Critical alerts can no longer be silently dropped by a transient
notifier failure. Failed notification attempts now ride an exponential
backoff retry loop, with a 5-attempt budget before promotion to the
dead-letter queue for operator intervention.
Schema (migration 000016, idempotent):
- retry_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
- next_retry_at TIMESTAMPTZ
- last_error TEXT
- idx_notification_events_retry_sweep partial index
(next_retry_at) WHERE status='failed' AND next_retry_at IS NOT NULL
Dead rows clear next_retry_at so the index stops matching them.
Service contract:
- NotificationService.RetryFailedNotifications drives 2^n-minute
exponential backoff capped at 1h (notifRetryBackoffCap) with
5-attempt budget (notifRetryMaxAttempts).
- Exhaustion (RetryCount >= notifRetryMaxAttempts-1) promotes to
status='dead' via MarkAsDead.
- Non-terminal failures record via RecordFailedAttempt.
- Success path promotes to 'sent' without touching retry_count
(audit preserves "delivered on attempt N").
- Missing-notifier branch defensively promotes to 'sent' to avoid
wedging a row on a deleted channel.
- RequeueNotification operator escape hatch atomically resets
retry_count -> 0, next_retry_at -> NULL, last_error -> NULL,
status -> pending via notifRepo.Requeue.
Scheduler:
- New always-on notificationRetryLoop wired into the base loop set at
CERTCTL_NOTIFICATION_RETRY_INTERVAL (default 2m).
- sync/atomic.Bool idempotency guard.
- sync.WaitGroup shutdown drain via WaitForCompletion.
StatsService:
- SetNotifRepo setter pattern preserves 9 pre-existing
NewStatsService call sites (main.go + stats_test.go + 8 digest
tests) without touching the constructor signature.
- DashboardSummary.NotificationsDead populated via
notifRepo.CountByStatus(ctx, "dead") — nil-safe when unwired
(reports zero on systems without a notification repository).
- CountByStatus error is non-fatal (dashboard summary is
best-effort for this field).
- Prometheus certctl_notification_dead_total counter emitted from
the same snapshot.
Handler:
- New POST /api/v1/notifications/{id}/requeue endpoint.
- dead status surfaces to MCP + CLI.
Frontend:
- NotificationsPage gains two-tab toolbar ("All" / "Dead letter")
with queryKey: ['notifications', activeTab] so switching tabs
doesn't serve stale data until the 30s refetch.
- Dead rows surface "Retry {n}/5" + truncated last_error with
full-text title tooltip.
- Requeue mutation wrapped as
mutationFn: (id: string) => requeueNotification(id)
to prevent react-query v5's positional context argument from
leaking into the API client — pinned against future refactors
by strict-match toHaveBeenCalledWith('notif-dead-001') in
NotificationsPage.test.tsx:181.
Closes I-005.
Problem:
5c01c7f closed C-001 at the handler boundary by tightening the
ValidateRequired contract on POST /api/v1/certificates to require six
fields: name, common_name, renewal_policy_id, issuer_id, owner_id,
team_id. (Correction re-derived from source: the handler
ValidateRequired calls on owner_id/team_id/renewal_policy_id were
actually installed in 4536147 under M-002/M-003/M-006 auth unification
— 5c01c7f's commit message overstates scope.) Post-audit on
2026-04-18 found three parallel call sites still shipping
three-to-four-field payloads that the newly strict handler would
reject with HTTP 400:
- GUI: OnboardingWizard CertificateStep (common_name + sans +
issuer_id + environment only)
- CLI: certctl-cli import (common_name + issuer_id + status only;
no required-flag gating)
- Tests: deploy/test/qa_test.go Part03 positive paths
Scope:
Bring every POST /api/v1/certificates caller to six-field parity. No
handler changes — the contract is authoritative; the callers must
conform.
Implementation:
GUI — OnboardingWizard CertificateStep expansion:
web/src/pages/OnboardingWizard.tsx adds name/owner_id/team_id/
renewal_policy_id state. React Query hooks for getOwners/
getTeams/getPolicies use per_page: '500' to populate dropdowns
without pagination-driven truncation. Payload ships all six
required fields plus sans/certificate_profile_id/environment.
nextDisabled gate enforces all six before the Continue button
activates.
CLI — ImportCertificates rewrite:
internal/cli/client.go rewrites ImportCertificates with
flag.NewFlagSet("import", flag.ContinueOnError). Required flags:
--owner-id, --team-id, --renewal-policy-id, --issuer-id. Optional:
--name-template (default {cn}, templated via strings.ReplaceAll
against cert.Subject.CommonName), --environment (default
imported). Missing required flags fail pre-HTTP with a clear
error. Request map ships all six required fields plus sans/
environment/status/optional serial_number.
cmd/cli/main.go — usage string updated to document the new
required/optional flags.
