Mechanical sed across the main go.mod's module declaration, the f5-mock-icontrol
sub-module's go.mod, every Go file's import path (361 files), and a rebuild of
the checked-in f5-mock-icontrol binary so its embedded build-info reflects the
new module path. No behavior change.
Choice B from cowork/transfer-certctl-to-org.md, executed 2026-05-04. Choice A
(keep module path declared as github.com/shankar0123/certctl regardless of
repo URL) shipped on the day of the org transfer (2026-05-03) since we had no
external Go consumers; this commit closes that deferral.
Backward-compat: GitHub HTTP redirects continue to forward
github.com/shankar0123/certctl → github.com/certctl-io/certctl at the URL
level, but Go's module proxy uses the path declared in go.mod as the
canonical name. Pre-fix, anyone trying `go get github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
hit a "module path mismatch" error because go.mod said
github.com/shankar0123/certctl and the URL they fetched it from said
certctl-io/certctl. Post-fix, the canonical name and the URL agree, so
go get / go install / external Go consumers / Go-tooling integrations
work cleanly via either the new path (preferred) or the old path (which
redirects and Go follows the redirect for source fetch).
Anyone still importing the old path inside their own code keeps working
provided they update their go.mod's `require` line to match — the module
path declared in their consumer's go.sum / go.mod is the authoritative
import name, so a mass sed across their import statements is the migration
on the consumer side. No external consumers exist today.
Diff shape:
361 *.go files — import path replacement only
2 go.mod — module declaration replacement only
1 binary — deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt
so embedded build-info reflects the new path (8618965 vs
8618933 bytes; 32-byte diff is the build-info change)
Total: 364 files, 730 insertions / 730 deletions, net-zero size, pure
mechanical substitution.
Verification:
gofmt: 17 files needed re-alignment after sed (the new path is one char
shorter than the old, so column-aligned import groups drifted). Applied
`gofmt -w` to fix.
go mod tidy: clean exit on both modules.
go vet ./...: clean exit.
go build ./...: clean exit.
go test -short -count=1 on representative packages: all green
(internal/domain, internal/validation, internal/crypto, internal/crypto/signer,
cmd/agent). Test output now reads `ok github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
confirming the module path resolves correctly.
binary: f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt; `strings | grep shankar0123` returns
nothing; `strings | grep certctl-io/certctl` shows the new module path
embedded in build-info.
Files intentionally NOT touched in this commit:
README.md / CHANGELOG.md / docs/ / etc. — already swept to certctl-io
URLs in commit 0729ee4 (the post-transfer URL refresh). This commit is
purely the Go-tooling layer.
Scarf pixels (`shankar0123.docker.scarf.sh/...`) — Scarf-account
namespace, not a Go import or GitHub repo URL. Stays.
This is a non-blocking, non-customer-impacting change. Operators pulling
container images, running `make verify`, hitting the API, or installing the
agent see no functional difference. Only Go-tooling consumers (none today)
are affected, and they're enabled — not broken — by this commit.
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 5.6 follow-up.
Closes the 'lying field' gap from the original Phase 5.6 commit (b33b843).
That commit shipped CertificateProfile.MustStaple as a domain field +
IssuanceRequest.MustStaple as the issuer-interface field + the local
issuer's RFC 7633 extension generation + byte-exact tests against the
spec — but the service layer (SCEP + EST + agent + renewal) never read
profile.MustStaple and never set IssuanceRequest.MustStaple. Operators
who set the field got: a stored value, an API that returned it, docs
that promised it worked, and a cert with no extension. Worse than not
having the field at all.
