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5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
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56e2ea1ad7 |
docs: v2.1.0 release polish — strip internal bundle/phase tags, update status for OIDC ship
README:
- Rewrite Status block: drop the stale 'federated identity not yet
shipped' line; flag v2.1.0 OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout
+ break-glass as early-access; encourage GitHub issues for IdP
rough edges. (A1 framing — keep early-access umbrella, no
SAML/WebAuthn/JIT roadmap teaser.)
- Add OIDC SSO bullet to 'What it does' covering per-IdP runbooks,
group-claim → role mapping, AES-256-GCM client_secret encryption,
JWKS auto-refresh, PKCE-S256, RFC 9700 §4.7.1 pre-login binding,
RFC 9207 iss check, __Host- cookies, CSRF rotation, idle+absolute
expiry, BCL, break-glass admin.
- Update Security paragraph: three auth paths (API keys / OIDC /
break-glass), HMAC-signed sessions, CSRF rotation, RFC OIDC BCL.
- Correct CI coverage thresholds against
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml (service 70%, handler 75%,
crypto 88%, auth packages 85-95%); 'static analysis' replaces
the inflated '11 linters' claim (actual count is 4 active).
Docs B3 sweep — strip operator-facing 'Bundle N' / 'Phase N' tags:
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md — rewrite intro; rename 5 H2
sections (API-key + RBAC defenses / OIDC + sessions + break-glass
defenses / OIDC + sessions threat catalogue / Closed federated-
identity threats / Future-work threats); clean ~12 H3/prose hits.
- docs/operator/rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from intro,
scope_id deferral note, MCP tools section, day-0 bootstrap, and
'Where to look next'.
- docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md — drop 'Phase 14' framing from
title intro, hardware floor caption, result table caption,
methodology, and pre-merge audit section.
- docs/operator/security.md — already cleaned earlier this session
(RBAC / day-0 / approval-bypass / OIDC federation / sessions /
OIDC first-admin / break-glass H3s).
- docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/{index,keycloak,authentik,okta,
azure-ad}.md — strip Auth Bundle 2 framing + Phase 10/3/4
references; replace with feature-name prose.
- docs/operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md — drop Bundle F / M-023
audit-reference framing; keep CWE-326.
- docs/operator/database-tls.md — drop Bundle B / M-018 framing
from intro + Helm section.
- docs/operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md — drop 'Production
hardening II Phase 10' status callout.
- docs/migration/oidc-enable.md — retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO';
strip Bundle 1/2 framing from prereqs, troubleshooting, related
docs; update __Host- cookie callout from 'audit MED-14' to
v2.1.0-BREAKING.
- docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from
intro, migration table, IsAdmin section, and cross-references.
- docs/migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md — strip residual
'Phase 5' tags from cert-manager integration test references.
- docs/reference/configuration.md — retitle Auth section.
- docs/reference/profiles.md — strip Bundle 1 Phase 9 framing
from RequiresApproval section + Related list.
- docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md — rewrite intro
(API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout +
break-glass); rename 'Bundle 1 (RBAC) standards covered
separately' H2; clean per-row Phase references.
- docs/README.md — rewrite nav-table entries to drop Bundle 1/2
parentheticals; retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO' migration entry.
No code or test changes; pure operator-facing prose polish for
the v2.1.0 tag.
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shankar0123
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fefeccfa59 |
harden(oidc): relax alg-downgrade IdP-bind check to intersection-empty (Keycloak compat)
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (Keycloak 26.x via testcontainers-go) revealed
the IdP-bind alg-downgrade check was too strict for real-world IdPs.
6 of the integration tests in internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak*_test.go
were failing with:
oidc: IdP advertises weak signing algorithms (HS*/none);
refusing to use as defense against downgrade attacks: HS256
Keycloak 26.x (and several other real-world IdPs — Auth0 when HS-mode is
enabled, some Authentik configs) advertise EVERY alg they're capable of
in the discovery doc's id_token_signing_alg_values_supported field, even
when the realm only signs with RS256 in practice. Pre-fix the IdP-bind
check refused on ANY HS* or 'none' advertisement → no real Keycloak deploy
could ever bind a provider row, hence the integration-test failures.
The strict-deny check was defense-in-depth on top of the load-bearing
per-token alg-pin at sig-verify time (isDisallowedAlg, service.go L1177):
that check rejects every ID token whose JWS header carries an alg outside
DefaultAllowedAlgs, regardless of what the discovery doc advertises.
A forged HS256 token signed with the IdP's RS256 pubkey as HMAC secret
is rejected at sig-verify time → the actual algorithm-confusion attack
is closed by the per-token pin, NOT by the discovery-doc check.