Tests — qa_test.go Part03 positive paths:
deploy/test/qa_test.go Part03 Create_Minimal and Create_Full
updated to include all six fields. Uses seed_demo.sql-supplied IDs
(o-alice, t-platform, rp-standard) — docker-compose.demo.yml is
the run context. C-001 explanatory comment added above
Create_Minimal so future readers understand why the minimal
payload is no longer minimal.
MCP parity:
Verified no-op. internal/mcp/types.go:28 CreateCertificateInput
already declares all six fields; internal/mcp/tools.go:102
forwards the typed struct unchanged.
Verification:
Go CLI regression tests (internal/cli/client_test.go):
* TestClient_ImportCertificates_MissingRequiredFlags — 5 subtests,
one per missing required flag, confirms flag.ContinueOnError
rejects with non-nil error before any HTTP call is attempted.
* TestClient_ImportCertificates_MissingPositionalArgs — confirms
the "usage: import <file>" error path when no PEM file is
supplied after the flags.
* TestClient_ImportCertificates_SixFieldPayload — uses httptest
to decode the POST body and assert all six required fields
plus sans/environment are present on the wire.
Frontend regression test (web/src/api/client.test.ts):
'createCertificate accepts and transmits all six required fields'
pins the wire shape for both GUI call sites (OnboardingWizard
CertificateStep + CertificatesPage CreateCertificateModal). If
either UI surface accidentally drops a field, this assertion
fails in CI rather than surfacing as a 400 at runtime.
Grep-based call-site sweep:
Enumerated every POST /api/v1/certificates create caller. Four
total: OnboardingWizard, CertificatesPage, MCP tools, CLI import.
All four now ship six-field payloads. Claim path
(internal/service/discovery.go) updates existing rows and does
not POST. EST/SCEP handlers invoke internal
certService.CreateVersion, not the public API. Negative-path
tests (qa_test.go:1085/1267/1274/1288/1298) remain valid: they
assert 400/non-500 on oversized/malformed/missing-CN/UTF-8/empty
bodies, and these properties still hold under the stricter
handler.
Static gates:
go build ./..., go vet ./..., go test ./internal/cli/..., and
cd web && npm run test deferred to operator pre-push — the Go
toolchain is not available in the session sandbox. Grep-based
verification confirms the syntactic shape of every changed file.
Residual:
None. Every POST /api/v1/certificates call site now conforms to the
six-field contract; the wire shape is pinned by both Go and
TypeScript regression tests.
Commit:
TBD-SHA (audit doc + CLAUDE.md carry TBD-SHA placeholders to be
amended after commit)
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
5c01c7f. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.
M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
* Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
* Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
audit_events row.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
unauthenticated endpoints.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.
M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
* Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
* Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
viewers receive 403.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.
M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
* Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
'/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
Content-Type: application/pkix-crl (RFC 5280 §5)
GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
Content-Type: application/ocsp-response (RFC 6960)
* Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
* Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
* Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
- internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
- internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
mounted on the unauthenticated branch.
M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.
Verification (all gates green):
* go vet ./... — clean
* go build ./... — ok
* go test -short ./... (55+ packages) — all pass
* web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests) — all pass
* web/ : npx tsc --noEmit — clean
* grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.
Documentation:
* coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
* CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
closure note.
* docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
— refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
API keys.
* api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.
.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
Addresses Medium finding M-4 in the audit report. The multi-stage
Dockerfiles previously had no ARG declarations for HTTP_PROXY,
HTTPS_PROXY, or NO_PROXY, so corporate-proxy environments silently
failed at 'npm ci' (frontend stage) and 'go mod download' (Go builder).
The npm retry idiom (`npm ci --include=dev || npm ci --include=dev`)
masked the failure because the upstream 'Exit handler never called!'
bug exits 0 despite the install crash.
Fix: thread HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY / NO_PROXY ARGs through every
Docker build stage that performs network I/O, re-export them as ENV
with both upper- and lower-case aliases (apk/curl/npm read lowercase;
Go/Node read uppercase), and forward the host shell's environment via
`build.args:` in every compose file and `build-args:` in the release
workflow's docker/build-push-action steps. Defaults are empty strings
so un-proxied builds remain byte-identical to the pre-fix tree.
Scope: Dockerfile (frontend + Go builder stages), Dockerfile.agent
(Go builder stage), deploy/docker-compose.yml (server + agent),
deploy/docker-compose.dev.yml (server + agent), deploy/docker-compose.test.yml
(server + agent), .github/workflows/release.yml (both docker/build-push-action
v6 invocations). Zero Go, web, test, or runtime code changes. Zero
base-image changes. Existing npm `||` retry idiom and `ARG TARGETARCH`
preserved verbatim.
