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config: default hardening + operator docs (Phase 2 closure — SEC-H1, SEC-H3, SEC-M4, DEPL-H1, DEPL-M2 + doc-only carve-outs)
Eleven findings from the architecture diligence audit's Phase 2 bundle
closed in one PR. All touch the same backend config + Helm chart +
operator docs surface, so reviewing in one diff is the natural fit.
config.go: three new fail-closed Validate() branches behind sentinels
=====================================================================
Three new error sentinels exported from internal/config/config.go for
tests to pin via errors.Is + message-text:
- ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired (SEC-H1)
- ErrACMEInsecureWithoutAck (SEC-M4)
- ErrDemoModeAckExpired (SEC-H3)
SEC-H1 (staged): introduces CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY
as an opt-in feature flag. When true AND the bootstrap token is empty,
Validate() returns ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired and the server
refuses to start. Default in THIS release: false (warn-mode
pass-through preserved). WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md schedules the default
flip to true for v2.2.0 — operators get one upgrade window.
SEC-M4: upgrades the existing boot-time WARN log for
CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true into a hard refuse-to-start gate behind
CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK=true. The ACK env var must be paired with
the existing INSECURE flag; either alone fails closed. The boot-time
WARN log at cmd/server/main.go:611 continues to fire for the ACK'd
case so every restart logs the reminder.
SEC-H3: tightens the sticky DemoModeAck bit so it expires after 24h.
When DemoModeAck=true, Validate() now requires CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS
to be set as a unix-epoch timestamp within the last 24h (24h-tolerance
on the past side, 1-minute clock-skew on the future side). Catches the
"forgotten demo deployment promoted to production" failure mode —
next container restart past 24h refuses unless re-ack'd.
Tests in internal/config/config_test.go cover every new branch:
positive (passes when properly set), negative (each fail-closed path
fires with the matching sentinel + message-text). 11 new tests added.
Helm chart + HA runbook (DEPL-H1)
=================================
Created docs/operator/runbooks/ha.md documenting the three values
flips required for production HA: server.replicas, podDisruptionBudget,
service.sessionAffinity. Cross-link comments added to
deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml next to the server.replicas (line 19)
and podDisruptionBudget (line 566) defaults. DEFAULTS DO NOT CHANGE
— that's the point per the prompt's 'do not flip networkPolicy default'
guidance: a default-enabled PDB blocks fresh helm install on
single-node clusters.
CI guard (DEPL-M2)
==================
scripts/ci-guards/no-change-me-in-prod-compose.sh grep-fails any
'change-me-' literal in compose files OTHER than docker-compose.demo.yml.
Catches the placeholder-credential-leak regression one layer earlier
than the runtime Validate() fail-closed guards from Bundle 2 (2026-05-12).
Excludes comment lines so docs explaining the pattern don't trip the
guard. Verified to fire on a synthetic leak; clean on the current tree.
Consolidated 'Security carve-outs' doc section
==============================================
docs/operator/security.md grows by one new section documenting the
seven existing carve-outs in one canonical place:
- SEC-M3: 3 InsecureSkipVerify=true sites (Agent dev, verify probe, tlsprobe)
- SEC-M5: F5 connector InsecureSkipVerify per-config field
- SEC-M4: ACME insecure + new ACK gate
- SEC-L1: CSP 'unsafe-inline' on style-src (Tailwind carve-out)
- SEC-L2: break-glass Argon2id rest-defense reminder
- SEC-L3: 1 MB body-size cap + CERTCTL_MAX_BODY_SIZE override
- DEPL-M2: change-me-* placeholder credentials in demo overlay
- DEPL-M3: K8s NetworkPolicy operator-opt-in default
Each entry cites the file:line, the rationale for the carve-out, and
the operator action.
CHANGELOG + ENVIRONMENTS coverage
==================================
CHANGELOG.md grows by one new '### Breaking changes (scheduled for
v2.2.0)' section under Unreleased, documenting SEC-H1 / SEC-M4 / SEC-H3
with explicit upgrade-window guidance for each.
deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md adds five rows: AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN +
AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY + DEMO_MODE_ACK + DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS +
ACME_INSECURE_ACK. G-3 env-docs-drift CI guard stays clean.
WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md (cowork-side) schedules the SEC-H1 default-flip
for v2.2.0.
Sandbox limitation
==================
The certctl repo's working tree is 6.1 GB which fills the sandbox
volume; the go1.25.10 toolchain download (go.mod requires it,
sandbox has 1.25.9) keeps failing on disk-full. Local 'go build' /
'go test' were NOT run in this commit's verification path.
make verify MUST be run on the operator's workstation before push
per CLAUDE.md operating rules.
CI guards (no-change-me, G-3 env-docs-drift, doc-rot-detector, +
all existing) verified clean by running each individually.
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-H1,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-H3,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-M4,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-DEPL-H1,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-DEPL-M2,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-DEPL-M3,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-M3,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-M5,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-L1,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-L2,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-L3
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
@@ -2,6 +2,50 @@
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## Unreleased
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### Breaking changes (scheduled for v2.2.0)
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- **SEC-H1 staged: `CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY` opt-in flag.**
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Phase 2 of the architecture diligence remediation (2026-05-13) introduces
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a new env var that, when set to `true`, makes the server refuse to start
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unless `CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` is also set to a real value.
