harden(oidc): relax alg-downgrade IdP-bind check to intersection-empty (Keycloak compat)

Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (Keycloak 26.x via testcontainers-go) revealed
the IdP-bind alg-downgrade check was too strict for real-world IdPs.
6 of the integration tests in internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak*_test.go
were failing with:

  oidc: IdP advertises weak signing algorithms (HS*/none);
  refusing to use as defense against downgrade attacks: HS256

Keycloak 26.x (and several other real-world IdPs — Auth0 when HS-mode is
enabled, some Authentik configs) advertise EVERY alg they're capable of
in the discovery doc's id_token_signing_alg_values_supported field, even
when the realm only signs with RS256 in practice. Pre-fix the IdP-bind
check refused on ANY HS* or 'none' advertisement → no real Keycloak deploy
could ever bind a provider row, hence the integration-test failures.

The strict-deny check was defense-in-depth on top of the load-bearing
per-token alg-pin at sig-verify time (isDisallowedAlg, service.go L1177):
that check rejects every ID token whose JWS header carries an alg outside
DefaultAllowedAlgs, regardless of what the discovery doc advertises.
A forged HS256 token signed with the IdP's RS256 pubkey as HMAC secret
is rejected at sig-verify time → the actual algorithm-confusion attack
is closed by the per-token pin, NOT by the discovery-doc check.

Fix: relax the IdP-bind check to refuse only when the intersection of
advertised vs DefaultAllowedAlgs is EMPTY (the pathological all-weak-alg
IdP case). Keycloak (RS256 + HS256 advertised) now binds successfully;
an HS-only IdP still fails closed.

Changes:
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go: rewrite the alg-check loop at L1067 in
  getOrLoad / RefreshKeys to compute the intersection set; refuse only
  when no acceptable alg is advertised. ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised
  docstring updated to reflect new contract. DefaultAllowedAlgs
  docstring + the package-level design-comment block at L40-72 updated
  with v2.1.0-relaxed semantics callouts.
- internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go: TestDiscovery dry-run validator
  rewritten to surface HS*/none alongside RS* as an informational note
  ('note: IdP advertises weak algorithms %v alongside acceptable ones')
  rather than a hard-fail error. HS-only / none-only still hard-fails.
- internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go: TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_*
  tests updated. Renamed:
  - RejectsHSAdvertised → RS256PlusHS256_BindsSuccessfully (positive)
  - RejectsNoneAdvertised → RejectsHSOnlyAdvertised (intersection-empty)
  - RefreshKeys_CatchesPostLoadDowngrade rotated to HS-only post-load
- internal/auth/oidc/coverage_fill_test.go: TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngradeDetected
  split into _HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote (positive, asserts note
  but no hard-fail) + _HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail (intersection-empty).
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md: OIDC token-validation alg-allow-list
  section rewritten to call out the load-bearing-defense hierarchy
  (per-token pin first, IdP-bind check defense-in-depth) and document
  the v2.1.0 relaxation rationale.
- CHANGELOG.md: ### Security entry under Unreleased.

Verify: go test ./internal/auth/oidc/ -short PASS; gofmt clean; go vet
clean. The Keycloak integration tests should now pass when the operator
re-runs 'make keycloak-integration-test'.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,6 +2,40 @@
 
