Commit Graph

11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
shankar0123 4bb7a748ac fix(deploy/test) + ci(guard): unblock deploy-vendor-e2e — encryption-key length
Two-part complete-path fix for the deploy-vendor-e2e failure that has
been firing since the ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 5 matrix collapse
started actually booting the certctl-test-server:

    Failed to load configuration:
    CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY too short (29 bytes; minimum 32).

Surfaced via the diagnostic-dump step landed in commit 69266c8 — the
server panicked on startup, Docker restarted it endlessly, compose
reported the dependency-chain symptom ("container certctl-test-server
is unhealthy"), but the actual cause was invisible in the previous
CI output. With the dump in place, the next failing run named the
problem in one line.

Root cause. The H-1 audit-closure master commit 6cb4414
("feat(security): bodyLimit on noAuth + security headers + encryption-
key validation (H-1 master)") added internal/config/config.go's
minEncryptionKeyLength = 32 byte floor + 5 unit tests that pin it.
The closure was incomplete: it never enforced the rule against the
literal CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY values certctl's own
deploy/docker-compose*.yml files pass. Pre-Phase-5 the test stack
didn't fully exercise the validator (the per-vendor matrix didn't
boot certctl-test-server in every job), so the gap was silent.
deploy/docker-compose.test.yml's literal value
`test-encryption-key-32chars!!` was 29 bytes — the name claimed 32
but the author miscounted (4+1+10+1+3+1+2+5+2 = 29). Pattern matches
every fix in this CI-stabilization sequence: pre-existing latent bug
that the old CI structurally hid.

Part 1 — direct fix (deploy/docker-compose.test.yml):

  Replace the 29-byte literal with a clearly test-only,
  self-documenting 49-byte value (`test-encryption-key-deterministic-
  32-byte-fixture`). 17 bytes of safety margin so a future tightening
  of the floor (32 → 33+) doesn't break this fixture again. Inline
  comment block explains the byte-budget contract + points at the
  H-1 closure commit. Production deploy/docker-compose.yml's default
  (`change-me-32-char-encryption-key`) is exactly 32 bytes — passes
  by 1 byte but on the edge; not touched here because operators are
  already told to override it via env (`${VAR:-default}`).

Part 2 — structural fix (scripts/ci-guards/H-1-encryption-key-min-
length.sh):

  New regression guard. Scans every deploy/docker-compose*.yml for
  literal CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY values + values inside
  ${VAR:-default} expansions, checks each against the 32-byte floor,
  fails CI with `::error::` annotation pointing at the offending
  file:line if any literal regresses. Bare ${VAR} env references with
  no default are skipped — those are operator-supplied at runtime
  and the validator handles them at boot.

  Verified manually:
    - Clean repo: `H-1-encryption-key-min-length: clean.` (exit 0)
    - 5-byte regression: emits proper ::error:: annotation, exit 1
    - Restore: clean again (exit 0)

  CI auto-picks up the new guard via the `for g in
  scripts/ci-guards/*.sh; do bash "$g"; done` loop in ci.yml's
  Regression guards step (no ci.yml change required).

  scripts/ci-guards/README.md updated: 20 → 21 guards, new row
  explaining the closure rationale.

The structural piece is the more important half of this fix. The
direct fix unblocks today's CI; the guard prevents the same class of
drift from ever recurring silently. Future audit closures that add
new validation rules to internal/config/config.go now have a working
template for the matching CI guard — drop a sibling .sh in the
ci-guards directory.

Bonus — what the diagnostic-dump step (69266c8) bought us. Before
that step landed, the same failure looked like an opaque "container
unhealthy" with no actionable signal. With it, the actual error
message + the offending env var + the exact byte count came out in
one CI run. The diagnostic infrastructure paid for itself within one
push.
2026-05-01 00:57:43 +00:00
shankar0123 3f4f8bbe36 refactor(scripts): move CI helpers out of scripts/ci-guards/
The 'Regression guards' loop step in ci.yml runs:
    for g in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh; do bash "$g"; done

Per the directory's own contract (scripts/ci-guards/README.md), every
script there MUST be runnable bare with no args / no env. Three files
violated that contract — they're helpers consumed by specific CI job
steps with arguments, not regression guards. They were misplaced.