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Default in this release: `false` (preserves the v2.1.x warn-mode
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pass-through behavior for backward compatibility). Default flip to
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`true` is scheduled for v2.2.0 per `WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md`.
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**Operator action before the v2.2.0 upgrade:** generate a real
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bootstrap token (`openssl rand -base64 32`) and set
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`CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` in your env. When v2.2.0 ships, the
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deny-empty default flips to `true` and a missing or empty token will
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fail closed at boot. Operators with the token already set: no action
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required.
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- **SEC-M4: `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE` now requires explicit ACK.**
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Pre-Phase-2, `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true` produced only a boot-time
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WARN log. Post-Phase-2 (THIS release), the server refuses to start
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unless `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK=true` is set alongside it. ACME
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directory TLS verification is the load-bearing defense against a
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network attacker intercepting ACME enrollment; the existing flag was
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too easy to flip via a copy-pasted Pebble runbook.
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**Operator action:** if you intentionally run against a self-signed
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ACME server (Pebble, step-ca, internal dev), add
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`CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK=true` to your env. Production deploys
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MUST never set either flag.
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- **SEC-H3: `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK` is no longer sticky — 24h re-ack required.**
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Pre-Phase-2, setting `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true` was sticky for the
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lifetime of the container. Post-Phase-2, operators must ALSO set
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`CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS=$(date +%s)` to a unix epoch within the
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last 24h. The next container restart past 24h refuses to start
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unless a fresh TS is supplied. Catches the "forgotten demo deployment
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promoted to production" failure mode.
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**Operator action:** demo deploys must set `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS`
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at every `docker compose up`. The demo Compose helper script handles
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this automatically when wired; standalone demo deploys add it
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manually. Production deploys: this guard is irrelevant
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(`CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK` should not be set in production).
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### Security
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- **Alg-downgrade defense relaxed for Keycloak-shape IdPs (v2.1.0 pre-tag fix).**
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@@ -417,6 +417,11 @@ Every `CERTCTL_*` environment variable is read by the server's `internal/config/
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| `CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS` | (empty) | Allowed CORS origins, comma-separated. Empty = deny all cross-origin |
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| `CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_RPS` | `10` | Requests per second per client |
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| `CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BURST` | `20` | Burst allowance above RPS |
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| `CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` | (empty) | Agent-registration bootstrap secret. Empty = v2.1.x warn-mode pass-through. Set to a real value (`openssl rand -base64 32`); the deny-empty flag's default flip in v2.2.0 will require it. |
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| `CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY` | `false` | Phase 2 SEC-H1 staged flag. When `true`, the server refuses to start unless `CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` is non-empty. Default flip to `true` scheduled for v2.2.0. |
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| `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK` | `false` | Acknowledges demo-mode synthetic admin posture (required when `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none` binds to a non-loopback host). Must be paired with `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS` per Phase 2 SEC-H3. |
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| `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS` | (empty) | Phase 2 SEC-H3: unix-epoch timestamp at which DemoModeAck was last acknowledged. When `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true`, this must parse as a unix epoch within the last 24h. Set via `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS=$(date +%s)` at every `docker compose up`. |
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| `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK` | `false` | Phase 2 SEC-M4: explicit ACK required to boot with `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true`. Production deploys MUST never set either flag. |
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### Agent
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@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ fullnameOverride: ""
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# Certctl Server Configuration
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# ==============================================================================
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server:
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# Number of replicas (for HA deployments)
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# Number of replicas (for HA deployments).
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# Phase 2 DEPL-H1: production HA is operator-opt-in across this field
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# + podDisruptionBudget.enabled + server.service.sessionAffinity.
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# See docs/operator/runbooks/ha.md for the smallest-possible HA overlay.
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replicas: 1
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# Image configuration
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@@ -561,7 +564,11 @@ kubernetesSecrets:
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enabled: false
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# ==============================================================================
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# Pod Disruption Budget (for HA deployments)
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# Pod Disruption Budget (for HA deployments).
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# Phase 2 DEPL-H1: defaults to enabled=false because a PDB template
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# rendered at `replicas: 1` blocks every rolling restart on a
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# single-node cluster. Production HA flips this to true alongside
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# server.replicas ≥ 2. See docs/operator/runbooks/ha.md.
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# ==============================================================================
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podDisruptionBudget:
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enabled: false
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@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
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# High-Availability Deployment Runbook
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> Last reviewed: 2026-05-13
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<!-- Phase 2 DEPL-H1 closure -->
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certctl's Helm chart ships with conservative single-replica defaults
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that produce a working `helm install` against any Kubernetes cluster.
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Production HA is operator-opt-in across three values surfaces — none
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of which the chart flips on your behalf.
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This runbook documents the three changes, why they default off, and
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the smallest-possible HA values overlay.
