auth-bundle-1 Phase 3 (primitive): RequirePermission middleware + demo-mode + protocol allowlist

Bundle 1 / Phase 3 (primitive ship): the load-bearing RBAC middleware factory plus its dependencies. Handler conversion sweep (5 admin files: bulk_revocation.go, admin_crl_cache.go, admin_scep_intune.go, admin_est.go, intermediate_ca.go) + m008_admin_gate_test.go registry update is Phase 3.5 follow-on; this commit ships the primitive so 3.5 is mechanical.

New context keys (internal/auth/context.go): ActorIDKey, ActorTypeKey, TenantIDKey alongside the legacy UserKey + AdminKey. New helpers GetActorID / GetActorType / GetTenantID with safe fallbacks (UserKey for actor id, ActorTypeAPIKey for missing type, DefaultTenantID for missing tenant). Constants DemoAnonActorID + ActorTypeAPIKey + ActorTypeAnonymous mirror internal/domain/auth without an import cycle.

RequirePermission factory (internal/auth/require_permission.go): wraps a handler and gates it behind a named permission. 401 when no actor, 403 when actor lacks permission, 500 on repository error. Skips the gate entirely for protocol endpoints (ACME / SCEP / EST / OCSP / CRL) per the audit's Category F do-not-gate allowlist. PermissionChecker is an interface so internal/auth doesn't depend on internal/service/auth (cmd/server wires the concrete Authorizer at startup). HasPermission is the imperative variant for handlers that branch behaviour rather than 403'ing. ScopeFunc closure extracts the scope type + id from the request for per-resource gating.

Protocol-endpoint allowlist (internal/auth/protocol_endpoints.go): IsProtocolEndpoint matches /acme, /scep, /.well-known/est, /.well-known/pki/ocsp, /.well-known/pki/crl prefixes. Adding a new protocol endpoint MUST update this list and add a parallel test.

Demo-mode synthetic admin (internal/auth/middleware.go::NewDemoModeAuth): when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is configured, this middleware injects ActorID=actor-demo-anon, ActorType=Anonymous, TenantID=t-default, plus the legacy UserKey + AdminKey for back-compat with existing handlers. The synthetic actor's admin-role grant is seeded by migration 000029 so RequirePermission resolves through the JOIN like any other actor. cmd/server startup wires this middleware only when none-mode is configured.

API-key middleware extension: NewAuthWithNamedKeys now populates the new keys (ActorIDKey, ActorTypeKey=APIKey, TenantIDKey=t-default) alongside UserKey + AdminKey on every successful Bearer match. Existing handlers continue to read UserKey / IsAdmin until the Phase 3.5 sweep converts them to RequirePermission.

Test coverage: TestRequirePermission_NoActorReturns401, TestRequirePermission_GrantedActorReaches200, TestRequirePermission_DeniedActorReturns403, TestRequirePermission_CheckerErrorReturns500, TestRequirePermission_ProtocolEndpointBypassesGate (covers all 5 prefixes), TestRequirePermission_ScopeFnExtractsResourceID, TestIsProtocolEndpoint_PrefixesOnly, TestNewDemoModeAuth_InjectsSyntheticActor, TestNewAuthWithNamedKeys_PopulatesPhase3ContextKeys. fakeChecker pins the contract without a database.

Phase 3.5 follow-on (NOT in this commit): convert each of the 5 admin handlers from auth.IsAdmin checks to auth.RequirePermission middleware in router.go; update internal/api/handler/m008_admin_gate_test.go to track auth.RequirePermission call sites instead of (or alongside) auth.IsAdmin; pick the right permission per handler (cert.revoke for bulk_revocation, etc.). Each handler conversion needs the 3-test triplet (_NonAdmin_Returns403 / _AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 / _AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor) per M-008.

