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fix(auth): apply rbacGate to every state-changing + read handler (CRIT-1 closure)
Closes the wire-layer authorization gap surfaced by the 2026-05-10 audit
(CRIT-1). Before this commit only ~24 of ~140 routes carried rbacGate
enforcement — all of them admin-only fine-grained perms (auth.session.*,
auth.oidc.*, auth.breakglass.admin, cert.bulk_revoke, crl.admin, scep.admin,
est.admin, ca.hierarchy.manage). Every catalogued legacy-CRUD perm
(cert.read/issue/revoke/delete, profile.edit/delete, issuer.edit/delete,
target.*, agent.*, plus role-mgmt verbs) was declared in
internal/domain/auth/validate.go but never wired at the router. A r-viewer
Bearer was essentially r-admin minus five verbs at the wire layer (CWE-862).
This commit:
- Adds rbacGateScoped(checker, perm, scopeType, scopeFn, h) helper to
internal/api/router/router.go for path-bound scope resolution. Per-profile
and per-issuer grants (Decision 2) now reach the wire layer.
- Wraps every state-changing route AND every read endpoint in router.go
with rbacGate (global) or rbacGateScoped (path-bound). The auth-management
routes (POST /api/v1/auth/roles, etc.) gain router-level enforcement
in addition to the existing service-layer Authorizer check — defense in
depth (HIGH-9 of the same audit collapses into this closure).
- Auth-exempt surfaces stay un-gated by design: login, callback, BCL,
logout, breakglass-login, bootstrap, health, auth-info, version. Allowlist
is documented in TestRouterRBACGateCoverage.
- Extends internal/domain/auth/validate.go CanonicalPermissions with 30 new
perms across 12 namespaces: cert.edit; job.read, job.cancel; approval.read,
approval.approve, approval.reject; policy.read/edit/delete;
team.read/edit/delete; owner.read/edit/delete; notification.read/edit;
discovery.read/run/claim; network_scan.read/edit/run;
healthcheck.read/edit/delete/acknowledge; digest.read, digest.send;
verification.read, verification.run; stats.read; metrics.read.
- Updates DefaultRoles for r-admin / r-operator / r-viewer / r-mcp / r-cli /
r-agent. r-auditor gets NOTHING new — the auditor pin
(TestAuditorRoleHoldsExactlyAuditReadAndExport) stays invariant.
- Migration 000039_audit_crit1_perms seeds the new perm rows + role grants
per the updated DefaultRoles map. Idempotent ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING.
Reverse migration removes role_permissions before permissions
(ON DELETE RESTRICT on the FK).
- AST-level CI guard TestRouterRBACGateCoverage in
internal/api/router/router_rbac_coverage_test.go walks router.go and
asserts every state-changing + read route is wrapped (or in the
documented allowlist). Adding a new ungated route fails CI.
- Updates docs/operator/rbac.md permission-catalogue table with the new
namespaces + footer link to the AST CI guard.
- Updates certctl/CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 section with the closure narrative.
Audit doc cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md CRIT-1 row annotated
CLOSED 2026-05-10. Bundle's exit-gate spec lives at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/01-crit-1-rbac-gates.md.
CRIT-2 / CRIT-3 / CRIT-4 / CRIT-5 of the same audit remain open and
continue to block the v2.1.0 tag.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt -d (no diff after gofmt -w on the touched files)
- go vet ./...
- go test -short -count=1 ./... (all packages pass including auditor pin)
- go build ./...
HIGH-9 of the audit closes via this commit's router-layer rbacGate on
POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles + DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}
(defense-in-depth on top of the existing service-layer privilege check).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md CRIT-1 HIGH-9
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
@@ -34,6 +34,27 @@
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What else changed in v2.1.0:
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- **Audit 2026-05-10 CRIT-1 closure — wire-layer RBAC enforcement.**
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The Bundle 1 + Bundle 2 audit surfaced that the permission catalogue
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was enforced on ~24 admin-only routes only; the bulk of state-changing
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routes (`POST /api/v1/certificates`, `PUT /api/v1/profiles/{id}`,
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`DELETE /api/v1/issuers/{id}`, `POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/csr`, even
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`POST /api/v1/auth/roles` + `POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles`) had
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no `rbacGate` wrap. A `r-viewer` Bearer was essentially `r-admin`
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minus five fine-grained verbs at the wire layer (CWE-862). This
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release wraps every state-changing + read endpoint with
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`rbacGate` (global scope) or `rbacGateScoped` (per-profile / per-
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issuer scope-bound grants), and adds an AST-level CI guard
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(`TestRouterRBACGateCoverage`) that fails when a new route is
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registered without enforcement. Catalogue extended via migration
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000039 with 30 permissions covering `cert.edit`, `job.*`,
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`approval.*`, `policy.*`, `team.*`, `owner.*`, `notification.*`,
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`discovery.*`, `network_scan.*`, `healthcheck.*`, `digest.*`,
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`verification.*`, `stats.read`, `metrics.read`. **AUDIT YOUR
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KEYS** (the scope-down call-out above) now translates to real
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reduction in blast radius. Auditor pin preserved at exactly
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`{audit.read, audit.export}`.