Fix: relax the IdP-bind check to refuse only when the intersection of
advertised vs DefaultAllowedAlgs is EMPTY (the pathological all-weak-alg
IdP case). Keycloak (RS256 + HS256 advertised) now binds successfully;
an HS-only IdP still fails closed.
Changes:
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go: rewrite the alg-check loop at L1067 in
getOrLoad / RefreshKeys to compute the intersection set; refuse only
when no acceptable alg is advertised. ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised
docstring updated to reflect new contract. DefaultAllowedAlgs
docstring + the package-level design-comment block at L40-72 updated
with v2.1.0-relaxed semantics callouts.
- internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go: TestDiscovery dry-run validator
rewritten to surface HS*/none alongside RS* as an informational note
('note: IdP advertises weak algorithms %v alongside acceptable ones')
rather than a hard-fail error. HS-only / none-only still hard-fails.
- internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go: TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_*
tests updated. Renamed:
- RejectsHSAdvertised → RS256PlusHS256_BindsSuccessfully (positive)
- RejectsNoneAdvertised → RejectsHSOnlyAdvertised (intersection-empty)
- RefreshKeys_CatchesPostLoadDowngrade rotated to HS-only post-load
- internal/auth/oidc/coverage_fill_test.go: TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngradeDetected
split into _HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote (positive, asserts note
but no hard-fail) + _HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail (intersection-empty).
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md: OIDC token-validation alg-allow-list
section rewritten to call out the load-bearing-defense hierarchy
(per-token pin first, IdP-bind check defense-in-depth) and document
the v2.1.0 relaxation rationale.
- CHANGELOG.md: ### Security entry under Unreleased.
Verify: go test ./internal/auth/oidc/ -short PASS; gofmt clean; go vet
clean. The Keycloak integration tests should now pass when the operator
re-runs 'make keycloak-integration-test'.
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shankar0123
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5e2accbf5f |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 12: extend auth-threat-model.md with Bundle 2 sections (OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout + OIDC first-admin + break-glass + 8 Bundle 2 threat sub-sections)
Closes Phase 12 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. The single
canonical operator-facing threat model (one doc per topic per the
docs convention) now covers both Bundle 1 (RBAC) AND Bundle 2 (OIDC
+ sessions + back-channel logout + OIDC first-admin + break-glass)
in one place.
File: docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md (MODIFIED, +485 LOC)
Conventions held
================
* The Bundle 1 sections ("Threat actors", "Defenses Bundle 1
ships", "Threats Bundle 1 does NOT close", "Compliance mapping",
"Operator-facing checks", "Cross-references") stay structurally
intact. Bundle 2 EXTENDS them; nothing is rewritten in place.
* `Last reviewed:` header bumped 2026-05-09 → 2026-05-10.
* Per the prompt's explicit instruction: "do NOT create a separate
auth-threat-model-bundle-2.md companion." This commit is a
single-file extension.
Changes
=======
Intro paragraph rewritten:
* From "Bundle 1 lands... Bundle 2 will be updated" to "Bundle 1
AND Bundle 2 land." Sets the reader's expectation that this is
the post-Bundle-2 doc.
Threat actors section (4 new actors appended):
* OIDC-federated end user (token-forgery / session-hijacking /
group-claim-manipulation surface).
* Stolen session cookie holder (XSS / network MITM / pasted-token).
* Compromised IdP (rogue token issuance; mitigations bounded to
audit trail + group-mapping configuration).
* Break-glass-password holder (Phase 7.5 path bypasses OIDC + group
layer entirely; default-OFF is the load-bearing mitigation).
NEW: Defenses Bundle 2 ships (5 sub-sections):
* OIDC token validation (Phase 3) — alg allow-list, IdP-downgrade
defense, exact iss match, aud + azp checks, at_hash
REQUIRED-when-access_token-present (Phase 3 tightening of OIDC
core's MAY → MUST), single-use state + nonce, PKCE-S256 mandatory,
iat window, JWKS rotation handling, JWKS-fetch-fail closed,
encrypted client_secret at rest.
* Session minting + cookies (Phases 4 + 6) — length-prefixed HMAC
defeating concatenation collision, HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite
cookie hardening, idle + absolute timeouts, CSRF defense via
double-submit-cookie + hashed-token-on-row, optional IP/UA bind,
signing-key rotation primitive with retention window, fail-fatal
EnsureInitialSigningKey at boot, pre-login vs post-login cookie
discrimination.
* Back-channel logout (Phase 5) — OpenID Connect Back-Channel
Logout 1.0 (NOT RFC 8414), required-claim pinning, jti-based
replay defense, alg allow-list applies, Cache-Control: no-store.
