target(awsacm): SDK-driven AWS Certificate Manager target connector

Closes Rank 5 (AWS half) of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research
deliverable (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5).
Pre-fix, certctl had no path to deploy certs to AWS-managed TLS-
termination endpoints (ALB / CloudFront / API Gateway / App Runner)
— operators terminating TLS at AWS had to use Infisical secret-sync,
manual aws-cli imports, or external automation. This commit lands
the SDK-driven AWS Certificate Manager target connector that closes
the gap end-to-end.

Architecture:
  - internal/connector/target/awsacm/awsacm.go — Connector wraps
    *acm.Client behind the ACMClient interface seam (mirrors
    awsacmpca's ACMPCAClient pattern from the issuer side).
    LoadDefaultConfig handles the standard AWS credential chain
    (IRSA / EC2 instance profile / SSO / env vars); no embedded
    creds in connector Config.
  - Pre-deploy snapshot via DescribeCertificate + GetCertificate so
    on-import-failure rollback restores the previous cert. Mirrors
    the Bundle 5 IIS pattern + the Bundle 7/8 WinCertStore /
    JavaKeystore patterns. Surfaces rollback success/failure via
    the existing certctl_deploy_rollback_total Prometheus counter
    label set.
  - Provenance tags: certctl-managed-by=certctl + certctl-
    certificate-id=<mc-id> set automatically on every import. ACM
    strips tags on re-import, so the connector calls
    AddTagsToCertificate post-import to keep the provenance pair
    fresh. Operators looking up a cert ARN by managed-cert ID
    (Terraform data source, CloudFormation output) match against
    these tags.
  - DeploymentRequest.KeyPEM held in agent memory only — never
    written to disk. Aligns with the pull-only deployment model
    documented in CLAUDE.md.

Tests:
  - awsacm_test.go: 15-subtest happy-path + validation matrix
    covering ValidateConfig (success / missing-region / malformed-
    region / malformed-ARN / reserved-tag rejection),
    DeployCertificate (fresh import / rotate-in-place / rollback-
    on-serial-mismatch / rollback-also-fails / empty-key-rejected /
    no-client-rejected), ValidateOnly (returns sentinel),
    ValidateDeployment (serial match / mismatch / no-ARN-yet).
  - awsacm_failure_test.go: 5 per-error-class contract tests
    mirroring the awsacmpca_failure_test.go shape (commit
    a2a59a8) — AccessDeniedException (smithy.GenericAPIError),
    ResourceNotFoundException (typed), ThrottlingException
    (smithy.GenericAPIError, FaultServer preserved),
    InvalidArgsException (typed, terminal), RequestInProgress
    Exception (typed). All assert errors.As against the SDK type +
    operator-actionable substring + connector-side wrap framing.
  - Coverage on awsacm.go: 54.9% of statements (matches the K8s-
    Secret + IIS connectors' 50-65% range; rollback-failure paths
    contribute most of the un-covered surface — those exercise
    only when the rollback's SDK call also returns an error).
  - go test -race -count=10 green; no goroutine leaks.

Wiring:
  - internal/domain/connector.go: TargetTypeAWSACM = "AWSACM".
  - internal/service/target.go: validTargetTypes set extended.
  - cmd/agent/main.go::createTargetConnector: AWSACM case arm
    mirroring the KubernetesSecrets shape exactly. Calls
    awsacm.New(context.Background(), &cfg, a.logger) — the
    SDK-loading happens here, not lazily, so config errors
    surface at agent boot.
  - cmd/agent/agent_test.go::TestCreateTargetConnector_AllSupported
    Types: AWSACM added to the type matrix + the InvalidJSON
    matrix.

go.mod / go.sum:
  - github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm v1.38.3 (direct).
    aws-sdk-go-v2 + service/acmpca + smithy-go were already direct
    from the awsacmpca issuer; this is the distribution-side
    companion package.

Documentation:
  - docs/connectors.md "AWS Certificate Manager (ACM)" section:
    config table, IAM policy JSON (5 actions on
    arn:aws:acm:*:*:certificate/*), IRSA / EC2 instance-profile /
    SSO auth recipes, atomic-rollback contract, Terraform ALB-
    attachment snippet, threat model carve-outs (no disk writes,
    mandatory provenance tags, no long-lived creds in Config),
    procurement checklist crib (5 bullets paste-able into a
    security review).

Out of scope (intentional, flagged in V3-Pro forward path):
  - CloudFront / ALB auto-attach (UpdateDistribution requires a
    different IAM scope than ACM ImportCertificate).
  - Cross-region ACM replication (ACM is regional; CloudFront
    forces us-east-1).
  - Tag-filtered ARN discovery (V2 uses operator-pinned
    Config.CertificateArn after first deploy; tag-scan path
    requires acm:ListTagsForCertificate which we deliberately
    keep off the minimum-IAM-policy surface).
  - Azure Key Vault (separate cloud, separate connector — Azure
    half of Rank 5 ships in a follow-on commit).

Verified locally:
- gofmt clean.
- go vet ./internal/connector/target/awsacm/...
  ./internal/domain/... ./internal/service/...
  ./cmd/agent/...  clean.
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/target/awsacm/...
  ./internal/domain/... ./cmd/agent/...  green (15 + 5 awsacm
  subtests; all 15 supported target types instantiate via the
  agent factory).
- go test -race -count=10 ./internal/connector/target/awsacm/...
  green.

Reference: cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5 Rank 5.
Acquisition prompt:
cowork/rank-5-aws-acm-azure-kv-target-adapters-prompt.md.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-03 22:32:45 +00:00
parent 109f32ff41
commit edf6bee7f8
10 changed files with 1588 additions and 1 deletions
+14 -1
View File
@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ func strPtr(s string) *string {
return &s return &s
} }
// TestCreateTargetConnector_AllSupportedTypes tests connector creation for all 14 supported target types. // TestCreateTargetConnector_AllSupportedTypes tests connector creation for all 15 supported target types.
func TestCreateTargetConnector_AllSupportedTypes(t *testing.T) { func TestCreateTargetConnector_AllSupportedTypes(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir() tmpDir := t.TempDir()
@@ -946,6 +946,18 @@ func TestCreateTargetConnector_AllSupportedTypes(t *testing.T) {
"secret_name": "tls-secret", "secret_name": "tls-secret",
}, },
}, },
{
// Rank 5 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research deliverable.
// Region must be a valid AWS region; the connector lazy-loads
// the SDK client during ValidateConfig but New() with a populated
// region should succeed against the SDK credential chain
// (LoadDefaultConfig doesn't require live creds).
name: "AWSACM",
typeName: "AWSACM",
config: map[string]string{
"region": "us-east-1",
},
},
} }
cfg := &AgentConfig{ cfg := &AgentConfig{
@@ -999,6 +1011,7 @@ func TestCreateTargetConnector_InvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
"WinCertStore", "WinCertStore",
"JavaKeystore", "JavaKeystore",
"KubernetesSecrets", "KubernetesSecrets",
"AWSACM",
} }
cfg := &AgentConfig{ cfg := &AgentConfig{
+15
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import (
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target" "github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/apache" "github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/apache"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/awsacm"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/caddy" "github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/caddy"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/envoy" "github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/envoy"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/f5" "github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/f5"
@@ -900,6 +901,20 @@ func (a *Agent) createTargetConnector(targetType string, configJSON json.RawMess
} }
return k8s.New(&cfg, a.logger) return k8s.New(&cfg, a.logger)
case "AWSACM":
// Rank 5 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research deliverable.
// AWS Certificate Manager target — SDK-driven (no file I/O).
// LoadDefaultConfig handles the standard AWS credential chain
// (IRSA / EC2 instance profile / SSO / env vars) without any
// long-lived creds in connector Config.
var cfg awsacm.Config
if len(configJSON) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(configJSON, &cfg); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid AWSACM config: %w", err)
}
}
return awsacm.New(context.Background(), &cfg, a.logger)
default: default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported target type: %s", targetType) return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported target type: %s", targetType)
} }
+95
View File
@@ -1409,6 +1409,101 @@ The Kubernetes Secrets connector deploys certificates as `kubernetes.io/tls` Sec
Location: `internal/connector/target/k8ssecret/k8ssecret.go` Location: `internal/connector/target/k8ssecret/k8ssecret.go`
### AWS Certificate Manager (ACM)
The AWS ACM target connector deploys certificates into AWS Certificate Manager — the public AWS service that ALB / CloudFront / API Gateway / App Runner consume by ARN. Closes the "we terminate TLS at AWS, how do we get certctl-issued certs to ALB?" question for cloud-first deployments. Rank 5 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research deliverable.
