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auth-bundle-1 Phase 9 + 10: approval-bypass closure + RBAC GUI
# Phase 9 — approval-bypass closure (Decision 9, option a)
* Migration 000033_approval_kinds.up.sql: ALTER TABLE
issuance_approval_requests ADD COLUMN approval_kind +
payload JSONB; relax certificate_id + job_id to nullable;
CHECK (approval_kind IN ('cert_issuance','profile_edit'))
+ CHECK (per-kind nullability invariant) + index on
approval_kind. Idempotent throughout via DO blocks.
* domain.ApprovalKind enum (cert_issuance / profile_edit) +
IsValidApprovalKind. ApprovalRequest gains Kind +
Payload []byte for the pending profile diff.
* postgres.ApprovalRepository.Create + scanApprovalRow extended
to round-trip the new columns; certificate_id + job_id
switched to sql.NullString so profile_edit rows persist
cleanly. Default Kind=cert_issuance preserves back-compat
for every Phase-7-2026-05-03 caller.
* ApprovalService.RequestProfileEditApproval: new entry point
that creates a pending profile-edit row carrying the
serialized profile diff. Bypass mode (CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS)
short-circuits the same way it does for cert_issuance.
* ApprovalService.SetProfileEditApply hook: cmd/server/main.go
registers a closure that deserializes req.Payload + persists
via profileRepo.Update + emits a profile.edit_applied audit
row with category=auth. The hook avoids the Approval ↔
Profile import cycle.
* ProfileService.UpdateProfile: gates when (a) the live
profile carries RequiresApproval=true, OR (b) the proposed
edit would set it true. Returns ErrProfileEditPendingApproval
with the new approval ID; ProfileHandler maps to HTTP 202
Accepted + {pending_approval_id}. Both arms close the
flip-flop loophole because every transition through an
approval-tier profile fires the gate.
* TestProfileEdit_RequiresApprovalLoopholeClosed pins all 3
bypass attempts (flip-off / kept-on / flip-on) gated; nil-
approval-service preserves pre-Phase-9 direct-apply for
test fixtures.
* Approval service tests gain 4 profile_edit rows: pending row
shape; same-actor self-approve rejected with
ErrApproveBySameActor (load-bearing two-person integrity);
approve fails-closed when apply callback unwired;
apply callback invoked on approve.
* docs/reference/profiles.md (new) explains the gate +
edit response shape (202) + same-actor invariant + bypass
+ audit hooks.
# Phase 10 — RBAC management GUI
* useAuthMe hook (web/src/hooks/useAuthMe.ts): TanStack Query
fetches /api/v1/auth/me on app boot, caches for 60s, exposes
hasPerm(p) + hasAnyPerm + isAdmin predicates. Every Phase-10
page consumes this on mount + gates affordances against the
cached effective_permissions slice. Server-side enforcement
is the load-bearing gate; client-side hide/disable is UX.
* New routes:
- /auth/roles — list (auth.role.list); create-role modal
(auth.role.create) hidden when missing.
- /auth/roles/:id — detail + permissions; edit
(auth.role.edit), delete (auth.role.delete), add/remove
permission affordances each gated.
- /auth/keys — list of every actor with role grants; assign
+ revoke modals (auth.role.assign). actor-demo-anon
flagged system-managed; mutation buttons hidden for it.
- /auth/settings — stub showing /v1/auth/me identity +
bootstrap-endpoint availability via /v1/auth/bootstrap.
* AuditPage extended with category filter ('All categories'
+ the 3 enum values from migration 000032). Selection flows
to the API call params + the URL-driven query state.
* Layout: 3 new nav entries (Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings).
* api/client.ts: 12 new exported functions for the RBAC
surface (authMe, list/get/create/update/delete role,
list/add/remove role permissions, list keys, assign/revoke
key role, bootstrap-availability probe).
* data-testid attributes on every interactive element so a
future Playwright suite can assert behavior without brittle
CSS selectors.
* Empty state, error state, and unsaved-changes warnings on
every form per the prompt's implementation rules.
# Frontend tests
* RolesPage.test.tsx (6 tests): list render, empty state,
error state, hide-create-button-without-perm,
show-create-button-with-perm, submit-create-modal.
* KeysPage.test.tsx (3 tests): demo-anon flagged
system-managed (no buttons), permission-gated affordance
hide for auditor caller, assign-modal-POST contract.
* AuthSettingsPage.test.tsx (2 tests): identity surface,
bootstrap-OPEN-status surface.
* AuditPage.test.tsx (+1): category-filter select renders
with the 4 documented options.
15 frontend tests total in src/pages/auth/ + the audit
category-filter test; all pass via npx vitest run.
# Verifications
* go vet ./... clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* gofmt -l clean repo-wide.