 ## Unreleased
 
+### Security
+
+- **Alg-downgrade defense relaxed for Keycloak-shape IdPs (v2.1.0 pre-tag fix).**
+  Pre-fix, the IdP-bind alg-downgrade check at `internal/auth/oidc/service.go`
+  refused to load any OIDC provider whose discovery doc advertised HS256 /
+  HS384 / HS512 / `none` in `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` —
+  even if RS256 was ALSO advertised. This broke binding against
+  Keycloak 26.x (and a handful of other real IdPs) which list every alg
+  the codebase is capable of in their discovery doc, regardless of which
+  one the realm actually signs with. The v2.1.0 Phase-10 live-IdP smoke
+  surfaced the regression: 6 testcontainers-Keycloak integration tests
+  failed with `oidc: IdP advertises weak signing algorithms (HS*/none); refusing to use as defense against downgrade attacks: HS256`.
+  **Fix:** the check now refuses only when the intersection of advertised
+  vs `DefaultAllowedAlgs` is EMPTY — an IdP advertising HS256 alongside
+  RS256 binds successfully, but an IdP advertising HS-only / none-only
+  still fails closed. The per-token alg pin at sig-verify time
+  (`isDisallowedAlg`, service.go ~L1177) remains the load-bearing defense
+  against the actual algorithm-confusion attack (forged HS256 token
+  signed with the IdP's RS256 pubkey as HMAC secret) — go-oidc/v3's
+  verifier rejects any token whose `alg` header isn't in the configured
+  allow-list, regardless of what the discovery doc claims. Updates:
+  `Service.getOrLoad` alg-check loop rewritten to compute intersection;
+  `ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised` docstring reflects new semantics;
+  `TestDiscovery` dry-run validator surfaces HS*/none alongside RS* as
+  an informational note (not a hard fail); `docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md`
+  alg-allow-list section updated to call out the load-bearing-defense
+  hierarchy. Tests: `TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_RS256PlusHS256_BindsSuccessfully`
+  (positive — Keycloak-shape) + `TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_RejectsHSOnlyAdvertised`
+  (negative — pathological intersection-empty case) +
+  `TestService_RefreshKeys_CatchesPostLoadDowngrade` updated to assert
+  intersection-empty post-rotation; `TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote`
+  + `TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail` pin the
+  dry-run validator's new behavior.
+
 ### Tests
 
 - **Vitest coverage for the 2026-05-10/11 GUI batch (Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 12).**

docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md

@@ -169,17 +169,27 @@ constant, router-level no-rbacGate-wraps-protocol-paths).
 
 - **Algorithm allow-list, never `none`, never HMAC.** The service-
   layer pinning lives in `internal/auth/oidc/service.go::disallowedAlgs`
-  and the IdP-downgrade-attack defense in
+  + `isDisallowedAlg`. The per-token alg check at sig-verify time
-  `Service.guardAdvertisedAlgs`. At provider creation AND on every
+  (`isDisallowedAlg`, line ~1177) is the load-bearing defense — every
-  `RefreshKeys`, the IdP's advertised
+  ID token whose JWS header carries an alg outside the allow-list
-  `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` is intersected with the
+  (RS256 / RS512 / ES256 / ES384 / EdDSA) is rejected with
-  allow-list (RS256 / RS512 / ES256 / ES384 / EdDSA). If the IdP
+  `ErrAlgRejected`. coreos/go-oidc additionally enforces the allow-list
-  advertises HS256/HS384/HS512 or `none` AT ALL, provider creation
+  per-token at verify time as defense-in-depth against an upstream
-  is rejected - the IdP has not yet signed a single token, but the
+  library regression. The IdP-downgrade-attack secondary defense at
-  service refuses to trust an IdP that COULD sign one with a weak
+  provider creation / `RefreshKeys` (v2.1.0-relaxed semantics)
-  alg. coreos/go-oidc additionally enforces the allow-list per-token
+  intersects the IdP's advertised `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported`
-  at verify time as defense-in-depth against an upstream library
+  with the allow-list and rejects only when the intersection is EMPTY
-  regression.
+  — i.e., the IdP advertises NO acceptable alg. Pre-v2.1.0 the check
+  strict-denied on ANY HS*/`none` advertisement; that broke against
+  Keycloak 26.x (which lists every alg it's capable of in its discovery
+  doc, including HS*, even when the realm only signs with RS256). The
+  relaxation is safe because the per-token alg pin already prevents
+  a real algorithm-confusion attack — a forged HS256 token using the
+  IdP's RS256 pubkey as HMAC secret is rejected at sig-verify regardless
+  of what the discovery doc advertises. Operators worried about a
+  compromised IdP rotating to weak algs without rotating its certctl
+  provider config get defense-in-depth from `JWKSStatus` + the alert
+  hooks in the GUI panel.
 - **Exact `iss` match.** ID-token `iss` claim must equal the
   configured `OIDCProvider.IssuerURL` byte-for-byte (sentinel
   `ErrIssuerMismatch`). A token from a different IdP - even one

