auth-bundle-1 Phase 13: docs (rbac.md + threat model + migration guide + security.md update)

Closes the last Phase before the Bundle 1 Exit gate. Operators
now have authoritative reference + threat model + migration guide
covering every behavior change Bundles 0-12 introduced.

# New docs

* docs/operator/rbac.md (340 lines) — operator how-to:
  - Mental model (actors / roles / permissions / scopes)
  - 7 default roles seeded by migration 000029 + the 5
    admin-only fine-grained perms seeded by 000030
  - Permission catalogue table by namespace
  - Scope semantics (global beats specific) + the Bundle-2
    deferral on scope_id FK enforcement
  - Granting / revoking access from GUI + CLI + HTTP API + MCP
  - The auditor pattern (audit-only, no resource read)
  - Day-0 bootstrap flow (CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN → curl →
    HTTP 410 thereafter)
  - Demo-mode (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none) caveat for production

* docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md (180 lines) — what the
  controls defend against:
  - 5 threat actors (external, wrong-role, compromised key,
    insider operator, compromised auditor)
  - Per-defense walk-through (API-key auth, RBAC, bootstrap,
    approval workflow + Phase 9 closure, audit trail,
    protocol-endpoint allowlist)
  - 9 explicit deferrals (OIDC, sessions, local accounts,
    JIT elevation, MFA, etc.) — Bundle 2 / future scope
  - Compliance mapping (SOC 2 CC6.1/CC6.3, HIPAA §164.312(b),
    NIST SSDF PO.5.2, FedRAMP AU-9, PCI-DSS §10)
  - 5 operator-runnable sanity checks (e.g.,
    'SELECT FROM audit_events WHERE actor=system-bypass' MUST
    return 0 in production)

* docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md (200 lines) — v2.0.x →
  v2.1.0 upgrade flow:
  - The SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS callout
  - Migration list (000029-000033) + what each does
  - 4-mode scope-down flow (interactive / non-interactive
    JSON / --suggest / --suggest --apply)
  - What changes for code that called auth.IsAdmin
  - Helm-specific upgrade flow with example post-upgrade Job
  - Docker Compose upgrade flow + the 5 examples folders
    that ride demo mode unchanged
  - Verification queries + rollback flow

# Updated docs

* docs/operator/security.md — Last-reviewed bumped to
  2026-05-09; existing Authentication-surface section
  extended to call out the Bundle 1 RBAC primitive,
  day-0 bootstrap path, and approval-bypass closure with
  cross-references to the new docs.

* docs/reference/profiles.md — Last-reviewed header
  formatting fixed (added the > blockquote prefix used
  consistently across the docs tree).

# docs/README.md navigation

* Operator section gains 2 new rows (RBAC + auth-threat-model)
  and Approval-workflow row updated to mention Phase 9
  closure.
* Reference section gains the Profiles row.
* Migration section gains the api-keys-to-rbac row with the
  AUDIT YOUR API KEYS callout in the link description.

# CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 section refreshed

The Phase 7 commit landed the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
callout. This commit appends the missing Phase 9-12 highlights:

  - Approval-bypass closure (profile-edit gate + flip-flop
    loophole + ErrApproveBySameActor invariant)
  - GUI: Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings / Approvals queue
  - 12 new MCP RBAC tools
  - Coverage gates on internal/auth + internal/service/auth
  - Protocol-endpoint allowlist pinned at 3 layers

Trailing cross-reference block now points at all 4 new docs.

# Verifications

* Every internal link in the 4 new/modified docs validated by
  shell sweep (find broken links → 0 hits).
* Every new doc carries 'Last reviewed: 2026-05-09' header
  with the > blockquote prefix matching the docs-tree
  convention.
* go vet ./... clean.
* staticcheck across every Bundle-1-touched Go package clean.
* gofmt -l clean repo-wide.
* go test -short -count=1 green across internal/auth (incl.
  bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router,
  internal/cli, internal/service (incl. auth),
  internal/domain/auth, internal/mcp, cmd/cli (cmd/server
  has 1 environmental failure on the sandbox virtiofs-tmp:
  TestPreflightSCEPRACertKey_KeyWorldReadable_Refuses depends
  on tmpfs file-mode semantics that virtiofs propagates
  differently — pre-existing, unrelated to Bundle 1).
* Frontend: 19 Vitest tests across src/pages/auth/ +
  AuditPage all pass; tsc --noEmit clean.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -54,13 +54,48 @@ What else changed in v2.1.0:
 - **`/v1/auth/check` enrichment.** Response now includes the actor's
   standing roles and effective permissions, so the GUI gates
   affordances from a single fetch on app boot.
+- **Approval-bypass closure.** Edits to a profile that has (or
+  would have) `RequiresApproval=true` now route through the
+  `ApprovalService` two-person integrity gate (Phase 9). Migration
+  000033 adds `approval_kind` + `payload` to
+  `issuance_approval_requests` so cert-issuance and profile-edit
+  approvals share the same workflow. Same-actor self-approve is
+  rejected with `ErrApproveBySameActor` for both kinds. Closes the
+  flip-flop loophole where an admin could disable approval, mutate,
+  re-enable. Documented at
+  [`docs/reference/profiles.md`](docs/reference/profiles.md).
+- **GUI: Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings / Approvals queue.**
+  Four new pages under `/auth/*` consume `/v1/auth/me` for
+  permission-aware rendering. The Approvals queue blocks
+  self-approve at the client layer (Approve/Reject buttons hidden
+  when requested_by == current actor_id) on top of the server-side
+  enforcement. AuditPage gains a category filter (cert_lifecycle /
+  auth / config) for the auditor view.
+- **MCP server gains 12 RBAC tools.** Operators driving certctl
+  from Claude / VS Code / any MCP client get parity with the GUI
+  + CLI. Each tool routes through the same HTTP handler; permission
+  gates fire server-side.
 - **OpenAPI catalogues every new route.** Every Bundle 1 endpoint
   ships with an `operationId`; the parity test guards against drift.
+- **Coverage gates.** `internal/auth/` and `internal/service/auth/`
+  now have ≥85% coverage floors in `.github/coverage-thresholds.yml`.
+  The 12-path negative-test list from the Bundle 1 prompt is
+  fully covered (path #12 deferred with in-tree TODO).
+- **Protocol-endpoint allowlist pinned at three layers.** The
+  middleware bypass (`auth.IsProtocolEndpoint`), the router-level
+  `AuthExemptRouterRoutes` constant, and a new
+  `phase12_protocol_allowlist_test.go` AST scan all guard against
+  accidentally wrapping ACME / SCEP / EST / OCSP / CRL routes in
+  `rbacGate`.
 - **Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions) starts after Bundle 1 lands on
   master.** Roadmap entry remains in `cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md`.
 
 Migration ordering, idempotency, and downgrade are documented in
-`docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md`.
+[`docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md`](docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md).
+The threat model + compliance mapping live at
+[`docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md`](docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md).
+Day-2 RBAC operations live at
+[`docs/operator/rbac.md`](docs/operator/rbac.md).
 
 ## v2.0.68 — Image registry path changed ⚠️