Moved (git mv):
  scripts/ci-guards/vendor-e2e-skip-check.sh         → scripts/
  scripts/ci-guards/vendor-e2e-skip-allowlist.txt    → scripts/
  scripts/ci-guards/coverage-pr-comment.sh           → scripts/

Updated ci.yml call sites:
  - deploy-vendor-e2e job: bash scripts/vendor-e2e-skip-check.sh $LOG
  - go-build-and-test job: bash scripts/coverage-pr-comment.sh

Tightened scripts/vendor-e2e-skip-check.sh arg parse from a silent
default ('LOG=${1:-test-output.log}') to a mandatory-arg form
('LOG=${1:?usage: ...}') so misuse fails loud at parse time rather
than at the missing-file check.

Updated scripts/ci-guards/README.md contract to spell out the
guard-vs-helper distinction explicitly; lists current helpers under
scripts/ for future-author guidance.

Verified locally: 'for g in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh; do bash $g; done'
returns clean (22 guards pass) on HEAD post-move.

Closes the regression-guards-loop failure that surfaced in CI run
25192163943 (job 73864471346 'Frontend Build').
2026-04-30 22:37:12 +00:00
shankar0123 ce987cc550 ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 11: make verify-docs + verify-deploy targets
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phase 11 / frozen decision 0.13.

Two new operator-side Makefile targets:

  make verify-docs   — pre-tag gate. Runs the QA-doc Part-count +
                       seed-count drift guards that Phase 1 dropped
                       from CI. Operator invokes pre-tag.
  make verify-deploy — optional pre-push gate. Runs digest-validity +
                       OpenAPI parity + Docker build smoke (server +
                       agent only — fast subset for local; CI builds
                       all 4 Dockerfiles).

NEW scripts/qa-doc-part-count.sh + scripts/qa-doc-seed-count.sh —
extracted from the original ci.yml steps verbatim, only difference is
the 'qa-doc-* drift guard' label updated to '*: clean.' in the success
output (matches the scripts/ci-guards/ contract).

Sandbox verification:
  bash scripts/qa-doc-part-count.sh → clean
  bash scripts/qa-doc-seed-count.sh → clean

Three-tier convention now documented in 'make help':
  verify         (required pre-commit)
  verify-deploy  (optional pre-push)
  verify-docs    (required pre-tag)
2026-04-30 20:53:43 +00:00
shankar0123 3a69600c2c ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 10: coverage PR-comment action
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phase 10 / frozen decision 0.9.

Self-hosted alternative to Codecov / Coveralls. Posts a per-package
coverage delta as a PR comment on every PR; updates the same comment
in place on subsequent pushes (avoids duplicate noise).

scripts/ci-guards/coverage-pr-comment.sh:
- Reads coverage.out from the prior Go Test step
- Builds per-package coverage table (mirrors check-coverage-thresholds
  averaging logic)
- Searches existing PR comments for the '**Coverage report' marker
  and PATCHes the existing one if found, else POSTs a new one
- No-op on non-PR builds (push to master, scheduled, etc.)

Wired into go-build-and-test job after 'Upload Coverage Report' step
with if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' guard.

Operator can swap to Codecov/Coveralls later by replacing this script
+ step with a third-party action — the YAML manifest at
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml stays unchanged either way.
2026-04-30 20:51:48 +00:00
shankar0123 19a5e438f2 ci-pipeline-cleanup Phases 7-9: image-and-supply-chain job
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phases 7-9 / frozen decisions 0.8 + 0.10 + 0.11.

NEW image-and-supply-chain job (Ubuntu, ~3 min). Three steps:

PHASE 7 — Digest validity
scripts/ci-guards/digest-validity.sh resolves every @sha256:<digest>
ref in deploy/**/*.{yml,Dockerfile*} against its registry. Closes the
H-001 lying-field gap that Bundle II hit (11 fabricated digests passed
H-001's regex-only check and failed docker pull in CI).
Sandbox verification: 16/16 digests in deploy/* + Dockerfiles all
return HTTP 200 from registry-1.docker.io / ghcr.io / mcr.microsoft.com.

