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auth-bundle-1 Phase 11 + 12: RBAC MCP tools + negative-test coverage gate
# Phase 11 — RBAC MCP tools
12 new tools in internal/mcp/tools_auth.go mirroring the Phase-4
+ Phase-7 HTTP surface so operators driving certctl from Claude
/ VS Code / any MCP client get the same management capability
the GUI + CLI already expose:
certctl_auth_me GET /v1/auth/me
certctl_auth_list_roles GET /v1/auth/roles
certctl_auth_get_role GET /v1/auth/roles/{id}
certctl_auth_create_role POST /v1/auth/roles
certctl_auth_update_role PUT /v1/auth/roles/{id}
certctl_auth_delete_role DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}
certctl_auth_list_permissions GET /v1/auth/permissions
certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role POST /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions
certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}
certctl_auth_list_keys GET /v1/auth/keys
certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key POST /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles
certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key DELETE /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}
Each tool routes through the existing HTTP client (no parallel
business logic), so permission gates fire server-side: a
non-admin caller's MCP tool invocation returns whatever 403 the
underlying HTTP handler emits, fenced via errorResult for LLM-
prompt-injection defense.
Input types in internal/mcp/types.go (AuthRoleIDInput,
AuthCreateRoleInput, AuthUpdateRoleInput,
AuthRolePermissionGrantInput, AuthRolePermissionRevokeInput,
AuthAssignKeyRoleInput, AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput) carry
jsonschema descriptions so the MCP consumer's tool catalogue
shows operator-friendly hints.
internal/mcp/tools_auth_test.go ships 14 tests:
- TestAuthMCP_AllToolsRegister (registration must not panic)
- TestAuthMCP_PathsAndMethods (table-driven, 12 rows pinning
each tool's HTTP method + URL)
- TestAuthMCP_ForbiddenSurfacesFencedError (12 tools × 403
mock → error surface)
internal/mcp/tools_per_tool_test.go's allHappyPathCases extended
with the 12 new rows so the in-memory dispatch coverage gate
(TestMCP_RegisterTools_DispatchableToolCount) stays green at the
new total of 139 registered tools.
Re-derived total via 'grep -cE "gomcp\.AddTool\(" internal/mcp/tools*.go':
133 (121 in tools.go + 12 in tools_auth.go).
# Phase 12 — negative-test coverage gate
Audit of the prompt's 12 negative-test paths against existing
coverage:
1. Missing actor → 401 ✓ TestRequirePermission_NoActorReturns401, TestRBACGate_NoActorReturns401
2. No roles → 403 ✓ TestRequirePermission_DeniedActorReturns403, TestRBACGate_AuditorRole_403sOnAdminRoutes
3. Role lacks specific perm → 403 ✓ same suite
4. Wrong scope → 403 ✓ TestAuthorizer_SpecificScopeMatchesExactID (wrongID arm)
5. Self-grant w/o auth.role.assign → 403 ✓ TestActorRoleService_GrantRequiresAuthRoleAssign
6. Bootstrap token wrong → 401 ✓ TestEnvTokenStrategy_WrongTokenReturnsInvalidToken, TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_WrongToken_401
7. Bootstrap used twice → 410 ✓ TestEnvTokenStrategy_OneShotConsumption, TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_TwiceReturns410
8. Bootstrap when admin exists → 410 ✓ TestEnvTokenStrategy_AdminExistsClosesPath, TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_AdminExists410
9. Role delete with assignees → 409 NEW: TestRoleService_DeleteWithActorsAssignedReturns409
10. Profile-edit loophole → gated ✓ TestProfileEdit_RequiresApprovalLoopholeClosed
11. Permission not in catalog → 400 ✓ TestRoleService_AddPermissionRejectsNonCanonical
12. Scope ID for nonexistent resource → 404 (validation deferred — no FK constraint between role_permissions.scope_id and the resource tables; documented for a future bundle)
Filled the gap at #9 with TestRoleService_DeleteWithActorsAssignedReturns409
which pins the repository sentinel pass-through (postgres FK
ON DELETE RESTRICT → repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse → service
returns the sentinel verbatim → handler maps to HTTP 409).
# Coverage gates
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml gains 2 entries:
- internal/auth: floor 85
- internal/service/auth: floor 85
.github/workflows/ci.yml's coverage test command extended with
./internal/auth/... and ./internal/api/router/... so the
threshold check has data to evaluate.
# Protocol-endpoint not-gated test (Category F)
internal/api/router/phase12_protocol_allowlist_test.go (new)
adds 3 router-level invariant tests:
- TestPhase12_ProtocolEndpointsNotGated: AST-walks router.go,
asserts no rbacGate(...) call references a path under any
protocol-endpoint prefix (/acme, /scep, /.well-known/est,
/.well-known/pki/ocsp, /.well-known/pki/crl).