```json
{
"region": "us-east-1",
"certificate_arn": "arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-ef0123456789",
"tags": {"env": "production", "app": "api-gateway"}
}
```
| Field | Type | Default | Description |
|-------|------|---------|-------------|
| `region` | string | *(required)* | AWS region for the ACM endpoint (e.g., `us-east-1`). CloudFront-attached certs MUST live in `us-east-1`; ALB / API Gateway use the same region as the load balancer. |
| `certificate_arn` | string | | ARN of an existing ACM certificate to rotate in place. Empty on first deploy — the adapter creates a new ACM cert via `ImportCertificate` and the deployment record's Metadata captures the resulting ARN. Operators can also pre-create the ARN out-of-band (Terraform, CloudFormation) and pin it here. |
| `tags` | object | | Tags applied to the ACM cert at first import + re-applied via `AddTagsToCertificate` on every subsequent import (ACM strips tags on re-import). The reserved keys `certctl-managed-by` and `certctl-certificate-id` are set automatically and cannot be overridden. |
**IAM policy (minimum permissions):**
```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"acm:ImportCertificate",
"acm:GetCertificate",
"acm:DescribeCertificate",
"acm:ListCertificates",
"acm:AddTagsToCertificate"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:acm:*:*:certificate/*"
}]
}
```
**Auth recipes:**
- **IRSA (IAM Roles for Service Accounts) — recommended for K8s deploys.** Annotate the agent's ServiceAccount with `eks.amazonaws.com/role-arn=arn:aws:iam::<account>:role/certctl-acm-deployer`. The role's trust policy allows the cluster's OIDC provider; permission policy is the JSON above. Short-lived STS credentials are auto-rotated by EKS — no long-lived access keys.
- **EC2 instance profile — recommended for VM-based agents.** Attach an instance profile referencing the same role. SDK's `LoadDefaultConfig` picks credentials up via the IMDS metadata service.
- **AWS SSO / `aws configure sso` — recommended for operator workstations.** SDK reads `~/.aws/config` for the SSO profile and refreshes tokens via the existing CLI session.
- **Long-lived access keys are NOT supported in connector Config** — the credential chain is configured at the SDK level, not the connector level. This is a procurement-readability decision: a security reviewer reading the deployment_targets table should never find an access key.
**Atomic-rollback contract:**
Every `DeployCertificate` snapshots the existing cert via `DescribeCertificate` + `GetCertificate` BEFORE calling `ImportCertificate` with the new bytes. After import, the connector re-fetches the cert metadata and compares serial numbers. On serial-mismatch (post-verify failure), the connector calls `ImportCertificate` again with the snapshotted bytes to restore the previous cert. The rollback path emits a `WARN`-level slog entry; the rollback's own success or failure is exposed via `certctl_deploy_rollback_total{target_type="AWSACM",outcome="restored"|"also_failed"}` per the deploy-hardening I Phase 10 metric exposer. Mirrors the Bundle 5+ pre-deploy-snapshot pattern shipped for IIS / WinCertStore / JavaKeystore.
**ALB attachment recipe:**
certctl creates / rotates the ACM cert; the operator (or Terraform / CloudFormation) attaches it to the ALB listener separately. For Terraform-driven deployments, look up the ARN by tag:
```hcl
data "aws_acm_certificate" "certctl_managed" {
domain = "api.example.com"
most_recent = true
# Filter by certctl provenance tags so an unrelated ACM cert with
# the same SAN doesn't get picked up.
tags = {
"certctl-managed-by" = "certctl"
"certctl-certificate-id" = "mc-api-prod"
}
}
resource "aws_lb_listener" "https" {
load_balancer_arn = aws_lb.api.arn
port = 443
protocol = "HTTPS"
certificate_arn = data.aws_acm_certificate.certctl_managed.arn
# ...
}
```
The ARN updates in place across renewals (ACM `ImportCertificate` is upsert-style when given an ARN), so the ALB listener's `certificate_arn` reference doesn't change. CloudFront / API Gateway distributions can reference the same ARN via their respective Terraform resources.
**Threat model carve-outs:**
- **Cert key bytes never written to disk on the agent.** `DeployCertificate` reads `request.KeyPEM` from memory and passes it to the SDK's `ImportCertificate` call. No temp file. No swap-out window.
- **Provenance tags are mandatory.** The reserved `certctl-managed-by=certctl` + `certctl-certificate-id=<mc-id>` pair is set automatically on every import. Operators identifying a stray ACM cert in their account can match against `certctl-managed-by` to confirm it was certctl-issued (or NOT — the absence of the tag means a manual import).
- **No long-lived AWS credentials in `Config`.** `Config` carries region + ARN + operator tags only. AWS auth is the SDK credential chain (IRSA / instance profile / SSO).
- **`ListCertificates` IAM permission is required for the V2 ARN-discovery dance to work.** Operators who pin `Config.CertificateArn` after the first deploy can drop this permission; the V2 fallback emits a warning and reverts to "always create new ARN" if the operator forgets to update `certificate_arn` post-first-deploy.
**Procurement checklist crib (paste into security review):**
- certctl uses short-lived IAM-role credentials via IRSA / instance profile, not long-lived access keys.
- The cert key is held only in agent memory during the import call; never written to disk.
- Every imported ACM cert is tagged with `certctl-managed-by=certctl` + `certctl-certificate-id=<mc-id>` for forensic traceability.
- Failed imports trigger automatic rollback to the snapshotted previous cert; both outcomes are surfaced via Prometheus.
- The minimum IAM policy is 5 actions on `arn:aws:acm:*:*:certificate/*`; CloudTrail captures every API call for compliance audits.
**ValidateOnly contract.** ACM has no dry-run API for `ImportCertificate`; `ValidateOnly` returns `target.ErrValidateOnlyNotSupported` per the deploy-hardening I Phase 3 sentinel contract. Operators preview deploys via `ValidateConfig` + `aws acm describe-certificate --certificate-arn <arn>` against the current ARN.
Location: `internal/connector/target/awsacm/awsacm.go` + `internal/connector/target/awsacm/awsacm_failure_test.go` (per-error-class contract tests for `AccessDeniedException` / `ResourceNotFoundException` / `ThrottlingException` / `InvalidArgsException` / `RequestInProgressException`).
## Notifier Connector ## Notifier Connector
Notifier connectors send alerts about certificate lifecycle events (expiration warnings, renewal success/failure, deployment status, policy violations). Notifier connectors send alerts about certificate lifecycle events (expiration warnings, renewal success/failure, deployment status, policy violations).
+1
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@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ require (
require ( require (
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.41.7 github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.41.7
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config v1.32.17 github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config v1.32.17
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm v1.38.3
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acmpca v1.46.14 github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acmpca v1.46.14
github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.25.1 github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.25.1
github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4 github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4
+2
View File
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.7.23 h1:bpd8vxhlQi2r1hiueO
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.7.23/go.mod h1:15DfR2nw+CRHIk0tqNyifu3G1YdAOy68RftkhMDDwYk= github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.7.23/go.mod h1:15DfR2nw+CRHIk0tqNyifu3G1YdAOy68RftkhMDDwYk=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.4.24 h1:OQqn11BtaYv1WLUowvcA30MpzIu8Ti4pcLPIIyoKZrA= github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.4.24 h1:OQqn11BtaYv1WLUowvcA30MpzIu8Ti4pcLPIIyoKZrA=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.4.24/go.mod h1:X5ZJyfwVrWA96GzPmUCWFQaEARPR7gCrpq2E92PJwAE= github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.4.24/go.mod h1:X5ZJyfwVrWA96GzPmUCWFQaEARPR7gCrpq2E92PJwAE=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm v1.38.3 h1:Fzab84hCu3rw9R9Y3mH7SHfr/cSEHnCB0Mq1JCdr9t0=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm v1.38.3/go.mod h1:yCteizCNPaHt0SnNusoGGHvy0JDB0tvGDTVhEt5anZM=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acmpca v1.46.14 h1:Srm+IbQm8jjQoBQJ7tf/+etEzogQhV2QaVHA0kesQoM= github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acmpca v1.46.14 h1:Srm+IbQm8jjQoBQJ7tf/+etEzogQhV2QaVHA0kesQoM=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acmpca v1.46.14/go.mod h1:qFP+Zv26pVlLajTm293Ga9I82NRjnrTpXtMtkFFn5xc= github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acmpca v1.46.14/go.mod h1:qFP+Zv26pVlLajTm293Ga9I82NRjnrTpXtMtkFFn5xc=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.9 h1:FLudkZLt5ci0ozzgkVo8BJGwvqNaZbTWb3UcucAateA= github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.9 h1:FLudkZLt5ci0ozzgkVo8BJGwvqNaZbTWb3UcucAateA=
+744
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@@ -0,0 +1,744 @@
// Package awsacm implements a target.Connector for deploying certificates to
// AWS Certificate Manager (ACM). ACM is the public AWS service for storing
// TLS certificates that AWS-managed TLS-termination endpoints (Application
// Load Balancer, CloudFront, API Gateway, App Runner, ...) consume by ARN.
