Mechanical sed across the main go.mod's module declaration, the f5-mock-icontrol
sub-module's go.mod, every Go file's import path (361 files), and a rebuild of
the checked-in f5-mock-icontrol binary so its embedded build-info reflects the
new module path. No behavior change.
Choice B from cowork/transfer-certctl-to-org.md, executed 2026-05-04. Choice A
(keep module path declared as github.com/shankar0123/certctl regardless of
repo URL) shipped on the day of the org transfer (2026-05-03) since we had no
external Go consumers; this commit closes that deferral.
Backward-compat: GitHub HTTP redirects continue to forward
github.com/shankar0123/certctl → github.com/certctl-io/certctl at the URL
level, but Go's module proxy uses the path declared in go.mod as the
canonical name. Pre-fix, anyone trying `go get github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
hit a "module path mismatch" error because go.mod said
github.com/shankar0123/certctl and the URL they fetched it from said
certctl-io/certctl. Post-fix, the canonical name and the URL agree, so
go get / go install / external Go consumers / Go-tooling integrations
work cleanly via either the new path (preferred) or the old path (which
redirects and Go follows the redirect for source fetch).
Anyone still importing the old path inside their own code keeps working
provided they update their go.mod's `require` line to match — the module
path declared in their consumer's go.sum / go.mod is the authoritative
import name, so a mass sed across their import statements is the migration
on the consumer side. No external consumers exist today.
Diff shape:
361 *.go files — import path replacement only
2 go.mod — module declaration replacement only
1 binary — deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt
so embedded build-info reflects the new path (8618965 vs
8618933 bytes; 32-byte diff is the build-info change)
Total: 364 files, 730 insertions / 730 deletions, net-zero size, pure
mechanical substitution.
Verification:
gofmt: 17 files needed re-alignment after sed (the new path is one char
shorter than the old, so column-aligned import groups drifted). Applied
`gofmt -w` to fix.
go mod tidy: clean exit on both modules.
go vet ./...: clean exit.
go build ./...: clean exit.
go test -short -count=1 on representative packages: all green
(internal/domain, internal/validation, internal/crypto, internal/crypto/signer,
cmd/agent). Test output now reads `ok github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
confirming the module path resolves correctly.
binary: f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt; `strings | grep shankar0123` returns
nothing; `strings | grep certctl-io/certctl` shows the new module path
embedded in build-info.
Files intentionally NOT touched in this commit:
README.md / CHANGELOG.md / docs/ / etc. — already swept to certctl-io
URLs in commit 0729ee4 (the post-transfer URL refresh). This commit is
purely the Go-tooling layer.
Scarf pixels (`shankar0123.docker.scarf.sh/...`) — Scarf-account
namespace, not a Go import or GitHub repo URL. Stays.
This is a non-blocking, non-customer-impacting change. Operators pulling
container images, running `make verify`, hitting the API, or installing the
agent see no functional difference. Only Go-tooling consumers (none today)
are affected, and they're enabled — not broken — by this commit.
Closes Top-10 fix#6 of the 2026-05-03 issuer-coverage audit (see
cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-03/RESULTS.md). Pre-fix, the
OpenSSL adapter's docs in docs/connectors.md explained usage but
did NOT enumerate the threat model. The adapter exec's an arbitrary
operator-supplied script — env-var inheritance, symlink attacks,
sandbox-escape, multi-tenant process-isolation gaps. An acquirer's
security reviewer reading this surface cold pattern-matches
"highest-risk issuer surface with the lowest documented threat
model."
This commit lands a doc-side operator playbook in
docs/connectors.md OpenSSL section (mirrors Bundle 8's "Operator
playbook: keytool argv password exposure" subsection shape and
the 2026-05-02 audit Top-10 fix#7 SSH InsecureIgnoreHostKey
playbook). Six topics covered:
1. Why the adapter exists despite the risk (CLI-driven CAs
without Go SDKs need an integration path).
2. Threat model the adapter accepts (trusted operator + trusted
script + appropriate ownership + clear audit trail).
3. Threat model the adapter does NOT accept (operator-writable
script paths, untrusted content, multi-tenant hosts).
4. Mitigations operators can layer (dedicated user, root-owned
0755 binary, audit rules, per-call timeout via
CERTCTL_OPENSSL_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, env sanitisation,
chroot/container, audit wrapper, per-call concurrency
bound).
5. When NOT to use the adapter (compliance environments,
multi-tenant servers, no-script-review environments).
6. V3-Pro forward path (hardened mode tracked in
cowork/WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md).
Inline comment in internal/connector/issuer/openssl/openssl.go
near the callSignScript exec call site forward-references the
new doc subsection (no logic change).
cowork/WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md gains an "OpenSSL hardened mode" V3-
Pro entry under "Adapter hardening" — sibling-folder doc, not in
the certctl repo, so not reflected in this commit's diff.
Same shape Bundle 8 used for the JavaKeystore playbook and the
2026-05-02 deployment-target audit Top-10 fix#7 used for the SSH
InsecureIgnoreHostKey playbook.