Branch: dev/auth-bundle-1. Phase 2 was prior commit (service layer). Phase 3.5 (handler conversion) + Phase 4 (HTTP API) on the next session.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-09 16:20:04 +00:00
parent e4a5eb714f
commit 791659ebf0
5 changed files with 526 additions and 1 deletions
+82
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@@ -48,3 +48,85 @@ func IsAdmin(ctx context.Context) bool {
admin, ok := ctx.Value(AdminKey{}).(bool)
return ok && admin
}
// =============================================================================
// Bundle 1 Phase 3: RBAC-aware context keys.
//
// ActorIDKey, ActorTypeKey, and TenantIDKey are populated by the auth
// middleware (NewAuthWithNamedKeys, NewDemoModeAuth, and Bundle 2's
// session middleware) so that downstream RBAC checks have a stable
// identity + tenancy view of the caller.
//
// UserKey + AdminKey continue to be populated for back-compat with
// existing audit / rate-limiter / handler code; the new keys are the
// canonical Phase 3+ identity.
// =============================================================================
// ActorIDKey is the canonical actor identifier (e.g. an API-key name,
// an OIDC user id, or the synthetic `actor-demo-anon`). Phase 3
// middleware populates this; auth.RequirePermission and
// auth.CallerFromContext read it.
type ActorIDKey struct{}
// ActorTypeKey is the typed-string actor type (User, System, Agent,
// APIKey, Anonymous) corresponding to internal/domain.ActorType. Stored
// as a string so the internal/auth package doesn't need to import the
// domain package and create a cycle.
type ActorTypeKey struct{}
// TenantIDKey is the tenant the request executes in. Bundle 1 ships
// single-tenant; every authenticated request gets the seeded
// `t-default` tenant unless the future managed-service offering
// configures a different one.
type TenantIDKey struct{}
// GetActorID returns the canonical actor id from context, or "" when
// no actor is present (anonymous request, missing middleware in test
// harnesses, etc.). Falls back to the legacy UserKey value for
// back-compat with handlers that have not yet adopted the new keys.
func GetActorID(ctx context.Context) string {
if id, ok := ctx.Value(ActorIDKey{}).(string); ok && id != "" {
return id
}
return GetUser(ctx)
}
// GetActorType returns the actor type string from context, or "" when
// no actor type was set. Phase 3 middleware sets this to "APIKey" for
// validated bearer-token requests and "Anonymous" for the demo-mode
// synthetic actor.
func GetActorType(ctx context.Context) string {
if t, ok := ctx.Value(ActorTypeKey{}).(string); ok {
return t
}
return ""
}
// GetTenantID returns the tenant id from context, or the seeded
// default tenant when no value was set. Returning the default rather
// than "" keeps RBAC lookups working in deployments that haven't
// configured a tenant explicitly (the Bundle 1 baseline).
func GetTenantID(ctx context.Context) string {
if t, ok := ctx.Value(TenantIDKey{}).(string); ok && t != "" {
return t
}
return DefaultTenantID
}
// DefaultTenantID is the seeded single tenant. Mirrors
// internal/domain/auth.DefaultTenantID; duplicated here to avoid a
// cross-package import in the hot-path middleware.
const DefaultTenantID = "t-default"
// DemoAnonActorID is the synthetic actor id used by the demo-mode
// auth middleware when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none. Mirrors
// internal/domain/auth.DemoAnonActorID.
const DemoAnonActorID = "actor-demo-anon"
// ActorTypeAPIKey + ActorTypeAnonymous mirror the corresponding
// domain.ActorType values. Stored as untyped strings here so callers
// don't have to import the domain package.
const (
ActorTypeAPIKey = "APIKey"
ActorTypeAnonymous = "Anonymous"
)
+36 -1
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@@ -100,9 +100,44 @@ func NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys []NamedAPIKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handl
return
}
// Store the authenticated identity and admin flag in context
// Store the authenticated identity and admin flag in context.
// Bundle 1 Phase 0: legacy UserKey + AdminKey for back-compat.
// Bundle 1 Phase 3: new ActorIDKey + ActorTypeKey + TenantIDKey
// for RBAC-aware downstream code (RequirePermission, etc.).
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserKey{}, matched.name)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, matched.admin)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorIDKey{}, matched.name)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorTypeKey{}, ActorTypeAPIKey)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, TenantIDKey{}, DefaultTenantID)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
}
// NewDemoModeAuth returns a middleware that injects the synthetic
// `actor-demo-anon` identity into every request context. Used when
// CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is configured (the demo path) so that