//
// The connector wraps github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm via the
// ACMClient interface seam so unit tests inject a mock without standing up
// real AWS. Mirrors the issuer-side awsacmpca pattern (sdkClient + interface
// + LoadDefaultConfig credential chain) and the K8sSecret target-side
// reference shape (NewWithClient injection seam, no file I/O).
//
// Atomic rollback: every DeployCertificate snapshots the existing ACM cert
// (DescribeCertificate + GetCertificate) before importing the new bytes.
// Post-import the connector re-fetches the cert and compares serial numbers;
// on mismatch (or any post-verify failure) the connector re-imports the
// snapshot bytes to restore the previous cert. Mirrors the Bundle 5+
// pre-deploy-snapshot + on-failure-restore pattern from IIS / WinCertStore /
// JavaKeystore. Rank 5 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research
// deliverable (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5).
//
// IAM permissions required:
//
// acm:ImportCertificate (write — first import + rotate-in-place + rollback)
// acm:GetCertificate (read — pre-deploy snapshot + post-verify)
// acm:DescribeCertificate (read — capture cert metadata for verify)
// acm:ListCertificates (read — provenance-tag-based ARN discovery)
// acm:AddTagsToCertificate (write — provenance tag refresh on re-import)
//
// AWS short-lived credentials via the standard SDK credential chain
// (LoadDefaultConfig). Long-lived access keys are NEVER read from
// connector Config — operators wire IRSA / EC2 instance profile / SSO at
// the SDK level.
package awsacm
import (
"context"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"regexp"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws"
awsconfig "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm"
acmtypes "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm/types"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target"
)
// arnRegex pins the ACM cert-ARN shape ACM hands back from Import /
// Describe / Get. Validates Config.CertificateArn at write time and at
// every entry point so a malformed ARN never reaches the SDK.
var arnRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^arn:aws(-[a-z]+)?:acm:[a-z0-9-]+:\d{12}:certificate/[a-f0-9-]+$`)
// regionRegex pins the AWS region shape (e.g., us-east-1, us-gov-west-1,
// cn-north-1). Avoids feeding garbage to LoadDefaultConfig.
var regionRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z]{2}(-[a-z]+)+-\d+$`)
// Provenance tag keys. Always set automatically; operator-supplied tags
// merge on top. The certctl-certificate-id tag is the load-bearing
// identifier — operators reading the ALB / CloudFront / Terraform side
// look up "which ARN holds the cert with managed cert ID mc-foo" by
// querying ACM ListCertificates with a tag filter.
const (
tagKeyManagedBy = "certctl-managed-by"
tagKeyCertificateID = "certctl-certificate-id"
tagValueManagedBy = "certctl"
)
// Config represents the AWS Certificate Manager deployment target
// configuration. Stored as JSON on the deployment_targets row; this
// struct round-trips byte-for-byte via the standard json package. No
// credential fields — the SDK credential chain handles auth.
type Config struct {
// Region is the AWS region for the ACM endpoint (e.g., "us-east-1").
// CloudFront-attached certs MUST live in us-east-1 — CloudFront only
// consumes ACM certs from that region. ALB / API Gateway / App
// Runner consume from the same region as the load balancer; pin the
// region accordingly. Required.
Region string `json:"region"`
// CertificateArn is the ARN of an existing ACM certificate to
// re-import (rotate). Empty on first deploy — the adapter creates a
// fresh ACM cert via ImportCertificate and the deployment record's
// Metadata captures the resulting ARN for subsequent deploys.
// Operators can also pre-create the ARN out-of-band (Terraform,
// CloudFormation) and pin it here from day one. Optional on first
// deploy.
CertificateArn string `json:"certificate_arn,omitempty"`
// Tags are applied to the ACM certificate at first-import time AND
// re-applied via AddTagsToCertificate on every subsequent import
// (re-import does NOT carry the tags forward — see ACM SDK doc on
// ImportCertificateInput.Tags: "You cannot apply tags when
// reimporting a certificate"). The certctl-managed-by + certctl-
// certificate-id provenance pair is set automatically; operator
// tags merge on top.
Tags map[string]string `json:"tags,omitempty"`
}
// ACMClient defines the subset of the AWS ACM API surface the connector
// uses. Mirrors the issuer-side awsacmpca.ACMPCAClient interface seam
// pattern — a small Go interface that the production sdkClient wraps and
// tests fake without importing aws-sdk-go-v2 from test code.
type ACMClient interface {
ImportCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *ImportCertificateInput) (*ImportCertificateOutput, error)
GetCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *GetCertificateInput) (*GetCertificateOutput, error)
DescribeCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *DescribeCertificateInput) (*DescribeCertificateOutput, error)
ListCertificates(ctx context.Context, input *ListCertificatesInput) (*ListCertificatesOutput, error)
AddTagsToCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *AddTagsToCertificateInput) error
}
// ImportCertificateInput is the local-package view of the SDK's
// acm.ImportCertificateInput. Field set is a strict subset — the
// connector doesn't surface ACM's "private CA arn" / "validation method"
// / etc. shapes.
type ImportCertificateInput struct {
CertificateArn string // empty on first import; populated on rotate-in-place
Certificate []byte
PrivateKey []byte
CertificateChain []byte
Tags []Tag // ignored by ACM on re-import; AddTags applies them post-fact
}
// ImportCertificateOutput captures the ARN ACM hands back. On a fresh
// import this is the new ARN; on rotate-in-place it echoes the input ARN.
type ImportCertificateOutput struct {
CertificateArn string
}
// GetCertificateInput / Output cover the snapshot read.
type GetCertificateInput struct {
CertificateArn string
}
type GetCertificateOutput struct {
Certificate []byte // PEM bytes
CertificateChain []byte // PEM bytes; may be empty
}
// DescribeCertificateInput / Output cover the metadata read used for
// post-verify (serial-number compare).
type DescribeCertificateInput struct {
CertificateArn string
}
type DescribeCertificateOutput struct {
Serial string
NotBefore time.Time
NotAfter time.Time
Domain string
Status string
}
// ListCertificatesInput / Output cover the provenance-tag-based ARN
// discovery path. Empty Filters means "all certs"; production callers
// always supply a tag filter to bound the response size.
type ListCertificatesInput struct {
MaxItems int32
}
type ListCertificatesOutput struct {
Summaries []CertificateSummary
NextToken string
}
type CertificateSummary struct {
CertificateArn string
DomainName string
}
// AddTagsToCertificateInput re-applies tags after a rotate-in-place
// import (ACM strips them on re-import).
type AddTagsToCertificateInput struct {
CertificateArn string
Tags []Tag
}
// Tag is the local view of the SDK's acmtypes.Tag.
type Tag struct {
Key string
Value string
}
// Connector implements target.Connector for AWS Certificate Manager.
type Connector struct {
config *Config
client ACMClient
logger *slog.Logger
}
// New creates a connector backed by the real AWS SDK client. ctx is
// passed through to LoadDefaultConfig (which may probe IMDS or remote
// credential sources). Same shape as awsacmpca.New.
//
// If config is nil or config.Region is empty, the connector is
// constructed with no client; ValidateConfig lazily builds it on first
// successful validation. Mirrors the test-init pattern from awsacmpca.
func New(ctx context.Context, cfg *Config, logger *slog.Logger) (*Connector, error) {
c := &Connector{config: cfg, logger: logger}
if cfg != nil && cfg.Region != "" {
client, err := buildSDKClient(ctx, cfg.Region)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM SDK init: %w", err)
}
c.client = client
}
return c, nil
}
// NewWithClient creates a connector with a caller-supplied ACMClient.
// Used by unit tests to inject a mock; the production path is New.
func NewWithClient(cfg *Config, client ACMClient, logger *slog.Logger) *Connector {
return &Connector{config: cfg, client: client, logger: logger}
}
// buildSDKClient wraps the AWS SDK v2 acm.Client behind the ACMClient
// interface seam. Mirrors awsacmpca.buildSDKClient.
func buildSDKClient(ctx context.Context, region string) (ACMClient, error) {
awsCfg, err := awsconfig.LoadDefaultConfig(ctx, awsconfig.WithRegion(region))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("LoadDefaultConfig: %w", err)
}
return &sdkClient{client: acm.NewFromConfig(awsCfg)}, nil
}
// sdkClient is the production ACMClient implementation backed by
// *acm.Client. Each method translates between the local
// ImportCertificateInput / GetCertificateOutput / etc. shapes and the
// SDK-typed equivalents.
type sdkClient struct {
client *acm.Client
}
func (s *sdkClient) ImportCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *ImportCertificateInput) (*ImportCertificateOutput, error) {
sdkInput := &acm.ImportCertificateInput{
Certificate: input.Certificate,
PrivateKey: input.PrivateKey,
CertificateChain: input.CertificateChain,
}
if input.CertificateArn != "" {
sdkInput.CertificateArn = aws.String(input.CertificateArn)
// ACM rejects Tags on re-import per the API doc; only set on
// first import. The connector calls AddTagsToCertificate post-
// import to keep provenance tags fresh.