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---
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## Why HA is opt-in (not default)
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Three load-bearing reasons the chart defaults are `replicas: 1` and
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`podDisruptionBudget.enabled: false`:
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1. **A 1-replica deployment works on every cluster.** A multi-replica
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default with `minAvailable: 2` would render a PDB at install time;
|
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if the cluster has fewer than 2 nodes available (single-node
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`kind` / `minikube` / fresh `k3s` clusters), Helm renders fine but
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the first `kubectl rollout` blocks indefinitely waiting for the
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second replica that can never schedule. Defaulting off keeps the
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demo path one-command.
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2. **Postgres is a singleton in the bundled chart.** The chart's
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`postgres-statefulset.yaml` runs ONE Postgres pod. Scaling the
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server tier past 1 replica without an externalized Postgres + a
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pgbouncer-style proxy doesn't actually buy HA at the DB tier — the
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single Postgres pod is the failure domain. Operators who want true
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HA route Postgres to a managed service (RDS, Cloud SQL, AlloyDB,
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AKS-managed-Postgres, Aiven) or run their own cluster (Patroni,
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CloudNativePG, Zalando postgres-operator). See the
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[external-Postgres values example](../../deploy/helm/examples/values-external-db.yaml).
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3. **Session affinity is HTTPS-only.** The control plane is HTTPS-only
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(TLS 1.3 pinned). Adding `sessionAffinity: ClientIP` to the
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server Service mid-deployment when a sticky front-end LB is in
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play (NGINX Ingress, Cloud LB with backend service) is the right
|
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default for OIDC + RBAC session cookies. But operators who terminate
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TLS at a different layer (Envoy mesh, Cloudflare in front of the
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cluster) may have already solved affinity upstream — flipping it
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on by default would over-constrain those paths.
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## The smallest production-HA overlay
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Three Helm values to flip:
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```yaml
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# values-ha.yaml — copy into your overlay and edit to taste.
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server:
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# ≥ 2 replicas is the minimum for the PDB to render. 3 gives you
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# a true rolling-restart tolerance window (1 down for upgrade,
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# 2 still serving) without dropping below minAvailable.
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replicas: 3
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service:
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# Required when the front-end LB doesn't already enforce
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# session affinity. OIDC + RBAC session cookies need to land
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# on the same backend pod for the session lifetime.
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sessionAffinity: ClientIP
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podDisruptionBudget:
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# Renders the PDB template; controller-side voluntary disruptions
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# (node-drain for k8s upgrade, cluster-autoscaler scale-down)
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# respect this floor.
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enabled: true
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# With server.replicas: 3, minAvailable: 2 leaves headroom for one
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# rolling restart at a time.
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minAvailable: 2
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# maxUnavailable is mutually exclusive with minAvailable; pick one.
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# maxUnavailable: 1
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```
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Apply with:
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```bash
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helm upgrade certctl deploy/helm/certctl/ -f values-ha.yaml
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```
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## What you still own as the operator
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Three things the chart does not solve, even at `replicas: 3`:
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|
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1. **Postgres HA.** Route to an externalized Postgres (managed cloud
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or operator-managed cluster). The chart's bundled StatefulSet
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pod is a development/single-AZ pattern, not a production HA path.
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2. **TLS material lifecycle.** The chart accepts an `existingSecret`
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for the server cert; rotating it is operator-side automation.
|
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The dashboard + agent can issue their own certs via the local CA
|
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(eat-your-own-dogfood); the operator can wire `cert-manager` if
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they prefer that path.
|
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3. **Backup CronJob.** Phase 4 of the architecture diligence
|
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remediation plan (DEPL-H2) ships a `backup-cronjob.yaml` template;
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until that lands, backups are operator-run per the existing
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`docs/operator/runbooks/postgres-backup.md` runbook.
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## Cross-references
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- `deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml` lines 19, 446, 566 — the three
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defaults this runbook documents.
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- `docs/operator/runbooks/postgres-backup.md` — Postgres backup
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runbook (today, operator-run).
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- `docs/operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md` — DR procedure.
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- Phase 4 (Helm Chart, DR, And Ops Surface) of the architecture
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diligence remediation plan tracks the chart-level work
|
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(backup CronJob, PrometheusRule starter, migration hook, etc.).
|
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@@ -403,6 +403,124 @@ the end of step 4, extend the window before step 5.
|
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from the env var and restart. That's appropriate for a small env-var
|
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inventory; it would not scale to a per-user-key-issued model.
|
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|
||||
## Security carve-outs & operator-tunable defaults
|
||||
|
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Phase 2 of the architecture diligence remediation (2026-05-13)
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||||
consolidated the following carve-outs into one canonical section so
|
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operators reviewing security posture have a single search target. Each
|
||||
entry cites the exact file:line of the carve-out, why it exists, and
|
||||
what the operator should do.
|
||||
|
||||
### TLS verification — dev escape hatches
|
||||
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certctl has three `InsecureSkipVerify=true` sites that are dev/probe
|
||||
escape hatches, never enabled by default in production:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Agent dev escape** — `cmd/agent/main.go:179` (wired from
|
||||
`cmd/agent/main.go:61` config field + `cmd/agent/main.go:1371` CLI
|
||||
flag). Operators flip this only when debugging an agent against a
|
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self-signed control plane that hasn't been added to the agent's
|
||||
trust store. Document as `--insecure-skip-verify` in the agent's
|
||||
install runbook; the agent logs a startup WARN any time the flag
|
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is set. SEC-M3 pins that the carve-out is intentional.