PHASE 8 — Docker build smoke (all 4 Dockerfiles)
Per frozen decision 0.10: build Dockerfile, Dockerfile.agent,
deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/Dockerfile, deploy/test/libest/Dockerfile.
Catches syntax errors + COPY path drift before tag-time release.yml.
The test-sidecar Dockerfiles are load-bearing for vendor-e2e — a
syntax error there silently breaks the e2e suite.

PHASE 9 — OpenAPI ↔ handler operationId parity
scripts/ci-guards/openapi-handler-parity.sh extracts router routes
(r.mux.Handle / r.Register "METHOD /path" syntax — Go 1.22+ ServeMux),
extracts OpenAPI operations (paths × HTTP methods), and fails if any
router route has no operationId AND is not documented in the new
api/openapi-handler-exceptions.yaml.

Verified gap at HEAD 1de61e91 (root-caused):
  142 router routes, 136 OpenAPI operations
  6 router-only routes — all SCEP wire-protocol endpoints (RFC-shaped,
    not REST). Documented in api/openapi-handler-exceptions.yaml with
    one-line why: justifications.
  0 OpenAPI-only operations.

Going forward: any new gap fails the build unless documented.

Status checks per push: now 7 (was 8 after Phase 5+6 dropped windows;
this Phase adds 1 = +1 net). Final acceptance gate target.

ci.yml: 383 → 432 lines (+49 for the new job + steps).
2026-04-30 20:50:52 +00:00
shankar0123 6f6de639a0 ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 5+6: collapse vendor matrix; delete Windows matrix
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phases 5+6 / frozen decisions 0.4 + 0.5
+ 0.6. Revises Bundle II decisions 0.4 (Windows matrix) and 0.9 (per-
vendor granularity).

PHASE 5 — Linux vendor matrix collapsed (12 jobs → 1):

The previous per-vendor matrix produced 12 status-check rows for
~1 real assertion (115/116 vendor-edge tests are t.Log placeholders
per Bundle II Phase 2-13 design). Granularity was fake signal.

Single-job version: brings up all 11 sidecars at once via
docker compose --profile deploy-e2e up -d, runs go test -run
'VendorEdge_' once, tears down once.

Critical caveat: requireSidecar() in deploy/test/vendor_e2e_helpers.go
uses t.Skipf() when a sidecar isn't reachable — silent test skip,
not CI failure. The new Skip-count enforcement step
(scripts/ci-guards/vendor-e2e-skip-check.sh) counts SKIP lines and
fails the build if it exceeds the allowlist at
scripts/ci-guards/vendor-e2e-skip-allowlist.txt (15 windows-iis-
requiring tests legitimately skip on Linux per Phase 6).

PHASE 6 — Windows matrix deleted entirely:

The deploy-vendor-e2e-windows job removed. Two reasons:
1. Can't physically work on windows-latest today (Docker not started
   in Windows-containers mode by default; bridge network driver
   missing on Windows Docker — see CI run 25183374742 failure logs).
2. Even fixed, validates nothing — all 16 IIS + WinCertStore tests
   are t.Log placeholders that exercise no IIS-specific behavior.

Per Bundle II frozen decision 0.14, the third criterion for
"verified" status in the vendor matrix is operator manual smoke
against a real instance. IIS + WinCertStore now satisfy that via
the playbook (Phase 6 follow-up adds docs/connector-iis.md::
Operator validation playbook).

The windows-iis-test sidecar STAYS in deploy/docker-compose.test.yml
under profiles: [deploy-e2e-windows] for operator local use. Linux
CI never activates this profile.

Operator-required action before merge: RAM headroom verification on
prototype branch (per frozen decision 0.14). If peak RSS > 12 GB on
ubuntu-latest with all 11 sidecars up, fall back to bucketed matrix
per cowork/ci-pipeline-cleanup/decisions-revised.md.

ci.yml: 417 → 383 lines (-34 net; -1105 cumulative since baseline 1488).
Status checks per push: 19 → 7 (collapse 12 vendor + 2 windows = -14;
add image-and-supply-chain in Phase 7-9 = +1; net 19-12-2+1 = ~7).

