Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.
M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
* Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
* Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
audit_events row.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
unauthenticated endpoints.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.
M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
* Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
* Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
viewers receive 403.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.
M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
* Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
'/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
Content-Type: application/pkix-crl (RFC 5280 §5)
GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
Content-Type: application/ocsp-response (RFC 6960)
* Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
* Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
* Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
- internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
- internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
mounted on the unauthenticated branch.
M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.
Verification (all gates green):
* go vet ./... — clean
* go build ./... — ok
* go test -short ./... (55+ packages) — all pass
* web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests) — all pass
* web/ : npx tsc --noEmit — clean
* grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.
Documentation:
* coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
* CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
closure note.
* docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
— refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
API keys.
* api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.
.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
1717-line Go test file covering all 52 Parts of testing-guide.md against the
Docker Compose demo stack. ~120 automated subtests (API, DB, source, perf),
11 skipped Parts with reasons, ~270 manual gaps documented. Audited against
actual router, seed data, domain structs, and migrations — 8 factual bugs
caught and fixed during review. Companion guide at docs/qa-test-guide.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Refactors deploy/test/run-test.sh into a typed Go test file with
crypto/x509 certificate parsing, eliminating fragile openssl text
scraping. 12 phases, 35 subtests covering Local CA, ACME, step-ca,
revocation, discovery, renewal, EST, S/MIME, and API spot checks.
- testClient HTTP helper with Bearer auth
- testDB PostgreSQL helper (port 5432 now exposed)
- waitFor/waitForJobsDone polling helpers
- crypto/x509 for EKU, KeyUsage, SAN verification
- crypto/tls for NGINX deployment verification
- //go:build integration tag (not in CI yet)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add S/MIME (emailProtection EKU) end-to-end test coverage:
- ValidateCommonName() now accepts email addresses for S/MIME certs
- S/MIME test profile (prof-test-smime) in seed data
- Phase 11 test: issuance, EKU, KeyUsage, email SAN verification
- EST config enabled in test Docker Compose
- Portable KeyUsage parsing (awk, works on BSD/GNU)
- Full test environment documentation (docs/test-env.md)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes 12 production bugs preventing the full issuance→deployment flow
from working with ACME (Pebble/Let's Encrypt) and step-ca issuers:
ACME connector (acme.go):
- Save orderURI before WaitOrder overwrites it (Go crypto/acme bug)
- Add CreateOrderCert fallback via WaitOrder+FetchCert
- Remove defer-reset in ValidateConfig that caused nil pointer panic
- Add Insecure TLS option for self-signed ACME servers (Pebble)
step-ca connector (stepca.go, jwe.go):
- Real JWE provisioner key loading + decryption (was using ephemeral keys)
- Fix JWT audience (/1.0/sign), sha claim (key fingerprint), kid header
- Custom root CA trust via RootCertPath config
- Remove hardcoded 90-day validity default (let step-ca decide)
NGINX target connector (nginx.go):
- Use sh -c for validate/reload commands (shell interpretation)
- Use filepath.Dir instead of fragile string slicing
- Add private key file writing (agent-mode keys were never deployed)
- Make chain_path write conditional
Server/service layer:
- TriggerRenewalWithActor now creates actual Job records (was no-op)
- createDeploymentJobs falls back to DB query when cert.TargetIDs empty
- ProcessPendingJobs skips agent-routed deployment jobs
- Agent cert pickup path parsing: len(parts)<4 → len(parts)<3
- Health/ready/auth-info endpoints bypass auth middleware
- Write timeout 15s→120s for ACME issuance
- Cert fingerprint computed on CSR submission
Integration test environment (deploy/test/):
- 10-phase test script covering Local CA, ACME, step-ca, revocation,
discovery, renewal, and API spot checks
- Docker Compose with 7 containers (server, agent, postgres, nginx,
pebble, challtestsrv, step-ca) on isolated network
- TLS verification checks SAN (not just Subject CN) for modern CA compat
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
shankar0123