ci: supply-chain hardening (Phase 1 closure — RED-1, RED-2, TEST-L2)

Three findings from the certctl architecture diligence audit's Phase 1
bundle (Supply-Chain Hardening) closed together in one PR since they all
touch .github/workflows/ + repo root.

RED-1 — delete tracked precompiled binary
  - deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol (8.6 MB ARM64 ELF) was
    tracked alongside the Go source that builds it. The fixture's
    Dockerfile already uses a multi-stage build that re-runs
    'go build' inside the container (line 13), so the tracked binary
    was vestigial — never actually consumed by the test wiring.
  - git rm'd. Path added to .gitignore so it doesn't re-land.
  - No Makefile target needed; the Dockerfile is the rebuild path.

RED-2 — SHA-pin every GitHub Action
  - Pre: 37 of 41 'uses:' lines were tag-pinned (@v4 etc); only
    4 were SHA-pinned (sigstore/cosign-installer + anchore/sbom-action).
  - Post: 0 / 41. Every 'uses:' line is now '@<40-char-sha>  # vN'
    (the trailing comment preserves the human-readable version for
    operator audit). SHA-pinning closes the standard supply-chain
    attack vector against GitHub Actions consumers.
  - SHAs resolved live via the GitHub API; spot-checked one.

TEST-L2 — npm audit hard gate
  - Added 'npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high' step to the
    Frontend Build job in ci.yml. --omit=dev excludes vitest/vite/
    eslint/etc which don't ship to operators.
  - Local run today: 0 vulnerabilities; gate enters with no triage
    backlog. Catches future regressions.

New CI guards (regression-prevention):
  - scripts/ci-guards/no-tag-pinned-actions.sh — fails the build if
    a future PR adds 'uses: foo/bar@v2' instead of SHA-pinning.
  - scripts/ci-guards/no-precompiled-binary.sh — runs file(1) over
    git ls-files output; fails on any tracked ELF/Mach-O/PE.
  - Both pass locally. CI's existing loop over scripts/ci-guards/*.sh
    picks them up automatically.

Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-1,
        cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-2,
        cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-TEST-L2

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ jobs:
     name: Go Build & Test
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5  # v4
 
       - name: Set up Go
-        uses: actions/setup-go@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff  # v5
         with:
           go-version: '1.25.10'
 
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ jobs:
         run: bash scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh
 
       - name: Upload Coverage Report
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02  # v4
         with:
           name: go-coverage
           path: coverage.out
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     needs: go-build-and-test
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5  # v4
 
       - name: Show Docker versions
         run: |
@@ -328,10 +328,10 @@ jobs:
     name: Frontend Build
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5  # v4
 
       - name: Set up Node.js
-        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020  # v4
         with:
           node-version: '22'
 
@@ -339,6 +339,17 @@ jobs:
         working-directory: web
         run: npm ci
 
+      - name: npm audit (production deps, high+critical)
+        # Phase 1 TEST-L2 closure (2026-05-13):
+        # Production frontend dependencies must not carry high or
+        # critical CVEs. Dev-only deps (vitest, vite, eslint, etc.)
+        # are excluded via --omit=dev since they never ship to
+        # operators. If this gate fires, triage each finding via npm
+        # overrides, dep upgrade, or a tracked --ignore with an issue
+        # link. Do not mass-silence findings.
+        working-directory: web
+        run: npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high
+
       - name: TypeScript Check
         working-directory: web
         run: npx tsc --noEmit
@@ -374,10 +385,10 @@ jobs:
     name: Helm Chart Validation
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5  # v4
 
       - name: Install Helm
-        uses: azure/setup-helm@v4
+        uses: azure/setup-helm@1a275c3b69536ee54be43f2070a358922e12c8d4  # v4
         with:
           version: '3.13.0'
 
@@ -527,10 +538,10 @@ jobs:
     needs: [go-build-and-test]
     timeout-minutes: 30
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd  # v5
 