internal/auth/oidc/coverage_fill_test.go

@@ -124,11 +124,13 @@ func TestTestDiscovery_HappyPath_AgainstMockIdP(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngradeDetected runs against a stub IdP that
+// TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote runs
-// advertises HS256 in id_token_signing_alg_values_supported. The
+// against a stub IdP that advertises both HS256 + RS256 (Keycloak-shape).
-// function MUST flag the downgrade attack vector in res.Errors but
+// Under v2.1.0-relaxed semantics this must SUCCEED (DiscoverySucceeded=true,
-// MUST NOT short-circuit (per-leg observability is the contract).
+// JWKSReachable=true) and surface only an informational note about the
-func TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngradeDetected(t *testing.T) {
+// weak-alg advertisement — NOT a hard "alg-downgrade defense tripped" error.
+// The per-token alg pin at sig-verify time remains the load-bearing defense.
+func TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote(t *testing.T) {
 	svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
@@ -156,15 +158,60 @@ func TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngradeDetected(t *testing.T) {
 	if !res.DiscoverySucceeded {
 		t.Errorf("expected DiscoverySucceeded=true; got Errors=%v", res.Errors)
 	}
+	// The Keycloak-shape advertisement must NOT trip the hard fail.
+	for _, e := range res.Errors {
+		if strings.Contains(e, "alg-downgrade defense tripped") {
+			t.Errorf("v2.1.0-relaxed semantics: HS256+RS256 must NOT trip hard fail; got %q", e)
+		}
+	}
+	// Informational note must be present.
+	noteFound := false
+	for _, e := range res.Errors {
+		if strings.Contains(e, "note:") && strings.Contains(e, "HS256") {
+			noteFound = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !noteFound {
+		t.Errorf("expected informational note about HS256 in errors; got %v", res.Errors)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail asserts the
+// pathological intersection-empty case still hard-fails.
+func TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail(t *testing.T) {
+	svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
+			"issuer":                                srv.URL,
+			"authorization_endpoint":                srv.URL + "/authorize",
+			"token_endpoint":                        srv.URL + "/token",
+			"jwks_uri":                              srv.URL + "/jwks",
+			"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"HS256", "HS384"}, // no RS
+		})
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/jwks", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"keys":[]}`))
+	})
+
+	res, err := svc.TestDiscovery(context.Background(), srv.URL)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("TestDiscovery: %v", err)
+	}
 	found := false
 	for _, e := range res.Errors {
-		if strings.Contains(e, "alg-downgrade defense tripped") && strings.Contains(e, "HS256") {
+		if strings.Contains(e, "alg-downgrade defense tripped") && strings.Contains(e, "only weak algorithms") {
 			found = true
 			break
 		}
 	}
 	if !found {
-		t.Errorf("expected alg-downgrade-tripped:HS256 in errors; got %v", res.Errors)
+		t.Errorf("expected hard-fail for HS-only IdP; got %v", res.Errors)
 	}
 }
 

internal/auth/oidc/service.go

@@ -52,9 +52,16 @@ import (
 //  6. IdP downgrade-attack defense: at provider creation /
 //     RefreshKeys, the discovery doc's
 //     `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` is intersected with
-//     the allow-list. If the IdP advertises HS* / none AT ALL, the
+//     the allow-list. The provider is rejected only when the
-//     provider is rejected with an actionable error so a future
+//     intersection is EMPTY (i.e., the IdP advertises NO acceptable
-//     compromised IdP can't downgrade.
+//     signing alg). Real IdPs like Keycloak advertise the full list
+//     of algorithms they're capable of including HS*, but actually
+//     sign with RS256; the per-token alg check at sig-verify time
+//     (line ~1177 `isDisallowedAlg`) is the load-bearing defense
+//     against an actual algorithm-confusion attack. Pre-v2.1.0 this
+//     check was strict-deny on any HS* advertisement; v2.1.0 relaxed
+//     to the intersection-empty form so Keycloak / other real IdPs
+//     bind successfully.
 //  7. JWKS handling delegated to coreos/go-oidc/v3; on JWKS fetch
 //     failure during a key rotation the service returns
 //     ErrJWKSUnreachable (HTTP 503), existing sessions untouched,
@@ -299,10 +306,16 @@ var (
 	// allow-list. HTTP 400.
 	ErrAlgRejected = errors.New("oidc: ID token signed with disallowed algorithm")
 