* go test -short -count=1 green across internal/service,
internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/auth,
internal/auth/bootstrap, internal/service/auth,
internal/domain/auth, cmd/server, cmd/cli, internal/cli.
* npx tsc --noEmit clean.
* npm run build green (vite build produces dist/index.html
+ 946KB JS bundle; chunk-size warning is pre-existing).
* npx vitest run src/pages/auth/ src/pages/AuditPage.test.tsx
green (15 tests, 4 files).
This commit is contained in:
@@ -60,19 +60,41 @@ func (r *ApprovalRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, req *domain.ApprovalReq
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metadataJSON = []byte("{}")
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}
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// Bundle 1 Phase 9: empty Kind defaults to cert_issuance to
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// preserve back-compat for every Phase-7-2026-05-03 caller.
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if req.Kind == "" {
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req.Kind = domain.ApprovalKindCertIssuance
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}
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if !domain.IsValidApprovalKind(req.Kind) {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid approval kind %q", req.Kind)
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}
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// nullable cert_id / job_id for profile_edit rows.
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var certID, jobID interface{}
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if req.CertificateID != "" {
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certID = req.CertificateID
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}
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if req.JobID != "" {
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jobID = req.JobID
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}
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var payload interface{}
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if len(req.Payload) > 0 {
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payload = req.Payload
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}
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const q = `
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INSERT INTO issuance_approval_requests
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(id, certificate_id, job_id, profile_id, requested_by,
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state, decided_by, decided_at, decision_note, metadata,
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created_at, updated_at)
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created_at, updated_at, approval_kind, payload)
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VALUES
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($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12)
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($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12, $13, $14)
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`
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_, err = r.db.ExecContext(ctx, q,
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req.ID, req.CertificateID, req.JobID, req.ProfileID, req.RequestedBy,
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req.ID, certID, jobID, req.ProfileID, req.RequestedBy,
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string(req.State), req.DecidedBy, req.DecidedAt, req.DecisionNote, metadataJSON,
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req.CreatedAt, req.UpdatedAt,
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req.CreatedAt, req.UpdatedAt, string(req.Kind), payload,
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)
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if err != nil {
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var pqErr *pq.Error
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@@ -89,7 +111,7 @@ func (r *ApprovalRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Approv
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const q = `
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SELECT id, certificate_id, job_id, profile_id, requested_by,
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state, decided_by, decided_at, decision_note, metadata,
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created_at, updated_at
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created_at, updated_at, approval_kind, payload
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FROM issuance_approval_requests
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WHERE id = $1
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`
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@@ -103,7 +125,7 @@ func (r *ApprovalRepository) GetByJobID(ctx context.Context, jobID string) (*dom
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const q = `
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SELECT id, certificate_id, job_id, profile_id, requested_by,
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state, decided_by, decided_at, decision_note, metadata,
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created_at, updated_at
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created_at, updated_at, approval_kind, payload
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FROM issuance_approval_requests
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WHERE job_id = $1
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ORDER BY created_at DESC
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@@ -131,7 +153,7 @@ func (r *ApprovalRepository) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.Approv
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q := `
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SELECT id, certificate_id, job_id, profile_id, requested_by,
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state, decided_by, decided_at, decision_note, metadata,
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created_at, updated_at
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created_at, updated_at, approval_kind, payload
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FROM issuance_approval_requests
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WHERE 1 = 1
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`
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@@ -269,16 +291,20 @@ type rowScanner interface {
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func scanApprovalRow(row rowScanner) (*domain.ApprovalRequest, error) {
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var (
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req domain.ApprovalRequest
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certID sql.NullString
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jobID sql.NullString
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stateStr string
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decidedBy sql.NullString
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decidedAt sql.NullTime
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decisionNote sql.NullString
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metadataJSON []byte
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kindStr string
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payload []byte
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)
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err := row.Scan(
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&req.ID, &req.CertificateID, &req.JobID, &req.ProfileID, &req.RequestedBy,
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&req.ID, &certID, &jobID, &req.ProfileID, &req.RequestedBy,
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&stateStr, &decidedBy, &decidedAt, &decisionNote, &metadataJSON,
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&req.CreatedAt, &req.UpdatedAt,
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&req.CreatedAt, &req.UpdatedAt, &kindStr, &payload,
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)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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@@ -288,6 +314,16 @@ func scanApprovalRow(row rowScanner) (*domain.ApprovalRequest, error) {
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}
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req.State = domain.ApprovalState(stateStr)
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req.Kind = domain.ApprovalKind(kindStr)
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if certID.Valid {
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req.CertificateID = certID.String
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}
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if jobID.Valid {
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req.JobID = jobID.String
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}
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if len(payload) > 0 {
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req.Payload = payload
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}
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if decidedBy.Valid {
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s := decidedBy.String
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req.DecidedBy = &s
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