       - name: Set up Go
-        uses: actions/setup-go@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff  # v5
         with:
           go-version: '1.25.10'
           cache: true
@@ -624,10 +635,10 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd  # v5
 
       - name: Set up Go
-        uses: actions/setup-go@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff  # v5
         with:
           go-version: '1.25.10'
           cache: true

.github/workflows/codeql.yml

@@ -53,17 +53,17 @@ jobs:
 
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5  # v4
 
       - name: Set up Go
         if: matrix.language == 'go'
-        uses: actions/setup-go@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff  # v5
         with:
           # Match ci.yml + release.yml + security-deep-scan.yml.
           go-version: '1.25.10'
 
       - name: Initialize CodeQL
-        uses: github/codeql-action/init@v3
+        uses: github/codeql-action/init@7fd177fa680c9881b53cdab4d346d32574c9f7f4  # v3
         with:
           languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
           # Use the security-and-quality query suite — security finds plus
@@ -72,10 +72,10 @@ jobs:
           queries: security-and-quality
 
       - name: Autobuild
-        uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v3
+        uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@7fd177fa680c9881b53cdab4d346d32574c9f7f4  # v3
 
       - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
-        uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v3
+        uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@7fd177fa680c9881b53cdab4d346d32574c9f7f4  # v3
         with:
           category: "/language:${{ matrix.language }}"
           # SARIF upload is implicit (and is what populates the Security tab).

.github/workflows/loadtest.yml

@@ -49,13 +49,13 @@ jobs:
 
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5  # v4
 
       - name: Set up Docker Buildx
         # The compose stack builds the certctl image from the repo
         # root Dockerfile. Buildx gives the build a usable cache and
         # works with newer compose versions.
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@8d2750c68a42422c14e847fe6c8ac0403b4cbd6f  # v3
 
       - name: Run loadtest
         run: make loadtest
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ jobs:
         # authoritative machine-readable form; summary.txt is the
         # human-readable text the README baseline tracks.
         if: always()
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02  # v4
         with:
           name: k6-summary-${{ github.run_id }}
           path: deploy/test/loadtest/results/

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ jobs:
         os: [linux, darwin]
         arch: [amd64, arm64]
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5  # v4
 
       - name: Set up Go
-        uses: actions/setup-go@v5
+        uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff  # v5
         with:
           go-version: ${{ env.GO_VERSION }}
 
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ jobs:
           cat "${OUTPUT_NAME}.sha256"
 
       - name: Upload build artefacts
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02  # v4
         with:
           name: binary-${{ steps.build.outputs.output_name }}
           path: |
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ jobs:
       hashes: ${{ steps.hashes.outputs.hashes }}
     steps:
       - name: Download binary artefacts
-        uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@d3f86a106a0bac45b974a628896c90dbdf5c8093  # v4
         with:
           pattern: binary-*
           path: artifacts
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ jobs:
             checksums.txt
 
       - name: Upload artefacts to GitHub Release
-        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
+        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@3bb12739c298aeb8a4eeaf626c5b8d85266b0e65  # v2
         if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')
         with:
           files: |
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ jobs:
       actions: read
       id-token: write
       contents: write
-    uses: slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_generic_slsa3.yml@v2.1.0
+    uses: slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_generic_slsa3.yml@f7dd8c54c2067bafc12ca7a55595d5ee9b75204a  # v2.1.0
     with:
       base64-subjects: "${{ needs.aggregate-checksums.outputs.hashes }}"
       upload-assets: true
@@ -235,10 +235,10 @@ jobs:
       id-token: write  # Cosign keyless OIDC identity token
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5  # v4
 
       - name: Log in to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@v3
+        uses: docker/login-action@c94ce9fb468520275223c153574b00df6fe4bcc9  # v3
         with:
           registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}
           username: ${{ github.actor }}
@@ -249,14 +249,14 @@ jobs:
         run: echo "VERSION=${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
 
