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2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
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8b75e0311b |
chore: rename Go module path to github.com/certctl-io/certctl
Mechanical sed across the main go.mod's module declaration, the f5-mock-icontrol
sub-module's go.mod, every Go file's import path (361 files), and a rebuild of
the checked-in f5-mock-icontrol binary so its embedded build-info reflects the
new module path. No behavior change.
Choice B from cowork/transfer-certctl-to-org.md, executed 2026-05-04. Choice A
(keep module path declared as github.com/shankar0123/certctl regardless of
repo URL) shipped on the day of the org transfer (2026-05-03) since we had no
external Go consumers; this commit closes that deferral.
Backward-compat: GitHub HTTP redirects continue to forward
github.com/shankar0123/certctl → github.com/certctl-io/certctl at the URL
level, but Go's module proxy uses the path declared in go.mod as the
canonical name. Pre-fix, anyone trying `go get github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
hit a "module path mismatch" error because go.mod said
github.com/shankar0123/certctl and the URL they fetched it from said
certctl-io/certctl. Post-fix, the canonical name and the URL agree, so
go get / go install / external Go consumers / Go-tooling integrations
work cleanly via either the new path (preferred) or the old path (which
redirects and Go follows the redirect for source fetch).
Anyone still importing the old path inside their own code keeps working
provided they update their go.mod's `require` line to match — the module
path declared in their consumer's go.sum / go.mod is the authoritative
import name, so a mass sed across their import statements is the migration
on the consumer side. No external consumers exist today.
Diff shape:
361 *.go files — import path replacement only
2 go.mod — module declaration replacement only
1 binary — deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt
so embedded build-info reflects the new path (8618965 vs
8618933 bytes; 32-byte diff is the build-info change)
Total: 364 files, 730 insertions / 730 deletions, net-zero size, pure
mechanical substitution.
Verification:
gofmt: 17 files needed re-alignment after sed (the new path is one char
shorter than the old, so column-aligned import groups drifted). Applied
`gofmt -w` to fix.
go mod tidy: clean exit on both modules.
go vet ./...: clean exit.
go build ./...: clean exit.
go test -short -count=1 on representative packages: all green
(internal/domain, internal/validation, internal/crypto, internal/crypto/signer,
cmd/agent). Test output now reads `ok github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
confirming the module path resolves correctly.
binary: f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt; `strings | grep shankar0123` returns
nothing; `strings | grep certctl-io/certctl` shows the new module path
embedded in build-info.
Files intentionally NOT touched in this commit:
README.md / CHANGELOG.md / docs/ / etc. — already swept to certctl-io
URLs in commit
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shankar0123
|
b540d4421e |
feat(scep): CertRep PKIMessage response builder (RFC 8894 §3.3.2)
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle — Phase 3 of 14.
Implements the SCEP CertRep response builder + wires it into the handler's
RFC 8894 path. After this commit, certctl emits proper CertRep PKIMessage
responses (signed by the RA key, with EnvelopedData encrypting the issued
cert chain to the device's transient signing cert) for both success and
failure outcomes — RFC 8894 §3.3 mandates a PKIMessage response on every
PKIOperation request, including failure cases that carry pkiStatus=2 +
failInfo.
internal/pkcs7/certrep.go (new, ~370 LoC)
* BuildCertRepPKIMessage: assembles the full ContentInfo → SignedData →
{certs, signerInfo, encapContent} structure per RFC 8894 §3.3.2 +
RFC 5652 §5+§6.
* Success path: encrypts the issued cert chain (PKCS#7 certs-only)
INSIDE an EnvelopedData targeting req.SignerCert (the device's
transient cert, NOT the RA cert — response goes back to the device
encrypted with its public key). AES-256-CBC + random 16-byte IV +
PKCS#7 padding + RSA PKCS#1v1.5 keyTrans.
* Failure path: encapContent is empty (no EnvelopedData); the failInfo
auth-attr is populated.
* Pending path: encapContent is empty; client polls via GetCertInitial.