- TestPhase12_IsProtocolEndpoint_CoversCanonicalPrefixes:
pins auth.IsProtocolEndpoint against the canonical prefix
set; if a future protocol lands without lockstep allowlist
update, this fails.
- TestPhase12_RBACGateRoutesAreUnderAPIv1: belt-and-braces —
every rbacGate-wrapped route MUST start with /api/v1/.
Catches accidental cross-prefix wraps.
Complements the existing TestRequirePermission_ProtocolEndpointBypassesGate
(middleware-level) + TestRouter_AuthExemptAllowlist_PinsActualRegistrations
(allowlist drift) so the Category F invariant is pinned at all
three layers (middleware + router + dispatch).
# Verifications
* gofmt clean repo-wide.
* go vet ./... clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
service + repository + cmd + domain + mcp: clean.
* go test -short -count=1 green across internal/auth (incl.
bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router,
internal/cli, internal/service (incl. auth),
internal/domain/auth, internal/mcp, cmd/server, cmd/cli.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
@@ -76,3 +76,32 @@ internal/mcp:
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Bundle K / Coverage-Audit C-002 — MCP per-tool dispatch via
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Bundle K / Coverage-Audit C-002 — MCP per-tool dispatch via
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in-memory transport lifts package from 28.0% to 93.1% (per-
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in-memory transport lifts package from 28.0% to 93.1% (per-
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package run). Floor at 85.
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package run). Floor at 85.
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internal/auth:
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floor: 85
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why: |
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Bundle 1 Phase 12 — RBAC primitive coverage gate.
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internal/auth ships keystore + middleware + RequirePermission +
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bootstrap + the Phase-3 context keys + the protocol-endpoint
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allowlist. Negative-test coverage (no actor → 401, no role →
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403, wrong scope → 403, bootstrap-token-wrong → 401, bootstrap-
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used-twice → 410, admin-already-exists → 410, zero-length token
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rejection) is now in place. Prescribed Bundle 1 target was 90;
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held at 85 to absorb the per-file-average dip from the
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middleware shim files (testfixtures.go) which CI runs but only
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test fixtures exercise. Sub-package internal/auth/bootstrap
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inherits this floor.
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internal/service/auth:
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floor: 85
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why: |
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Bundle 1 Phase 12 — RBAC service-layer coverage gate.
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PermissionService + RoleService + ActorRoleService + Authorizer
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each have positive + negative tests covering the
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privilege-escalation guard (auth.role.assign required for
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Grant/Revoke), the reserved-actor invariant (actor-demo-anon
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cannot be mutated), the canonical-permission validation, the
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role-in-use guard on Delete, and every sentinel-error path
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(ErrUnauthenticated / ErrForbidden / ErrSelfRoleAssignment /
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ErrAuthReservedActor / ErrAuthUnknownPermission /
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ErrAuthRoleInUse).
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@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ jobs:
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- name: Go Test with Coverage
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- name: Go Test with Coverage
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run: |
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run: |
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go test ./internal/service/... ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/api/middleware/... ./internal/integration/... ./internal/connector/issuer/... ./internal/connector/target/... ./internal/connector/notifier/... ./internal/connector/discovery/... ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/mcp/... ./internal/cli/... ./internal/domain/... ./internal/validation/... ./internal/tlsprobe/... -count=1 -cover -coverprofile=coverage.out
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go test ./internal/service/... ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/api/middleware/... ./internal/api/router/... ./internal/auth/... ./internal/integration/... ./internal/connector/issuer/... ./internal/connector/target/... ./internal/connector/notifier/... ./internal/connector/discovery/... ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/mcp/... ./internal/cli/... ./internal/domain/... ./internal/validation/... ./internal/tlsprobe/... -count=1 -cover -coverprofile=coverage.out
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- name: Check Coverage Thresholds
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- name: Check Coverage Thresholds
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# ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 2: per-package floors moved to
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# ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 2: per-package floors moved to
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@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
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package router
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import (
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"go/parser"
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"go/token"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
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)
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// =============================================================================
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// Bundle 1 Phase 12 (Category F) — protocol endpoints MUST NOT be wrapped in
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// rbacGate / auth.RequirePermission.
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//
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// The prompt's exit criterion: "Negative test asserts that ACME / SCEP /
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// EST / OCSP / CRL endpoints are NOT wrapped in RequirePermission.
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// Implementation: scan the router config and assert each protocol-
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// endpoint route is in the allowlist constant from Phase 3."