* OIDC first-admin bootstrap (Phase 7) — coexists with Bundle 1's
env-var-token bootstrap, group-scoped, one-shot per tenant via
admin-existence probe, explicit OIDC provider gate, audit row on
every grant.
* Break-glass admin (Phase 7.5) — default-OFF, surface-invisibility
via 404-not-403, Argon2id with OWASP 2024 params, lockout state
machine, constant-time across all failure paths via verifyDummy,
WARN log at boot when ENABLED=true, 5/min rate limit on the
public login endpoint.
NEW: Bundle 2 threat catalogue (8 sub-sections, one per
prompt-enumerated threat axis):
1. OIDC token forgery vectors and mitigations (9-row table covering
alg confusion, audience injection, issuer mismatch, nonce replay,
state replay, at_hash substitution, iat window manipulation,
JWKS rotation mid-login, JWKS-fetch failure during a key
rotation).
2. Session hijacking vectors and mitigations (7-row table covering
XSS cookie theft, network MITM, CSRF, concatenation-collision
forgery, stolen-cookie replay, cross-tab interference, sign-out
race).
3. IdP compromise scenarios (operator monitors IdP audit logs,
operator can rotate group-role mappings without redeploying,
audit trail records source provider, provider-delete returns
409 with active sessions).
4. Back-channel logout failure modes (6-row table covering IdP
unreachable, invalid signature, replay via jti, alg confusion,
missing events claim, present-nonce-claim).
5. Group-claim manipulation (4-row table covering operator
misconfigured mapping, misconfigured groups_claim_path, IdP
renames a group, IdP user maintainer adds user to unintended
group).
6. Bootstrap phase risks post-Bundle-2 (4-row table covering
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN leak, CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS
misconfigured to a wide group, both bootstrap strategies
simultaneously, multi-IdP without explicit provider gate).
7. Break-glass risks (7-row table covering phished password,
online brute-force, offline brute-force on DB compromise,
operator forgets to disable, side-channel timing on
wrong-vs-no-credential-vs-locked, surface fingerprinting,
reserved-actor mutation).
8. Token-leak hygiene (the explicit grep policy with three
per-package logging_test.go pointers + the audit_redact.go
defense-in-depth note).
Threats Bundle 1 does NOT close section relabeled:
* Section header now reads "Threats Bundle 1 does NOT close
(Bundle 2 closure status)" with each item carrying ✅ / ⚠️ /
"still deferred" markers.
* Items 1, 2, 3, 8 marked ✅ closed by Bundle 2.
* Items 4, 5, 7, 9 marked still-deferred with v3 / follow-on
pointers.
* Item 6 (rate limiting on bootstrap) marked acceptable; Bundle 2
adds the same rate-limit primitive to /auth/breakglass/login.
NEW: Threats Bundle 2 does NOT close section listing the 8 v3 /
future-work items:
* WebAuthn / FIDO2 second factor (Decision 12).
* Time-bound role grants / JIT elevation.
* SAML federation (operators broker through Keycloak).
* Multi-tenant data isolation activation (gated to managed-service
hosting work).
* HSM / FIPS-validated signing key for sessions.
* OIDC RP-initiated logout (Bundle 2 implements only back-channel).
* GUI E2E via Playwright.
* Per-IdP runbook external-tester sign-off (encouraged, NOT a merge
gate post-2026-05-10 policy change).
Operator-facing checks section extended:
* 6 new SQL-shaped checks for Bundle 2 (provider count drift,
per-actor session count, unmapped-groups audit-row spike,
break-glass usage outside incidents, OIDC first-admin one-row-per-
tenant invariant, retired-signing-key GC liveness).
Cross-references section split into Bundle 1 anchors + Bundle 2
anchors:
* Bundle 2 anchors enumerate every load-bearing file: 6
internal/auth/ packages, 5 migrations, 3 ci-guards.
Compliance mapping section UNCHANGED:
* Phase 15 (standards-and-RFC-implementation table) is the proper
home for the RFC + CWE evidence the Bundle 2 surface adds.
Re-introducing framework-mapping prose at the threat-model layer
would regress the operator's 2026-05-05 retired-compliance-docs
decision, which is explicitly forbidden by the Phase 15 prompt.
Verification
============
* `> Last reviewed: 2026-05-10` — confirmed via head -3.
* All 8 prompt-mandated Bundle 2 threat sub-sections present —
confirmed via grep `^### ` count (19 ### headers total: 6 Bundle
1 + 5 Bundle 2 defenses + 8 Bundle 2 threats).
* All 39 prompt-listed threat-vector keywords present — confirmed
via single-line grep counting 39 hits across the prompt's
vocabulary.