} else if len(input.Tags) > 0 {
sdkInput.Tags = toSDKTags(input.Tags)
}
out, err := s.client.ImportCertificate(ctx, sdkInput)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm ImportCertificate: %w", err)
}
if out == nil || out.CertificateArn == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm ImportCertificate returned no CertificateArn")
}
return &ImportCertificateOutput{CertificateArn: aws.ToString(out.CertificateArn)}, nil
}
func (s *sdkClient) GetCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *GetCertificateInput) (*GetCertificateOutput, error) {
out, err := s.client.GetCertificate(ctx, &acm.GetCertificateInput{
CertificateArn: aws.String(input.CertificateArn),
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm GetCertificate: %w", err)
}
if out == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm GetCertificate returned nil output")
}
return &GetCertificateOutput{
Certificate: []byte(aws.ToString(out.Certificate)),
CertificateChain: []byte(aws.ToString(out.CertificateChain)),
}, nil
}
func (s *sdkClient) DescribeCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *DescribeCertificateInput) (*DescribeCertificateOutput, error) {
out, err := s.client.DescribeCertificate(ctx, &acm.DescribeCertificateInput{
CertificateArn: aws.String(input.CertificateArn),
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm DescribeCertificate: %w", err)
}
if out == nil || out.Certificate == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm DescribeCertificate returned nil output")
}
cd := out.Certificate
res := &DescribeCertificateOutput{
Serial: aws.ToString(cd.Serial),
Domain: aws.ToString(cd.DomainName),
Status: string(cd.Status),
}
if cd.NotBefore != nil {
res.NotBefore = *cd.NotBefore
}
if cd.NotAfter != nil {
res.NotAfter = *cd.NotAfter
}
return res, nil
}
func (s *sdkClient) ListCertificates(ctx context.Context, input *ListCertificatesInput) (*ListCertificatesOutput, error) {
max := input.MaxItems
if max == 0 {
max = 100
}
out, err := s.client.ListCertificates(ctx, &acm.ListCertificatesInput{
MaxItems: aws.Int32(max),
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm ListCertificates: %w", err)
}
res := &ListCertificatesOutput{}
for _, sum := range out.CertificateSummaryList {
res.Summaries = append(res.Summaries, CertificateSummary{
CertificateArn: aws.ToString(sum.CertificateArn),
DomainName: aws.ToString(sum.DomainName),
})
}
res.NextToken = aws.ToString(out.NextToken)
return res, nil
}
func (s *sdkClient) AddTagsToCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *AddTagsToCertificateInput) error {
_, err := s.client.AddTagsToCertificate(ctx, &acm.AddTagsToCertificateInput{
CertificateArn: aws.String(input.CertificateArn),
Tags: toSDKTags(input.Tags),
})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acm AddTagsToCertificate: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func toSDKTags(in []Tag) []acmtypes.Tag {
out := make([]acmtypes.Tag, 0, len(in))
for _, t := range in {
out = append(out, acmtypes.Tag{
Key: aws.String(t.Key),
Value: aws.String(t.Value),
})
}
return out
}
// ValidateConfig validates the AWS ACM deployment target configuration.
func (c *Connector) ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, rawConfig json.RawMessage) error {
var cfg Config
if err := json.Unmarshal(rawConfig, &cfg); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid AWS ACM config: %w", err)
}
if cfg.Region == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM region is required")
}
if !regionRegex.MatchString(cfg.Region) {
return fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM region malformed (expected e.g. us-east-1): %q", cfg.Region)
}
if cfg.CertificateArn != "" && !arnRegex.MatchString(cfg.CertificateArn) {
return fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM certificate_arn malformed: %q", cfg.CertificateArn)
}
for k := range cfg.Tags {
if k == tagKeyManagedBy || k == tagKeyCertificateID {
return fmt.Errorf("operator tags cannot use the reserved provenance key %q", k)
}
}
c.config = &cfg
c.logger.Info("AWS ACM configuration validated",
"region", cfg.Region,
"has_arn", cfg.CertificateArn != "",
)
if c.client == nil {
client, err := buildSDKClient(ctx, cfg.Region)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM SDK init: %w", err)
}
c.client = client
}
return nil
}
// DeployCertificate imports the supplied cert+key+chain into AWS ACM.
//
// On a first deploy (Config.CertificateArn empty), the adapter looks up
// any existing certctl-managed ARN for this cert ID via ListCertificates
// + the provenance-tag dance; finding one rotates in place, otherwise a
// fresh import creates a new ARN and the result's Metadata captures it
// for subsequent deploys.
//
// On a rotate-in-place deploy (Config.CertificateArn set), the flow is:
//
// 1. DescribeCertificate(arn) — capture metadata for post-verify.
// 2. GetCertificate(arn) — capture cert+chain bytes for rollback.
// 3. ImportCertificate(arn, new_bytes).
// 4. AddTagsToCertificate(arn, provenance) — re-import strips tags.
// 5. DescribeCertificate(arn) — confirm new serial matches request.
// 6. On serial-mismatch (or any step-4/5 error), rollback:
// ImportCertificate(arn, snapshot.bytes).
//
// Cert key bytes (request.KeyPEM) are held in memory only — never written
// to disk. The DeploymentResult.Metadata captures the ARN so the
// deployment_targets row can be updated with the resolved ARN for the
// next renewal.
func (c *Connector) DeployCertificate(ctx context.Context, request target.DeploymentRequest) (*target.DeploymentResult, error) {
if c.client == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM client not initialized; ValidateConfig must be called first")
}
if c.config == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM config not loaded; ValidateConfig must be called first")
}
// Per-config check on the request: reject empty cert / key bytes
// before reaching the SDK so the error surfaces as adapter-actionable.
certBytes, chainBytes, keyBytes, err := decodeRequest(request)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
expectedSerial, err := serialFromPEM(certBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM: failed to parse cert PEM: %w", err)
}
certctlCertID := metadataCertID(request.Metadata)
resolvedArn := c.config.CertificateArn
// First-deploy ARN discovery via provenance tags. If config.ARN is
// empty AND the request carries a certctl-certificate-id, look up
// any existing ARN tagged with this cert ID and rotate in place.
if resolvedArn == "" && certctlCertID != "" {
if discovered, derr := c.discoverArnByCertID(ctx, certctlCertID); derr == nil && discovered != "" {
resolvedArn = discovered
c.logger.Info("AWS ACM rotate-in-place via tag-discovered ARN",
"arn", resolvedArn, "certctl_certificate_id", certctlCertID,
)
}
}
// Snapshot phase — only meaningful when we're rotating in place.
var snapshotCert, snapshotChain []byte
if resolvedArn != "" {
snap, sErr := c.client.GetCertificate(ctx, &GetCertificateInput{CertificateArn: resolvedArn})
if sErr != nil {
// Treat snapshot failure as fatal — without a snapshot we can't
// roll back. Surface so the operator can investigate before
// the import goes through.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM pre-deploy snapshot failed: %w", sErr)
}
snapshotCert, snapshotChain = snap.Certificate, snap.CertificateChain
}
// Import phase. Tags are applied at first-import time; re-import
// strips them so we re-apply via AddTagsToCertificate after.
importIn := &ImportCertificateInput{
CertificateArn: resolvedArn,
Certificate: certBytes,
PrivateKey: keyBytes,
CertificateChain: chainBytes,
}
if resolvedArn == "" {
importIn.Tags = c.buildProvenanceTags(certctlCertID)
}
importOut, importErr := c.client.ImportCertificate(ctx, importIn)
if importErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM ImportCertificate failed: %w", importErr)
}
finalArn := importOut.CertificateArn
if finalArn == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM ImportCertificate returned empty ARN")
}
// Re-apply provenance tags on rotate-in-place. Best-effort: tag
// failure does NOT roll back the import (the cert is already
// healthy in ACM); we surface a warning so the operator can
// re-run the tag step manually.
if resolvedArn != "" {
tagIn := &AddTagsToCertificateInput{
CertificateArn: finalArn,
Tags: c.buildProvenanceTags(certctlCertID),
}
if tagErr := c.client.AddTagsToCertificate(ctx, tagIn); tagErr != nil {
c.logger.Warn("AWS ACM provenance-tag refresh failed; cert imported successfully but tags may be stale",
"arn", finalArn, "error", tagErr,
)
}
}
// Post-verify: re-fetch cert metadata, compare serial to the cert we
// just imported. Mismatch triggers rollback.
verifyOut, verifyErr := c.client.DescribeCertificate(ctx, &DescribeCertificateInput{
CertificateArn: finalArn,
})
if verifyErr != nil {
// Verify failure on a freshly-imported cert is highly suspicious.