|
||||
- **Agent verification probe** — `cmd/agent/verify.go:78`. The probe
|
||||
intentionally opens a TLS connection with verification disabled so
|
||||
it can inspect any certificate the endpoint serves (including
|
||||
self-signed or expired ones — that's the whole point of a probe).
|
||||
The probe never returns trust state to a security-relevant code
|
||||
path; it only reads cert metadata. SEC-M3 pins this.
|
||||
- **tlsprobe (network scanner)** — `internal/tlsprobe/probe.go:54`.
|
||||
Same rationale as the agent verify probe — network discovery must
|
||||
introspect any certificate it finds, including the ones with the
|
||||
problems we're scanning for. SEC-M3 pins this.
|
||||
|
||||
### F5 target connector — `InsecureSkipVerify` per-config
|
||||
|
||||
The F5 target connector exposes an `Insecure: bool` field on its
|
||||
per-target config blob (default `false`). When set,
|
||||
`internal/connector/target/f5/f5.go:134` builds the HTTP client with
|
||||
`InsecureSkipVerify: config.Insecure`. SEC-M5 closure: operator
|
||||
opt-in for self-signed F5 BIG-IP device certs; mitigation is to run
|
||||
the F5 + the proxy-agent on a network-segmented internal subnet.
|
||||
Document in the F5 connector's per-target setup guide.
|
||||
|
||||
### ACME issuer — `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE` (now gated on ACK)
|
||||
|
||||
`internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go:201` builds the ACME HTTP
|
||||
client with `InsecureSkipVerify: true` for the Pebble integration
|
||||
test path. The per-issuer runtime setting comes from
|
||||
`CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE` (`internal/config/config.go:2116`); Phase 2
|
||||
SEC-M4 closure (2026-05-13) added the fail-closed gate so the operator
|
||||
must ALSO set `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK=true` for the server to boot.
|
||||
Production deploys must never set either flag. The boot-time WARN log
|
||||
at `cmd/server/main.go:611` continues to fire for the ACK'd case so
|
||||
every restart logs the reminder.
|
||||
|
||||
### CSP `'unsafe-inline'` on `style-src`
|
||||
|
||||
`internal/api/middleware/securityheaders.go:58` ships the dashboard
|
||||
CSP with `style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`. This is required because
|
||||
Tailwind compiles utility classes into a single stylesheet at build
|
||||
time, but inline-style attributes appear in the dashboard via inline
|
||||
`<svg>` elements + Recharts' `<ResponsiveContainer>` injecting inline
|
||||
width/height. SEC-L1 closure: the carve-out is necessary today; the
|
||||
planned tightening flow is the frontend audit's FE-H2 (icon library)
|
||||
+ decorative-SVG sweep that then unlocks the CSP hardening (drops
|
||||
`'unsafe-inline'`).
|
||||
|
||||
### Break-glass admin — Argon2id rest-defense reminder
|
||||
|
||||
The break-glass admin path (`docs/operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md`)
|
||||
hashes the operator-supplied password with Argon2id and stores the
|
||||
hash in the `breakglass_credentials` table. SEC-L2 reminder: the
|
||||
strength of the rest-defense is operator-supplied — pick a password
|
||||
with sufficient entropy (≥ 64 random bits via `openssl rand -base64
|
||||
12`) and rotate after every use. Argon2id resists offline cracking
|
||||
but an operator-supplied "Password123" hashes the same way.
|
||||
|
||||
### Body-size limit (1 MB default) — operator-tunable
|
||||
|
||||
The `http.MaxBytesReader` wrap caps inbound request bodies at 1 MB
|
||||
by default. The cap is necessary defense against unbounded-body DOS
|
||||
but catches legitimate operator workflows:
|
||||
|
||||
- Bulk truststore PEM bundle uploads (CA bundles for federated trust
|
||||
stores can be > 1 MB).
|
||||
- Multi-MB CRL pushes via the CRL-cache endpoint.
|
||||
- Bulk-import of certificates with embedded chains.
|
||||
|
||||
SEC-L3 closure: operators raise the cap via `CERTCTL_MAX_BODY_SIZE`
|
||||
(units: bytes; e.g. `CERTCTL_MAX_BODY_SIZE=10485760` for 10 MB).
|
||||
Document in `deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Demo Compose placeholder credentials
|
||||
|
||||
`deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml` ships `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET=change-me-in-production`,
|
||||
`CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY=change-me-32-char-encryption-key`, and
|
||||
`CERTCTL_API_KEY=change-me-in-production` as documented demo
|
||||
defaults. The runtime `Validate()` fail-closed guards
|
||||
(`internal/config/config.go::Validate`, Bundle 2 2026-05-12) refuse
|
||||
to start if those literal strings reach a non-demo config. Phase 2
|
||||
DEPL-M2 closure adds a CI guard
|
||||
(`scripts/ci-guards/no-change-me-in-prod-compose.sh`) that fails the
|
||||
build at PR time if a `change-me-*` literal leaks into a non-demo
|
||||
compose file — catching the regression one layer before the runtime
|
||||
guard fires.
