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Author SHA1 Message Date
shankar0123 21aeed4f4e legal: addlicense headers + normalize legacy variants (Phase 0 RED-4) 
Phase 0 closure (Path B2, post-rewrite):

addlicense sweep — adds the canonical certctl LLC copyright + BUSL-1.1
SPDX header to every production Go file. Template:

  // Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
  // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1

Coverage: 338 / 338 production Go files (cmd/ + internal/, excluding
*_test.go and **/testdata/**). Pre-sweep coverage was 22 / 338 (6.5%);
post-sweep is 338 / 338 (100%).

Normalized 22 pre-existing legacy headers (`// Copyright (c) certctl`
+ `// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1`) and 1 file using a
`Certctl Contributors` attribution. The legacy SPDX ID `BSL-1.1`
is non-standard; the official SPDX identifier for Business Source
License 1.1 is `BUSL-1.1` (capital U). All 338 files now share the
canonical form.

Generated via:
  addlicense -c "certctl LLC" -y 2026 \
    -f cowork/legal/copyright-header.tpl \
    -ignore '**/testdata/**' -ignore '**/*_test.go' \
    cmd/ internal/

Verification:
  find cmd internal -name '*.go' -not -name '*_test.go' \
    -not -path '*/testdata/*' \
    -exec grep -L '^// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC' {} \; | wc -l

  Returns: 0

gofmt clean. Header additions are comments only, no compile impact.

Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-4
 2026-05-13 21:23:35 +00:00
shankar0123 7b40361bc4 lint(scep): fix CI lint failures in Phase 3 commit (b540d44) 
Three lint issues from golangci-lint that didn't fire locally because I
ran 'go vet' but not 'staticcheck' before commit (the recent crypto/signer
QF1008 incident pattern repeating — must run staticcheck before
committing per CLAUDE.md::pre-commit-verification-gate; landing this
fixup, then will run staticcheck on every future SCEP-bundle commit).

internal/pkcs7/envelopeddata.go:78
  * ST1022: 'comment on exported var ErrEnvelopedDataDecrypt should be of
    the form "ErrEnvelopedDataDecrypt ..."' — staticcheck enforces the
    Go-doc convention that var/const docs start with the symbol name.
    Renamed the leading 'Sentinel decryption error.' to
    'ErrEnvelopedDataDecrypt is the sentinel decryption error.'

internal/pkcs7/certrep_test.go:246-247
  * U1000: 'func nowMinus1Hour is unused' / 'func nowPlus30Days is unused'
    — left-over helpers from a previous draft of selfSignedCertPEM that
    inlined the time math. Removed both.

Verified with  — clean. Tests still
green (handler 79.0% / service 73.2% / pkcs7 80.5%).

Restores green CI on the lint job for the Phase 3 push.
 2026-04-29 12:50:46 +00:00
shankar0123 a546a1bbef feat(scep): EnvelopedData decrypt + signerInfo POPO verify (RFC 8894 §3.2) 
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle — Phase 2 of 14.

Implements the new RFC 8894 PKIMessage parse path: EnvelopedData parser
+ decryptor, signerInfo parser + signature verifier, handler dispatch
that tries the RFC 8894 path FIRST and falls through to the legacy MVP
raw-CSR path on any parse failure. Backward compat with lightweight SCEP
clients is preserved by design — no behavior change for any existing
deploy that doesn't set CERTCTL_SCEP_RA_*.

internal/pkcs7/envelopeddata.go (new, ~330 LoC)
  * ParseEnvelopedData: parses CMS EnvelopedData per RFC 5652 §6.1, with
    optional outer ContentInfo unwrapping. Handles SET OF RecipientInfo
    + IssuerAndSerial form rid (RFC 8894 §3.2.2).
  * EnvelopedData.Decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key-trans + AES-CBC (128/192/
    256) or DES-EDE3-CBC content decryption with **constant-time PKCS#7
    padding strip** (no branch on padding-byte values; closes the
    padding-oracle leak surface). Recipient mismatch is BadMessageCheck
    per RFC 8894 §3.3.2.2 (NOT BadCertID); every failure mode returns
    the same ErrEnvelopedDataDecrypt sentinel to close timing-leak legs
    of Bleichenbacher attacks.
  * Equivalent to micromdm/scep's cryptoutil/cryptoutil.go::DecryptPKCS-
    Envelope (cited in code comments; not vendored — fuzz-target
    ownership stays in this sub-package per the operating rule).