No code logic changes (only the explanatory comment near the
exec call site). No test changes. Doc-only commit.
Verified locally:
- gofmt / go vet clean.
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/issuer/openssl/...
green.
Audit reference: cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-03/RESULTS.md
Top-10 fix#6.
Closes Top-10 fix#3 of the 2026-05-03 issuer-coverage audit (see
cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-03/RESULTS.md). Pre-fix, the
OpenSSL adapter (497 LOC, certctl's highest-risk issuer surface)
had openssl_test.go (8 happy-path funcs + 20 subtests) but no
dedicated _failure_test.go. Compare to ACME, Vault, DigiCert,
Sectigo, Entrust, GlobalSign, EJBCA — all peers have one. An
acquirer's diligence team flags this as an immediate blocker on
the highest-risk issuer surface.
This commit adds 6 failure-mode tests:
1. TestOpenSSL_Issue_ScriptNotFound_OperatorActionableError —
SignScript path doesn't exist; error wraps os.ErrNotExist
(errors.Is); message contains 'no such file' / 'not found'
so the operator's grep finds it in journalctl.
2. TestOpenSSL_Issue_PermissionDenied_OperatorActionableError —
SignScript exists with mode 0o600 (non-executable); error
wraps os.ErrPermission; message contains 'permission'.
Skipped under root (uid 0 bypasses chmod gating).
3. TestOpenSSL_Issue_MalformedStdout_DistinguishedFromCSRReject
— script exits 0 + writes garbage (no PEM markers) to the
cert output file; error mentions PEM/certificate/parse so
operators distinguish output-parsing failure from a script-
side fault.
4. TestOpenSSL_Issue_NonZeroExit_DistinguishesCAReject_From_
ScriptError — script writes 'policy violation: …' to stderr
and exits 2 (CA-side rejection convention); the script's
stderr surfaces in the error message; errors.Unwrap returns
non-nil (proving the underlying *exec.ExitError chain
survives).
5. TestOpenSSL_Issue_TimeoutEnforced_ContextCancellationPropagates
— script does 'exec sleep 30' (not 'sleep 30 ' as a child;
exec replaces bash so SIGKILL goes directly to the sleeper,
avoiding the orphan-pipes corner case where a killed bash
leaves sleep holding stdout/stderr open and CombinedOutput
blocks); ctx with 100ms deadline; call returns within ~5s
wall-clock; either errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded)
or the error message names 'killed' / 'signal'.
6. TestOpenSSL_Issue_SignalKilled_PartialOutputDiscarded —
script writes a half-PEM ('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMII…')
then 'kill -KILL $$'; assertion: result is nil OR
CertPEM is empty (no half-cert leaks to caller); error
names 'signal' / 'killed' OR 'PEM' / 'parse' (both are
operator-actionable).
Each test pins the operator-actionable error message contract:
the message names the failure mode (so journalctl + grep find
it) and proves no half-state was created (no partial cert
returned). errors.Is / errors.Unwrap checks confirm the wrapping
chain survives.
The OpenSSL adapter has no commandRunner abstraction (production
code uses exec.CommandContext directly); these tests use real
operator-supplied scripts written to t.TempDir (matches the
adapter's actual production code path; no os/exec mocking). The
'exec sleep 30' technique in Test 5 is the load-bearing fix for
the bash-orphans-sleep-and-pipes-stay-open corner case that
otherwise makes the test take 30s instead of 100ms.
Coverage delta:
- Before this commit: openssl_test.go + openssl_stubs_test.go
covered 8 happy-path funcs.
- After: 79.8% statement coverage of openssl.go (up from
operator-pre-existing baseline; the 6 new tests exercise
every error path through callSignScript + parseCertificate).
Tests pass clean under '-race -count=10' (Test 5's deadline
tolerance is the only timing-sensitive case; the 5s wall-clock
budget vs the 100ms ctx deadline gives ample slack on slow CI
without masking deadline-not-enforced bugs).
Test-only commit; no production code changes. Hardening fixes
(per-call concurrency semaphore, threat-model docs) are separate
Top-10 entries.
Verified locally:
- gofmt clean across the repo.
- go vet ./... clean across the repo.
- go test -race -count=10 -short
./internal/connector/issuer/openssl/... green.
Audit reference: cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-03/
RESULTS.md Top-10 fix#3.
Mechanical reformat. The new 'gofmt drift' CI step (added in
ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4, commit 0f205a8) surfaced 111 files
with accumulated gofmt drift across cmd/, internal/, and deploy/test/.
Each file's diff is gofmt-standard: whitespace adjustments, intra-
group import sorting (alphabetical by import path within blank-line-
separated groups), and struct-tag column alignment. No semantic
changes — verified via 'git diff --ignore-all-space' which shows only
the line-position deltas from import reordering.
The gate stays in place after this commit. Going forward it catches
gofmt drift at PR time.
Closes M-001 partially; M-002, M-003, and CI threshold raise #2 deferred.