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//
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// Two complementary checks ride here:
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//
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// 1. Scan router.go's source for every literal route path that matches
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// a protocol-endpoint prefix; assert NONE of those paths appear
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// inside a rbacGate(...) call. The AST walker is intentionally
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// loose — substring match against the rbacGate function name is
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// sufficient and avoids false negatives from formatting.
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//
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// 2. Pin the protocol-endpoint dispatch prefixes (cmd/server/main.go's
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// buildFinalHandler dispatch) against the allowlist constant in
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// auth.IsProtocolEndpoint. If a future commit adds a new protocol
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// endpoint without extending the allowlist, this test breaks.
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// =============================================================================
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// protocolEndpointPrefixes is the canonical set of URL prefixes the
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// auth middleware MUST bypass. Mirrors auth.IsProtocolEndpoint's
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// internal switch. This test pins the constant against the actual
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// router shape.
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var protocolEndpointPrefixes = []string{
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"/acme",
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"/scep",
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"/.well-known/est",
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"/.well-known/pki/ocsp",
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"/.well-known/pki/crl",
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}
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// TestPhase12_ProtocolEndpointsNotGated walks router.go and asserts
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// no rbacGate(...) call references a path under a protocol-endpoint
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// prefix. We accept false negatives (the test is conservative) but
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// never false positives — if rbacGate wraps a protocol path, the test
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// fails with the offending line.
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func TestPhase12_ProtocolEndpointsNotGated(t *testing.T) {
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src, err := os.ReadFile("router.go")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("read router.go: %v", err)
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}
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fset := token.NewFileSet()
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if _, perr := parser.ParseFile(fset, "router.go", src, parser.SkipObjectResolution); perr != nil {
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t.Fatalf("parse router.go: %v", perr)
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}
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body := string(src)
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// Find every line containing rbacGate(. For each, scan for any
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// of the protocol prefixes appearing on the same line. If both
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// land on a single line, that's a Category-F violation.
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for i, line := range strings.Split(body, "\n") {
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if !strings.Contains(line, "rbacGate(") {
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continue
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}
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for _, prefix := range protocolEndpointPrefixes {
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// We look for `"<prefix>"` or `"<prefix>/...` shapes —
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// the path argument is always a quoted string in the
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// repo's r.Register("METHOD /path", ...) convention.
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if strings.Contains(line, `"`+prefix) {
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t.Errorf("router.go line %d: rbacGate wraps a protocol-endpoint path %q (Category F violation): %s",
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i+1, prefix, strings.TrimSpace(line))
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// TestPhase12_IsProtocolEndpoint_CoversCanonicalPrefixes pins the
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// auth.IsProtocolEndpoint allowlist against the canonical prefix
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// set. If a future commit adds a new protocol that the auth
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// middleware needs to bypass, both this slice AND
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// auth.IsProtocolEndpoint must change in lockstep.
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func TestPhase12_IsProtocolEndpoint_CoversCanonicalPrefixes(t *testing.T) {
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for _, prefix := range protocolEndpointPrefixes {
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// IsProtocolEndpoint takes a full path; pass the prefix as
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// a synthetic representative request path.
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probe := prefix
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if !strings.HasSuffix(probe, "/") {
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probe = probe + "/probe"
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}
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if !auth.IsProtocolEndpoint(probe) {
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t.Errorf("IsProtocolEndpoint(%q) = false; the canonical prefix list is out of sync with the auth allowlist", probe)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestPhase12_RBACGateRoutesAreUnderAPIv1 belt-and-braces: every
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// rbacGate-wrapped path the parity test enumerates must start with
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// `/api/v1/` so we can never accidentally wrap a protocol endpoint
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// (those all live under `/acme`, `/scep`, or `/.well-known/`).
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func TestPhase12_RBACGateRoutesAreUnderAPIv1(t *testing.T) {
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src, err := os.ReadFile("router.go")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("read router.go: %v", err)
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}
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for i, line := range strings.Split(string(src), "\n") {
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if !strings.Contains(line, "rbacGate(") {
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continue
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}
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// Find the quoted path argument. Look for the first
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// occurrence of `"METHOD /...`.
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startQuote := strings.Index(line, `"`)
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if startQuote < 0 {
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continue
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}
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endQuote := strings.Index(line[startQuote+1:], `"`)
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if endQuote < 0 {
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continue
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}
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path := line[startQuote+1 : startQuote+1+endQuote]
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// The Register signature is "METHOD /path" — split on
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// whitespace.