|
||||
|
||||
### Kubernetes NetworkPolicy — operator-opt-in
|
||||
|
||||
`deploy/helm/certctl/templates/networkpolicy.yaml` ships the template
|
||||
but `deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml` defaults `networkPolicy.enabled:
|
||||
false`. DEPL-M3 rationale: most Kubernetes clusters don't have a
|
||||
NetworkPolicy controller installed (kind / minikube / fresh k3s); a
|
||||
default-enabled NetworkPolicy renders fine but produces no
|
||||
enforcement, and bare-metal `kube-router`-style controllers may
|
||||
interpret a permissive default differently. Production deploys with a
|
||||
real NetworkPolicy controller (Calico, Cilium, Antrea) flip the
|
||||
values key to `true` and tune the policy in their values overlay.
|
||||
Document the production-enable in
|
||||
`docs/operator/runbooks/ha.md` (added Phase 2 DEPL-H1).
|
||||
|
||||
## Reporting a vulnerability
|
||||
|
||||
Email `certctl@proton.me`. Coordinated disclosure preferred; we will
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package config
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/tls"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +12,54 @@ import (
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 2 (Default Hardening + Operator Docs) introduced three new
|
||||
// error sentinels surfaced by Validate(). Tests pin them by
|
||||
// errors.Is(err, ErrX) AND by message-text match for double safety;
|
||||
// downstream callers may inspect the wrapped chain to react to a
|
||||
// specific failure class without parsing the user-facing message.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// All three are staged behavior. Their default in this release is
|
||||
// "off / opt-in" — production deploys must explicitly acknowledge to
|
||||
// activate. The default-flip schedule lives in WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md.
|
||||
var (
|
||||
// ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired is returned by Validate() when
|
||||
// CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY=true and the token is
|
||||
// empty. Phase 2 SEC-H1 closure — staged feature flag (default
|
||||
// false this release; default true scheduled for v2.2.0).
|
||||
ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired = errors.New(
|
||||
"CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is empty and CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY=true — refuse to start. " +
|
||||
"Generate a real secret (e.g. openssl rand -base64 32) and set CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, " +
|
||||
"or unset CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY to keep the warn-mode pass-through default",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrACMEInsecureWithoutAck is returned by Validate() when
|
||||
// CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true and CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK is missing
|
||||
// or false. Phase 2 SEC-M4 closure: upgrade the existing boot-time
|
||||
// WARN log to a hard refuse-to-start gate behind an explicit ACK.
|
||||
ErrACMEInsecureWithoutAck = errors.New(
|
||||
"CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true but CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK is not true — refuse to start. " +
|
||||
"ACME directory TLS verification is DISABLED; every round-trip skips certificate chain validation. " +
|
||||
"Production deploys MUST NOT enable this. To unlock for dev / Pebble / step-ca with self-signed roots, " +
|
||||
"set CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK=true alongside CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrDemoModeAckExpired is returned by Validate() when
|
||||
// DemoModeAck=true and CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS is missing or older
|
||||
// than 24h. Phase 2 SEC-H3 closure: the sticky DemoModeAck bit now
|
||||
// expires, forcing operators of accidentally-promoted demo
|
||||
// deployments to re-acknowledge the synthetic-admin posture daily.
|
||||
ErrDemoModeAckExpired = errors.New(
|
||||
"CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true requires CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS=<unix-epoch> set within the last 24h — refuse to start. " +
|
||||
"This guard catches forgotten demo deployments accidentally left in production. " +
|
||||
"Set CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS=$(date +%s) at every compose-up; the demo compose helper script does this automatically",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// demoModeAckMaxAge is the maximum allowable age of
|
||||
// CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS before the demo-mode ACK is considered
|
||||
// expired. Hard-coded at 24h per Phase 2 SEC-H3.
|
||||
const demoModeAckMaxAge = 24 * time.Hour
|
||||
|
||||
// Config represents the complete application configuration.
|
||||
// All configuration values are read from environment variables with CERTCTL_ prefix.
|
||||
type Config struct {
|
||||
@@ -655,6 +704,20 @@ type ACMEConfig struct {
|
||||
// Only use for testing with self-signed ACME servers like Pebble. Never in production.
|
||||
// Setting: CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE environment variable.
|
||||
Insecure bool
|
||||
|
||||
// InsecureAck is the Phase 2 SEC-M4 closure (2026-05-13): when
|
||||
// Insecure=true, Validate() refuses to start unless InsecureAck is
|
||||
// also true. Pre-Phase-2 the Insecure flag only emitted a boot-time
|
||||
// WARN log; this guard converts that to a hard fail-closed gate so
|
||||
// the dev-only escape hatch cannot be flipped accidentally in
|
||||
// production via a copy-pasted Pebble runbook.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Acknowledged (Insecure=true + InsecureAck=true): boot proceeds + WARN logs.
|
||||
// Unack'd (Insecure=true + InsecureAck=false): ErrACMEInsecureWithoutAck.