* Auth-attr ordering matches micromdm/scep for byte-level wire-format
diffing (DER SET-OF normalises order anyway, but matching the
reference implementation makes audit + manual inspection easier).
* senderNonce is freshly generated from crypto/rand on every call.
* RA key signs the canonical SET OF Attribute re-serialisation (RFC
5652 §5.4 quirk every CMS implementation hits — wire form is [0]
IMPLICIT but the signature is computed over EXPLICIT SET OF).
* Helper functions: buildCertRepAuthAttrs, buildSignerInfoCertRep,
signCertRep, buildEncapContentInfo, buildEnvelopedDataAES256, all
constructed via this package's existing ASN1Wrap primitives (avoids
asn1.Marshal nuances with nested RawValues — same pattern Phase 2
settled on).
internal/pkcs7/signedinfo.go (1-line tweak)
* ParseSignedData no longer refuses when SignerInfos is empty. The
degenerate certs-only SignedData form (RFC 8894 §3.5.1 GetCACert
response, RFC 7030 EST cacerts, AND now the encrypted certs-only
inner content of the CertRep EnvelopedData) is structurally valid
with zero signers. Caller decides whether the lack of signers is
an error in their context.
internal/pkcs7/certrep_test.go (new, ~230 LoC)
* TestBuildCertRepPKIMessage_Success_RoundTrip — full pipeline
round-trip: build → ParseSignedData → VerifySignature → auth-attr
extractors → ParseEnvelopedData(encapContent) → Decrypt with device
key → ParseSignedData(innerCertsOnly) → assert issued cert CN.
Catches drift between the build-side encoding and the parse-side
decoding.
* TestBuildCertRepPKIMessage_Failure_NoEncapContent — pkiStatus=2 +
failInfo populated; encapContent empty.
* TestBuildCertRepPKIMessage_FreshSenderNonceEachCall — pins the
'never reuse senderNonce' invariant from RFC 8894 §3.2.1.4.5
(replay defense).
* TestBuildCertRepPKIMessage_RejectsNonRSADeviceCert — pins the
RSA-only requirement on the device's transient cert (KTRI requires
RSA pubkey for keyTrans encryption).
* TestBuildCertRepPKIMessage_NilArgs_Refuses.
internal/pkcs7/certrep_fuzz_test.go (new, ~150 LoC)
* FuzzBuildCertRepPKIMessage — varies transactionID + senderNonce +
signerCert; asserts no panic. When build succeeds for the success
path, asserts round-trip soundness (output parses back via
ParseSignedData). 6s seed-corpus run hit no panics.
internal/api/handler/scep.go
* pkiOperation now emits writeCertRepPKIMessage for the RFC 8894
path (both success AND failure). MVP path keeps writeSCEPResponse
for backward compat with lightweight clients.
* tryParseRFC8894 extended to extract the RFC 2985 §5.4.1
challengePassword attribute from the recovered CSR, so the
service-layer's challenge-password gate can run on the RFC 8894
path the same way it does on the MVP path. Returns
(envelope, csrPEM, challengePassword, ok) — was 3-tuple before.
* extractChallengePasswordFromCSR helper mirrors the MVP path's
extractCSRFields logic; same staticcheck SA1019 carve-out for
the deprecated csr.Attributes API (RFC 2985 challengePassword
has no non-deprecated stdlib API per the M-028 audit closure).
* writeCertRepPKIMessage helper wraps pkcs7.BuildCertRepPKIMessage;
on build failure (programmer/config bug) returns HTTP 500 rather
than try a fallback PKIMessage that might re-trigger the same bug.
Verification:
* gofmt + go vet clean across pkcs7 / api/handler.
* go test -short -count=1 green across pkcs7 / api/handler /
api/router / service / cmd/server.
* Coverage: pkcs7 80.5% (was 78.4% before Phase 3). Handler/service
held steady.
* Fuzz seed-corpus (6s): FuzzBuildCertRepPKIMessage — no panic;
round-trip soundness invariant held for every successful build.
Phase 3 of 14 in SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle.
Living progress at cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md.
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