// RBAC-gated handlers see an admin-equivalent caller without operator
// configuration.
//
// The synthetic actor is seeded by migration 000029_rbac.up.sql with
// the admin role at global scope, so RequirePermission resolves
// every gated request as an admin. The reserved-actor guard in the
// service layer prevents the API from accidentally mutating this
// actor's role assignments.
//
// Production deployments MUST NOT use this middleware. The cmd/server
// startup wires it only when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is explicitly
// configured.
func NewDemoModeAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserKey{}, DemoAnonActorID)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, true)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorIDKey{}, DemoAnonActorID)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorTypeKey{}, ActorTypeAnonymous)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, TenantIDKey{}, DefaultTenantID)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
+49
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@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
package auth
import "strings"
// ProtocolEndpointPrefixes lists the URL path prefixes that authenticate
// via the protocol itself rather than via certctl's Bearer / cookie
// stack. Bundle 1 Phase 3 uses this allowlist as the explicit "do NOT
// wrap with RequirePermission" set: the RBAC middleware applies only to
// admin handlers replacing legacy IsAdmin checks plus any new
// permission-gated routes; the endpoints below keep their existing
// protocol-level auth.
//
// Adding a new protocol endpoint that doesn't take a Bearer token MUST
// also add the prefix here and a parallel test in Phase 12 asserting
// the route is unwrapped.
//
// Per the Phase 3 audit:
//
// ACME server : /acme/profile/<id>/* + /acme/* (JWS-signed, RFC 8555).
// SCEP server : /scep (challenge password +
// signed CSR, RFC 8894).
// EST server : /.well-known/est/* (mTLS client cert,
// RFC 7030).
// OCSP responder : /.well-known/pki/ocsp (RFC 6960, public).
// CRL distrib. : /.well-known/pki/crl/* (RFC 5280, public).
//
// Plus the existing public-route bypass list at internal/api/router
// (router.go:69-72): /health, /ready, /api/v1/auth/info. Those bypass
// EVERY middleware stack, not just RBAC, so they're not in this
// allowlist; they're handled in router.go directly.
var ProtocolEndpointPrefixes = []string{
"/acme",
"/scep",
"/.well-known/est",
"/.well-known/pki/ocsp",
"/.well-known/pki/crl",
}
// IsProtocolEndpoint reports whether the request path is in the
// "do not gate" allowlist. Phase 3 RequirePermission check bails out
// early for these paths so the protocol surface is preserved.
func IsProtocolEndpoint(path string) bool {
for _, p := range ProtocolEndpointPrefixes {
if path == p || strings.HasPrefix(path, p+"/") {
return true
}
}
return false
}
+126
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@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
package auth
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
)
// PermissionChecker is the dependency the RequirePermission middleware
// expects. internal/service/auth.Authorizer satisfies this interface;
// tests can supply an in-memory fake.
//
// scopeID is nil for global checks; non-nil for per-resource checks
// (e.g. per-profile or per-issuer scoping). scopeType matches
// internal/domain/auth.ScopeType ("global", "profile", "issuer").
type PermissionChecker interface {
CheckPermission(
ctx context.Context,
actorID string,
actorType string,
tenantID string,
permission string,
scopeType string,
scopeID *string,
) (bool, error)
}
// ScopeFunc extracts the scope (type, id) from the request. A nil
// ScopeFunc means "global scope" (the most common case for admin-class
// gates like bulk revocation, intermediate-CA management, etc.).
type ScopeFunc func(r *http.Request) (scopeType string, scopeID *string)
// RequirePermission returns a middleware that gates the wrapped handler
// behind the named permission. Returns 401 when no actor is in
// context, 403 when the actor exists but lacks the permission, 500 on
// repository errors. Skips the gate entirely for protocol-level
// endpoints in ProtocolEndpointPrefixes (ACME / SCEP / EST / OCSP / CRL).
//
// The permission name MUST exist in
// internal/domain/auth.CanonicalPermissions (enforced indirectly via
// the seed migration; an unknown permission name will simply return
// 403 because no role grant references it).
func RequirePermission(checker PermissionChecker, permission string, scope ScopeFunc) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Protocol endpoints keep their existing protocol-level
// auth; the RBAC gate doesn't apply.
if IsProtocolEndpoint(r.URL.Path) {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
ctx := r.Context()
actorID := GetActorID(ctx)
if actorID == "" {
