harden(oidc): strict UA/IP binding (A-6) — close request-empty bypass in MED-16

The MED-16 closure (2a1a0b3) added the RFC 9700 §4.7.1 pre-login
UA/IP binding but the consume-side compare at
internal/auth/oidc/service.go was gated by:

  if s.preLoginRequireUA && storedUA != "" && userAgent != "" {
      ... constant-time compare ...
  }
  if s.preLoginRequireIP && storedIP != "" && ip != "" {
      ... constant-time compare ...
  }

The `userAgent != ""` and `ip != ""` arms were intended as
rolling-deploy / headless-proxy compat ("if the request didn't supply
a value, don't try to compare against nothing"). They achieve that —
and they ALSO short-circuit the compare whenever the **attacker**
controls the request side, which is always at /auth/oidc/callback.

Threat model:
  1. Attacker acquires a pre-login cookie (HMAC-protected; requires
     RNG break OR transit leak — not implausible, that's why the
     binding exists in the first place).
  2. Attacker replays the cookie at /auth/oidc/callback from their
     own user-agent.
  3. Attacker OMITS the User-Agent header. curl doesn't send one by
     default. Many programmatic HTTP clients omit it.

Pre-A-6, step 3 trivially bypassed the binding check. The whole
RFC 9700 §4.7.1 defense was theatre against the realistic threat —
silent-allow when the attacker abandons the header they don't want
checked.

Fix: flipped to strict-when-stored. When the pre-login row carries a
binding value (storedUA != "" or storedIP != ""), the request MUST
present a matching value. An empty request side with a non-empty
stored side now rejects with two new sentinels:

  ErrPreLoginUAMissing  — request omitted User-Agent header
  ErrPreLoginIPMissing  — request had no resolvable client IP

Distinguished from the existing *Mismatch sentinels so the audit
row can tell apart "binding violation" (operator mis-configured the
proxy) from "missing-header bypass attempt" (active exploit indicator).
The handler-side classifyOIDCFailure adds typed errors.Is dispatch:

  ErrPreLoginUAMissing → "prelogin_ua_missing"
  ErrPreLoginIPMissing → "prelogin_ip_missing"

SIEM rules can now alert specifically on the bypass-attempt category
distinctly from operator config drift.

Legacy-row compat preserved: pre-migration rows where storedUA == ""
/ storedIP == "" still pass through unchecked. That window is
bounded by the 10-minute pre-login TTL — within 10 minutes of the
MED-16 deploy every legacy row has expired and the strict path is
universal.

Operator escape hatches preserved: CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA=false
(symmetric for IP) bypasses both the *Mismatch AND the new *Missing
reject paths. Required for environments where a proxy strips the
User-Agent header in transit (rare but documented in the operator
advisory).

Regression coverage:

  service_test.go (5 new tests under
  `Audit 2026-05-11 A-6 — strict-when-stored` block):
    TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_A6_UAStoredButRequestEmpty_Rejects
      — the load-bearing bypass-closure leg
    TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_A6_IPStoredButRequestEmpty_Rejects
      — symmetric for IP
    TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_A6_LegacyRowEmptyStoredStillPasses
      — legacy-row compat preserved
    TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_A6_ToggleOff_AllowsBypass
      — UA toggle off allows the bypass (operator escape hatch)
    TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_A6_ToggleOff_IP_AllowsBypass
      — IP toggle off allows the bypass

  auth_session_oidc_test.go::TestClassifyOIDCFailure extended:
    ErrPreLoginUAMismatch → prelogin_ua_mismatch (new explicit pin)
    ErrPreLoginIPMismatch → prelogin_ip_mismatch (new explicit pin)
    ErrPreLoginUAMissing → prelogin_ua_missing
    ErrPreLoginIPMissing → prelogin_ip_missing
    fmt.Errorf wrapped variants of the *Missing sentinels round-trip
    through errors.Is (defense against future context-wrapping in
    the service layer)

Verify gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, all 10 MED-16 tests
+ extended TestClassifyOIDCFailure pass; full short-mode test run
across internal/auth/oidc + internal/api/handler also green.

Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/06-high-prelogin-ua-strict-mode.md.
Audit doc: MED-16 row in cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md
appended with the A-6 follow-up closure annotation; status table
row updated to "CLOSED + A-6 follow-up CLOSED 2026-05-11".
Operator advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes covers the
two operator-visible behaviour changes: (1) callback requests
without User-Agent now reject when a binding was stored, and (2)
the CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA=false escape hatch is the
documented path for environments where the proxy strips the header.

internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go

@@ -1006,11 +1006,11 @@ func (h *AuthSessionOIDCHandler) TestProvider(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
 	}
 	h.recordAudit(r.Context(), "auth.oidc_provider_tested", caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, "",
 		map[string]interface{}{
-			"issuer_url":           req.IssuerURL,
-			"discovery_succeeded":  res.DiscoverySucceeded,
-			"jwks_reachable":       res.JWKSReachable,
-			"iss_param_supported":  res.IssParamSupported,
-			"error_count":          len(res.Errors),
+			"issuer_url":          req.IssuerURL,
+			"discovery_succeeded": res.DiscoverySucceeded,
+			"jwks_reachable":      res.JWKSReachable,
+			"iss_param_supported": res.IssParamSupported,
+			"error_count":         len(res.Errors),
 		})
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, res)
 }
@@ -1267,6 +1267,14 @@ func classifyOIDCFailure(err error) string {
 		return "prelogin_ua_mismatch"
 	case errors.Is(err, oidcsvc.ErrPreLoginIPMismatch):
 		return "prelogin_ip_mismatch"
+	// Audit 2026-05-11 A-6 — strict-when-stored. Distinguishes the
+	// new "request omitted the bound header" reject path from the
+	// existing "header was supplied but didn't match" path so SIEM
+	// rules can alert specifically on attempted bypasses.
+	case errors.Is(err, oidcsvc.ErrPreLoginUAMissing):
+		return "prelogin_ua_missing"
+	case errors.Is(err, oidcsvc.ErrPreLoginIPMissing):
+		return "prelogin_ip_missing"
 	}
 	msg := strings.ToLower(err.Error())
 	switch {

internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go

@@ -1217,6 +1217,17 @@ func TestClassifyOIDCFailure(t *testing.T) {
 		// Wrapped variants must round-trip through errors.Is.
 		{fmt.Errorf("upstream: %w", oidcsvc.ErrIssParamMissing), "iss_param_missing"},
 		{fmt.Errorf("upstream: %w", oidcsvc.ErrIssParamMismatch), "iss_param_mismatch"},
+		// Audit 2026-05-11 A-6 — strict-when-stored. Distinguishes the
+		// new request-omitted-binding reject path from the existing
+		// mismatch leg. Wrapped variants must round-trip through
+		// errors.Is so the audit category remains stable even when
+		// the service layer adds context wrapping.
+		{oidcsvc.ErrPreLoginUAMismatch, "prelogin_ua_mismatch"},
+		{oidcsvc.ErrPreLoginIPMismatch, "prelogin_ip_mismatch"},
+		{oidcsvc.ErrPreLoginUAMissing, "prelogin_ua_missing"},
+		{oidcsvc.ErrPreLoginIPMissing, "prelogin_ip_missing"},
+		{fmt.Errorf("upstream: %w", oidcsvc.ErrPreLoginUAMissing), "prelogin_ua_missing"},
+		{fmt.Errorf("upstream: %w", oidcsvc.ErrPreLoginIPMissing), "prelogin_ip_missing"},
 		{errors.New("some other error"), "unspecified"},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {