"` (closest semantic match in the new TitleCase allowlist). Only severity reference in the integration/ directory; verified via grep. ## Out of scope, logged for follow-up (d/D-008) Three policy-engine drift issues orthogonal to D-005 + D-006, explicitly deferred per direction: 1. `migrations/seed.sql` policy_rules INSERTs use lowercase TYPE values (`'ownership'`, `'environment'`, `'lifetime'`, `'renewal_window'`). These are load-bearing on `internal/service/policy.go::evaluateRule`'s `switch rule.Type` (which also uses the lowercase strings). Migrating requires coordinated changes across seed + evaluation engine. 2. `migrations/seed_demo.sql:482-483` contains lowercase `'critical'` severity — will now fail the new CHECK constraint. Separate fix. 3. `evaluateRule` hardcodes `Severity: domain.PolicySeverityWarning` on emitted violations and ignores the configured `rule.Config`. The new severity column is read correctly on the CRUD path but not yet consulted during evaluation. ## Verification Backend: - `go build ./...` — clean - `go vet ./...` — clean - `go test -short ./...` — all packages green, including `internal/service` (policy service), `internal/api/handler` (policy + MCP handler tests), `internal/integration` (e2e_test.go after fix), `internal/domain`, `internal/repository/postgres`. Frontend: - `tsc --noEmit` — clean - `vitest run` — 223/223 passing (4 new assertions in types.test.ts) - `vite build` — clean (only the pre-existing chunk-size warning)	2026-04-18 13:02:04 +00:00
shankar0123	50c520e1ff	feat: dashboard theme overhaul — light content area with branded teal sidebar ... Complete frontend visual redesign using certctl logo color palette: - Deep teal sidebar (#0c2e25) with prominent centered logo (64px in white pill) - Light content area (#f0f4f8) with white cards and visible borders - Brand colors from logo: teal (#2ea88f), blue (#3b7dd8), orange (#e8873a), green (#4ebe6e) - Inter + JetBrains Mono typography, colored stat card top borders - All 17 pages + 7 components updated (25 files, ~700 lines changed) - 15 new dashboard screenshots replacing old dark theme screenshots - Prometheus metrics e2e test added, integration test mock fixes - Docs updated: architecture.md theme description, testing-guide.md DNS-PERSIST-01 coverage Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-26 23:27:42 -04:00
shankar0123	7d14635a72	feat: add EST server (RFC 7030) for device certificate enrollment (M23) ... Implement Enrollment over Secure Transport protocol with 4 endpoints under /.well-known/est/ — cacerts (CA chain distribution), simpleenroll (initial enrollment), simplereenroll (certificate renewal), and csrattrs (CSR attributes). PKCS#7 certs-only wire format with hand-rolled ASN.1, accepts both PEM and base64-encoded DER CSRs, configurable issuer and profile binding, full audit trail. 28 new tests (18 handler + 10 service). Also includes: - GetCACertPEM added to issuer connector interface (all 4 issuers updated) - EST integration tests wired into e2e test suite (13 test cases) - QA testing guide Part 26 (15 manual EST test cases) - All docs updated: README, features, architecture, concepts, connectors, quickstart, demo-advanced (endpoint counts, MCP wording, agent IDs, issuer interface, resource lists, OpenSSL status) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-25 15:31:06 -04:00
shankar0123	e078a686bf	feat: M20 Enhanced Query API — sort, time-range filters, cursor pagination, sparse fields, deployments endpoint ... V2 (free) query enhancements for certificates: - `sort` param with direction (`?sort=-notAfter` for descending) - Time-range filters: `expires_before`, `expires_after`, `created_after`, `updated_after` - Cursor-based pagination (`?cursor=token&page_size=100`) alongside page-based - Sparse field selection (`?fields=id,commonName,status`) - Additional filters: `agent_id`, `profile_id` - New endpoint: `GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deployments` 25 new tests (12 handler + 13 e2e) covering all M20 features. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-23 18:56:02 -04:00
shankar0123	373346a0ba	feat: comprehensive e2e test suite for cross-milestone integration testing ... 7 test functions with 35+ subtests covering stats/metrics endpoints, cross-resource workflows (policy→cert→agent→renew→revoke→audit), job approval workflows, notification endpoints, CRL endpoint, pagination across 6 endpoints, and issuer/target CRUD lifecycle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-23 18:25:43 -04:00