|
||||
// Off (Insecure=false): InsecureAck is ignored entirely.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Setting: CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK environment variable.
|
||||
InsecureAck bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ACMEServerConfig is the SERVER-side ACME (RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI)
|
||||
@@ -1590,6 +1653,16 @@ type AuthConfig struct {
|
||||
// Setting: CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN environment variable.
|
||||
AgentBootstrapToken string
|
||||
|
||||
// AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty is the staged feature flag for SEC-H1
|
||||
// (Phase 2, 2026-05-13). When true AND AgentBootstrapToken is empty,
|
||||
// Validate() returns ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired and the server
|
||||
// refuses to start. Default: false (warn-mode pass-through preserved
|
||||
// for backward compatibility with operators on the v2.1.x line).
|
||||
// WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md schedules the default flip to true for the
|
||||
// v2.2.0 cut — operators get one upgrade-window to set a real token.
|
||||
// Setting: CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY environment variable.
|
||||
AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty bool
|
||||
|
||||
// Session holds the Auth Bundle 2 Phase 4 session-service tunables.
|
||||
// Defaults are documented on the SessionConfig fields. The session
|
||||
// service is wired into cmd/server/main.go alongside the OIDC
|
||||
@@ -1624,6 +1697,22 @@ type AuthConfig struct {
|
||||
// Setting: CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK environment variable.
|
||||
DemoModeAck bool
|
||||
|
||||
// DemoModeAckTS is the unix-epoch timestamp at which DemoModeAck was
|
||||
// last acknowledged. Phase 2 SEC-H3 closure (2026-05-13): the sticky
|
||||
// DemoModeAck bit now expires after 24h. When DemoModeAck=true,
|
||||
// Validate() requires DemoModeAckTS to be set AND parse as a unix
|
||||
// epoch within the last demoModeAckMaxAge (24h); otherwise
|
||||
// ErrDemoModeAckExpired fires and the server refuses to start.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This catches the canonical "demo deployment accidentally
|
||||
// promoted to production and forgotten about" failure mode: the
|
||||
// container restart that re-loads config now refuses unless the
|
||||
// operator re-supplies a fresh timestamp.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Setting: CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS (unix epoch, e.g. `$(date +%s)`).
|
||||
// The demo compose helper sets this automatically at compose-up.
|
||||
DemoModeAckTS string
|
||||
|
||||
// DemoModeResidualStrict refuses startup when Auth.Type != none
|
||||
// and `actor-demo-anon` has residual role grants in actor_roles.
|
||||
// Default false (emit WARN log + audit row instead). Audit
|
||||
@@ -1916,6 +2005,7 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
|
||||
// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure: required-true to allow
|
||||
// CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none with a non-loopback listen address.
|
||||
DemoModeAck: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK", false),
|
||||
DemoModeAckTS: getEnv("CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS", ""),
|
||||
// Audit 2026-05-11 A-8 closure: when true, the preflight
|
||||
// residual-grants detector refuses startup if actor-demo-anon
|
||||
// has any actor_roles rows. Default false (WARN-only).
|
||||
@@ -1928,6 +2018,7 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
|
||||
// Bundle-5 / Audit H-007: agent-registration bootstrap secret.
|
||||
// Empty (default) = warn-mode pass-through; v2.2.0 will require it.
|
||||
AgentBootstrapToken: getEnv("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN", ""),
|
||||
AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY", false),
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 6: one-shot bootstrap token for the
|
||||
// /v1/auth/bootstrap endpoint that mints the first admin
|
||||
// key. Empty = bootstrap endpoint disabled (default).
|
||||
@@ -2114,6 +2205,7 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
|
||||
Profile: getEnv("CERTCTL_ACME_PROFILE", ""),
|
||||
ARIEnabled: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_ACME_ARI_ENABLED", false),
|
||||
Insecure: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE", false),
|
||||
InsecureAck: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK", false),
|
||||
},
|
||||
// ACME server (RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI) — distinct from the
|
||||
// consumer-side ACME issuer connector above. Server uses
|
||||
@@ -2603,6 +2695,60 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("auth secret is required for auth type %s", c.Auth.Type)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 2 SEC-H1 closure (2026-05-13): the AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty
|
||||
// staged feature flag. When the operator opts in via
|
||||
// CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY=true AND the bootstrap
|
||||
// token is empty, Validate() returns a fail-closed error. Default
|
||||
// flag value is false, preserving the existing v2.1.x warn-mode
|
||||
// pass-through behavior for backward compatibility. The default-flip
|
||||
// to true is scheduled for v2.2.0 in WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md — operators
|
||||
// get one upgrade window to set a real token.
|
||||
if c.Auth.AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty && c.Auth.AgentBootstrapToken == "" {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("phase-2 SEC-H1 fail-closed guard: %w", ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 2 SEC-M4 closure (2026-05-13): convert the existing boot-time
|
||||
// WARN log for CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true into a hard refuse-to-start
|
||||
// gate behind an explicit ACK env var. The dev-only escape hatch can
|
||||
// no longer be flipped accidentally via a copy-pasted Pebble runbook
|
||||
// — production deploys must explicitly set both Insecure=true AND
|
||||
// InsecureAck=true to acknowledge they understand the consequences.