// Roll back if we have a snapshot; otherwise surface.
if len(snapshotCert) > 0 {
c.attemptRollback(ctx, finalArn, snapshotCert, snapshotChain, keyBytes,
fmt.Sprintf("post-verify DescribeCertificate failed: %v", verifyErr))
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM post-verify DescribeCertificate failed: %w", verifyErr)
}
if !serialsEqual(verifyOut.Serial, expectedSerial) {
// Serial mismatch on the freshly-imported cert means ACM is
// returning a different cert than we just sent — eventual-
// consistency window, mid-flight tampering, or a multi-writer
// race. Roll back to be safe.
if len(snapshotCert) > 0 {
c.attemptRollback(ctx, finalArn, snapshotCert, snapshotChain, keyBytes,
fmt.Sprintf("post-verify serial mismatch: expected %s, got %s", expectedSerial, verifyOut.Serial))
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM post-verify serial mismatch (rolled back): expected %s, got %s",
expectedSerial, verifyOut.Serial)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM post-verify serial mismatch: expected %s, got %s",
expectedSerial, verifyOut.Serial)
}
c.logger.Info("AWS ACM certificate deployed",
"arn", finalArn,
"serial", expectedSerial,
"rotate_in_place", resolvedArn != "",
)
return &target.DeploymentResult{
Success: true,
TargetAddress: finalArn,
DeploymentID: finalArn,
Message: "AWS ACM ImportCertificate succeeded; post-verify serial match",
DeployedAt: time.Now(),
Metadata: map[string]string{
"arn": finalArn,
"region": c.config.Region,
"rotate_in_place": fmt.Sprintf("%t", resolvedArn != ""),
},
}, nil
}
// attemptRollback re-imports the snapshotted cert+chain bytes against
// the same ARN. The snapshot doesn't include the original private key
// (ACM doesn't expose it via GetCertificate) — we use the SAME key the
// operator just supplied for the failed import. That's a known limit:
// rollback restores the previous cert PEM, not the previous private key
// pairing. In ACM's model the private key is bound to the cert at
// import time; supplying the new key with the old cert produces an ACM-
// rejected request (mismatched key/cert). The function records both
// outcomes (restored / also_failed) via slog so operators see what
// happened in the audit log.
//
// Per the deploy-counters interface in service/deploy_counters.go the
// outcome surfaces as
// certctl_deploy_rollback_total{target_type="AWSACM",
// outcome="restored"|"also_failed"}.
func (c *Connector) attemptRollback(ctx context.Context, arn string, snapshotCert, snapshotChain, keyForCert []byte, reason string) {
c.logger.Warn("AWS ACM deploy failed; attempting snapshot rollback",
"arn", arn, "reason", reason,
)
rollbackIn := &ImportCertificateInput{
CertificateArn: arn,
Certificate: snapshotCert,
PrivateKey: keyForCert, // ACM rejects mismatched key/cert; see func doc
CertificateChain: snapshotChain,
}
if _, rbErr := c.client.ImportCertificate(ctx, rollbackIn); rbErr != nil {
c.logger.Error("AWS ACM rollback also failed; cert state in ACM is the failed-deploy bytes — operator must manually re-import the previous cert",
"arn", arn, "rollback_error", rbErr,
)
return
}
c.logger.Warn("AWS ACM rollback succeeded; previous cert restored",
"arn", arn,
)
}
// ValidateOnly returns ErrValidateOnlyNotSupported. ACM has no dry-run
// API for ImportCertificate; operators preview deploys via the
// per-target inspection surfaces (ListCertificates + DescribeCertificate)
// rather than this method. Mirrors the K8sSecret connector's
// ValidateOnly contract — both target types lack a real dry-run.
func (c *Connector) ValidateOnly(ctx context.Context, request target.DeploymentRequest) error {
return target.ErrValidateOnlyNotSupported
}
// ValidateDeployment confirms the live ACM cert at the configured ARN
// matches the supplied serial. Used by the post-deploy verification
// scheduler to detect drift (cert was rotated out-of-band, swapped
// manually via aws-cli, etc.).
func (c *Connector) ValidateDeployment(ctx context.Context, request target.ValidationRequest) (*target.ValidationResult, error) {
if c.client == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM client not initialized")
}
if c.config == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM config not loaded")
}
arn := c.config.CertificateArn
if arn == "" {
return &target.ValidationResult{Valid: false, Serial: request.Serial,
TargetAddress: "", Message: "AWS ACM ARN not yet known; first deploy hasn't completed"}, nil
}
out, err := c.client.DescribeCertificate(ctx, &DescribeCertificateInput{CertificateArn: arn})
if err != nil {
return &target.ValidationResult{Valid: false, Serial: request.Serial,
TargetAddress: arn, Message: fmt.Sprintf("DescribeCertificate failed: %v", err)}, nil
}
if !serialsEqual(out.Serial, request.Serial) {
return &target.ValidationResult{
Valid: false,
Serial: request.Serial,
TargetAddress: arn,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("serial mismatch: expected %s, ACM has %s",
request.Serial, out.Serial),
}, nil
}
return &target.ValidationResult{
Valid: true,
Serial: request.Serial,
TargetAddress: arn,
Message: "ACM cert serial matches expected",
}, nil
}
// discoverArnByCertID searches ACM for any cert tagged with
// certctl-certificate-id=<id>. Returns the first match's ARN; empty
// string if no match. Bounded scan: at most 200 certs paginated
// (defensive — production deploys typically have <200 certctl-managed
// ACM certs per region).
//
// AWS ACM's tag-filter API requires a follow-up ListTagsForCertificate
// call per ARN — there is no server-side tag-filtered list. We
// short-circuit the scan as soon as we find a match; for the common
// case (one cert, one ARN) the cost is one ListCertificates + one
// ListTagsForCertificate call. The operator can always pin
// Config.CertificateArn explicitly to skip discovery entirely.
//
// Future optimization: cache ARN-by-cert-ID in the deployment_targets
// row's Metadata so the second deploy doesn't re-discover. Out of scope
// for the Rank 5 V2 ship — Config.CertificateArn population on first
// deploy via DeploymentResult.Metadata gives us the same result without
// the cache layer.
func (c *Connector) discoverArnByCertID(ctx context.Context, certID string) (string, error) {
// V2 minimum-viable: rely on the operator pinning ARN after first
// deploy via Config.CertificateArn update. The full tag-scan path
// requires acm:ListTagsForCertificate IAM permission which we
// haven't documented as required (V2 sticks to the 4-permission
// minimum surface). Returning empty here keeps the IAM-policy-
// matrix coherent; first deploys without an ARN create a fresh ACM
// cert, and the operator updates the deployment-target row with
// the resulting ARN via the response Metadata.
return "", errors.New("V2 ARN discovery requires operator to update deployment_target.config.certificate_arn after first deploy")
}
// buildProvenanceTags constructs the certctl-managed-by + certctl-
// certificate-id tag pair, merged with any operator-supplied tags from
// Config.Tags. The provenance pair always wins on key collision (already
// rejected at ValidateConfig time).
func (c *Connector) buildProvenanceTags(certctlCertID string) []Tag {
tags := []Tag{{Key: tagKeyManagedBy, Value: tagValueManagedBy}}
if certctlCertID != "" {
tags = append(tags, Tag{Key: tagKeyCertificateID, Value: certctlCertID})
}
for k, v := range c.config.Tags {
tags = append(tags, Tag{Key: k, Value: v})
}
return tags
}
// decodeRequest extracts cert+chain+key bytes from the deployment
// request and surfaces typed errors for the empty-bytes cases that ACM
// itself would reject with a less-informative SDK error.
func decodeRequest(request target.DeploymentRequest) (cert, chain, key []byte, err error) {
if request.CertPEM == "" {
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM: cert_pem is required")
}
if request.KeyPEM == "" {
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM: key_pem is required (the agent must supply the private key)")
}
return []byte(request.CertPEM), []byte(request.ChainPEM), []byte(request.KeyPEM), nil
}
// serialFromPEM parses the leaf cert PEM and returns the serial number
// formatted to match ACM's DescribeCertificate response shape (uppercase
// hex with colon separators, e.g. "ab:cd:01"). ACM normalises serials
// this way; we mirror it so the verify compare is byte-exact.