Operator action for Phase 13: update GitHub branch protection rules
(required-checks list 19 → 7 entries). Documented in cowork/
ci-pipeline-cleanup/decisions-revised.md.
2026-04-30 20:46:05 +00:00
shankar0123 60f368ef33 ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 2: coverage thresholds → YAML manifest
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phase 2 / frozen decision 0.3.

Move 9 hardcoded coverage thresholds from inline bash to a YAML
manifest at .github/coverage-thresholds.yml. The load-bearing
per-package context (Bundle reference, HEAD measurement, gap
rationale) survives in the YAML's `why:` field instead of in
inline bash comments.

Adding a new gated package: one YAML entry instead of ~30 lines
of bash + 50 lines of comment.

Coverage check logic extracted to scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh
so the operator can run the same check locally:
  bash scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh

ci.yml dropped 557 → 417 lines (-140, total Phase 1+2: -1071,
-72% from baseline 1488).

Same 9 floors, same fail-on-miss semantics — pure relocation:
  internal/service:                70  (was: 70)
  internal/api/handler:            75  (was: 75)
  internal/domain:                 40  (was: 40)
  internal/api/middleware:         30  (was: 30)
  internal/crypto:                 88  (was: 88)
  internal/connector/issuer/local: 86  (was: 86)
  internal/connector/issuer/acme:  80  (was: 80)
  internal/connector/issuer/stepca: 80  (was: 80)
  internal/mcp:                    85  (was: 85)

Sandbox verification:
- ci.yml YAML-parses cleanly
- coverage-thresholds.yml YAML-parses cleanly with all 9 entries
- scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh extracts the (pkg, floor)
  table correctly from the YAML
2026-04-30 20:39:30 +00:00
shankar0123 5b7a022767 ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 1: extract 20 regression guards to scripts/ci-guards/
Bundle: ci-pipeline-cleanup, Phase 1.

Pure relocation — no behavior change. Each guard's bash logic is
byte-identical to the prior inline version; the only changes are:
(a) the guard becomes a sibling script under scripts/ci-guards/<id>.sh,
(b) ci.yml's per-guard step is replaced by a single loop step that
iterates all scripts.

20 scripts extracted (alphabetized):
  B-1-orphan-crud.sh, D-1-D-2-statusbadge-phantom.sh,
  G-1-jwt-auth-literal.sh, G-2-api-key-hash-json.sh,
  G-3-env-docs-drift.sh, H-001-bare-from.sh, H-009-readme-jwt.sh,
  L-001-insecure-skip-verify.sh, L-1-bulk-action-loop.sh,
  M-012-no-root-user.sh, P-1-documented-orphan-fns.sh,
  S-1-hardcoded-source-counts.sh, S-2-strings-contains-err.sh,
  T-1-frontend-page-coverage.sh, U-2-plaintext-healthcheck.sh,
  U-3-migration-mount.sh, bundle-8-L-015-target-blank-rel-noopener.sh,
  bundle-8-L-019-dangerously-set-inner-html.sh,
  bundle-8-M-009-bare-usemutation.sh, test-naming-convention.sh

Plus scripts/ci-guards/README.md documenting the contract:
- Each script must exit 0 on clean repo, non-zero with ::error::
  prefix on regression
- Runnable from repo root via 'bash scripts/ci-guards/<id>.sh'
- Adding a new guard: drop a new <id>.sh; CI auto-picks it up

ci.yml dropped 1488 → 557 lines (-931, -63%).

Single CI loop step now collects ALL guard failures before failing
the build instead of fail-fast — UX win for regressions that hit
two guards at once.

Two guards (QA-doc Part-count + seed-count, ci.yml lines 868-917)
deliberately NOT extracted — they move to 'make verify-docs' in
Phase 11 because they protect docs-the-operator-reads, not the
product itself.