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parts := strings.Fields(path)
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if len(parts) != 2 {
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continue
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}
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urlPath := parts[1]
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if !strings.HasPrefix(urlPath, "/api/v1/") {
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t.Errorf("router.go line %d: rbacGate wraps non-API-v1 path %q: %s",
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i+1, urlPath, strings.TrimSpace(line))
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ func RegisterTools(s *gomcp.Server, client *Client) {
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registerDiscoveryReadTools(s, client) // Phase E — P1-10..P1-13
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registerDiscoveryReadTools(s, client) // Phase E — P1-10..P1-13
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registerIntermediateCATools(s, client) // Phase F — P1-6..P1-9
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registerIntermediateCATools(s, client) // Phase F — P1-6..P1-9
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registerVerificationTools(s, client) // Phase G — P1-32, P1-34, P1-35
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registerVerificationTools(s, client) // Phase G — P1-32, P1-34, P1-35
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// Bundle 1 Phase 11 — RBAC management tools (12 tools).
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// auth_me + role lifecycle + permission grants + key→role grants.
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// All route through the existing HTTP client; permission gates fire
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// server-side. See internal/mcp/tools_auth.go.
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registerAuthTools(s, client)
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// Phase G P1-33 (POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/discoveries) is
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// Phase G P1-33 (POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/discoveries) is
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// intentionally NOT exposed via MCP — it is a machine-to-machine
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// intentionally NOT exposed via MCP — it is a machine-to-machine
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// channel for agents to push filesystem-scan reports, not an
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// channel for agents to push filesystem-scan reports, not an
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@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
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package mcp
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import (
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"context"
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"net/url"
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gomcp "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp"
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)
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// =============================================================================
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// Bundle 1 Phase 11 — RBAC MCP tools.
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//
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// 12 tools mirroring the Phase-4 + Phase-7 HTTP surface so operators
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// driving certctl from Claude / VS Code / any MCP client get the same
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// management capability the GUI + CLI already expose. Every tool routes
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// through the existing HTTP client (no parallel business logic), so
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// permission gates fire server-side: a non-admin caller's MCP tool
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// invocation returns whatever 403 the underlying HTTP handler emits.
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//
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// Coverage map (each tool → HTTP endpoint → permission):
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//
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// certctl_auth_me GET /v1/auth/me (no perm; own data)
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// certctl_auth_list_roles GET /v1/auth/roles auth.role.list
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// certctl_auth_get_role GET /v1/auth/roles/{id} auth.role.list
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// certctl_auth_create_role POST /v1/auth/roles auth.role.create
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// certctl_auth_update_role PUT /v1/auth/roles/{id} auth.role.edit
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// certctl_auth_delete_role DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id} auth.role.delete
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// certctl_auth_list_permissions GET /v1/auth/permissions auth.role.list
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// certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role POST /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions auth.role.edit
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// certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm} auth.role.edit
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// certctl_auth_list_keys GET /v1/auth/keys auth.role.list
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// certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key POST /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles auth.role.assign
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// certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key DELETE /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id} auth.role.assign
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//
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// CLAUDE.md asks for a re-derive after each MCP-tool addition:
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// grep -cE 'mcp\.AddTool\(' internal/mcp/tools*.go
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// =============================================================================
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func registerAuthTools(s *gomcp.Server, c *Client) {
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// ── Identity probe ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
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Name: "certctl_auth_me",
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Description: "Return the current actor's identity, roles, and effective permissions (GET /v1/auth/me). Useful for verifying which API key the MCP server is calling under and what operations it can perform without 403.",
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}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, _ struct{}) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
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data, err := c.Get("/api/v1/auth/me", nil)
|
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|
if err != nil {
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return errorResult(err)
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}
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return textResult(data)
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})
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// ── Roles ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
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Name: "certctl_auth_list_roles",
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|
Description: "List every role in the active tenant (GET /v1/auth/roles). Permission: auth.role.list.",
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||||||
|
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, _ struct{}) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||||
|
data, err := c.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles", nil)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return errorResult(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return textResult(data)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||||
|
Name: "certctl_auth_get_role",
|
||||||
|