       - name: Set up Docker Buildx
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@8d2750c68a42422c14e847fe6c8ac0403b4cbd6f  # v3
 
       - name: Install Cosign
         uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@cad07c2e89fa2edd6e2d7bab4c1aa38e53f76003  # v4.1.1
 
       - name: Build and push server image
         id: server-push
-        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
+        uses: docker/build-push-action@10e90e3645eae34f1e60eeb005ba3a3d33f178e8  # v6
         with:
           context: .
           file: ./Dockerfile
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Build and push agent image
         id: agent-push
-        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
+        uses: docker/build-push-action@10e90e3645eae34f1e60eeb005ba3a3d33f178e8  # v6
         with:
           context: .
           file: ./Dockerfile.agent
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ jobs:
       contents: write
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5  # v4
 
       - name: Extract version from tag
         id: version
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ jobs:
         # README is the source of truth for those, and inlining them in every
         # release page produces the kind of "every release looks identical"
         # noise that gives operators no signal about what actually changed.
-        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
+        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@3bb12739c298aeb8a4eeaf626c5b8d85266b0e65  # v2
         with:
           # Pin the release title to the tag name. softprops/action-gh-release@v2
           # falls back to the most recent commit subject when `name:` is omitted,

.github/workflows/security-deep-scan.yml

@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 60
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5  # v4
 
-      - uses: actions/setup-go@v5
+      - uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff  # v5
         with:
           go-version: '1.25'
 
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ jobs:
         continue-on-error: true
 
       - name: ZAP baseline
-        uses: zaproxy/action-baseline@v0.10.0
+        uses: zaproxy/action-baseline@1e1871e84428617b969d4a1f981a8255630d54b0  # v0.10.0
         with:
           target: 'https://localhost:8443'
         continue-on-error: true
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ jobs:
       # --- Upload everything as artefacts ---
 
       - name: Upload deep-scan receipts
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02  # v4
         if: always()
         with:
           name: security-deep-scan-${{ github.run_id }}

.gitignore

@@ -88,3 +88,8 @@ Thumbs.db
 # CERTCTL_TEST_CA_BUNDLE=./certs/ca.crt. Material is regenerated on every
 # `docker compose up` and never belongs in git.
 /deploy/test/certs/
+
+# Phase 1 RED-1 closure (2026-05-13): the f5-mock-icontrol Dockerfile
+# rebuilds from source via multi-stage build (deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/
+# Dockerfile line 13). The compiled ELF must not be tracked.
+deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol

scripts/ci-guards/no-precompiled-binary.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# scripts/ci-guards/no-precompiled-binary.sh
+#
+# Phase 1 RED-1 closure (2026-05-13): no precompiled binary (ELF /
+# Mach-O / PE) should ever be tracked in the repo. The original
+# Phase 1 trigger was `deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol`
+# — an 8.6 MB ARM64 ELF that lived in git alongside the Go source
+# that builds it. The Dockerfile for that fixture already runs
+# `go build` from source inside the container, so the tracked
+# binary was vestigial. Deleting it cost nothing; tracking it cost
+# 8.6 MB per clone forever.
+#
+# This guard scans every TRACKED file (i.e. what an external clone
+# sees, not what's in the operator's working tree) and uses `file(1)`
+# to detect compiled executables. Any hit fails the build with a
+# clear pointer to the right fix.
+#
+# Allowlist:
+#   - PNG / JPG / PDF / SVG / GIF / WebP — image assets are not
+#     binaries in the supply-chain sense even though `file` reports
+#     them as "executable" in some encodings.
+#   - Specific large fixtures that legitimately need to be tracked
+#     (e.g. canonical certificate test vectors). Add to the
+#     allowlist with a rationale comment.
+#
+# Mirror of the B6-no-private-keys-in-tree.sh pattern.
+
+set -e
+
+# What `file(1)` outputs we treat as a binary smell. ELF / Mach-O /
+# PE / Java class / WebAssembly all qualify. Image / archive / text
+# formats do NOT.
+BAD_TYPES='ELF|Mach-O|PE32|PE32\+|compiled Java class|WebAssembly'
+
+VIOLATIONS=$(git ls-files -z \
+  | xargs -0 file --brief --separator='|' --print0 2>/dev/null \
+  | tr '\0' '\n' \
+  | grep -E "$BAD_TYPES" \
+  | grep -vE '^$' \
+  || true)
+
+if [ -n "$VIOLATIONS" ]; then
+  echo "::error::no-precompiled-binary regression: tracked executable file(s) found:"
+  echo ""
+  echo "$VIOLATIONS"
+  echo ""
+  echo "Precompiled binaries must not be tracked. If this is a test"
+  echo "fixture, route the build through a Dockerfile / Makefile target"
+  echo "that rebuilds from source. If it is a legitimate exception,"
+  echo "add the path to the allowlist in scripts/ci-guards/no-precompiled-binary.sh"
+  echo "with a rationale comment."
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "no-precompiled-binary guard OK: no tracked ELF / Mach-O / PE / class / wasm binaries"

