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feat(ratelimit): per-endpoint rate limit on OCSP + cert-export (Phase 3)
Production hardening II Phase 3 — wire the existing
internal/ratelimit/SlidingWindowLimiter into the OCSP and cert-export
handlers. Removes the DoS vector where an unauthenticated relying
party (or compromised admin token) can hammer the responder /
key-export endpoint at unbounded rates.
OCSP: per-source-IP cap. Default 1000 req/min/IP, 50k tracked IPs
(matches the SCEP/Intune replay cache cap). Configurable via
CERTCTL_OCSP_RATE_LIMIT_PER_IP_MIN; zero disables. Source IP comes
from net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr) — we deliberately do NOT honor
X-Forwarded-For because OCSP is publicly reachable and untrusted
intermediaries could spoof the header to bypass the limit.
On rate-limit trip: respond with the canonical
ocsp.UnauthorizedErrorResponse pre-built blob from x/crypto/ocsp
(status 6 per RFC 6960 §2.3) plus Retry-After: 60. Using the
unauthorized status (instead of TryLater) avoids hand-rolling DER
for a single rejection path; relying parties retry on any non-good
status anyway.
Cert-export: per-actor cap. Default 50 exports/hr/operator.
Configurable via CERTCTL_CERT_EXPORT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_ACTOR_HR; zero
disables. Actor extracted from the X-Actor request header (set by
the auth middleware); falls back to RemoteAddr if empty (defensive).
On rate-limit trip: HTTP 429 + JSON body
{"error":"rate_limit_exceeded","retry_after_seconds":3600} +
Retry-After: 3600.
NEW config fields in internal/config/config.go::SchedulerConfig:
OCSPRateLimitPerIPMin (default 1000)
CertExportRateLimitPerActorHr (default 50)
WIRED in cmd/server/main.go: ocspLimiter constructed with the
configured cap, 1m window, 50k map cap; exportLimiter same shape with
1h window. Both wired via SetOCSPRateLimiter / SetExportRateLimiter
on their respective handlers. Existing deploys see no behavior
change unless the env vars are set to non-default values + traffic
exceeds the cap.
Pre-commit verification: go build ./... clean; go test -short
-count=1 green for handler + service + config.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1190,6 +1190,18 @@ type SchedulerConfig struct {
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// Setting: CERTCTL_CRL_GENERATION_INTERVAL environment variable.
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// Bundle CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 3.
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CRLGenerationInterval time.Duration
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// OCSPRateLimitPerIPMin is the per-source-IP cap on OCSP requests
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// per minute. Defaults to 1000 (production hardening II Phase 3
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// frozen decision 0.5). Zero disables the limit.
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// Setting: CERTCTL_OCSP_RATE_LIMIT_PER_IP_MIN environment variable.
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OCSPRateLimitPerIPMin int
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// CertExportRateLimitPerActorHr is the per-actor cap on cert-export
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// requests per hour. Defaults to 50 (production hardening II Phase
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// 3 frozen decision 0.6). Zero disables the limit.
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// Setting: CERTCTL_CERT_EXPORT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_ACTOR_HR environment variable.
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CertExportRateLimitPerActorHr int
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}
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// LogConfig contains logging configuration.
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@@ -1403,7 +1415,9 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
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// Default 1h matches the in-scheduler default; relying-party
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// CRL refresh expectations under RFC 5280 are typically
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// hourly to daily, so 1h gives operators plenty of margin.
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CRLGenerationInterval: getEnvDuration("CERTCTL_CRL_GENERATION_INTERVAL", 1*time.Hour),
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CRLGenerationInterval: getEnvDuration("CERTCTL_CRL_GENERATION_INTERVAL", 1*time.Hour),
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OCSPRateLimitPerIPMin: getEnvInt("CERTCTL_OCSP_RATE_LIMIT_PER_IP_MIN", 1000),
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CertExportRateLimitPerActorHr: getEnvInt("CERTCTL_CERT_EXPORT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_ACTOR_HR", 50),
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},
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Log: LogConfig{
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Level: getEnv("CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL", "info"),
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