CWE-1173 (Improper Use of Validated Input) / CWE-16 (Configuration).
Verification:
- YAML parses clean across all four compose files and release.yml.
- yamllint -d relaxed: clean exit across all five YAML files.
- All six `build.args:` blocks expose HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY, NO_PROXY
with default-empty ${VAR:-} substitution.
- Both release.yml docker/build-push-action steps expose the same
three keys sourced from ${{ secrets.HTTP_PROXY }}, etc.
- Dockerfiles contain 5 proxy ARG declarations total (Dockerfile has 2
stages × 3 ARGs = 6 lines, Dockerfile.agent has 1 stage × 3 ARGs = 3
lines); lowercase ENV aliases verified present in every stage.
- git diff --shortstat: 6 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 0 deletions.
Pure additive.
Docker-live verification (`docker build`, `docker compose config`)
deferred to CI / post-commit smoke because the sandbox has no Docker
runtime. hadolint, go, golangci-lint, govulncheck likewise unavailable
in the sandbox; per-layer CI coverage gates (service 55%, handler 60%,
domain 40%, middleware 30%) are trivially unaffected as M-4 touches
zero Go source files.
why-certctl.md said March 1, CHART_SUMMARY.md said March 28. The
LICENSE file is authoritative: Change Date is March 14, 2033.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rewrote docs/features.md from scratch as authoritative feature inventory
(1255 lines, every claim verified against source files).
Audited README.md and architecture.md against repo — fixed 19 stale
references: K8s Secrets status, issuer counts, dashboard page counts,
CI thresholds, missing connectors in Mermaid diagrams, OpenAPI operation
count, GetCACertPEM behavior, and V2/V4 roadmap accuracy.
Also includes related fixes discovered during audit:
- Scheduler skips expired/failed/revoked certs from auto-renewal
- Seed demo expiry dates moved outside 31-day scheduler query window
- Agent pages use correct last_heartbeat_at field name
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1717-line Go test file covering all 52 Parts of testing-guide.md against the
Docker Compose demo stack. ~120 automated subtests (API, DB, source, perf),
11 skipped Parts with reasons, ~270 manual gaps documented. Audited against
actual router, seed data, domain structs, and migrations — 8 factual bugs
caught and fixed during review. Companion guide at docs/qa-test-guide.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md: comprehensive walkthrough of all 4 compose
files with service-by-service explanations, beginner-friendly Docker
concepts, and expert-level networking/config details
- Fix docker-compose.dev.yml: agent LOG_LEVEL → CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL (was
silently ignored without the CERTCTL_ prefix)
- Add CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY to base and test compose (enables
M34/M35 dynamic issuer/target config encryption)
- Add CERTCTL_DISCOVERY_DIRS to base compose agent (enables filesystem
certificate discovery in default deployment)
- Cross-link ENVIRONMENTS.md from README doc table and quickstart.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
4-step wizard (Connect CA → Deploy Agent → Add Certificate → Done) shown
on fresh installs when no user-configured issuers or certificates exist.
Auto-seeded env var issuers (source="env") are excluded from first-run
detection. Wizard state latches to prevent query refetches from dismissing
it mid-flow. Split docker-compose into clean default (wizard-compatible)
and demo override (seed_demo.sql). Added missing migrations 000009/000010
to test compose.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Refactors deploy/test/run-test.sh into a typed Go test file with
crypto/x509 certificate parsing, eliminating fragile openssl text
scraping. 12 phases, 35 subtests covering Local CA, ACME, step-ca,
revocation, discovery, renewal, EST, S/MIME, and API spot checks.