* Internal markdown links resolve cleanly — confirmed via shell
loop iterating each `]( ...)` reference and checking `[ -e "$path" ]`.
* No backend / Go-test impact — pure docs commit.
* `make verify` gate unchanged.
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shankar0123
|
5313cd8492 |
auth-bundle-1 Phase 13 follow-up: em-dash sweep + broken-link fix
Self-audit on
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shankar0123
|
e7a94b6080 |
auth-bundle-1 Phase 13: docs (rbac.md + threat model + migration guide + security.md update)
Closes the last Phase before the Bundle 1 Exit gate. Operators
now have authoritative reference + threat model + migration guide
covering every behavior change Bundles 0-12 introduced.
# New docs
* docs/operator/rbac.md (340 lines) — operator how-to:
- Mental model (actors / roles / permissions / scopes)
- 7 default roles seeded by migration 000029 + the 5
admin-only fine-grained perms seeded by 000030
- Permission catalogue table by namespace
- Scope semantics (global beats specific) + the Bundle-2
deferral on scope_id FK enforcement
- Granting / revoking access from GUI + CLI + HTTP API + MCP
- The auditor pattern (audit-only, no resource read)
- Day-0 bootstrap flow (CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN → curl →
HTTP 410 thereafter)
- Demo-mode (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none) caveat for production
* docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md (180 lines) — what the
controls defend against:
- 5 threat actors (external, wrong-role, compromised key,
insider operator, compromised auditor)
- Per-defense walk-through (API-key auth, RBAC, bootstrap,
approval workflow + Phase 9 closure, audit trail,
protocol-endpoint allowlist)
- 9 explicit deferrals (OIDC, sessions, local accounts,
JIT elevation, MFA, etc.) — Bundle 2 / future scope
- Compliance mapping (SOC 2 CC6.1/CC6.3, HIPAA §164.312(b),
NIST SSDF PO.5.2, FedRAMP AU-9, PCI-DSS §10)
- 5 operator-runnable sanity checks (e.g.,
'SELECT FROM audit_events WHERE actor=system-bypass' MUST
return 0 in production)
* docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md (200 lines) — v2.0.x →
v2.1.0 upgrade flow:
- The SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS callout
- Migration list (000029-000033) + what each does
- 4-mode scope-down flow (interactive / non-interactive
JSON / --suggest / --suggest --apply)
- What changes for code that called auth.IsAdmin
- Helm-specific upgrade flow with example post-upgrade Job
- Docker Compose upgrade flow + the 5 examples folders
that ride demo mode unchanged
- Verification queries + rollback flow
# Updated docs
* docs/operator/security.md — Last-reviewed bumped to
2026-05-09; existing Authentication-surface section
extended to call out the Bundle 1 RBAC primitive,
day-0 bootstrap path, and approval-bypass closure with
cross-references to the new docs.
* docs/reference/profiles.md — Last-reviewed header
formatting fixed (added the > blockquote prefix used
consistently across the docs tree).
# docs/README.md navigation
* Operator section gains 2 new rows (RBAC + auth-threat-model)
and Approval-workflow row updated to mention Phase 9
closure.
* Reference section gains the Profiles row.
* Migration section gains the api-keys-to-rbac row with the
AUDIT YOUR API KEYS callout in the link description.
# CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 section refreshed
The Phase 7 commit landed the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
callout. This commit appends the missing Phase 9-12 highlights:
- Approval-bypass closure (profile-edit gate + flip-flop
loophole + ErrApproveBySameActor invariant)
- GUI: Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings / Approvals queue
- 12 new MCP RBAC tools
- Coverage gates on internal/auth + internal/service/auth
- Protocol-endpoint allowlist pinned at 3 layers
Trailing cross-reference block now points at all 4 new docs.
# Verifications
* Every internal link in the 4 new/modified docs validated by
shell sweep (find broken links → 0 hits).
* Every new doc carries 'Last reviewed: 2026-05-09' header
with the > blockquote prefix matching the docs-tree
convention.
* go vet ./... clean.
* staticcheck across every Bundle-1-touched Go package clean.
* gofmt -l clean repo-wide.
* go test -short -count=1 green across internal/auth (incl.
bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router,
internal/cli, internal/service (incl. auth),
internal/domain/auth, internal/mcp, cmd/cli (cmd/server
has 1 environmental failure on the sandbox virtiofs-tmp:
TestPreflightSCEPRACertKey_KeyWorldReadable_Refuses depends
on tmpfs file-mode semantics that virtiofs propagates
differently — pre-existing, unrelated to Bundle 1).
* Frontend: 19 Vitest tests across src/pages/auth/ +
AuditPage all pass; tsc --noEmit clean.
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