func serialFromPEM(certPEM []byte) (string, error) {
block, _ := pem.Decode(certPEM)
if block == nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to decode cert PEM")
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse cert: %w", err)
}
hex := fmt.Sprintf("%x", cert.SerialNumber)
if len(hex)%2 == 1 {
hex = "0" + hex
}
var b strings.Builder
for i := 0; i < len(hex); i += 2 {
if i > 0 {
b.WriteByte(':')
}
b.WriteString(hex[i : i+2])
}
return b.String(), nil
}
// serialsEqual compares two serial strings case-insensitively and
// strips colon separators. Defends against ACM occasionally returning
// serials in slightly different formats across SDK versions.
func serialsEqual(a, b string) bool {
norm := func(s string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.ReplaceAll(s, ":", ""))
}
return norm(a) == norm(b)
}
// metadataCertID extracts the certctl-managed certificate ID from the
// deployment request's Metadata map. The renewal scheduler populates
// this with the source-of-truth managed-cert row's ID; the connector
// stamps it as the certctl-certificate-id provenance tag.
func metadataCertID(metadata map[string]string) string {
if v, ok := metadata["certificate_id"]; ok {
return v
}
if v, ok := metadata["certctl_certificate_id"]; ok {
return v
}
return ""
}
// Compile-time assertion: *Connector implements target.Connector and
// *sdkClient implements ACMClient. Catches interface drift at build
// time rather than at first deploy.
var (
_ target.Connector = (*Connector)(nil)
_ ACMClient = (*sdkClient)(nil)
)
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
package awsacm_test
// Rank 5 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research deliverable
// (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5). Per-error-class
// failure tests for the AWS ACM target connector — mirrors the
// awsacmpca_failure_test.go shape (commit 60dce0b) on the issuer side.
//
// Each test injects one specific AWS SDK v2 typed error via the
// mockACMClient seam, calls DeployCertificate, and asserts:
//
// 1. error non-nil,
// 2. errors.As against the SDK's typed error value succeeds (so the
// wrap chain via fmt.Errorf("...%w", ...) is intact and upstream
// retry / classification logic can introspect the typed value),
// 3. operator-actionable substring is present in the surfaced
// message,
// 4. the failure category is correct (e.g. throttling = retryable;
// validation = terminal).
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws"
acmtypes "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm/types"
smithy "github.com/aws/smithy-go"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/awsacm"
)
// TestAWSACM_Issue_AccessDenied_OperatorActionableError pins the
// behaviour when the IAM principal lacks acm:ImportCertificate. AWS
// surfaces this as a smithy APIError with Code="AccessDeniedException"
// (the ACM SDK does not generate a typed *types.AccessDeniedException
// in v1.38.x — read it locally to confirm).
func TestAWSACM_Issue_AccessDenied_OperatorActionableError(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
certPEM, keyPEM, _ := generateTestCert(t, "denied.example.com")
sdkErr := &smithy.GenericAPIError{
Code: "AccessDeniedException",
Message: "User: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/ci is not authorized to perform: acm:ImportCertificate",
Fault: smithy.FaultClient,
}
mock := &mockACMClient{importErr: sdkErr}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(&awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1"}, mock, quietTestLogger())
_, err := c.DeployCertificate(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{
CertPEM: certPEM,
KeyPEM: keyPEM,
Metadata: map[string]string{"certificate_id": "mc-denied"},
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected access-denied error, got nil")
}
var sdk *smithy.GenericAPIError
if !errors.As(err, &sdk) {
t.Fatalf("wrap chain broke — errors.As against *smithy.GenericAPIError failed; err=%v", err)
}
if sdk.ErrorCode() != "AccessDeniedException" {
t.Errorf("expected ErrorCode=AccessDeniedException, got %q", sdk.ErrorCode())
}
msg := err.Error()
if !strings.Contains(msg, "AccessDenied") {
t.Errorf("operator-actionable substring missing — message must mention AccessDenied; got: %s", msg)
}
if !strings.Contains(msg, "ImportCertificate failed") {
t.Errorf("connector wrap missing — expected 'ImportCertificate failed: ...' framing; got: %s", msg)
}
}
// TestAWSACM_Issue_ResourceNotFound_NamesTheMissingARN pins behaviour
// when the configured CertificateArn doesn't exist (deleted out-of-
// band, typo'd config, wrong region). The SDK's
// *types.ResourceNotFoundException carries the ARN in its message; the
// connector must preserve the ARN through the wrap chain so the
// operator can identify which resource was missing.
func TestAWSACM_Issue_ResourceNotFound_NamesTheMissingARN(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
certPEM, keyPEM, _ := generateTestCert(t, "missing.example.com")
missingArn := "arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/deadbeef-dead-beef-dead-beefdeadbeef"
sdkErr := &acmtypes.ResourceNotFoundException{
Message: aws.String("Could not find certificate " + missingArn),
}
// We need the snapshot read to fail — the connector calls
// GetCertificate first to capture the snapshot. ResourceNotFound at
// snapshot time means "no cert at this ARN," so we surface that
// error and bail before the import.
mock := &mockACMClient{getErr: sdkErr}
cfg := &awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1", CertificateArn: missingArn}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(cfg, mock, quietTestLogger())
_, err := c.DeployCertificate(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{
CertPEM: certPEM,
KeyPEM: keyPEM,
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected resource-not-found error")
}
var sdk *acmtypes.ResourceNotFoundException
if !errors.As(err, &sdk) {
t.Fatalf("wrap chain broke — errors.As against *types.ResourceNotFoundException failed; err=%v", err)
}
msg := err.Error()
if !strings.Contains(msg, missingArn) {
t.Errorf("operator-actionable substring missing — message must name the missing ARN %q; got: %s", missingArn, msg)
}
if !strings.Contains(msg, "snapshot") {
t.Errorf("expected 'snapshot' framing on pre-deploy snapshot failure; got: %s", msg)
}
}
// TestAWSACM_Issue_Throttling_RetryableSurfacePreserved pins the
// behaviour when ACM throttles a burst of imports (renewal storm,
// bulk migration). Real traffic surfaces ThrottlingException via
// *smithy.GenericAPIError; the connector must preserve the typed
// value + Fault classification so any upstream retry layer can engage.
// Per the spec's "no new retry logic" scope, the connector itself
// does not retry; it surfaces the typed error.
func TestAWSACM_Issue_Throttling_RetryableSurfacePreserved(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
certPEM, keyPEM, _ := generateTestCert(t, "throttle.example.com")
sdkErr := &smithy.GenericAPIError{
Code: "ThrottlingException",
Message: "Rate exceeded",
Fault: smithy.FaultServer,
}
mock := &mockACMClient{importErr: sdkErr}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(&awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1"}, mock, quietTestLogger())
_, err := c.DeployCertificate(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{
CertPEM: certPEM,
KeyPEM: keyPEM,
Metadata: map[string]string{"certificate_id": "mc-throttle"},
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected throttle error")
}
var sdk *smithy.GenericAPIError
if !errors.As(err, &sdk) {
t.Fatalf("wrap chain broke; err=%v", err)
}
if sdk.ErrorCode() != "ThrottlingException" {
t.Errorf("expected ErrorCode=ThrottlingException, got %q", sdk.ErrorCode())
}
if sdk.ErrorFault() != smithy.FaultServer {
t.Errorf("expected FaultServer (retryable class) preserved; got %v", sdk.ErrorFault())
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "Throttling") {
t.Errorf("operator-actionable substring missing — message must mention Throttling; got: %s", err.Error())
}
}
// TestAWSACM_Issue_InvalidArgs_TerminalNotRetryable pins behaviour
// when ACM rejects the cert+key as malformed (mismatched key/cert,
// unsupported algorithm). InvalidArgsException is a terminal class —
// operators must fix the inputs, not retry.
func TestAWSACM_Issue_InvalidArgs_TerminalNotRetryable(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
certPEM, keyPEM, _ := generateTestCert(t, "invalid.example.com")
sdkErr := &acmtypes.InvalidArgsException{
Message: aws.String("The certificate body is invalid: chain not bound to leaf"),
}
mock := &mockACMClient{importErr: sdkErr}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(&awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1"}, mock, quietTestLogger())
_, err := c.DeployCertificate(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{
CertPEM: certPEM,
KeyPEM: keyPEM,
Metadata: map[string]string{"certificate_id": "mc-invalid"},
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected invalid-args error")
}
var sdk *acmtypes.InvalidArgsException
if !errors.As(err, &sdk) {
t.Fatalf("wrap chain broke; err=%v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "chain not bound") {
t.Errorf("operator-actionable substring missing — message must name the validation issue; got: %s", err.Error())
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "InvalidArgs") {
t.Errorf("expected InvalidArgs in surfaced message; got: %s", err.Error())
}
}
// TestAWSACM_Issue_RequestInProgress_TerminalForCurrentAttempt pins
// behaviour when ACM reports an in-flight request for the same
// idempotency key. RequestInProgressException IS a generated typed
// value; the connector must surface it cleanly so upstream logic can
// decide whether to wait + retry or fail-fast.
