8 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
shankar0123	630831aeac	harden(audit+session): full SHA-256 audit hash + cookie segment length cap (MED-15 + Nit-4) ... Audit 2026-05-10 Fix 13 Phase F + Fix 14 Phase F partial — close MED-15 + Nit-4. Phases C/D/E/G of Fix 13 and the bulk of Fix 14 deferred to v3 with documented workarounds (see audit doc batch-deferral summary). MED-15: internal/api/middleware/audit.go::AuditLog now emits the full 64-hex-char SHA-256 hash instead of the prior [:16] truncation. The audit_events.body_hash schema column is already CHAR(64); the truncation was an integrity-collision hole — 64 bits is birthday-attack-feasible (~2^32 ~ 4B). Regression test TestAuditLog_HashesRequestBody updated to assert len(BodyHash) == 64. Nit-4: internal/auth/session/service.go::parseCookie adds a per-segment length cap (maxCookieSegmentLen = 4 KiB). Pre-fix, an attacker could send a 10MB cookie segment to amplify HMAC compute cost; the constant-time compare chews through the input regardless of outcome. The cap is loose enough that no legitimate client trips it (real cookies are <1KB total per segment), tight enough to bound attacker-extracted work per failed request. Deferred (with audit-doc closure annotations): - MED-4/5/6/7: OIDC GUI advanced fields + test endpoint + JWKS auto-refresh + JWKS health. v3 OIDC-operator-experience bundle. Workarounds documented. - MED-8/10/11/12: RBAC GUI scope picker / approval payload decode / UsersPage / runtime config panel. v3 GUI-polish bundle. Backend already accepts the scope_type/scope_id fields; the gap is GUI. - MED-13: MCP tools for approvals / break-glass / bootstrap. v3 MCP-expansion bundle. - MED-14: __Host- cookie rename. Risky (invalidates active sessions on rolling deploy); warrants own change-window. - MED-16/17: Pre-login UA/IP binding + RFC 9207 iss URL check. v3 OIDC-hardening bundle. - All 12 LOWs + 4 of 5 Nits: v3 cleanup bundle. Closure tally: 5 CRIT + 11 of 12 HIGH (HIGH-10 deferred) + 5 MEDs (MED-1/2/3/9/15) + Nit-4 closed in-bundle. The deferred set is ergonomics + observability polish that fits planned v3 bundles; no CRIT/HIGH-class risk surface remains exposed. Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-15, Nit-4 Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/13-med-bundle.md Phase F cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/14-low-nit-cleanup.md Phase F	2026-05-10 22:02:26 +00:00
shankar0123	99a012e3be	auth-bundle-1 Phase 0: extract internal/auth/ from middleware package ... Bundle 1 / Phase 0: pure refactor splitting auth surface out of internal/api/middleware so Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions) and the broader RBAC primitive (roles, permissions, scoped grants) have a clean home. Moved to internal/auth/: NamedAPIKey, HashAPIKey, AuthConfig, NewAuthWithNamedKeys, NewAuth, UserKey, AdminKey, GetUser, IsAdmin. Added testfixtures.go (WithActor / WithAdmin / WithActorAdmin) so handler tests don't construct context manually. Stayed in internal/api/middleware/: RequestID, Logging, NewLogging, Recovery, RateLimitConfig, NewRateLimiter (now imports auth.GetUser for per-user keying per audit Category C), CORSConfig, NewCORS, ContentType, CORS, GetRequestID, responseWriter, Chain, audit middleware (now imports auth.GetUser). Updated 22 caller files across cmd/, internal/api/handler/, internal/api/middleware/, internal/mcp/. Existing m008_admin_gate_test.go now scans for auth.IsAdmin( substring; Phase 3 will further evolve to track auth.RequirePermission. Behavior unchanged: all handler / middleware / service / connector / cmd / mcp tests pass with no test-logic edits, only import-path renames. Phase 0 exit criteria: internal/auth/ exists with 6 files; middleware.go went 575 -> 422 lines (auth-related ~150 lines moved out); grep -rE 'middleware\.(GetUser|IsAdmin|UserKey|AdminKey|NamedAPIKey|HashAPIKey|NewAuth)' returns 0 hits; context.WithValue(.*middleware.UserKey/AdminKey) returns 0 hits; go vet ./... clean; go test -short ./... green across all packages tested. Branch: dev/auth-bundle-1. Per cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md, do not merge to master without (1) make verify green, (2) >= 2 external testers confirm, (3) >= 90% coverage on internal/auth/ in .github/coverage-thresholds.yml.	2026-05-09 15:51:31 +00:00
shankar0123	7cb453a336	chore(fmt): repo-wide gofmt -w sweep — close drift surfaced by ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4 ... Mechanical reformat. The new 'gofmt drift' CI step (added in ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4, commit 0f205a8) surfaced 111 files with accumulated gofmt drift across cmd/, internal/, and deploy/test/. Each file's diff is gofmt-standard: whitespace adjustments, intra- group import sorting (alphabetical by import path within blank-line- separated groups), and struct-tag column alignment. No semantic changes — verified via 'git diff --ignore-all-space' which shows only the line-position deltas from import reordering. The gate stays in place after this commit. Going forward it catches gofmt drift at PR time.	2026-04-30 22:33:57 +00:00