Stubs coverage shipped across 8 issuer connectors via per-connector
<conn>_stubs_test.go (~50 LoC each) pinning the not-supported
issuer.Connector interface methods (GenerateCRL, SignOCSPResponse,
GetCACertPEM, GetRenewalInfo). Most CAs delegate CRL/OCSP/CA-cert
distribution to managed services, so these are documented stubs that
return errors. Pinning them ensures the stubs aren't silently replaced
with no-ops in a future refactor.
Coverage delta:
digicert: 79.3% -> 81.0% (+1.7pp)
ejbca: 75.8% -> 76.5% (+0.7pp)
entrust: 70.8% -> 70.8% (stubs already covered)
sectigo: 78.0% -> 79.4% (+1.4pp)
vault: 81.0% -> 84.1% (+3.1pp)
openssl: 76.9% -> 78.0% (+1.1pp)
googlecas: 81.0% -> 83.4% (+2.4pp)
globalsign: 75.9% -> 78.2% (+2.3pp)
(awsacmpca not included; its 0%-coverage hotspots are stubClient methods
structurally different from the others' interface stubs. Already at 83.5%.)
Why the gates aren't yet met: the stub functions are tiny (1-2 lines
each, mostly 'return nil, fmt.Errorf("not supported")'). Lifting each
connector to >=85% requires per-connector failure-mode test files
mirroring Bundle J's ACME pattern (httptest.Server + canned 401/403/
429+Retry-After/5xx/malformed responses against the actual API methods).
That's ~200-300 LoC x 9 connectors = ~2000-2700 LoC of bespoke per-CA
mock work; exceeds this session's budget. Tracked as follow-on
Bundle N.A-extended / N.B-extended.
Deferred sub-batches:
N.C (M-002 + M-003): internal/service (70.5%) + internal/api/handler
(79.4%) round-out NOT YET STARTED. Tracked as Bundle N.C-extended.
N.CI (CI threshold raise #2): prescribed raises require underlying
coverage at proposed floors first. Premature raise would fail CI
immediately. Tracked as Bundle N.CI-extended.
Verification:
go vet ./internal/connector/issuer/{8-pkgs}/... clean
gofmt -l clean
go test -short -count=1 PASS for all 8
Audit deliverables:
gap-backlog.md: M-001 partial-strikethrough with per-connector table
+ Bundle N closure-log entry covering all 4 sub-batch statuses
closure-plan.md: Bundle N [~] with per-sub-batch status breakdown
CHANGELOG.md: [unreleased] Bundle N entry
Enforce certificate profile crypto constraints across all 5 issuance paths
(renewal, agent CSR, EST, SCEP). ValidateCSRAgainstProfile() rejects CSRs
with key algorithm/size that don't match profile rules. MaxTTL enforcement
caps certificate validity per issuer connector (Local CA, Vault, step-ca
enforce directly; ACME/DigiCert/Sectigo pass through). Key algorithm and
size are now persisted in certificate_versions for audit compliance.
16 new tests (12 service-layer + 4 Local CA connector). Removes hardcoded
version number from GUI sidebar. Documentation updated across architecture,
features, connectors, and README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Updated AgentService interface to accept context.Context parameter in all methods
- Replaced context.Background() calls with proper ctx parameter in agent.go
- Updated AgentGroupService interface to accept context.Context parameter
- Replaced context.Background() calls with proper ctx parameter in agent_group.go
- Updated handler methods to pass r.Context() to service methods
- Context now properly propagates through request lifecycle for timeout/cancellation
- Improved request tracing and cancellation behavior
Implement Enrollment over Secure Transport protocol with 4 endpoints under
/.well-known/est/ — cacerts (CA chain distribution), simpleenroll (initial
enrollment), simplereenroll (certificate renewal), and csrattrs (CSR
attributes). PKCS#7 certs-only wire format with hand-rolled ASN.1, accepts
both PEM and base64-encoded DER CSRs, configurable issuer and profile
binding, full audit trail. 28 new tests (18 handler + 10 service).
Also includes:
- GetCACertPEM added to issuer connector interface (all 4 issuers updated)
- EST integration tests wired into e2e test suite (13 test cases)
- QA testing guide Part 26 (15 manual EST test cases)
- All docs updated: README, features, architecture, concepts, connectors,
quickstart, demo-advanced (endpoint counts, MCP wording, agent IDs,
issuer interface, resource lists, OpenSSL status)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
M17: Script-based issuer connector delegating sign/revoke/CRL to user-provided
scripts. Compatible with any CA tooling (OpenSSL, cfssl, custom PKI). Configurable
timeout, environment variable passthrough. 14 tests including timeout enforcement.
M16b: certctl-cli wraps all 76 REST API endpoints for terminal workflows. Supports
certs/agents/jobs list/get/renew/revoke/cancel, bulk PEM import with progress
reporting, server health status, table and JSON output formats. Zero external
dependencies (stdlib only). 14 tests with mock HTTP server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
shankar0123