func TestAWSACM_Issue_RequestInProgress_TerminalForCurrentAttempt(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
certPEM, keyPEM, _ := generateTestCert(t, "inprogress.example.com")
sdkErr := &acmtypes.RequestInProgressException{
Message: aws.String("The certificate request is already being processed; resubmit after completion"),
}
mock := &mockACMClient{importErr: sdkErr}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(&awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1"}, mock, quietTestLogger())
_, err := c.DeployCertificate(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{
CertPEM: certPEM,
KeyPEM: keyPEM,
Metadata: map[string]string{"certificate_id": "mc-inprogress"},
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected request-in-progress error")
}
var sdk *acmtypes.RequestInProgressException
if !errors.As(err, &sdk) {
t.Fatalf("wrap chain broke; err=%v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "RequestInProgress") {
t.Errorf("expected RequestInProgress in surfaced message; got: %s", err.Error())
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "already being processed") {
t.Errorf("operator-actionable substring missing — message must explain the conflict; got: %s", err.Error())
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,480 @@
package awsacm_test
// Rank 5 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research deliverable
// (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5). Happy-path table-
// driven tests for the AWS ACM target connector. Mirrors the
// k8ssecret_test.go ergonomics + the Bundle 5+ atomic-rollback
// assertions from IIS / WinCertStore / JavaKeystore.
//
// Per-error-class failure tests live in awsacm_failure_test.go and
// follow the awsacmpca_failure_test.go shape (commit 60dce0b).
import (
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math/big"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/awsacm"
)
// mockACMClient is the unit-test fake for the ACMClient interface seam.
// Every method records the input it received so tests can assert on
// "did the connector call DescribeCertificate twice for the post-verify
// step?" / "what tags did the second AddTagsToCertificate call use?".
//
// Each method has a corresponding *Err field so a test can inject a
// failure on the specific call it cares about while leaving the others
// healthy.
type mockACMClient struct {
mu sync.Mutex
// Per-call recording.
importCalls []*awsacm.ImportCertificateInput
getCalls []*awsacm.GetCertificateInput
describeCalls []*awsacm.DescribeCertificateInput
listCalls []*awsacm.ListCertificatesInput
tagCalls []*awsacm.AddTagsToCertificateInput
// Per-method canned responses + error injection. Each test case
// constructs the mock with whatever shape it needs.
importOutput *awsacm.ImportCertificateOutput
importErr error
getOutput *awsacm.GetCertificateOutput
getErr error
describeOutput *awsacm.DescribeCertificateOutput
describeErr error
listOutput *awsacm.ListCertificatesOutput
listErr error
tagErr error
// rollbackHook lets tests inject a different importErr on the
// SECOND ImportCertificate call (the rollback path) so the
// "rollback also fails" branch can be exercised independently of
// the first-import path. nil disables the hook.
rollbackImportErr error
}
func (m *mockACMClient) ImportCertificate(ctx context.Context, in *awsacm.ImportCertificateInput) (*awsacm.ImportCertificateOutput, error) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.importCalls = append(m.importCalls, in)
if len(m.importCalls) > 1 && m.rollbackImportErr != nil {
return nil, m.rollbackImportErr
}
if m.importErr != nil {
return nil, m.importErr
}
if m.importOutput != nil {
return m.importOutput, nil
}
// Default success path: echo the ARN if the caller supplied one,
// otherwise synthesise a fresh ARN deterministically so tests can
// assert on it.
arn := in.CertificateArn
if arn == "" {
arn = "arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-ef0123456789"
}
return &awsacm.ImportCertificateOutput{CertificateArn: arn}, nil
}
func (m *mockACMClient) GetCertificate(ctx context.Context, in *awsacm.GetCertificateInput) (*awsacm.GetCertificateOutput, error) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.getCalls = append(m.getCalls, in)
if m.getErr != nil {
return nil, m.getErr
}
if m.getOutput != nil {
return m.getOutput, nil
}
return &awsacm.GetCertificateOutput{}, nil
}
func (m *mockACMClient) DescribeCertificate(ctx context.Context, in *awsacm.DescribeCertificateInput) (*awsacm.DescribeCertificateOutput, error) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.describeCalls = append(m.describeCalls, in)
if m.describeErr != nil {
return nil, m.describeErr
}
if m.describeOutput != nil {
return m.describeOutput, nil
}
return &awsacm.DescribeCertificateOutput{}, nil
}
func (m *mockACMClient) ListCertificates(ctx context.Context, in *awsacm.ListCertificatesInput) (*awsacm.ListCertificatesOutput, error) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.listCalls = append(m.listCalls, in)
if m.listErr != nil {
return nil, m.listErr
}
if m.listOutput != nil {
return m.listOutput, nil
}
return &awsacm.ListCertificatesOutput{}, nil
}
func (m *mockACMClient) AddTagsToCertificate(ctx context.Context, in *awsacm.AddTagsToCertificateInput) error {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.tagCalls = append(m.tagCalls, in)
return m.tagErr
}
func quietTestLogger() *slog.Logger {
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError}))
}
// generateTestCert constructs a self-signed ECDSA P-256 cert for tests.
// Returns (certPEM, keyPEM, serialFormatted) where serialFormatted
// matches the colon-separated lowercase-hex shape ACM emits via
// DescribeCertificate.
func generateTestCert(t *testing.T, cn string) (certPEM, keyPEM, serial string) {
t.Helper()
priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate key: %v", err)
}
serialNum, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128))
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: serialNum,
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour),
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &priv.PublicKey, priv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create cert: %v", err)
}
certPEM = string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der}))
keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(priv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal key: %v", err)
}
keyPEM = string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER}))
// Format serial as colon-separated lowercase hex (ACM's output shape).
hex := fmt.Sprintf("%x", serialNum)
if len(hex)%2 == 1 {
hex = "0" + hex
}
var b strings.Builder
for i := 0; i < len(hex); i += 2 {
if i > 0 {
b.WriteByte(':')
}
b.WriteString(hex[i : i+2])
}
serial = b.String()
return
}
func TestAWSACM_ValidateConfig_Success(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(nil, &mockACMClient{}, quietTestLogger())
cfg := awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1"}
raw, _ := json.Marshal(cfg)
if err := c.ValidateConfig(ctx, raw); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ValidateConfig: %v", err)
}
}
func TestAWSACM_ValidateConfig_MissingRegion(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(nil, &mockACMClient{}, quietTestLogger())
raw, _ := json.Marshal(awsacm.Config{})
err := c.ValidateConfig(ctx, raw)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "region is required") {
t.Errorf("expected region-required error, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestAWSACM_ValidateConfig_MalformedRegion(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(nil, &mockACMClient{}, quietTestLogger())
raw, _ := json.Marshal(awsacm.Config{Region: "not-a-region"})
err := c.ValidateConfig(ctx, raw)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "region malformed") {
t.Errorf("expected region-malformed error, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestAWSACM_ValidateConfig_MalformedARN(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(nil, &mockACMClient{}, quietTestLogger())
raw, _ := json.Marshal(awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1", CertificateArn: "not-an-arn"})
err := c.ValidateConfig(ctx, raw)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "certificate_arn malformed") {
t.Errorf("expected ARN-malformed error, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestAWSACM_ValidateConfig_RejectsReservedTags(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(nil, &mockACMClient{}, quietTestLogger())
raw, _ := json.Marshal(awsacm.Config{
Region: "us-east-1",
Tags: map[string]string{"certctl-managed-by": "operator-spoofed"},
})
err := c.ValidateConfig(ctx, raw)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "reserved provenance key") {
t.Errorf("expected reserved-key rejection, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestAWSACM_DeployCertificate_FreshImport(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
certPEM, keyPEM, serial := generateTestCert(t, "fresh.example.com")
mock := &mockACMClient{
describeOutput: &awsacm.DescribeCertificateOutput{Serial: serial, Status: "ISSUED"},
}
cfg := &awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1"}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(cfg, mock, quietTestLogger())
res, err := c.DeployCertificate(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{
CertPEM: certPEM,
KeyPEM: keyPEM,
ChainPEM: "",
Metadata: map[string]string{"certificate_id": "mc-fresh"},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeployCertificate: %v", err)
}
if !res.Success {
t.Errorf("expected Success=true")
}
if res.TargetAddress == "" {
t.Errorf("expected TargetAddress (ARN) populated")
}
if len(mock.importCalls) != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected exactly 1 ImportCertificate call (fresh import), got %d", len(mock.importCalls))
}
// Fresh import: tags MUST be supplied on the ImportCertificate call
// (ACM strips them on re-import; this is the only window).
if len(mock.importCalls[0].Tags) < 2 {
t.Errorf("expected provenance tags (managed-by + cert-id) on fresh import; got %d tags", len(mock.importCalls[0].Tags))
}
// No AddTagsToCertificate on fresh import.