-	// ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised: provider's discovery doc advertises
+	// ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised: provider's discovery doc lists NO
-	// HS* or `none` algorithms. Provider creation / refresh rejects.
+	// alg from DefaultAllowedAlgs in `id_token_signing_alg_values_
-	// HTTP 400.
+	// supported`. v2.1.0-relaxed semantics: an IdP that advertises
-	ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised = errors.New("oidc: IdP advertises weak signing algorithms (HS*/none); refusing to use as defense against downgrade attacks")
+	// HS* / none ALONGSIDE RS256+ binds successfully; only an IdP
+	// that advertises ZERO acceptable algs fails closed. The
+	// per-token alg check at sig-verify time (isDisallowedAlg) is
+	// the load-bearing defense against an actual algorithm-confusion
+	// attack. Provider creation / refresh rejects only when the
+	// intersection is empty. HTTP 400.
+	ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised = errors.New("oidc: IdP advertises no acceptable signing algorithms (intersection of advertised vs DefaultAllowedAlgs is empty)")
 
 	// ErrJWKSUnreachable: JWKS endpoint fetch failed during a
 	// rotation. The in-flight login fails 503; existing sessions
@@ -367,8 +380,11 @@ var (
 // DefaultAllowedAlgs is the operator-default ID-token signing algorithm
 // allow-list. Configurable per-provider but the union must be a subset
 // of this set. HMAC algorithms (HS256/HS384/HS512) and `none` are
-// NEVER in the default set; the IdP downgrade defense rejects any
+// NEVER in the default set; sig-verify rejects any token whose `alg`
-// provider that advertises them in discovery.
+// header is outside this list. v2.1.0-relaxed: the IdP downgrade defense
+// at provider creation only rejects a provider whose advertised list
+// intersects this allow-list to the EMPTY set — Keycloak / Auth0 / etc.
+// that advertise HS* alongside RS* bind successfully.
 var DefaultAllowedAlgs = []string{
 	gooidc.RS256, gooidc.RS512,
 	gooidc.ES256, gooidc.ES384,
@@ -1064,11 +1080,36 @@ func (s *Service) getOrLoad(ctx context.Context, providerID string) (*providerEn
 	if cerr := provider.Claims(&advertised); cerr != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc: discovery claims: %w", cerr)
 	}
+	// Alg-downgrade defense (v2.1.0 relaxation — keycloak-compat).
+	// Pre-v2.1.0 this loop refused to bind if the IdP advertised ANY
+	// HS*/none in `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported`. That was
+	// too strict for real-world IdPs: Keycloak 26.x (and several others)
+	// list every alg they're CAPABLE of, not the ones the realm is
+	// actively signing with — so a realm signing exclusively with RS256
+	// still advertises HS256/HS384/HS512/PS*/etc. in its discovery doc.
+	// The actual algorithm-confusion attack (forged HS256 token with the
+	// RS256 pubkey as HMAC secret) is caught at sig-verify time by the
+	// per-token alg check (isDisallowedAlg, ~L1177) AND by go-oidc/v3's
+	// verifier-side allow-list pin to DefaultAllowedAlgs. So a Keycloak
+	// that *says* it supports HS256 but only ever signs with RS256 is
+	// safe to bind to.
+	// New semantics: refuse only if the IdP advertises NO acceptable alg
+	// (intersection of advertised vs DefaultAllowedAlgs is empty). A
+	// pathological HS-only IdP still fails closed.
+	allowedSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(DefaultAllowedAlgs))
+	for _, a := range DefaultAllowedAlgs {
+		allowedSet[a] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	hasAcceptable := false
 	for _, a := range advertised.IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported {
-		if _, deny := disallowedAlgs[a]; deny {
+		if _, ok := allowedSet[a]; ok {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised, a)
+			hasAcceptable = true
+			break
 		}
 	}
+	if len(advertised.IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported) > 0 && !hasAcceptable {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: advertised=%v", ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised, advertised.IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported)
+	}
 