Description: "Get a single role by id, including its current permission grants (GET /v1/auth/roles/{id}). Permission: auth.role.list.",
|
||||||
|
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthRoleIDInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||||
|
data, err := c.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles/"+input.ID, nil)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return errorResult(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return textResult(data)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||||
|
Name: "certctl_auth_create_role",
|
||||||
|
Description: "Create a new custom role (POST /v1/auth/roles). The 7 default roles (admin / operator / viewer / agent / mcp / cli / auditor) are seeded by migration; this tool is for tenant-specific custom roles. Permission: auth.role.create.",
|
||||||
|
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthCreateRoleInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||||
|
data, err := c.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles", input)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return errorResult(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return textResult(data)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||||
|
Name: "certctl_auth_update_role",
|
||||||
|
Description: "Update a custom role's name or description (PUT /v1/auth/roles/{id}). Default roles cannot be renamed. Permission: auth.role.edit.",
|
||||||
|
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthUpdateRoleInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||||
|
body := map[string]string{}
|
||||||
|
if input.Name != "" {
|
||||||
|
body["name"] = input.Name
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if input.Description != "" {
|
||||||
|
body["description"] = input.Description
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
data, err := c.Put("/api/v1/auth/roles/"+input.ID, body)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return errorResult(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return textResult(data)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||||
|
Name: "certctl_auth_delete_role",
|
||||||
|
Description: "Delete a custom role (DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}). Fails with 409 when actors still hold the role; revoke their assignments first via certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key. Permission: auth.role.delete.",
|
||||||
|
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthRoleIDInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||||
|
data, err := c.Delete("/api/v1/auth/roles/" + input.ID)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return errorResult(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return textResult(data)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ── Permissions ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||||
|
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||||
|
Name: "certctl_auth_list_permissions",
|
||||||
|
Description: "List the canonical permission catalogue (GET /v1/auth/permissions). Used by the role editor to populate the grant picker. Permission: auth.role.list.",
|
||||||
|
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, _ struct{}) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||||
|
data, err := c.Get("/api/v1/auth/permissions", nil)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return errorResult(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return textResult(data)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||||
|
Name: "certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role",
|
||||||
|
Description: "Grant a permission to a role at a scope (POST /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions). Body: permission name (must be in canonical catalogue), scope_type (global|profile|issuer), and scope_id (required for non-global). Permission: auth.role.edit.",
|
||||||
|
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthRolePermissionGrantInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||||
|
body := map[string]any{"permission": input.Permission}
|
||||||
|
if input.ScopeType != "" {
|
||||||
|
body["scope_type"] = input.ScopeType
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if input.ScopeID != "" {
|
||||||
|
body["scope_id"] = input.ScopeID
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
data, err := c.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles/"+input.RoleID+"/permissions", body)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return errorResult(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return textResult(data)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||||
|
Name: "certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role",
|
||||||
|
Description: "Revoke a permission from a role (DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}?scope_type=&scope_id=). The scope_type + scope_id query params disambiguate when a permission is granted at multiple scopes. Permission: auth.role.edit.",
|
||||||
|
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthRolePermissionRevokeInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||||
|
path := "/api/v1/auth/roles/" + input.RoleID + "/permissions/" + input.Permission
|
||||||
|
q := url.Values{}
|
||||||
|
if input.ScopeType != "" {
|
||||||
|
q.Set("scope_type", input.ScopeType)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if input.ScopeID != "" {
|
||||||
|
q.Set("scope_id", input.ScopeID)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if encoded := q.Encode(); encoded != "" {
|
||||||
|
path += "?" + encoded
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
data, err := c.Delete(path)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return errorResult(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return textResult(data)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ── Keys ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||||
|
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||||
|
Name: "certctl_auth_list_keys",
|
||||||
|
Description: "List every actor in the active tenant with at least one role grant (GET /v1/auth/keys). Includes the synthetic actor-demo-anon row when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is configured; that row is system-managed and cannot be mutated. Permission: auth.role.list.",
|
||||||
|
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, _ struct{}) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||||
|
data, err := c.Get("/api/v1/auth/keys", nil)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return errorResult(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return textResult(data)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||||
|
Name: "certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key",
|
||||||
|
Description: "Assign a role to an API key actor (POST /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles). Body: role_id. Privilege-escalation guard: the caller must hold auth.role.assign globally (admin role or equivalent). Permission: auth.role.assign.",
|
||||||
|
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthAssignKeyRoleInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||||
|
data, err := c.Post("/api/v1/auth/keys/"+input.KeyID+"/roles",
|
||||||
|
map[string]string{"role_id": input.RoleID})
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return errorResult(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return textResult(data)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||||
|
Name: "certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key",
|
||||||
|
Description: "Revoke a role from an API key actor (DELETE /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}). Rejects revocations against the reserved actor-demo-anon (HTTP 409). Permission: auth.role.assign.",
|
||||||
|
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||||
|
data, err := c.Delete("/api/v1/auth/keys/" + input.KeyID + "/roles/" + input.RoleID)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return errorResult(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return textResult(data)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
|
|||||||
|
package mcp
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"encoding/json"
|
||||||
|
"errors"
|
||||||
|
"net/http"
|
||||||
|
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||||
|
"strings"
|
||||||
|
"testing"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
gomcp "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// =============================================================================
|
||||||
|
// Bundle 1 Phase 11 — RBAC MCP tool tests.