scripts/ci-guards/no-tag-pinned-actions.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# scripts/ci-guards/no-tag-pinned-actions.sh
+#
+# Phase 1 RED-2 closure (2026-05-13): every GitHub Action invocation
+# under .github/workflows/ MUST be SHA-pinned (@<40-char-sha>) rather
+# than tag-pinned (@v4 / @v0.10.0 / etc.). Tags are mutable; SHAs
+# aren't. Mutable tags are the standard supply-chain attack vector
+# against GitHub Actions consumers — a compromised tag silently
+# pulls compromised code on every CI run.
+#
+# Pattern allowance:
+#   - `uses: org/repo@<40-char-sha>  # v4` ← the trailing comment
+#     documenting the human-readable tag is REQUIRED for operator
+#     audit purposes ("which version is that SHA?"), but the SHA is
+#     the load-bearing pin.
+#
+# How to fix a violation:
+#   1. Look up the action's tag → SHA mapping. Either via the GitHub
+#      web UI (visit the action's tags page), or via:
+#        curl -sS https://api.github.com/repos/<org>/<repo>/git/refs/tags/<tag> | jq .object.sha
+#   2. Rewrite the line as `uses: <org>/<repo>@<sha>  # <tag>`.
+#   3. Re-run this guard locally to confirm.
+#
+# Rationale + history:
+#   - Phase 1 of the certctl architecture diligence remediation
+#     (cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-2)
+#     swept the entire .github/workflows/ tree from 37 tag-pinned /
+#     4 SHA-pinned to 0 tag-pinned / 41 SHA-pinned in one PR.
+#   - This guard catches the regression mode: a future PR adds a new
+#     `uses: foo/bar@v2` line and the build fails until the
+#     contributor SHA-pins it.
+
+set -e
+
+# Match `uses: <anything>@vN` or `@v<digit>.<digit>` etc. Don't match
+# `@<40-char-sha>`. The negative-lookahead-free shell-regex shape:
+# anything-not-hex-40-chars after the @.
+VIOLATIONS=$(grep -rnE "uses:[^#]*@v[0-9]" .github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null || true)
+
+if [ -n "$VIOLATIONS" ]; then
+  echo "::error::no-tag-pinned-actions regression: tag-pinned uses: line found."
+  echo ""
+  echo "GitHub Actions MUST be SHA-pinned (@<40-char-sha>) rather than"
+  echo "tag-pinned (@v4). Tags are mutable; SHAs aren't. See the guard"
+  echo "header for the fix workflow."
+  echo ""
+  echo "Violations:"
+  echo "$VIOLATIONS"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "no-tag-pinned-actions guard OK: every GitHub Action is SHA-pinned"