 	// Compute the effective allow-list: intersection of the default
 	// allow-list AND any operator-configured restriction (currently

internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go

@@ -576,32 +576,40 @@ func TestService_ATHash_UnknownAlgReturnsFalse(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// Test 11: IdP downgrade-attack defense. A provider whose discovery doc
+// Test 11: IdP downgrade-attack defense (v2.1.0-relaxed semantics).
-// advertises HS256 in id_token_signing_alg_values_supported is REJECTED
+// Pre-v2.1.0 ANY HS* advertisement refused. Real IdPs like Keycloak
-// by the cache load with ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised.
+// 26.x advertise the full alg list (HS+RS+ES+PS) but actually sign
-func TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_RejectsHSAdvertised(t *testing.T) {
+// with RS256 — they failed the old check + caused legitimate-IdP
+// integration tests to red. New contract: bind when the intersection
+// of advertised vs DefaultAllowedAlgs is non-empty; reject only when
+// the IdP advertises NO acceptable alg. Per-token alg pin at sig-verify
+// (isDisallowedAlg) still catches an actual algorithm-confusion attack.
+func TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_RS256PlusHS256_BindsSuccessfully(t *testing.T) {
 	idp := newMockIdP(t)
-	idp.advertisedAlgs = []string{"RS256", "HS256"} // HS256 is the downgrade vector
+	idp.advertisedAlgs = []string{"RS256", "HS256"} // Keycloak-shape — both advertised
 
-	svc, _ := newServiceWithProvider(t, idp.URL(), "op-bad-idp")
+	svc, _ := newServiceWithProvider(t, idp.URL(), "op-keycloak-shape")
 
-	_, err := svc.getOrLoad(context.Background(), "op-bad-idp")
+	entry, err := svc.getOrLoad(context.Background(), "op-keycloak-shape")
-	if !errors.Is(err, ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised) {
+	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised", err)
+		t.Fatalf("RS256+HS256 advertisement must bind successfully (v2.1.0 relaxation); got %v", err)
+	}
+	if entry.provider == nil || entry.verifier == nil {
+		t.Errorf("expected non-nil provider+verifier on successful bind")
 	}
 }
 
-// Test 12: IdP downgrade-attack defense — `none` advertisement also
+// Test 12: IdP downgrade-attack defense — HS-only advertisement is
-// triggers rejection.
+// still rejected (the pathological case the defense protects against).
-func TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_RejectsNoneAdvertised(t *testing.T) {
+func TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_RejectsHSOnlyAdvertised(t *testing.T) {
 	idp := newMockIdP(t)
-	idp.advertisedAlgs = []string{"RS256", "none"}
+	idp.advertisedAlgs = []string{"HS256", "HS384", "HS512"} // no RS/ES — pathological
 
-	svc, _ := newServiceWithProvider(t, idp.URL(), "op-none-idp")
+	svc, _ := newServiceWithProvider(t, idp.URL(), "op-hs-only-idp")
 
-	_, err := svc.getOrLoad(context.Background(), "op-none-idp")
+	_, err := svc.getOrLoad(context.Background(), "op-hs-only-idp")
 	if !errors.Is(err, ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised) {
-		t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised", err)
+		t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised (intersection is empty)", err)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -624,7 +632,9 @@ func TestService_GetOrLoad_AcceptsCleanIdP(t *testing.T) {
 