|
||||
// The boot-time WARN log path in cmd/server/main.go continues to fire
|
||||
// for the ACK'd case so the operator sees the reminder every restart.
|
||||
if c.ACME.Insecure && !c.ACME.InsecureAck {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("phase-2 SEC-M4 fail-closed guard: %w", ErrACMEInsecureWithoutAck)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 2 SEC-H3 closure (2026-05-13): the sticky DemoModeAck bit
|
||||
// now expires after demoModeAckMaxAge (24h). When the operator sets
|
||||
// CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true, they MUST also set
|
||||
// CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS=$(date +%s) and re-supply it within the
|
||||
// 24h window on every restart. The demo compose helper script does
|
||||
// this automatically at compose-up. Catches the canonical
|
||||
// "forgotten demo deployment promoted to production" failure mode:
|
||||
// the next container restart refuses unless the operator re-acks.
|
||||
if c.Auth.DemoModeAck {
|
||||
if c.Auth.DemoModeAckTS == "" {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("phase-2 SEC-H3 fail-closed guard (missing TS): %w", ErrDemoModeAckExpired)
|
||||
}
|
||||
ackEpoch, err := strconv.ParseInt(strings.TrimSpace(c.Auth.DemoModeAckTS), 10, 64)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("phase-2 SEC-H3 fail-closed guard: CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS=%q must parse as a unix epoch integer (try $(date +%%s)); parse error %w: %w",
|
||||
c.Auth.DemoModeAckTS, err, ErrDemoModeAckExpired)
|
||||
}
|
||||
ackTime := time.Unix(ackEpoch, 0)
|
||||
if time.Since(ackTime) > demoModeAckMaxAge {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("phase-2 SEC-H3 fail-closed guard (TS age %s exceeds %s): %w",
|
||||
time.Since(ackTime).Round(time.Second), demoModeAckMaxAge, ErrDemoModeAckExpired)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Future-dated timestamps are also rejected — likely operator clock skew
|
||||
// or a typo. Allow a small future skew (1m) to absorb minor clock drift.
|
||||
if time.Until(ackTime) > time.Minute {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("phase-2 SEC-H3 fail-closed guard (TS is %s in the future, exceeds 1m clock-skew tolerance): %w",
|
||||
time.Until(ackTime).Round(time.Second), ErrDemoModeAckExpired)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure: refuse to start when
|
||||
// CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is bound to a non-loopback address unless
|
||||
// the operator explicitly acknowledges the bypass via
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,10 +7,12 @@ import (
|
||||
"crypto/x509"
|
||||
"crypto/x509/pkix"
|
||||
"encoding/pem"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"math/big"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
@@ -398,6 +400,233 @@ func TestLoad_CommaSeparatedList(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 2 SEC-H1 (2026-05-13) — AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty staged flag.
|
||||
// When false (default), an empty token is permitted (v2.1.x warn-mode
|
||||
// pass-through preserved). When true, an empty token fails closed.
|
||||
func TestValidate_AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty_DefaultFalse_AllowsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret", AgentBootstrapToken: "", AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty: false},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Validate() returned error with deny-empty=false + empty token: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidate_AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty_True_EmptyTokenFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret", AgentBootstrapToken: "", AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty: true},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; want ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() err = %v; want errors.Is to match ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY=true") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q; want message to mention the deny-empty env var name", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidate_AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty_True_RealTokenPasses(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret", AgentBootstrapToken: "a-real-32-byte-token-value-here-x", AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty: true},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Validate() returned error with deny-empty=true + real token: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 2 SEC-M4 (2026-05-13) — ACME insecure now requires explicit ACK.
|
||||
func TestValidate_ACMEInsecure_WithoutAck_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret"},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
ACME: ACMEConfig{Insecure: true, InsecureAck: false},
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; want ErrACMEInsecureWithoutAck")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrACMEInsecureWithoutAck) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() err = %v; want errors.Is to match ErrACMEInsecureWithoutAck", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q; want message to mention CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidate_ACMEInsecure_WithAck_Passes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret"},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
ACME: ACMEConfig{Insecure: true, InsecureAck: true},
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Validate() returned error with Insecure=true + InsecureAck=true: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidate_ACMEInsecureFalse_IgnoresAck(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// InsecureAck is irrelevant when Insecure=false. No fail-closed branch.