Verification (sandbox):
- All 20 scripts pass against HEAD (chmod +x; for g in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh; do bash $g; done)
- New ci.yml YAML-parses cleanly
- Job boundaries preserved: go-build-and-test, frontend-build,
  helm-lint, deploy-vendor-e2e, deploy-vendor-e2e-windows
- Loop step appears twice (once at end of go-build-and-test, once
  at end of frontend-build) so both jobs continue running their
  set of guards
2026-04-30 20:36:26 +00:00
Shankar b566355d6f fix(bundle-7): Verification & Tool Suite Execution — wire mandatory scans + first-run evidence
Closes Audit-2026-04-25 D-001..D-002 + D-006 (partial) + H-005 (partial).
Opens new tracker IDs H-010, M-028, L-020, L-021 (see closure document
in cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/tool-output/_BUNDLE-7-CLOSURE.md).

What changed
- scripts/install-security-tools.sh (NEW) — idempotent installer for the
  Go-based subset (govulncheck, staticcheck, errcheck, ineffassign,
  gosec, osv-scanner). Used locally + by both CI workflows.
- .github/workflows/security-deep-scan.yml (NEW) — daily + workflow_dispatch
  scans for tools that need docker/network: trivy image, syft SBOM,
  ZAP baseline, schemathesis, nuclei, testssl.sh, gosec, osv-scanner,
  full-suite race detector at -count=10. Every step continue-on-error;
  artefacts uploaded for triage.
- .github/workflows/ci.yml — staticcheck added as a soft (continue-on-error)
  gate alongside the existing govulncheck hard gate. Soft until M-028
  closes the 6 remaining SA1019 deprecated-API sites; flip to fail-on-
  non-zero then. Per-package coverage gates extended: pkcs7 hard ≥85%
  (currently 100%), local-issuer soft ≥65% transitional floor (H-010
  raises to 85%).
- staticcheck.conf (NEW) — suppresses 4 style-only rules (ST1005, ST1000,
  ST1003, S1009, S1011, SA9003) with documented justifications. Real
  defects (SA1019) NOT suppressed.
- .govulnignore (NEW) — empty placeholder with the suppression contract
  (one OSV ID + justification + review-by date per line). Bundle-7's
  5 deferred-call advisories don't need entries because govulncheck's
  default exit code already passes.

Local tool-run evidence (cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/tool-output/2026-04-26/):
- govulncheck.txt + govulncheck-verbose.txt — clean (0 affected; 5 deferred-call)
- staticcheck.txt + staticcheck-after-suppressions.txt — 6 SA1019 → M-028
- errcheck.txt — 1294 sites, all defer-Close / response-write convention → triaged
- ineffassign.txt — 15 unique sites → L-020
- helm-lint.txt — clean (1 INFO-level icon recommendation)
- go-test-race.txt — clean across scheduler/middleware/mcp at -count=3
  (CI runs -count=10 against the full suite)
- go-test-cover.txt — crypto 86.7% ✓, pkcs7 100% ✓, local-issuer 68.3% ✗ → H-010

Closures in this bundle
- D-001 partial — 4 of 6 Go-based tools ran locally; remainder wired in CI
- D-002 closed — race detector clean
- D-006 partial — helm lint passes; kube-score / kubesec deferred to CI
- D-007 deferred — semgrep p/react-security wired in CI (needs docker)
- D-003 / D-004 / D-005 deferred — wired in security-deep-scan.yml
- H-005 partial — crypto + pkcs7 meet 85%; local-issuer at 68.3% → H-010

New tracker IDs opened (next-bundle scope)
- H-010 — local-issuer coverage gap (68.3% vs 85% target). 2-3 days.
- M-028 — 6 deprecated-API sites (SA1019). Migration coordinated.
- L-020 — ineffassign cleanup sweep, 15 mechanical sites.
- L-021 — 5 transitive Go-module CVEs (deferred-call). Monitor + bump.