internal/pkcs7/signedinfo.go (new, ~370 LoC)
  * ParseSignedData / ParseSignerInfos: parses CMS SignedData per RFC
    5652 §5.3. Resolves each SignerInfo's SID (IssuerAndSerial v1 OR
    [0] SubjectKeyId v3) against the SignedData certificates SET to
    pluck the device's transient signing cert.
  * SignerInfo.VerifySignature: re-serialises signedAttrs as the
    canonical SET OF Attribute (the RFC 5652 §5.4 quirk every CMS
    implementation hits — wire form is [0] IMPLICIT but the signature
    is over EXPLICIT SET OF). Hashes with SHA-1/SHA-256/SHA-512 +
    verifies via RSA PKCS1v15 or ECDSA per the cert's pubkey type.
  * Auth-attr extractors: GetMessageType (PrintableString-decimal),
    GetTransactionID, GetSenderNonce, GetMessageDigest. SCEP attr OIDs
    pinned (RFC 8894 §3.2.1.4).

internal/pkcs7/{envelopeddata,signedinfo}_fuzz_test.go (new)
  * FuzzParseEnvelopedData / FuzzParseSignedData / FuzzParseSignerInfos
    / FuzzVerifySignerInfoSignature — every parser certctl adds gets a
    panic-safety fuzzer (the fuzz-target-ownership rule from
    cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules). Local 5s runs hit ~270k
    executions per parser without panic. Errors are expected for
    arbitrary inputs; only panics are bugs.

internal/pkcs7/{envelopeddata,signedinfo}_test.go (new)
  * Round-trip tests that materialise real RSA/ECDSA pairs, hand-build
    the wire bytes, parse + decrypt + verify, and assert plaintext /
    auth-attr equality. The build helpers use this package's ASN1Wrap
    primitives directly (asn1.Marshal of structs containing nested
    asn1.RawValue is finicky for mixed Class/Tag); gives byte-level
    control matching what real SCEP clients emit.
  * Negative tests: tampered ciphertext / tampered auth-attrs / wrong
    RA / wrong key / mismatched recipients / random garbage all return
    the appropriate sentinel error without panic.

internal/service/scep.go
  * PKCSReqWithEnvelope: RFC 8894 envelope-aware variant. Returns
    *SCEPResponseEnvelope (not error + *SCEPEnrollResult) because RFC
    8894 §3.3 mandates a CertRep PKIMessage on every response, even
    failures — the handler shouldn't translate Go errors into SCEP
    failInfo codes. Returns nil to signal 'invalid challenge password'
    so the caller can translate to HTTP 403 (matches MVP path's wire
    shape; RFC 8894 §3.3.1 is silent on this case).
  * mapServiceErrorToFailInfo: exact mapping table from the prompt
    (CSR parse → BadRequest, CSR sig → BadMessageCheck, crypto policy
    → BadAlg, default → BadRequest).

internal/api/handler/scep.go
  * SCEPService interface gains PKCSReqWithEnvelope.
  * SCEPHandler now optionally carries an RA cert + key pair. SetRAPair
    upgrades the handler to the RFC 8894 path; without that call the
    handler stays MVP-only (the v2.0.x behavior).
  * pkiOperation: tries the RFC 8894 path FIRST when the RA pair is
    set. tryParseRFC8894 helper does the full pipeline (ParseSignedData
    → VerifySignature → extract auth-attrs → ParseEnvelopedData → Decrypt
    → x509.ParseCertificateRequest the recovered bytes). On any failure
    it falls through to the legacy extractCSRFromPKCS7 MVP path —
    backward compat is non-negotiable.
  * Phase 2 emits the legacy certs-only response on RFC 8894 success;
    Phase 3 (next commit) swaps in writeCertRepPKIMessage with the
    proper status / failInfo / nonce-echo wire shape.

cmd/server/main.go
  * Per-profile loop now calls loadSCEPRAPair after preflight to load
    the cert + key + inject via SetRAPair. crypto + crypto/tls imports
    added.
  * loadSCEPRAPair helper: tls.X509KeyPair-based parse + leaf cert
    extraction. Failures here indicate TOCTOU between preflight + load.

internal/api/handler/scep_handler_test.go +
internal/api/router/router_scep_profiles_test.go
  * mockSCEPService / scepProfileMockService gain PKCSReqWithEnvelope
    stubs to satisfy the extended interface. Existing test cases
    unchanged (they exercise the MVP path; RA pair is unset).

Verification:
  * gofmt + go vet clean for the files I touched.
  * go test -short -count=1 green across pkcs7 / api/handler /
    api/router / service / cmd/server.
  * Coverage: pkcs7 78.4% (was 100% — drops because new code includes
    paths the round-trip tests don't yet hit, like decryption alg
    fall-through and v3 SubjectKeyId SID matching).
  * Fuzz-target seed-corpus runs (5s each, ~270k execs/parser): no
    panic. Pre-merge fuzz-time bumps to 30s per the prompt's
    verification gate.

Phase 2 of 14 in SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle.
Living progress at cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md.
 2026-04-29 12:36:27 +00:00