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Authentication required")
return
}
actorType := GetActorType(ctx)
if actorType == "" {
// Legacy callers that only set UserKey: assume APIKey.
// Bundle 2's OIDC middleware sets the type explicitly
// to "User"; the demo-mode middleware sets it to
// "Anonymous"; the API-key middleware (Phase 3
// extension) sets it to "APIKey".
actorType = ActorTypeAPIKey
}
scopeType := "global"
var scopeID *string
if scope != nil {
scopeType, scopeID = scope(r)
}
tenantID := GetTenantID(ctx)
ok, err := checker.CheckPermission(ctx, actorID, actorType, tenantID, permission, scopeType, scopeID)
if err != nil {
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "RBAC check failed",
"permission", permission,
"actor_id", actorID,
"error", err,
)
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal error")
return
}
if !ok {
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Insufficient permissions")
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// HasPermission is a convenience for handlers that need to check a
// permission imperatively (e.g. branch behaviour without 403'ing the
// whole request). Returns (true, nil) when granted, (false, nil) when
// denied, (false, err) on repository failure. Skips the protocol-
// endpoint allowlist.
func HasPermission(ctx context.Context, checker PermissionChecker, permission string, scopeType string, scopeID *string) (bool, error) {
actorID := GetActorID(ctx)
if actorID == "" {
return false, ErrNoActor
}
actorType := GetActorType(ctx)
if actorType == "" {
actorType = ActorTypeAPIKey
}
tenantID := GetTenantID(ctx)
return checker.CheckPermission(ctx, actorID, actorType, tenantID, permission, scopeType, scopeID)
}
// ErrNoActor is returned by HasPermission when the request context has
// no actor identity. Handler code typically translates this to HTTP
// 401.
var ErrNoActor = errors.New("auth: no actor in context")
func writeJSONError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(status)
// Match the existing middleware error shape so handler tests that
// assert on the body text continue to work.
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"` + msg + `"}`))
}
+233
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@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
package auth
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
// fakeChecker implements PermissionChecker for unit tests. The check
// function controls the result; tests pin specific behaviour via
// closures.
type fakeChecker struct {
check func(ctx context.Context, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType string, scopeID *string) (bool, error)
}
func (f *fakeChecker) CheckPermission(ctx context.Context, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType string, scopeID *string) (bool, error) {
return f.check(ctx, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType, scopeID)
}
func okHandler() http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
}
func TestRequirePermission_NoActorReturns401(t *testing.T) {
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
t.Fatalf("checker should not be called when no actor in context")
return false, nil
}}
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "cert.read", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("no actor should yield 401; got %d", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestRequirePermission_GrantedActorReaches200(t *testing.T) {
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, actorID, actorType, _, perm, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
if actorID != "alice" {
t.Errorf("actor id = %q, want alice", actorID)
}
if actorType != ActorTypeAPIKey {
t.Errorf("actor type = %q, want %q", actorType, ActorTypeAPIKey)
}
if perm != "cert.read" {
t.Errorf("perm = %q, want cert.read", perm)
}
return true, nil
}}
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "cert.read", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates", nil)
req = req.WithContext(WithActor(req.Context(), "alice"))
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorIDKey{}, "alice"))
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorTypeKey{}, ActorTypeAPIKey))
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("granted actor should reach handler 200; got %d", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestRequirePermission_DeniedActorReturns403(t *testing.T) {
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
return false, nil
}}
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "cert.delete", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/certificates/mc-1", nil)
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorIDKey{}, "bob"))
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorTypeKey{}, ActorTypeAPIKey))
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("denied actor should yield 403; got %d", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestRequirePermission_CheckerErrorReturns500(t *testing.T) {
