gsadmin/certctl
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git synced 2026-06-10 02:29:38 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

harden(auth): LOW + Nit batch — bootstrap audit, crypto/rand, XFF trust, CSRF check, protocol-prefix unify (Batch 1)

Browse Source 
Audit 2026-05-10 — close 8 LOWs + 2 Nits in-bundle. Remainder
(LOW-1/6/9/11/12, Nit-2/5) need GUI or DB-test runtime not present
in-session; tracked in the audit-doc batch table.

LOW-2: bootstrap.ValidateAndMint now emits 'bootstrap.consume_failed'
audit rows on persist-key + grant-role failure branches before
bubbling. Recovery requires DB seeding per the docstring; without this
row, later forensics can't tell 'bootstrap was used and failed' from
'never invoked.'

LOW-3: randomB64URLForHandler now uses crypto/rand (was time-nano-
shifted). Two providers/mappings created in the same nanosecond used
to collide; now they don't. Time-nano fallback retained for the
unlikely crypto/rand-broken path.

LOW-4: breakglass.verifyDummy uses s.readRand(salt) for the dummy
Argon2id verify. Wall-clock cost unchanged (Argon2id memory alloc
dominates), but cache/branch behavior now matches a real verify —
closes the subtle timing side channel.

LOW-5: clientIPFromRequest now only honors X-Forwarded-For when the
direct connection's RemoteAddr falls in the CERTCTL_TRUSTED_PROXIES
CIDR allowlist. Default-deny: empty list means XFF is ignored.
SetTrustedProxies wired in cmd/server/main.go from cfg.Auth.TrustedProxies.

LOW-7: internal/auth/protocol_endpoints.go::ProtocolEndpointPrefixes
now carries /scep-mtls + /.well-known/est-mtls (previously only in
router.AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes; the two lists had drifted). The
canonical-prefix coverage test in Phase 12 still pins the set.

LOW-8: docs/operator/rbac.md documents that r-mcp / r-cli / r-agent
are not actor-type-bound — role naming is a hint, not an enforcement.
Operators wanting hard binding must apply periodic audit queries.
Native binding is on the v2 roadmap.

LOW-10: Session.Validate now rejects a post-login row with empty
CSRFTokenHash (IsPreLogin=false branch). validSession test fixture
updated with a valid 64-hex CSRF hash.

Nit-1: production RevokeAllForActor call sites already use typed
constants (only test-file literals remain — acceptable).

Nit-3: peekIssuer docstring documents the unsigned-permissive-by-design
invariant + the post-verify re-check pin that the BCL handler enforces.
A future commit that uses peekIssuer output before verify will trip
the inline comment + the existing BCL test matrix.

Status table updated in cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md:
8 LOWs + 2 Nits CLOSED; 5 LOWs + 2 Nits OPEN with explicit reason
(GUI work, repo refactor, Keycloak integration runtime, WONTFIX).

Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md LOW-2/3/4/5/7/8/10
      cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md Nit-1/3
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-10 22:26:12 +00:00
parent 630831aeac
commit 9cce2ab043
11 changed files with 204 additions and 12 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
internal/auth/bootstrap/service.go
+29
View File
@@ -160,6 +160,22 @@ func (s *Service) ValidateAndMint(ctx context.Context, token, actorName string)
CreatedAt: now,
}
if err := s.keys.Create(ctx, apiKey); err != nil {
// Audit 2026-05-10 LOW-2 closure — emit a consume_failed audit row
// before bubbling the error. Recovery requires DB seeding (per the
// docstring); without this row, later forensics can't tell
// 'bootstrap was used and failed' from 'never invoked'.
if s.audit != nil {
if aerr := s.audit.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, "bootstrap-token", domain.ActorTypeSystem,
"bootstrap.consume_failed", domain.EventCategoryAuth, "api_key", apiKey.ID,
map[string]interface{}{
"actor_name": actorName,
"stage": "persist_key",
"error": err.Error(),
}); aerr != nil {
slog.WarnContext(ctx, "bootstrap.consume_failed audit write failed",
"actor_name", actorName, "err", aerr)
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bootstrap: persist key: %w", err)
}
if err := s.roles.Grant(ctx, &authdomain.ActorRole{
@@ -169,6 +185,19 @@ func (s *Service) ValidateAndMint(ctx context.Context, token, actorName string)
TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID,
GrantedBy: "bootstrap",
}); err != nil {
// LOW-2 — same audit-on-failure pattern as the persist-key branch.
if s.audit != nil {
if aerr := s.audit.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, "bootstrap-token", domain.ActorTypeSystem,
"bootstrap.consume_failed", domain.EventCategoryAuth, "api_key", apiKey.ID,
map[string]interface{}{
"actor_name": actorName,
"stage": "grant_role",
"error": err.Error(),
}); aerr != nil {
slog.WarnContext(ctx, "bootstrap.consume_failed audit write failed",
"actor_name", actorName, "err", aerr)
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bootstrap: grant admin role: %w", err)
}
if s.keyStore != nil {