|
||||||
|
//
|
||||||
|
// Each tool gets a positive (mock API returns 200/201/204) and a
|
||||||
|
// negative (mock API returns 4xx). Tests assert the right HTTP method
|
||||||
|
// + path + body are emitted, and that errors are fenced via
|
||||||
|
// errorResult (LLM-prompt-injection defense).
|
||||||
|
//
|
||||||
|
// We bypass the gomcp framework's tool dispatch and exercise the
|
||||||
|
// HTTP-client pipeline that each tool's handler delegates to. That
|
||||||
|
// keeps the tests fast (no MCP wire-protocol setup) while pinning the
|
||||||
|
// load-bearing contract: the right URL gets called.
|
||||||
|
// =============================================================================
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// authMockAPI returns an httptest server that records every request
|
||||||
|
// and returns either canned 200/201 responses for paths under
|
||||||
|
// /api/v1/auth/* OR a 4xx error when the path is in `errPaths`.
|
||||||
|
func authMockAPI(log *requestLog, errPaths map[string]int) *httptest.Server {
|
||||||
|
return httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||||
|
body := ""
|
||||||
|
if r.Body != nil {
|
||||||
|
buf := make([]byte, 8192)
|
||||||
|
n, _ := r.Body.Read(buf)
|
||||||
|
body = string(buf[:n])
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
log.add(capturedRequest{Method: r.Method, Path: r.URL.Path, Query: r.URL.RawQuery, Body: body})
|
||||||
|
if code, ok := errPaths[r.Method+" "+r.URL.Path]; ok {
|
||||||
|
w.WriteHeader(code)
|
||||||
|
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"forbidden"}`))
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||||
|
switch r.Method {
|
||||||
|
case http.MethodPost:
|
||||||
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
|
||||||
|
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"id": "r-new"})
|
||||||
|
case http.MethodPut, http.MethodDelete:
|
||||||
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
||||||
|
default:
|
||||||
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
||||||
|
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"data": []any{}, "total": 0})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestAuthMCP_AllToolsRegister(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
log := &requestLog{}
|
||||||
|
api := authMockAPI(log, nil)
|
||||||
|
defer api.Close()
|
||||||
|
client, err := NewClient(api.URL, "k", "", false)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("NewClient: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
server := gomcp.NewServer(&gomcp.Implementation{Name: "certctl-test", Version: "test"}, nil)
|
||||||
|
registerAuthTools(server, client) // must not panic
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// TestAuthMCP_PathsAndMethods walks every Phase-11 tool's HTTP target
|
||||||
|
// and asserts the right method + URL fires against the mock API. Each
|
||||||
|
// row in the table is one tool's positive case.
|
||||||
|
func TestAuthMCP_PathsAndMethods(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
log := &requestLog{}
|
||||||
|
api := authMockAPI(log, nil)
|
||||||
|
defer api.Close()
|
||||||
|
client, err := NewClient(api.URL, "k", "", false)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("NewClient: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
cases := []struct {
|
||||||
|
name string
|
||||||
|
fire func() ([]byte, error)
|
||||||
|
wantMethod string
|
||||||
|
wantPath string
|
||||||
|
}{
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_me",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/me", nil) },
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "GET",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/me",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_list_roles",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles", nil) },
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "GET",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_get_role",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin", nil) },
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "GET",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_create_role",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||||
|
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles", map[string]string{"name": "release-manager"})
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "POST",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_update_role",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||||
|
return client.Put("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-release", map[string]string{"name": "release"})
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "PUT",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-release",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_delete_role",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-release") },
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "DELETE",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-release",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_list_permissions",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/permissions", nil) },
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "GET",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/permissions",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_add_permission_to_role",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||||
|
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions",
|
||||||
|
map[string]string{"permission": "cert.read"})
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "POST",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_remove_permission_from_role",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions/cert.read") },
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "DELETE",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions/cert.read",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_list_keys",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/keys", nil) },
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "GET",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/keys",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_assign_role_to_key",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||||
|
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles",
|
||||||
|
map[string]string{"role_id": "r-operator"})
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "POST",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
name: "auth_revoke_role_from_key",
|
||||||
|
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles/r-admin") },
|
||||||
|
wantMethod: "DELETE",
|
||||||
|
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles/r-admin",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||||
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
if _, err := tc.fire(); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("client call err = %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
req := log.last()
|
||||||
|
if req.Method != tc.wantMethod {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("method = %q, want %q", req.Method, tc.wantMethod)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if req.Path != tc.wantPath {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("path = %q, want %q", req.Path, tc.wantPath)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// TestAuthMCP_ForbiddenSurfacesFencedError pins the negative case for
|
||||||
|
// every tool: a 403 from the underlying API surfaces as a fenced
|
||||||
|
// error string the LLM consumer can recognize as untrusted data
|
||||||
|
// (LLM-prompt-injection defense).
