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0152bdf567097a18574475e5937a3a14a653eca9
5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
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0152bdf567 |
fix(auth/rbac): scope-aware ActorRole revoke (A-4)
HIGH-10's UNIQUE (actor, role, scope_type, scope_id, tenant) uniqueness
extension lets an operator grant the same role to the same actor at
multiple scopes (e.g. r-operator on profile=p-acme AND profile=p-globex).
But ActorRoleRepository.Revoke's WHERE clause omitted (scope_type,
scope_id) — a single call deleted every variant. Selective revoke was
unrepresentable; operators had to drop all and re-grant N-1, opening
a race window where the actor's access was briefly different.
Closure across all layers (handler → service → repo → MCP → GUI client),
preserving the legacy "revoke all variants" contract for unmodified
callers:
internal/repository/auth.go
- New ActorRoleRevokeOptions struct. Zero value = legacy semantic;
non-empty ScopeType narrows to one variant.
- New ErrActorRoleNotFound sentinel for scoped no-match (HTTP 404).
internal/repository/postgres/auth.go
- Revoke signature extended with opts. Empty opts.ScopeType uses
the legacy SQL (no scope WHERE), zero-row delete = no error.
- Non-empty narrows with `scope_type = $5 AND scope_id IS NOT
DISTINCT FROM $6` — the IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM is load-bearing,
vanilla `=` would silently miss the (global, NULL) case because
NULL ≠ NULL in standard SQL.
- Selective revoke with zero matching rows returns
ErrActorRoleNotFound; operators get feedback on typos.
internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go
- Revoke takes opts. Audit row's details map records the scope so
SIEMs can distinguish wide-vs-selective revokes:
`scope: "all_variants"` for the legacy path, or
`scope_type` + `scope_id` for selective. Privilege check
(auth.role.assign) and reserved-actor guard unchanged.
internal/api/handler/auth.go
- RevokeRoleFromKey parses optional `?scope_type=` / `?scope_id=`
query params via new parseRevokeScope helper.
- Validation mirrors AssignRoleToKey: scope_id forbidden with
scope_type=global, required with profile/issuer, invalid
scope_type → 400. scope_id without scope_type also → 400.
- writeAuthError maps ErrActorRoleNotFound to 404.
internal/mcp/tools_auth.go + types.go
- AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput gains optional ScopeType + ScopeID with
jsonschema descriptions explaining the dual-mode contract.
- Tool call site appends URL-encoded query params when ScopeType
is set; legacy callers (no scope_type) emit the bare DELETE
path unchanged.
web/src/api/client.ts
- authRevokeKeyRole signature: optional 3rd argument
`{ scope_type?, scope_id? }`. Pre-A-4 call sites (no opts arg)
keep firing the bare DELETE — fully backward compatible. The
GUI KeysPage's per-row revoke button (still one row per role,
pre-Fix-12) continues to use the legacy shape; future GUI work
can pass scope params for per-variant rows.
docs/operator/rbac.md
- New "Revoke: legacy 'all variants' vs scope-selective" subsection
under "From the HTTP API" with curl examples for both modes plus
the audit-row payload shape that lets SOC/SIEM tell them apart.
Regression coverage:
Repository (testcontainers, skipped under -short — 6 tests in
internal/repository/postgres/auth_revoke_scope_test.go):
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_RemovesAllVariants
TestRevokeActorRole_WithScope_RemovesOnlyMatching
TestRevokeActorRole_WithGlobalScope_RemovesOnlyGlobal — pins the
IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM branch (global, NULL)
TestRevokeActorRole_NoMatch_ReturnsNotFound — pins the new sentinel
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_NoMatch_IsNoOp — pins the legacy
idempotence contract
TestRevokeActorRole_IssuerScope_RemovesOnlyMatching — pin the
issuer-scope half (profile + issuer are symmetric scope types)
Handler (7 new tests in auth_test.go):
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey — extended to assert no scope
filter is forwarded when query string is empty (legacy behaviour)
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedProfile
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsMissingScopeID
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithoutScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsInvalidScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedNotFoundReturns404
MCP (2 new table rows in tools_per_tool_test.go):
Scoped revoke with scope_type=profile + scope_id=p-acme →
`?scope_type=profile&scope_id=p-acme`
Scoped revoke with scope_type=global (no scope_id) →
`?scope_type=global`
Service-layer test plumbing (service_test.go) updated for new opts
arg: 4 existing call sites pass repository.ActorRoleRevokeOptions{}
to keep their pre-A-4 semantics; the fakeActorRoleRepo.Revoke
implementation now mirrors the postgres scope-aware behaviour
(legacy zero-value vs scoped narrowing + ErrActorRoleNotFound on
no-match).
Verify gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short across
repository/postgres, service/auth, api/handler, and mcp. The
pre-existing KeysPage.test.tsx failure observed on the baseline
commit (reproduced via `git stash` earlier in Fix 03) is unrelated;
my client.ts change adds an optional third argument and is fully
backward-compatible.
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/04-high-actor-role-revoke-scope.md.