NOT addressed in this bundle (deferred to a future Bundle 7-bis)
- M-007 bulk-operation partial-failure tests
- M-008 admin-gated role-gate tests
- L-010 mock.Anything overuse audit
- L-018 defect age analysis on remaining High findings

Verification
- go vet ./...                                → clean
- go build ./...                              → clean
- go test -short -count=1 ./...               → all packages pass
- go test -race -count=3 ./scheduler/middleware/mcp → clean
- go test -cover ./crypto/pkcs7/local-issuer  → see go-test-cover.txt
- govulncheck ./...                           → clean
- staticcheck ./...                           → 6 SA1019 (tracked as M-028)
- helm lint                                   → clean
- yaml lint .github/workflows/*.yml           → clean
- python3 yaml.safe_load(api/openapi.yaml)    → 89 paths

Bundle 7 of the 2026-04-25 comprehensive audit. Tool-output evidence
preserved at cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/tool-output/2026-04-26/.
2026-04-26 14:37:28 +00:00
Shankar 3155b9475f v2.0.47: HTTPS Everywhere — TLS-only control plane, agents/CLI/MCP
Breaking change release. Plaintext HTTP listener removed. The certctl
control plane now terminates TLS 1.3 on :8443 via
http.Server.ListenAndServeTLS. No CERTCTL_TLS_ENABLED=false escape
hatch. No dual-listener mode. One-step cutover per docs/upgrade-to-tls.md.

Server
- cmd/server/tls.go: certHolder with SIGHUP hot-reload + atomic cert
  swap, buildServerTLSConfig (TLS 1.3 min, GetCertificate callback),
  preflightServerTLS validation
- cmd/server/main.go: ListenAndServeTLS in place of ListenAndServe,
  watchSIGHUP wiring, cert/key path config threading
- tls_test.go: 418-line regression coverage of reload, preflight,
  callback behavior, SAN validation

Config
- CERTCTL_TLS_CERT_PATH / CERTCTL_TLS_KEY_PATH (required)
- Plaintext rejection: agents/CLI/MCP pre-flight-fail on http://
  URLs with a pointer to docs/upgrade-to-tls.md

Agents, CLI, MCP
- All three pre-flight-reject http:// URLs with fail-loud diagnostic
- CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH for private-CA trust
- CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY for dev-only bypass
  (loud warning on startup)
- install-agent.sh emits both vars as commented template lines

docker-compose
- certctl-tls-init sidecar generates SAN-valid self-signed cert into
  deploy/test/certs/ on first boot
- All demo-stack curls pin against ca.crt with --cacert

Helm chart
- Three TLS provisioning modes, exactly one required:
  - server.tls.existingSecret (operator-supplied)
  - server.tls.certManager.enabled (cert-manager integration)
  - server.tls.selfSigned.enabled (eval only — not for production)
- server-certificate.yaml template for cert-manager mode
- helm install without a TLS source fails at template render with
  a pointer to docs/tls.md

CI
- .github/workflows/ci.yml Helm Chart Validation step renders the
  chart in both existingSecret and cert-manager modes, plus an
  inverse guard-regression test that asserts helm template MUST
  refuse to render when no TLS source is configured. Previously
  the single `helm template` invocation hit the certctl.tls.required
  fail-loud guard and exit-1'd CI. Four invocations now: lint
  (existingSecret), template (existingSecret), template
  (cert-manager), template (no args — must fail).

Integration tests
- deploy/test/integration_test.go stands up the Compose stack over
  HTTPS, extracts the CA bundle, and exercises every certctl API
  over https://localhost:8443
- All 34 integration subtests green (per Phase 8 local CI-parity)

Documentation
- New: docs/tls.md (provisioning patterns, rotation, SIGHUP reload)
- New: docs/upgrade-to-tls.md (one-step cutover, no-downgrade
  warnings, fleet-roll sequencing)
- CHANGELOG.md: v2.2.0 "HTTPS Everywhere — The Irony" entry
  (file heading unchanged; release tag is v2.0.47)
- All curls in docs/, examples/, deploy/helm/ guides use
  https://localhost:8443 --cacert

Verification
- grep -rn "ListenAndServe[^T]" cmd/ internal/ → 0 hits
- grep -rn "\"http://" cmd/ internal/ → 2 benign hits (Caddy admin
  API default, SSRF doc comment) — zero certctl endpoints
- Tasks #197–#206 (Phases 0–8) all closed in the tracker

Files: 65 changed, 3489 insertions, 372 deletions (pre-CI-fix).
2026-04-20 03:43:10 +00:00
shankar0123 d395776a95 Initial scaffold: certificate control plane v0.1.0 2026-03-14 08:22:17 -04:00