shankar0123	3287e174dc	Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001) ... Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006) on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests, and the React client. M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash, principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel. * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware, bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer now read the principal off the context and persist it on every audit_events row. * Regression coverage: - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation, principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for unauthenticated endpoints. - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go, job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions. M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B) * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403 when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field. * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and viewers receive 403. * Regression coverage: - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf, TestRejectJob_NotSelf. - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go — TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds. M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto: GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id} Content-Type: application/pkix-crl (RFC 5280 §5) GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial} Content-Type: application/ocsp-response (RFC 6960) * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served. * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial. * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404. * Regression coverage: - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer. - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP. - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are mounted on the unauthenticated branch. M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002 EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in. Verification (all gates green): * go vet ./... — clean * go build ./... — ok * go test -short ./... (55+ packages) — all pass * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests) — all pass * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit — clean * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits, all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments. Documentation: * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 → Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.) * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification closure note. * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md, docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md, docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named API keys. * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths. .gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session- scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.	2026-04-18 18:17:41 +00:00
shankar0123	e3196e7b50	M-2 PR-F: Middleware/ACME ctx-propagation + contextcheck linter + audit closeout ... Final PR in the six-commit M-2 sequence (PR-A: CertificateService cluster cdc9d03, PR-B: IssuerService+TargetService eb14236, PR-C: Policy/Profile/ Owner/Team 2497be4, PR-D: Job/Notification/Audit ccd89c3, PR-E: AgentService 283ec27, PR-F: this commit). PR-A through PR-E collapsed the service-layer shim methods and deleted every in-production context.Background() / context.TODO() call from internal/service/; this PR completes the sweep across the non-service tiers (HTTP middleware + ACME connector) and wires the contextcheck linter so regressions fail CI. Three narrow edits land the D-3 pattern (context.WithoutCancel for subsidiary async writes and deferred shutdown contexts): - internal/api/middleware/audit.go -- async audit goroutine now runs on auditCtx := context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()) instead of context.Background(). Preserves request-scoped values (trace ID, auth) while detaching from the request's cancellation so the audit write does not get killed when the response completes. Goroutine is still tracked via a.wg (M-1 shutdown drain) so Flush(ctx) behaviour is unchanged. CWE-770 Missing Release (goroutine leak potential) + CWE-400 Resource Exhaustion (missed cancellation propagation). - internal/api/middleware/middleware.go -- Recovery panic path now logs via slog.ErrorContext(ctx, ...) instead of log.Printf. Request- scoped trace/auth metadata now carries through the panic log, matching every other request log. D-3 non-bypass: the context is r.Context() captured before the defer, so even a panic mid-handler propagates the ctx's trace ID into the ERROR log line. - internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go (HTTP-01 challenge server shutdown) -- defer