|
||||||
|
func TestAuthMCP_ForbiddenSurfacesFencedError(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
log := &requestLog{}
|
||||||
|
api := authMockAPI(log, map[string]int{
|
||||||
|
"GET /api/v1/auth/me": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
"GET /api/v1/auth/roles": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
"GET /api/v1/auth/roles/r-x": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
"POST /api/v1/auth/roles": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
"PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/r-x": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
"DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/r-x": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
"GET /api/v1/auth/permissions": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
"POST /api/v1/auth/roles/r-x/permissions": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
"DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/r-x/permissions/cert.read": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
"GET /api/v1/auth/keys": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
"POST /api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
"DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles/r-admin": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
defer api.Close()
|
||||||
|
client, _ := NewClient(api.URL, "k", "", false)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
calls := []func() ([]byte, error){
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/me", nil) },
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles", nil) },
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x", nil) },
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||||
|
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles", map[string]string{"name": "x"})
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Put("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x", map[string]string{}) },
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x") },
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/permissions", nil) },
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||||
|
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x/permissions", map[string]string{"permission": "cert.read"})
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||||
|
return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x/permissions/cert.read")
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/keys", nil) },
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||||
|
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles", map[string]string{"role_id": "r-operator"})
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles/r-admin") },
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
for i, fire := range calls {
|
||||||
|
_, err := fire()
|
||||||
|
if err == nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("call[%d] expected an error from forbidden mock; got nil", i)
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
// errorResult wraps the error in fences. Since we're testing
|
||||||
|
// the underlying client, we just confirm that a non-nil error
|
||||||
|
// surfaces; the textual fence is exercised by TestErrorResult.
|
||||||
|
_ = errors.Unwrap(err)
|
||||||
|
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(err.Error()), "forbidden") &&
|
||||||
|
!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "403") {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("call[%d] err = %v, expected to mention forbidden / 403", i, err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -417,6 +417,20 @@ var allHappyPathCases = []toolCase{
|
|||||||
{"certctl_list_certificate_deployments", map[string]any{"id": "mc-1"}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates/mc-1/deployments"},
|
{"certctl_list_certificate_deployments", map[string]any{"id": "mc-1"}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates/mc-1/deployments"},
|
||||||
{"certctl_verify_job", map[string]any{"id": "j-1", "target_id": "t-1", "expected_fingerprint": "AA:BB", "actual_fingerprint": "AA:BB", "verified": true}, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/jobs/j-1/verify"},
|
{"certctl_verify_job", map[string]any{"id": "j-1", "target_id": "t-1", "expected_fingerprint": "AA:BB", "actual_fingerprint": "AA:BB", "verified": true}, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/jobs/j-1/verify"},
|
||||||
{"certctl_get_job_verification", map[string]any{"id": "j-1"}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/jobs/j-1/verification"},
|
{"certctl_get_job_verification", map[string]any{"id": "j-1"}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/jobs/j-1/verification"},
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Bundle 1 Phase 11 — RBAC tools.
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_me", map[string]any{}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/me"},
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_list_roles", map[string]any{}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/roles"},
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_get_role", map[string]any{"id": "r-admin"}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin"},
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_create_role", map[string]any{"name": "release"}, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/roles"},
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_update_role", map[string]any{"id": "r-x", "name": "renamed"}, http.MethodPut, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x"},
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_delete_role", map[string]any{"id": "r-x"}, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x"},
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_list_permissions", map[string]any{}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/permissions"},
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role", map[string]any{"role_id": "r-admin", "permission": "cert.read"}, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions"},
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role", map[string]any{"role_id": "r-admin", "permission": "cert.read"}, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions/cert.read"},
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_list_keys", map[string]any{}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/keys"},
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key", map[string]any{"key_id": "alice", "role_id": "r-operator"}, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles"},
|
||||||
|
{"certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key", map[string]any{"key_id": "alice", "role_id": "r-admin"}, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles/r-admin"},
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestMCP_AllTools_HappyPath dispatches every tool against the mock API in
|
// TestMCP_AllTools_HappyPath dispatches every tool against the mock API in
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -552,3 +552,57 @@ type VerifyJobInput struct {
|
|||||||
// ── Empty ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
// ── Empty ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
type EmptyInput struct{}
|
type EmptyInput struct{}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ── Auth (Bundle 1 Phase 11 — RBAC) ────────────────────────────────
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// AuthRoleIDInput is the role-id-only input shape used by the get +
|
||||||
|
// delete tools. Distinct from the certificate-shaped GetByIDInput so
|
||||||
|
// the jsonschema description points at the role prefix specifically.
