auth-bundle-1 Phase 9 + 10: approval-bypass closure + RBAC GUI

# Phase 9 — approval-bypass closure (Decision 9, option a)

* Migration 000033_approval_kinds.up.sql: ALTER TABLE
  issuance_approval_requests ADD COLUMN approval_kind +
  payload JSONB; relax certificate_id + job_id to nullable;
  CHECK (approval_kind IN ('cert_issuance','profile_edit'))
  + CHECK (per-kind nullability invariant) + index on
  approval_kind. Idempotent throughout via DO blocks.
* domain.ApprovalKind enum (cert_issuance / profile_edit) +
  IsValidApprovalKind. ApprovalRequest gains Kind +
  Payload []byte for the pending profile diff.
* postgres.ApprovalRepository.Create + scanApprovalRow extended
  to round-trip the new columns; certificate_id + job_id
  switched to sql.NullString so profile_edit rows persist
  cleanly. Default Kind=cert_issuance preserves back-compat
  for every Phase-7-2026-05-03 caller.
* ApprovalService.RequestProfileEditApproval: new entry point
  that creates a pending profile-edit row carrying the
  serialized profile diff. Bypass mode (CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS)
  short-circuits the same way it does for cert_issuance.
* ApprovalService.SetProfileEditApply hook: cmd/server/main.go
  registers a closure that deserializes req.Payload + persists
  via profileRepo.Update + emits a profile.edit_applied audit
  row with category=auth. The hook avoids the Approval ↔
  Profile import cycle.
* ProfileService.UpdateProfile: gates when (a) the live
  profile carries RequiresApproval=true, OR (b) the proposed
  edit would set it true. Returns ErrProfileEditPendingApproval
  with the new approval ID; ProfileHandler maps to HTTP 202
  Accepted + {pending_approval_id}. Both arms close the
  flip-flop loophole because every transition through an
  approval-tier profile fires the gate.
* TestProfileEdit_RequiresApprovalLoopholeClosed pins all 3
  bypass attempts (flip-off / kept-on / flip-on) gated; nil-
  approval-service preserves pre-Phase-9 direct-apply for
  test fixtures.
* Approval service tests gain 4 profile_edit rows: pending row
  shape; same-actor self-approve rejected with
  ErrApproveBySameActor (load-bearing two-person integrity);
  approve fails-closed when apply callback unwired;
  apply callback invoked on approve.
* docs/reference/profiles.md (new) explains the gate +
  edit response shape (202) + same-actor invariant + bypass
  + audit hooks.

# Phase 10 — RBAC management GUI

* useAuthMe hook (web/src/hooks/useAuthMe.ts): TanStack Query
  fetches /api/v1/auth/me on app boot, caches for 60s, exposes
  hasPerm(p) + hasAnyPerm + isAdmin predicates. Every Phase-10
  page consumes this on mount + gates affordances against the
  cached effective_permissions slice. Server-side enforcement
  is the load-bearing gate; client-side hide/disable is UX.
* New routes:
   - /auth/roles — list (auth.role.list); create-role modal
     (auth.role.create) hidden when missing.
   - /auth/roles/:id — detail + permissions; edit
     (auth.role.edit), delete (auth.role.delete), add/remove
     permission affordances each gated.
   - /auth/keys — list of every actor with role grants; assign
     + revoke modals (auth.role.assign). actor-demo-anon
     flagged system-managed; mutation buttons hidden for it.
   - /auth/settings — stub showing /v1/auth/me identity +
     bootstrap-endpoint availability via /v1/auth/bootstrap.
* AuditPage extended with category filter ('All categories'
  + the 3 enum values from migration 000032). Selection flows
  to the API call params + the URL-driven query state.
* Layout: 3 new nav entries (Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings).
* api/client.ts: 12 new exported functions for the RBAC
  surface (authMe, list/get/create/update/delete role,
  list/add/remove role permissions, list keys, assign/revoke
  key role, bootstrap-availability probe).
* data-testid attributes on every interactive element so a
  future Playwright suite can assert behavior without brittle
  CSS selectors.
* Empty state, error state, and unsaved-changes warnings on
  every form per the prompt's implementation rules.

# Frontend tests

* RolesPage.test.tsx (6 tests): list render, empty state,
  error state, hide-create-button-without-perm,
  show-create-button-with-perm, submit-create-modal.
* KeysPage.test.tsx (3 tests): demo-anon flagged
  system-managed (no buttons), permission-gated affordance
  hide for auditor caller, assign-modal-POST contract.
* AuthSettingsPage.test.tsx (2 tests): identity surface,
  bootstrap-OPEN-status surface.
* AuditPage.test.tsx (+1): category-filter select renders
  with the 4 documented options.

15 frontend tests total in src/pages/auth/ + the audit
category-filter test; all pass via npx vitest run.

# Verifications

* go vet ./... clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* gofmt -l clean repo-wide.
* go test -short -count=1 green across internal/service,
  internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/auth,
  internal/auth/bootstrap, internal/service/auth,
  internal/domain/auth, cmd/server, cmd/cli, internal/cli.
* npx tsc --noEmit clean.
* npm run build green (vite build produces dist/index.html
  + 946KB JS bundle; chunk-size warning is pre-existing).
* npx vitest run src/pages/auth/ src/pages/AuditPage.test.tsx
  green (15 tests, 4 files).

web/src/hooks/useAuthMe.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+import { useQuery } from '@tanstack/react-query';
+import { authMe, type AuthMeResponse } from '../api/client';
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Bundle 1 Phase 10 — `useAuthMe` is the GUI's single source of truth for
+// "what can the current actor do?" Every Phase-10 auth page (Roles,
+// Keys, Auth Settings, Audit category filter) consumes this hook on
+// mount + caches via TanStack Query, so toggling between pages doesn't
+// re-fetch the permission set every navigation.
+//
+// The hook returns three things:
+//
+//   - data:        the raw AuthMeResponse from /v1/auth/me (or undefined while
+//                  loading / on error).
+//   - hasPerm(p):  predicate the caller uses to gate buttons / links.
+//                  Reads the cached effective_permissions slice.
+//   - isLoading + error: standard TanStack Query surface.
+//
+// The permission check is intentionally a string-equality match against
+// the canonical permission names. Scope semantics (global / profile /
+// issuer) are NOT applied client-side — the server is the load-bearing
+// gate. The client uses hasPerm purely for "show or hide the button"
+// UX; the server returns 403 if a missing perm gets through anyway.
+// =============================================================================
+
+const STALE_TIME_MS = 60_000;
+
+export function useAuthMe() {
+  const query = useQuery<AuthMeResponse, Error>({
+    queryKey: ['auth', 'me'],
+    queryFn: authMe,
+    staleTime: STALE_TIME_MS,
+    retry: 0,
+  });
+
+  const hasPerm = (perm: string): boolean => {
+    if (!query.data) return false;
+    return query.data.effective_permissions.some(p => p.permission === perm);
+  };
+
+  const hasAnyPerm = (perms: string[]): boolean => {
+    if (!query.data) return false;
+    return perms.some(p => hasPerm(p));
+  };
+
+  const isAdmin = (): boolean => {
+    return Boolean(query.data?.roles?.includes('r-admin') || query.data?.admin);
+  };
+
+  return {
+    data: query.data,
+    isLoading: query.isLoading,
+    error: query.error,
+    hasPerm,
+    hasAnyPerm,
+    isAdmin,
+  };
+}