shutdown context derived from context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 5s) instead of context.Background(). Preserves parent ctx values, detaches from parent cancellation so Shutdown always gets its full 5-second budget even when the parent was cancelled. Matches the same pattern applied in ACME's solveAuthorizationsDNS01 and solveAuthorizationsDNSPersist01. Linter wiring: .golangci.yml adds `contextcheck` to the enabled set. golangci-lint v2.11.4 now fails CI on any function that takes a context.Context parameter but calls into context.Background() or context.TODO() instead of propagating -- regression guard for all five prior PRs. Verification (CI parity, GOCACHE=/tmp/gocache GOMODCACHE=/tmp/gomodcache GOLANGCI_LINT_CACHE=/tmp/lintcache): - go build ./... -> 0 - go vet ./... -> 0 - golangci-lint run (contextcheck enabled) -> 0 issues - go test -race -short ./internal/api/middleware/... -> PASS - go test -race -short ./internal/scheduler/... -> PASS - go test -race -short ./internal/connector/issuer/acme/... -> PASS - go test -race -short ./internal/service/... -> PASS - rg "context\.(Background|TODO)\(\)" internal/service/ internal/scheduler/ internal/connector/ internal/api/middleware/ -> 0 non-test hits (one pedagogical godoc reference in audit.go documenting why context.Background() would be wrong remains intentional) Wire-format invariants preserved: 0 API routes, 0 SQL migrations, 0 frontend bytes, 0 OpenAPI bytes, 0 connector interface signature changes, 0 new env vars, 0 new external dependencies (pure context stdlib). The AuditRecorder interface signature, the body-hash algorithm (SHA-256 16 hex chars), the excluded-path short-circuit, the actor-extraction path, the responseWriter status-capture wrapper, the AuditServiceAdapter, and all 116 API routes under /api/v1/, /.well-known/est/, /scep, /health, /auth are byte-identical. M-2 aggregate across PR-A through PR-F: 57 files, +635 / -613 (PR-A 12f +227/-237, PR-B 9f +150/-146, PR-C 17f +156/-148, PR-D 11f +67/-63, PR-E 4f +9/-15, PR-F 4f +26/-4). With M-2 closed, 8 of 10 Medium findings resolved; M-9, M-10, L-1..L-4, I-1..I-8 remain post-v2.1.0 hardening batch. Audit complete. Commit: 1f6cf0eafa. Sections: 12. Findings: 2/7/10/4/6.	2026-04-18 01:43:47 +00:00
shankar0123	d14a45401b	fix(audit): drain in-flight recording goroutines on shutdown (M-1) ... Audit events spawned from the HTTP middleware ran in detached goroutines using context.Background(). On SIGTERM the DB pool was closed before those goroutines finished writing, silently dropping audit events (CWE-662 Improper Synchronization / CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption). NewAuditLog now returns an *AuditMiddleware struct that tracks every spawned goroutine with sync.WaitGroup. Callers wire the middleware via its Middleware method value (preserves the existing func(http.Handler) http.Handler shape) and drain the WaitGroup with Flush(ctx), which blocks until in-flight recordings complete or the provided context is cancelled — mirroring scheduler.WaitForCompletion. Flush is invoked in cmd/server/main.go between http.Server.Shutdown (no new requests accepted) and db.Close (pool torn down), with a timeout returning ErrAuditFlushTimeout wrapping ctx.Err(). Request-derived inputs (method, path, status) are snapshotted before the goroutine spawn so the worker does not race with http.Server reusing r after the handler returns. Tests: TestAuditLog_FlushDrainsInFlightGoroutines TestAuditLog_FlushTimeoutReturnsErrAuditFlushTimeout Verification: go build ./... : 0 go vet ./... : 0 go test -race -short ./... : 0 (all packages) go test -cover ./internal/api/middleware : 81.4% golangci-lint run : 0 issues govulncheck ./... : 0 vulns in called code	2026-04-17 17:29:48 +00:00
shankar0123	6d508cf53f	fix: security audit remediation (AUDIT-001, 003, 004, 005, 006, 018) ... - AUDIT-001: Validate OpenSSL revoke inputs (hex-only serials, RFC 5280 reasons) - AUDIT-003: Enforce /20 CIDR size cap at API level (create + update) - AUDIT-004: Support comma-separated CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET for zero-downtime key rotation - AUDIT-005: Add ReadHeaderTimeout (5s) to prevent Slowloris - AUDIT-006: Document audit trail query parameter exclusion rationale - AUDIT-018: Add immediate-run-on-start to short-lived expiry scheduler loop Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-28 14:11:16 -04:00
shankar0123	9b0ff37973	feat: M19 API audit log + M16a notifier connectors (Slack, Teams, PagerDuty, OpsGenie) ... M19: HTTP middleware records every API call to the immutable audit trail with method, path, actor, SHA-256 body hash, status, and latency. Best-effort async recording via goroutine. Health/ready probes excluded. M16a: Four pluggable notifier connectors — Slack (incoming webhook), Teams (MessageCard), PagerDuty (Events API v2), OpsGenie (Alert API v2). Each enabled by config env var. 30 new tests across middleware and connectors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-23 17:58:14 -04:00