if len(mock.tagCalls) != 0 {
t.Errorf("fresh import should not call AddTagsToCertificate, got %d", len(mock.tagCalls))
}
}
func TestAWSACM_DeployCertificate_RotateInPlace(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
certPEM, keyPEM, serial := generateTestCert(t, "rotate.example.com")
existingARN := "arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/00000000-1111-2222-3333-444444444444"
mock := &mockACMClient{
// Pre-deploy snapshot returns the previous cert bytes (we use
// a random self-signed for the snapshot).
getOutput: &awsacm.GetCertificateOutput{
Certificate: []byte("snapshot-cert-pem"),
},
describeOutput: &awsacm.DescribeCertificateOutput{Serial: serial, Status: "ISSUED"},
}
cfg := &awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1", CertificateArn: existingARN}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(cfg, mock, quietTestLogger())
res, err := c.DeployCertificate(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{
CertPEM: certPEM,
KeyPEM: keyPEM,
Metadata: map[string]string{"certificate_id": "mc-rotate"},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeployCertificate: %v", err)
}
if res.TargetAddress != existingARN {
t.Errorf("rotate-in-place should preserve ARN; expected %s, got %s", existingARN, res.TargetAddress)
}
// Rotate-in-place: snapshot read happens before import.
if len(mock.getCalls) != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected pre-deploy GetCertificate; got %d calls", len(mock.getCalls))
}
// Tags re-applied via AddTagsToCertificate (re-import strips them).
if len(mock.tagCalls) != 1 {
t.Errorf("rotate-in-place should AddTagsToCertificate once; got %d", len(mock.tagCalls))
}
// Import call MUST carry the existing ARN.
if mock.importCalls[0].CertificateArn != existingARN {
t.Errorf("rotate import should target existing ARN; got %q", mock.importCalls[0].CertificateArn)
}
}
func TestAWSACM_DeployCertificate_RollbackOnSerialMismatch(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
certPEM, keyPEM, _ := generateTestCert(t, "mismatch.example.com")
existingARN := "arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee"
mock := &mockACMClient{
getOutput: &awsacm.GetCertificateOutput{Certificate: []byte("snapshot-bytes")},
// Post-verify returns a DIFFERENT serial than the imported cert
// — triggers rollback.
describeOutput: &awsacm.DescribeCertificateOutput{
Serial: "ff:ff:ff:ff", // intentionally wrong
},
}
cfg := &awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1", CertificateArn: existingARN}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(cfg, mock, quietTestLogger())
_, err := c.DeployCertificate(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{
CertPEM: certPEM,
KeyPEM: keyPEM,
Metadata: map[string]string{"certificate_id": "mc-mismatch"},
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on serial mismatch")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "rolled back") {
t.Errorf("expected error to mention rollback; got %v", err)
}
// Two ImportCertificate calls: the failing import + the rollback
// re-import with snapshot bytes.
if len(mock.importCalls) != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected 2 ImportCertificate calls (initial + rollback); got %d", len(mock.importCalls))
}
// The second import MUST carry the snapshot bytes.
if string(mock.importCalls[1].Certificate) != "snapshot-bytes" {
t.Errorf("rollback should re-import snapshot bytes; got %q", string(mock.importCalls[1].Certificate))
}
}
func TestAWSACM_DeployCertificate_RollbackAlsoFails(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
certPEM, keyPEM, _ := generateTestCert(t, "twofail.example.com")
existingARN := "arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/cccccccc-dddd-eeee-ffff-000000000000"
mock := &mockACMClient{
getOutput: &awsacm.GetCertificateOutput{Certificate: []byte("snapshot")},
describeOutput: &awsacm.DescribeCertificateOutput{Serial: "00:00"},
rollbackImportErr: errors.New("simulated rollback ImportCertificate failure"),
}
cfg := &awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1", CertificateArn: existingARN}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(cfg, mock, quietTestLogger())
_, err := c.DeployCertificate(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{
CertPEM: certPEM,
KeyPEM: keyPEM,
Metadata: map[string]string{"certificate_id": "mc-twofail"},
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on rollback failure")
}
// We still surfaced the original mismatch error to the caller; the
// rollback failure logs but doesn't change the surfaced error
// shape. Ensure we attempted the rollback (2 import calls).
if len(mock.importCalls) != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected 2 import calls including failed rollback; got %d", len(mock.importCalls))
}
}
func TestAWSACM_DeployCertificate_EmptyKeyPEM(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
certPEM, _, _ := generateTestCert(t, "nokey.example.com")
cfg := &awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1"}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(cfg, &mockACMClient{}, quietTestLogger())
_, err := c.DeployCertificate(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{
CertPEM: certPEM,
KeyPEM: "",
Metadata: map[string]string{"certificate_id": "mc-nokey"},
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "key_pem is required") {
t.Errorf("expected key-required error, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestAWSACM_DeployCertificate_NoClient(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
cfg := &awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1"}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(cfg, nil, quietTestLogger())
_, err := c.DeployCertificate(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: "x", KeyPEM: "y"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "client not initialized") {
t.Errorf("expected client-not-initialized; got %v", err)
}
}
func TestAWSACM_ValidateOnly_NotSupported(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(&awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1"}, &mockACMClient{}, quietTestLogger())
err := c.ValidateOnly(ctx, target.DeploymentRequest{})
if !errors.Is(err, target.ErrValidateOnlyNotSupported) {
t.Errorf("expected ErrValidateOnlyNotSupported, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestAWSACM_ValidateDeployment_SerialMatch(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
mock := &mockACMClient{
describeOutput: &awsacm.DescribeCertificateOutput{Serial: "ab:cd:01"},
}
arn := "arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
cfg := &awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1", CertificateArn: arn}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(cfg, mock, quietTestLogger())
res, err := c.ValidateDeployment(ctx, target.ValidationRequest{Serial: "ab:cd:01"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ValidateDeployment: %v", err)
}
if !res.Valid {
t.Errorf("expected Valid=true, got %+v", res)
}
if res.TargetAddress != arn {
t.Errorf("expected TargetAddress=%s, got %s", arn, res.TargetAddress)
}
}
func TestAWSACM_ValidateDeployment_SerialMismatch(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
mock := &mockACMClient{
describeOutput: &awsacm.DescribeCertificateOutput{Serial: "00:00"},
}
arn := "arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/22222222-3333-4444-5555-666666666666"
cfg := &awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1", CertificateArn: arn}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(cfg, mock, quietTestLogger())
res, err := c.ValidateDeployment(ctx, target.ValidationRequest{Serial: "ab:cd:01"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ValidateDeployment unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if res.Valid {
t.Errorf("expected Valid=false on serial mismatch, got %+v", res)
}
}
func TestAWSACM_ValidateDeployment_NoARNYet(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
cfg := &awsacm.Config{Region: "us-east-1"}
c := awsacm.NewWithClient(cfg, &mockACMClient{}, quietTestLogger())
res, err := c.ValidateDeployment(ctx, target.ValidationRequest{Serial: "ab:cd"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if res.Valid {
t.Errorf("expected Valid=false when ARN not yet known")
}
if !strings.Contains(res.Message, "ARN not yet known") {
t.Errorf("expected ARN-not-yet-known message; got %q", res.Message)
}
}
+9
View File
@@ -212,4 +212,13 @@ const (
TargetTypeWinCertStore TargetType = "WinCertStore" TargetTypeWinCertStore TargetType = "WinCertStore"
TargetTypeJavaKeystore TargetType = "JavaKeystore" TargetTypeJavaKeystore TargetType = "JavaKeystore"
TargetTypeKubernetesSecrets TargetType = "KubernetesSecrets" TargetTypeKubernetesSecrets TargetType = "KubernetesSecrets"
// TargetTypeAWSACM deploys certificates to AWS Certificate Manager
// (ACM) — the public AWS service that ALB / CloudFront / API
// Gateway / App Runner consume by ARN. Rank 5 of the 2026-05-03
// Infisical deep-research deliverable
// (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5). See
// docs/connectors.md "AWS Certificate Manager" section for the
// operator playbook including minimum IAM policy + atomic-rollback
// contract.
TargetTypeAWSACM TargetType = "AWSACM"
) )
+1
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ var validTargetTypes = map[domain.TargetType]bool{
domain.TargetTypeWinCertStore: true, domain.TargetTypeWinCertStore: true,
domain.TargetTypeJavaKeystore: true, domain.TargetTypeJavaKeystore: true,
domain.TargetTypeKubernetesSecrets: true, domain.TargetTypeKubernetesSecrets: true,
domain.TargetTypeAWSACM: true,
} }
// isValidTargetType checks if a type string is a known target type. // isValidTargetType checks if a type string is a known target type.