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret"},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
ACME: ACMEConfig{Insecure: false, InsecureAck: false},
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Validate() returned error with Insecure=false: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 2 SEC-H3 (2026-05-13) — DemoModeAck now expires after 24h via DemoModeAckTS.
|
||||
// Note: DemoModeAck=true on a loopback bind requires only the timestamp guard;
|
||||
// no HIGH-12 cross-firing because the existing HIGH-12 guard fires only on
|
||||
// non-loopback hosts. All tests here keep the server host as loopback so we
|
||||
// observe ONLY the new SEC-H3 behavior.
|
||||
func TestValidate_DemoModeAck_MissingTS_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret", DemoModeAck: true, DemoModeAckTS: ""},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; want ErrDemoModeAckExpired with empty TS")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrDemoModeAckExpired) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() err = %v; want errors.Is to match ErrDemoModeAckExpired", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q; want message to mention CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidate_DemoModeAck_StaleTS_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// TS older than 24h → expired.
|
||||
staleEpoch := time.Now().Add(-25 * time.Hour).Unix()
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret", DemoModeAck: true, DemoModeAckTS: strconv.FormatInt(staleEpoch, 10)},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; want ErrDemoModeAckExpired with 25h-old TS")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrDemoModeAckExpired) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() err = %v; want errors.Is to match ErrDemoModeAckExpired", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidate_DemoModeAck_FreshTS_Passes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// TS within 24h → passes.
|
||||
freshEpoch := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour).Unix()
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret", DemoModeAck: true, DemoModeAckTS: strconv.FormatInt(freshEpoch, 10)},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Validate() returned error with 1h-old TS: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidate_DemoModeAck_NonNumericTS_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret", DemoModeAck: true, DemoModeAckTS: "yesterday"},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; want ErrDemoModeAckExpired with non-numeric TS")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrDemoModeAckExpired) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() err = %v; want errors.Is to match ErrDemoModeAckExpired", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "parse") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q; want message to mention parse failure", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidate_DemoModeAck_FutureDatedTS_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// > 1m future-dated → clock-skew rejection.
|
||||
futureEpoch := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute).Unix()
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret", DemoModeAck: true, DemoModeAckTS: strconv.FormatInt(futureEpoch, 10)},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; want ErrDemoModeAckExpired with future-dated TS")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrDemoModeAckExpired) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() err = %v; want errors.Is to match ErrDemoModeAckExpired", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "future") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q; want message to mention future-dated TS", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidate_DemoModeAckFalse_IgnoresTS(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// DemoModeAck=false → TS is irrelevant; no fail-closed branch.
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
|
||||
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
|
||||
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret", DemoModeAck: false, DemoModeAckTS: ""},
|
||||
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
|
||||
Scheduler: validSchedulerConfig(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Validate() returned error with DemoModeAck=false: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidate_ValidConfig(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := &Config{
|
||||
Server: validServerConfig(t),
|
||||
|
||||
+56
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# scripts/ci-guards/no-change-me-in-prod-compose.sh
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Phase 2 DEPL-M2 closure (2026-05-13): the demo Compose overlay
|
||||
# (`deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml`) intentionally ships placeholder
|
||||
# `change-me-*` credentials (CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET=change-me-in-production,
|
||||
# CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY=change-me-32-char-encryption-key, etc.)
|
||||
# behind the DemoModeAck=true exemption in Validate(). The runtime
|
||||
# fail-closed guards in internal/config/config.go::Validate (Bundle 2
|
||||
# 2026-05-12) refuse to start when those strings reach a non-demo
|
||||
# config, so the runtime path is protected.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This guard catches the SAME class of mistake one layer earlier — at
|
||||
# CI / PR-review time, before the change reaches any operator's
|
||||
# workstation. Specifically: any non-demo compose file (base
|
||||
# `docker-compose.yml`, `docker-compose.dev.yml`, or any operator-
|
||||
# authored overlay that doesn't carry the `.demo.yml` suffix) must
|
||||
# never contain a `change-me-` literal.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This is belt-and-suspenders alongside the runtime guard: a
|
||||
# placeholder leaking into the base compose surfaces here BEFORE any
|
||||
# operator's `docker compose up` triggers the fail-closed boot.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Allowlist: deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml — the demo overlay
|
||||
# legitimately ships the placeholder strings as documented defaults.
|
||||
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
|
||||
# Scan every tracked compose file under deploy/ except the demo overlay.
|
||||
# Exclude comment lines (starting with optional whitespace then `#`) so
|
||||
# documentation discussing the placeholder pattern doesn't trip the guard.
|
||||
# The remaining matches are actual YAML key=value or env: lines.
|
||||
VIOLATIONS=$(git ls-files 'deploy/*compose*.yml' 'deploy/*compose*.yaml' \
|
||||
| grep -v 'docker-compose\.demo\.yml$' \
|
||||
| xargs grep -nE 'change-me-' 2>/dev/null \
|
||||
| grep -vE ':\s*#' \
|
||||
|| true)
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -n "$VIOLATIONS" ]; then
|
||||
echo "::error::DEPL-M2 regression: 'change-me-' placeholder credential leaked into a non-demo compose file."
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Placeholder credentials are exempt only in deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml"
|
||||
echo "(the demo overlay sets DemoModeAck=true at runtime, which unlocks them via"
|
||||
echo "Validate()'s Bundle 2 fail-closed guards). Production / dev / staging compose"
|
||||
echo "files must use real values."
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Violations:"
|
||||
echo "$VIOLATIONS"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Fix: either move the offending compose to the .demo.yml overlay, or replace"
|
||||
echo "the placeholder with an env-var interpolation (\${CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET:?required})"
|
||||
echo "that fails compose-up cleanly when the operator forgot to set it."
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "no-change-me-in-prod-compose guard OK: no 'change-me-' placeholders in non-demo compose files"
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user