Per the new operating rule landed in cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules
('Always take the complete path, not the easy path'), this commit closes
the wire end-to-end.
internal/service/renewal.go
* IssuerConnector interface signature gains a mustStaple bool param on
IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate. The original 'this is a wider
refactor' framing was overstated — it's one extra arg threaded
through six call sites, not a structural change.
internal/service/issuer_adapter.go
* IssuerConnectorAdapter.IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate accept
the new param + populate IssuanceRequest.MustStaple /
RenewalRequest.MustStaple. Connectors that don't honor extension
injection (Vault, EJBCA, ACME, etc.) silently ignore the field —
the Phase 5.6 commit's docblock already noted this.
internal/service/scep.go
* processEnrollment now reads profile.MustStaple alongside
profile.MaxTTLSeconds and threads it through the IssueCertificate
call. The SCEP path was the load-bearing one — the original Phase
5.6 docs example showed exactly this code shape but the wire was
never landed.
internal/service/est.go
* Same pattern as SCEP: read profile.MustStaple + thread to
IssueCertificate. Defense in depth so a deploy that mounts the
same profile across SCEP + EST gets consistent extension behavior.
internal/service/agent.go
* The fallback direct-issuer signing path in heartbeatPipeline reads
profile + threads MustStaple through. Server-mode keygen + ad-hoc
CSR submission paths both go through this.
internal/service/renewal.go (the renewal-loop side, not the interface)
* Both renewal call sites (server-CSR-generated + agent-CSR-submitted)
read profile.MustStaple + thread it through RenewCertificate. Renewed
certs match their initial-issuance extension set when the bound
profile changes mid-lifetime.
internal/service/scep_must_staple_test.go (new)
* TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_PlumbsMustStapleToIssuer — end-to-end
integration test: profile.MustStaple=true → SCEP service →
mock IssuerConnector saw mustStaple=true. This is the test the
original Phase 5.6 commit should have shipped — proves the wire
reaches the connector.
* TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_NoMustStaplePropagatesFalse — companion
pinning the symmetric contract; the mock pre-sets LastMustStaple=true
so a stuck-at-true bug surfaces.
internal/service/testutil_test.go +
internal/service/m11c_crypto_enforcement_test.go +
internal/service/issuer_adapter_test.go +
cmd/server/preflight_test.go
* Mock + fake IssuerConnector implementations gain the new mustStaple
bool param. mockIssuerConnector + capturingIssuerConnector also gain
a LastMustStaple / lastMustStaple field used by the new integration
tests to assert the wire reached the connector.
* Existing test call sites for adapter.IssueCertificate /
adapter.RenewCertificate gain a trailing 'false' arg (mechanical bulk
edit, no behavior change).
Verification:
* gofmt + go vet + staticcheck clean for all touched paths.
* go test -short -count=1 green across cmd/agent / cmd/cli /
cmd/mcp-server / cmd/server / api/handler / api/middleware /
api/router / service / scheduler / pkcs7 / connector/issuer/local /
every connector subpackage / domain / crypto / mcp / repository.
* The new TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_PlumbsMustStapleToIssuer test passes,
proving the wire works end-to-end.
The follow-up rule from cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules — 'can an
operator flip the configurable bit and observe the behavior change
end-to-end with no further code changes?' — is now YES for must-staple
on the SCEP + EST + agent + renewal paths.
Problem (CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function):
internal/service/scep.go PKCSReq skipped the shared-secret check when
s.challengePassword was empty. An unconfigured-but-enabled SCEP server
accepted any unauthenticated client reaching /scep and issued a
certificate against the configured issuer for any CSR with a valid
signature. No audit trail distinguished authenticated from
unauthenticated enrollments. This matches the two-layer fail-closed
pattern already used for C-2 (f549a7a): reject at startup AND reject
at the service boundary.
Fix (two layers, defense-in-depth):
Layer 1 — startup pre-flight in cmd/server/main.go:
preflightSCEPChallengePassword returns a non-nil error when SCEP is
enabled and CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD is empty. main logs and
os.Exit(1)s before the SCEP service is constructed. Disabled SCEP is
unaffected. The helper is unit-testable in isolation.
Layer 2 — service-layer rejection in internal/service/scep.go:
PKCSReq refuses enrollment when s.challengePassword == "" even though
main already blocks this state — protects future call sites (tests,
library reuse, a REST-over-HTTPS wrapper). When a secret is
configured, the comparison now uses crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
so response time does not leak the configured secret through a
short-circuiting byte compare.