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
return false, errors.New("database fell over")
}}
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "cert.read", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates", nil)
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorIDKey{}, "alice"))
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("checker error should yield 500; got %d", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestRequirePermission_ProtocolEndpointBypassesGate(t *testing.T) {
gateChecks := 0
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
gateChecks++
return false, nil
}}
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "cert.read", nil)
for _, p := range []string{
"/acme/profile/corp/new-order",
"/scep",
"/.well-known/est/cacerts",
"/.well-known/pki/ocsp",
"/.well-known/pki/crl/ca.crl",
} {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, p, nil)
// Deliberately no actor: protocol endpoints must reach the
// handler regardless of context state.
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("protocol endpoint %s should bypass gate; got %d", p, rec.Code)
}
}
if gateChecks != 0 {
t.Errorf("checker should be called zero times for protocol endpoints; got %d", gateChecks)
}
}
func TestRequirePermission_ScopeFnExtractsResourceID(t *testing.T) {
captured := struct {
scopeType string
scopeID *string
}{}
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, st string, sid *string) (bool, error) {
captured.scopeType = st
captured.scopeID = sid
return true, nil
}}
scope := func(r *http.Request) (string, *string) {
id := r.URL.Query().Get("profile")
return "profile", &id
}
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "profile.edit", scope)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "/api/v1/profiles/p-corp?profile=p-corp", nil)
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorIDKey{}, "alice"))
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("scoped grant should pass; got %d", rec.Code)
}
if captured.scopeType != "profile" {
t.Errorf("scope type = %q, want profile", captured.scopeType)
}
if captured.scopeID == nil || *captured.scopeID != "p-corp" {
t.Errorf("scope id = %v, want p-corp", captured.scopeID)
}
}
func TestIsProtocolEndpoint_PrefixesOnly(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
path string
want bool
}{
{"/acme", true},
{"/acme/profile/corp/new-order", true},
{"/scep", true},
// Query strings live in r.URL.RawQuery; r.URL.Path stays
// just `/scep`, so callers always pass the path-only form.
{"/.well-known/est/cacerts", true},
{"/.well-known/pki/ocsp", true},
{"/.well-known/pki/crl/ca.crl", true},
{"/api/v1/certificates", false},
{"/api/v1/auth/me", false},
{"/health", false}, // bypassed at the router level, NOT by RBAC.
{"/acmedotcom", false},
{"/scepfake", false},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
if got := IsProtocolEndpoint(tc.path); got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("IsProtocolEndpoint(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.path, got, tc.want)
}
}
}
func TestNewDemoModeAuth_InjectsSyntheticActor(t *testing.T) {
mw := NewDemoModeAuth()
var captured struct {
actorID, actorType, user string
isAdmin bool
}
handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
captured.actorID = GetActorID(r.Context())
captured.actorType = GetActorType(r.Context())
captured.user = GetUser(r.Context())
captured.isAdmin = IsAdmin(r.Context())
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if captured.actorID != DemoAnonActorID {
t.Errorf("actor id = %q, want %q", captured.actorID, DemoAnonActorID)
}
if captured.actorType != ActorTypeAnonymous {
t.Errorf("actor type = %q, want %q", captured.actorType, ActorTypeAnonymous)
}
if captured.user != DemoAnonActorID {
t.Errorf("legacy UserKey = %q, want %q (back-compat)", captured.user, DemoAnonActorID)
}
if !captured.isAdmin {
t.Errorf("legacy AdminKey should be true in demo mode (back-compat for IsAdmin handlers)")
}
}
func TestNewAuthWithNamedKeys_PopulatesPhase3ContextKeys(t *testing.T) {
mw := NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]NamedAPIKey{
{Name: "alice", Key: "ALICE_KEY", Admin: true},
})
var captured struct {
actorID, actorType, tenantID string
}
handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
captured.actorID = GetActorID(r.Context())
captured.actorType = GetActorType(r.Context())
captured.tenantID = GetTenantID(r.Context())
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer ALICE_KEY")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if captured.actorID != "alice" {
t.Errorf("Phase 3 actor id = %q, want alice", captured.actorID)
}
if captured.actorType != ActorTypeAPIKey {
t.Errorf("Phase 3 actor type = %q, want %q", captured.actorType, ActorTypeAPIKey)
}
if captured.tenantID != DefaultTenantID {
t.Errorf("Phase 3 tenant id = %q, want %q", captured.tenantID, DefaultTenantID)
}
}