Audit doc updated: new row A-4 (2026-05-11) CLOSED appended to the
status table at the bottom of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md.
Operator-visible advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes under
Security (non-BREAKING — legacy callers are unchanged).
Depends on Fix 01 (the scope-aware EffectivePermissions read path on
branch fix/audit-2026-05-11/crit-actor-role-scope-reads). This fix
makes the inverse op selectively reversible; without Fix 01 the read
side would mis-evaluate scoped grants anyway, making selective revoke
moot at runtime.
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shankar0123
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72b54ce850 |
feat(auth/rbac): scope_type+scope_id+expires_at on role grants (HIGH-10)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close HIGH-10 from the HANDOFF.md backend batch
(item 1). Per-actor scoped + time-bound role grants are now
expressible via the API.
Migration 000043: adds scope_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'global' +
scope_id TEXT to actor_roles. Constraints:
- actor_roles_scope_type_enum: scope_type ∈ {global, profile, issuer}
- actor_roles_scope_id_required_when_not_global: scope_id is NULL
iff scope_type='global'
- Uniqueness extended: (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, scope_type,
scope_id, tenant_id) — so an operator can grant the same role to
the same actor scoped to multiple profiles/issuers (e.g.
r-operator on p-finance AND on p-engineering).
Index idx_actor_roles_scope for non-global lookup hot paths.
Domain: ActorRole.ScopeType (ScopeType enum) + ScopeID (*string).
Authorizer.CheckPermission already understands the tuple via the
parallel role_permissions columns; this addition gives operators a
per-actor knob without forking roles.
Postgres repo: Grant writes scope_type+scope_id with ON CONFLICT keyed
on the new uniqueness tuple. Defaults to (global, NULL) when caller
omits.
Handler: assignRoleRequest extended with scope_type / scope_id /
expires_at. Validation:
- role_id required (unchanged)
- scope_type defaults to 'global'; allowed values global/profile/
issuer; anything else → 400
- scope_id required when scope_type ∈ {profile, issuer}; rejected
(must be empty) when scope_type='global'
- expires_at must be in the future when present; nil = standing
Regression matrix in internal/api/handler/auth_test.go (6 cases):
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_ProfileScopeBoundGrantPersists
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_TimeBoundGrantPersists
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsScopeIDWithGlobalScope
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsMissingScopeIDOnProfile
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsPastExpiry
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsInvalidScopeType
HIGH-10 marked CLOSED in audit-doc — the v3 deferral from the prior
session is reversed; everything lands in v2.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 1
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-10
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shankar0123
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5d79e53ad0 |
auth-bundle-1 follow-on: close coverage gaps to clear Phase 12 floors
CI run #486 (post-Bundle-1 merge + Go 1.25.10 bump) failed three coverage-threshold gates: internal/api/handler 74.7% < floor 75 (-0.3pp) internal/auth 66.3% < floor 85 (-18.7pp) internal/service/auth 51.1% < floor 85 (-33.9pp) The Phase 12 gate file's "85% with negative-test coverage" claim turned out to be aspirational — the read-side and Update-path methods on RoleService / PermissionService / ActorRoleService had zero unit-test coverage, and internal/auth's keystore + HasPermission helper had zero tests. This commit closes the gap without lowering the gate. Per-package CI-style averages after this commit (per scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh's per-function-mean): internal/api/handler 76.1% (+1.4pp, margin +1.1pp) internal/auth 90.5% (+24.2pp, margin +5.5pp) internal/service/auth 93.7% (+42.6pp, margin +8.7pp) Tests added: internal/service/auth/service_test.go (+18 tests, +518 LOC): PermissionService.List, PermissionService.GetByName, RoleService.Get (4 paths), RoleService.List (system caller), RoleService.Update (4 paths), RoleService.ListPermissions (3 paths), RoleService.AddPermission/RemovePermission round-trip + gate paths, RoleService.Delete (success + nil-caller + no-perm + audit), RoleService.Create (nil-caller), ActorRoleService.ListForActor (self-bypass + cross-actor + nil-caller + system + with-perm), ActorRoleService.Effective- Permissions (same shape), ActorRoleService.ListKeys (3 paths + system bypass), ActorRoleService.Revoke (4 paths), Authorizer edge cases (empty actorID short-circuit, empty tenantID default, scoped-grant-without-scope-id no-match invariant, repo-error wrap-and-return, HoldsAnyOf early-exit), recordAudit nil-arm short-circuits. internal/auth/keystore_test.go (NEW, +175 LOC): StaticKeyStore.Len, StaticKeyStore.LookupByHash hit + miss, MutableKeyStore seeded lookup + Len, Add registers new key, AddHashed registers from precomputed hash, AddHashed replaces on duplicate hash (idempotent boot-loader contract), HasPermission no-actor / default-actor-type / checker-error / scoped-check threading. internal/auth/bootstrap/service_test.go (+36 LOC): Service.Available nil-receiver/nil-strategy short-circuit, Service.Available delegates to Strategy when configured. internal/api/handler/auth_test.go (+208 LOC): GetRole returns role + permissions, GetRole 404 + 401, UpdateRole 200 + invalid-JSON-400 + 401, ListKeys returns actor list + 401, RemoveRolePermission 204 (global + scoped) + 401, rolePermToResponse scope encoding pin via GetRole. Verified: gofmt -l . clean (touched files only). go vet ./internal/auth/... ./internal/service/auth/... ./internal/api/handler/ rc=0. go test -count=1 -short on the four packages green. CI-style per-function averages computed via the live scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh arithmetic — all three gated packages clear their floors with margin. Per CLAUDE.md "complete path" + "do not lower the gate to make CI green": gate file unchanged. The 85/85/75 floors stand. |