Files:
- cmd/server/main.go: preflightSCEPChallengePassword helper; call site
inside the `if cfg.SCEP.Enabled` block before issuer lookup; fatal
slog error references CWE-306 and names the env var so operators can
diagnose the startup failure without reading code.
- cmd/server/main_test.go: TestPreflightSCEPChallengePassword with five
table-driven subtests (disabled empty, disabled set, enabled empty
rejected, enabled set, single-char boundary). The enabled-empty case
asserts the error string contains both CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD
and CWE-306 so the log message remains actionable.
- internal/config/config.go: SCEPConfig.ChallengePassword godoc now
states the field is REQUIRED when SCEP.Enabled and cross-references
preflightSCEPChallengePassword.
- internal/service/scep.go: imports crypto/subtle; PKCSReq rewritten
with the two-layer check; comment block cites H-2 / CWE-306 and the
constant-time rationale.
- internal/service/scep_test.go: existing tests that relied on the
vulnerable empty-password path now configure a secret on both sides.
TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_NotRequired is replaced by
TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_EmptyServerConfigRejected
which iterates ["", "any-value", "guess"] against an unconfigured
server and asserts "not configured" in the error. A new
TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_ConstantTimeLengthIndependence
exercises same-prefix-longer and wrong-case inputs to guard against a
regression from ConstantTimeCompare to a short-circuiting byte compare.
- internal/service/m11c_crypto_enforcement_test.go: four tests
(RejectsWeakKey, AcceptsStrongKey, MaxTTL_ForwardedToIssuer,
NoProfileRepo_PassesThrough) constructed NewSCEPService with an empty
challenge password and exercised PKCSReq through the now-rejected
vulnerable path. All four now configure "secret123" on both sides with
an inline H-2 comment; the crypto/MaxTTL/profile behavior they assert
is unchanged.
Wire-format / behavioral invariants preserved:
- RFC 8894 SCEP handler is untouched (internal/api/handler/scep.go and
internal/pkcs7/*): GetCACaps/GetCACert responses, PKIOperation request
parsing, and the PKCS#7 certs-only response format are byte-identical.
- RFC 7030 EST handler is untouched
(internal/api/handler/est.go + internal/pkcs7/*).
- Revocation idempotency composite key (H-1, migration 000012) untouched.
- AES-256-GCM config encryption (C-2) untouched.
- CRL DER bytes and OCSP response bytes unchanged.
Verification:
- go build ./... silent success
- go vet ./... silent success
- go test -race -count=1 ./internal/service/ ./cmd/server/
./internal/api/handler/ ./internal/integration/ all OK
- Coverage with comfortable headroom over CI gates:
service 67.8% (gate 55%)
handler 79.0% (gate 60%)
domain 92.7% (gate 40%)
middleware 80.0% (gate 30%)
cmd/server 1.6% (preflightSCEPChallengePassword: 100%)
internal/service/scep.go PKCSReq statement coverage: 100%.
- rg sweeps: no `s.challengePassword != ""` remains;
no `challengePassword != s.challengePassword` remains.
Operational note: operators with SCEP enabled but no challenge password
set will see a fatal startup error and a log line citing
CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD and CWE-306 after upgrading. This is the
intended fail-closed behavior. Fix by either setting the env var to a
non-empty shared secret or setting CERTCTL_SCEP_ENABLED=false.
Audit report: certctl-audit-report.md (revision 5) logs this under
H-2 Resolution Log.
Enforce certificate profile crypto constraints across all 5 issuance paths
(renewal, agent CSR, EST, SCEP). ValidateCSRAgainstProfile() rejects CSRs
with key algorithm/size that don't match profile rules. MaxTTL enforcement
caps certificate validity per issuer connector (Local CA, Vault, step-ca
enforce directly; ACME/DigiCert/Sectigo pass through). Key algorithm and
size are now persisted in certificate_versions for audit compliance.
16 new tests (12 service-layer + 4 Local CA connector). Removes hardcoded
version number from GUI sidebar. Documentation updated across architecture,
features, connectors, and README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
shankar0123