 // Test 14: RefreshKeys evicts the cache + re-fetches discovery, which
 // re-runs the downgrade defense. If the IdP rotated to advertising
-// HS256 between loads, RefreshKeys catches it.
+// ONLY weak algs between loads (intersection-empty case), RefreshKeys
+// catches it. Pre-v2.1.0 this test asserted the strict-deny "any HS*"
+// behavior; v2.1.0-relaxed asserts the intersection-empty behavior.
 func TestService_RefreshKeys_CatchesPostLoadDowngrade(t *testing.T) {
 	idp := newMockIdP(t)
 	svc, _ := newServiceWithProvider(t, idp.URL(), "op-rotate")
@@ -633,11 +643,11 @@ func TestService_RefreshKeys_CatchesPostLoadDowngrade(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("initial load: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// IdP rotates to advertising HS256.
+	// IdP rotates to advertising ONLY HS algs — pathological case.
-	idp.advertisedAlgs = []string{"RS256", "HS256"}
+	idp.advertisedAlgs = []string{"HS256", "HS384"}
 	err := svc.RefreshKeys(context.Background(), "op-rotate")
 	if !errors.Is(err, ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised) {
-		t.Errorf("RefreshKeys err = %v; want ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised", err)
+		t.Errorf("RefreshKeys err = %v; want ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised (intersection-empty)", err)
 	}
 }
 

internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go

@@ -76,14 +76,37 @@ func (s *Service) TestDiscovery(ctx context.Context, issuerURL string) (*TestDis
 	res.JWKSURI = advertised.JWKSURI
 	res.UserInfoEndpoint = advertised.UserInfoEndpoint
 
-	// Step 3 — alg-downgrade defense. The IdP MUST NOT advertise HS*
+	// Step 3 — alg-downgrade defense (v2.1.0-relaxed semantics).
-	// or none in the signing-alg list (operators that bind certctl to
+	// Pre-v2.1.0 this loop appended an error for ANY HS*/none in the
-	// an IdP advertising these are at risk of a forged-token attack).
+	// IdP's advertised list. That was strict-deny but incompatible with
-	// Same check applied in getOrLoad's production path.
+	// real IdPs like Keycloak 26.x which list every alg they're capable
+	// of, even though the realm only signs with RS256.
+	// New semantics: only flag the IdP if the intersection of advertised
+	// vs DefaultAllowedAlgs is empty (a pathological all-weak IdP). Each
+	// HS*/none advertisement is still surfaced as an informational note
+	// so operators can ask their IdP team to tighten the list, but it's
+	// no longer a hard fail. The per-token alg check at sig-verify time
+	// (isDisallowedAlg in service.go ~L1177) is the load-bearing defense.
+	allowedSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(DefaultAllowedAlgs))
+	for _, a := range DefaultAllowedAlgs {
+		allowedSet[a] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	hasAcceptable := false
+	weak := []string{}
 	for _, a := range advertised.IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported {
-		if _, deny := disallowedAlgs[a]; deny {
+		if _, ok := allowedSet[a]; ok {
-			res.Errors = append(res.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("alg-downgrade defense tripped: IdP advertises %s in id_token_signing_alg_values_supported", a))
+			hasAcceptable = true
 		}
+		if _, deny := disallowedAlgs[a]; deny {
+			weak = append(weak, a)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(advertised.IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported) > 0 && !hasAcceptable {
+		res.Errors = append(res.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("alg-downgrade defense tripped: IdP advertises only weak algorithms (%v) — no acceptable alg from %v present", advertised.IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported, DefaultAllowedAlgs))
+	} else if len(weak) > 0 {
+		// Informational only — RS/ES present alongside HS, so the
+		// IdP binds successfully but the operator should know.
+		res.Errors = append(res.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("note: IdP advertises weak algorithms %v alongside acceptable ones — verifier-side alg pin prevents downgrade, but tightening the IdP's advertised list is recommended", weak))
 	}
 
 	// Step 4 — JWKS reachability. The go-oidc Verifier defers JWKS