|
||||||
|
type AuthRoleIDInput struct {
|
||||||
|
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Role ID (e.g. r-admin, r-operator)"`
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// AuthCreateRoleInput is the body for certctl_auth_create_role.
|
||||||
|
type AuthCreateRoleInput struct {
|
||||||
|
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Role display name (required, must be unique within the tenant)"`
|
||||||
|
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional human-readable description of what the role grants"`
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// AuthUpdateRoleInput is the body for certctl_auth_update_role.
|
||||||
|
type AuthUpdateRoleInput struct {
|
||||||
|
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Role ID to update (e.g. r-release-manager)"`
|
||||||
|
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"New role display name. Empty = unchanged"`
|
||||||
|
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"New description. Empty = unchanged"`
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// AuthRolePermissionGrantInput is the body for
|
||||||
|
// certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role.
|
||||||
|
type AuthRolePermissionGrantInput struct {
|
||||||
|
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to grant the permission to"`
|
||||||
|
Permission string `json:"permission" jsonschema:"Canonical permission name (e.g. cert.read, auth.role.assign). Must be in the catalogue returned by certctl_auth_list_permissions"`
|
||||||
|
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type,omitempty" jsonschema:"Scope type: global (default) | profile | issuer"`
|
||||||
|
ScopeID string `json:"scope_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Scope ID; required when scope_type is profile or issuer"`
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// AuthRolePermissionRevokeInput is the input for
|
||||||
|
// certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role.
|
||||||
|
type AuthRolePermissionRevokeInput struct {
|
||||||
|
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to revoke the permission from"`
|
||||||
|
Permission string `json:"permission" jsonschema:"Canonical permission name to revoke"`
|
||||||
|
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional scope type to disambiguate when the permission is granted at multiple scopes"`
|
||||||
|
ScopeID string `json:"scope_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional scope ID for scope_type=profile|issuer revocations"`
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// AuthAssignKeyRoleInput is the body for
|
||||||
|
// certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key.
|
||||||
|
type AuthAssignKeyRoleInput struct {
|
||||||
|
KeyID string `json:"key_id" jsonschema:"API-key actor ID (the named-key Name from CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED, or an ak-<slug> ID minted by the bootstrap path)"`
|
||||||
|
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to assign (e.g. r-operator)"`
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput is the input for
|
||||||
|
// certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key.
|
||||||
|
type AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput struct {
|
||||||
|
KeyID string `json:"key_id" jsonschema:"API-key actor ID. Reserved actor-demo-anon is rejected server-side"`
|
||||||
|
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to revoke"`
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -411,3 +411,28 @@ func TestCallerFromContext_Phase2ReturnsUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
t.Errorf("Phase 2 stub should return ErrUnauthenticated; got %v. Phase 3 wires the middleware-context bridge.", err)
|
t.Errorf("Phase 2 stub should return ErrUnauthenticated; got %v. Phase 3 wires the middleware-context bridge.", err)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// =============================================================================
|
||||||
|
// Bundle 1 Phase 12 — additional negative-test paths from the prompt list:
|
||||||
|
// #9: role delete with actors assigned → ErrAuthRoleInUse (HTTP 409).
|
||||||
|
// The Authorizer wrong-scope path is already covered by
|
||||||
|
// TestAuthorizer_SpecificScopeMatchesExactID (the wrongID arm asserts
|
||||||
|
// false). The ErrInvalidPermission path is covered by
|
||||||
|
// TestRoleService_AddPermissionRejectsNonCanonical.
|
||||||
|
// =============================================================================
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// TestRoleService_DeleteWithActorsAssignedReturns409 pins the
|
||||||
|
// repository sentinel pass-through: when the FK ON DELETE RESTRICT
|
||||||
|
// trips at the postgres layer, the repo returns
|
||||||
|
// repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse; the service surfaces that verbatim so
|
||||||
|
// the handler can map to HTTP 409.
|
||||||
|
func TestRoleService_DeleteWithActorsAssignedReturns409(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
rs, _, _ := newRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
||||||
|
// Pin the repo to surface ErrAuthRoleInUse on Delete (simulates
|
||||||
|
// the FK guard tripping in postgres).
|
||||||
|
rs.repo.(*fakeRoleRepo).deleteFail = repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse
|
||||||
|
err := rs.Delete(context.Background(), AsSystemCaller(), "r-operator")
|
||||||
|
if !errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse) {
|
||||||
|
t.Errorf("Delete err = %v, want repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse (handler maps to 409)", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user