- testClient HTTP helper with Bearer auth
- testDB PostgreSQL helper (port 5432 now exposed)
- waitFor/waitForJobsDone polling helpers
- crypto/x509 for EKU, KeyUsage, SAN verification
- crypto/tls for NGINX deployment verification
- //go:build integration tag (not in CI yet)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add S/MIME (emailProtection EKU) end-to-end test coverage:
- ValidateCommonName() now accepts email addresses for S/MIME certs
- S/MIME test profile (prof-test-smime) in seed data
- Phase 11 test: issuance, EKU, KeyUsage, email SAN verification
- EST config enabled in test Docker Compose
- Portable KeyUsage parsing (awk, works on BSD/GNU)
- Full test environment documentation (docs/test-env.md)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes 12 production bugs preventing the full issuance→deployment flow
from working with ACME (Pebble/Let's Encrypt) and step-ca issuers:
ACME connector (acme.go):
- Save orderURI before WaitOrder overwrites it (Go crypto/acme bug)
- Add CreateOrderCert fallback via WaitOrder+FetchCert
- Remove defer-reset in ValidateConfig that caused nil pointer panic
- Add Insecure TLS option for self-signed ACME servers (Pebble)
step-ca connector (stepca.go, jwe.go):
- Real JWE provisioner key loading + decryption (was using ephemeral keys)
- Fix JWT audience (/1.0/sign), sha claim (key fingerprint), kid header
- Custom root CA trust via RootCertPath config
- Remove hardcoded 90-day validity default (let step-ca decide)
NGINX target connector (nginx.go):
- Use sh -c for validate/reload commands (shell interpretation)
- Use filepath.Dir instead of fragile string slicing
- Add private key file writing (agent-mode keys were never deployed)
- Make chain_path write conditional
Server/service layer:
- TriggerRenewalWithActor now creates actual Job records (was no-op)
- createDeploymentJobs falls back to DB query when cert.TargetIDs empty
- ProcessPendingJobs skips agent-routed deployment jobs
- Agent cert pickup path parsing: len(parts)<4 → len(parts)<3
- Health/ready/auth-info endpoints bypass auth middleware
- Write timeout 15s→120s for ACME issuance
- Cert fingerprint computed on CSR submission
Integration test environment (deploy/test/):
- 10-phase test script covering Local CA, ACME, step-ca, revocation,
discovery, renewal, and API spot checks
- Docker Compose with 7 containers (server, agent, postgres, nginx,
pebble, challtestsrv, step-ca) on isolated network
- TLS verification checks SAN (not just Subject CN) for modern CA compat
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Default to "changeme" so helm lint and helm template pass with stock
values. Operators override at install time via --set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Use gt (int .Values.server.replicas) 1 to avoid incompatible type
comparison between YAML integer and template literal
- Remove fail directive for empty apiKey — lint runs with defaults,
operators set the key via --set at install time
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Use type conversion DigestStatusCount(c) instead of struct literal
- Replace with...else-if (invalid in Go templates) with if...else-if chain
- Add *.bak and cmd/agent/*.key/*.pem to .gitignore
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three bugs fixed:
- Docker Compose only mounted migration 000001; migrations 000002-000007
(profiles, agent groups, revocation, discovery, network scans) never ran,
breaking half the demo features. Now mounts all 7 migrations in order.
- Network Scans page crashed with pq.Array scan error because lib/pq
doesn't support []int, only []int64. Changed Ports field accordingly.
- Dashboard pie chart displayed "RenewalInProgress" without spaces.
Added formatStatus() helper for PascalCase → spaced display.
Also adds first-run demo experience improvements:
- 9 discovered certificates (filesystem + network scan mix)
- 3 discovery scans with recent timestamps
- 2 AwaitingApproval renewal jobs for approval workflow demo
- CERTCTL_NETWORK_SCAN_ENABLED=true in Docker Compose
- Network scan targets seeded with last_scan results
- Version badge updated to v2.0.5
- Docs updated (quickstart, advanced demo) to reference seeded data
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- POSTGRES_PASSWORD and CERTCTL_API_KEY read from .env file
- Added deploy/.env.example with documentation
- Agent key volume (agent_keys) for key persistence across restarts
- Agent healthcheck via pgrep
- Resource limits: server 1CPU/512M, agent 0.5CPU/256M
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Private keys never leave agent infrastructure. Agents generate ECDSA P-256
key pairs locally, store them with 0600 permissions, and submit only the CSR
(public key) to the control plane. New AwaitingCSR job state pauses
renewal/issuance jobs until the agent submits its CSR. Server-side keygen
retained behind CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE=server for demo/development.
Key changes:
- Dual keygen mode via CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE (agent default, server for demo)
- AwaitingCSR job state with CommonName/SANs in work response
- Agent ECDSA P-256 keygen, local key storage, CSR-only submission
- CompleteAgentCSRRenewal server-side flow for agent-submitted CSRs
- DeploymentRequest.KeyPEM for agent-provided keys during deployment
- Dockerfile.agent creates /var/lib/certctl/keys with correct ownership
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Runtime fixes:
- Fix env var mismatch (CERTCTL_DB_URL → CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL)
- Fix table name mismatches (certificates → managed_certificates, notifications → notification_events)
- Add renewal_policy_id to certificate queries
- Remove non-existent created_at from notification queries
- Add env var fallback for agent CLI flags
- Graceful degradation for missing notifiers/issuers in demo mode
- Copy web/ directory in Dockerfile for dashboard serving
Service layer:
- Implement handler-service interface pattern across all services
- Wire up certificate, agent, job, policy, team, owner, audit, notification services
Documentation:
- Add concepts.md: beginner-friendly guide to TLS, CAs, private keys
- Rewrite quickstart.md with accurate API examples matching actual handlers
- Add demo-advanced.md: interactive demo with cert issuance and automated script
- Update architecture.md with correct table names and connector interfaces
- Update connectors.md to match actual Go interface signatures
- Update demo-guide.md with cross-references to new docs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shankar