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shankar0123
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3ef45e2ad4 |
auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp. |
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shankar0123
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b169f258de |
auth-bundle-1 Phase 4 + 5: RBAC HTTP API + CLI surface
Phase 4 (HTTP API): * internal/api/handler/auth.go: AuthHandler with 12 endpoints under /api/v1/auth/* — ListRoles, GetRole, CreateRole, UpdateRole, DeleteRole, ListPermissions, AddRolePermission, RemoveRolePermission, AssignRoleToKey, RevokeRoleFromKey, Me. callerFromRequest builds an authsvc.Caller from the Phase 3 ActorIDKey/ActorTypeKey/TenantIDKey context values. writeAuthError translates service + repository sentinels into HTTP status codes (401/403/404/409/400/500). 14 handler tests with in-memory fakes pin the HTTP shape + error mapping. * internal/api/router/router.go: HandlerRegistry gains an Auth field; 11 new routes registered. openapi_parity_test SpecParityExceptions extended with the new auth routes (OpenAPI YAML schema land in a Phase 4 follow-up commit so the schema review is its own atomic change; the route shape is fully documented inline via the Go type definitions until then). * cmd/server/main.go: wires the postgres auth repos (RoleRepository, PermissionRepository, ActorRoleRepository) + the Authorizer + RoleService/PermissionService/ActorRoleService into the new AuthHandler. Adds authPermissionCheckerAdapter to bridge the typed-string Authorizer signature to the auth.PermissionChecker interface (avoids an internal/auth → internal/service/auth import cycle). Phase 5 (CLI): * cmd/cli/main.go: adds 'auth' command dispatch with subcommands roles/permissions/keys/me. * internal/cli/auth.go: AuthMe, AuthListRoles, AuthGetRole, AuthListPermissions, AuthAssignRoleToKey, AuthRevokeRoleFromKey methods on Client. Mirrors the Phase 4 HTTP surface. Phase 3.5 (handler IsAdmin → middleware-wrapped RequirePermission) DEFERRED. Honest reasoning: (1) The 5 admin handlers (bulk_revocation, admin_crl_cache, admin_scep_intune, admin_est, intermediate_ca) currently gate via auth.IsAdmin checks INSIDE the handler bodies. Converting cleanly requires moving the gate to the router (auth.RequirePermission middleware wrap) AND removing the in-handler check AND rewriting the existing 3-test triplets per handler (M-008 pinned: _NonAdmin_Returns403 / _AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 / _AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor) because the existing tests call the handler function directly, bypassing middleware. After conversion, those tests would pass without 403'ing because the gate moved away — the test invariants need to flow through a router-level integration setup instead. (2) Picking the right permission per handler is a security-review-worthy decision. Using existing operator-class perms (cert.revoke, issuer.edit) widens access from admin-only to operator-class; adding new admin-only perms (cert.bulk_revoke, crl.admin, scep.admin, est.admin, ca.hierarchy.manage) requires a migration 000030 plus a coordinated catalogue update in internal/domain/auth/validate.go. Both options are defensible but warrant a focused commit, not a 5-handler sweep mixed in with the API + CLI work. (3) The conversion can be done now without functional regressions IF we leave the in-handler IsAdmin checks in place AND add middleware wraps as defense-in-depth — but that's the worst of both worlds (legacy gate still blocks non-admin operators, defeating the point of RBAC; new gate adds runtime cost with no semantic change). A clean conversion needs the in-handler check removed. Concrete plan for Phase 3.5 (separate commit, next session): (a) add new admin-only perms via migration 000030 OR document the widening to operator-class; (b) wrap each of the 5 admin routes with auth.RequirePermission(checker, perm, nil) in router.go; (c) remove auth.IsAdmin checks from the 5 handler bodies; (d) move the M-008 _NonAdmin/_AdminExplicitFalse tests to router-level integration tests, keep _AdminPermitted as a direct handler test for actor-passthrough; (e) update m008_admin_gate_test.go registry to track auth.RequirePermission middleware wraps in router.go instead of auth.IsAdmin call sites in handler files. Verifications: go vet ./... clean; gofmt clean across all touched files; go test -short -count=1 across internal/auth, internal/service/auth, internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, cmd/server, cmd/cli all green (one transient too-many-open-files retry on internal/cli + internal/api/router; second run clean). Branch: dev/auth-bundle-1. Commit chain: |