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- **RBAC primitive shipped.** `tenants`, `roles`, `permissions`,
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`role_permissions`, `actor_roles` tables (migration 000029); 33-permission
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canonical catalogue; 7 default roles (`admin`, `operator`, `viewer`,
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@@ -82,6 +82,26 @@ for the live catalogue.
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| `auth.key.*` | `auth.key.list`, `auth.key.create`, `auth.key.rotate`, `auth.key.delete` | API key management |
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| `auth.bootstrap.*` | `auth.bootstrap.use` | Day-0 first-admin path |
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| `crl.admin`, `scep.admin`, `est.admin`, `ca.hierarchy.manage` | (single perms) | The five admin-only fine-grained perms (see above) |
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| `job.*` | `job.read`, `job.cancel` | Deployment job lifecycle |
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| `approval.*` | `approval.read`, `approval.approve`, `approval.reject` | Two-person approval workflow (cert-issuance + profile-edit) |
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| `policy.*` | `policy.read`, `policy.edit`, `policy.delete` | Compliance policies + renewal policies |
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| `team.*`, `owner.*` | `team.read`, `team.edit`, `team.delete`, `owner.*` | Organizational metadata |
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| `notification.*` | `notification.read`, `notification.edit` | Notification queue + requeue |
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| `discovery.*` | `discovery.read`, `discovery.run`, `discovery.claim` | Agent + cloud-secret-store discovery |
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| `network_scan.*` | `network_scan.read`, `network_scan.edit`, `network_scan.run` | TLS network scanning + SCEP probing |
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| `healthcheck.*` | `healthcheck.read`, `healthcheck.edit`, `healthcheck.delete`, `healthcheck.acknowledge` | Uptime monitors |
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| `digest.*` | `digest.read`, `digest.send` | Operator-summary digest emails |
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| `verification.*` | `verification.read`, `verification.run` | Post-deploy verification |
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| `stats.read`, `metrics.read` | (single perms) | Dashboard summary + Prometheus exposition |
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The full catalogue lives in
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[`internal/domain/auth/validate.go`](../../internal/domain/auth/validate.go).
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The router-level enforcement sits in
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[`internal/api/router/router.go`](../../internal/api/router/router.go);
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the AST-level CI guard
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[`TestRouterRBACGateCoverage`](../../internal/api/router/router_rbac_coverage_test.go)
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pins the contract — adding a new state-changing or read endpoint
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without an `rbacGate` / `rbacGateScoped` wrap fails CI.
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## Scope semantics
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+196
-140
@@ -9,9 +9,17 @@ import (
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)
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// rbacGate wraps a handler with auth.RequirePermission(checker, perm,
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// nil). Used by RegisterHandlers to gate the legacy admin routes
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// (Bundle 1 Phase 3.5). When checker is nil the wrap is a no-op so
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// tests / demo deployments without the RBAC stack continue to work.
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// nil) — i.e. a GLOBAL-SCOPE permission check. Used by RegisterHandlers
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// to gate every state-changing + read endpoint. When checker is nil the
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// wrap is a no-op so tests / demo deployments without the RBAC stack
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// continue to work.
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//
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// Every state-changing handler in this file MUST be wrapped by either
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// rbacGate or rbacGateScoped (or appear in the AuthExemptRouterRoutes
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// allowlist). The TestRouterRBACGateCoverage AST-level CI guard pins
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// this contract; adding a new POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE without an rbacGate
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// wrap fails CI. See cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md CRIT-1 for
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// the closure history.
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func rbacGate(checker auth.PermissionChecker, perm string, h http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {
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if checker == nil {
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return h
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@@ -19,6 +27,40 @@ func rbacGate(checker auth.PermissionChecker, perm string, h http.HandlerFunc) h
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return auth.RequirePermission(checker, perm, nil)(h)
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}
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// rbacGateScoped wraps a handler with a per-request scope-resolving
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// permission check. The scopeFn extracts a scope identifier from the
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// *http.Request (typically a path value, e.g. r.PathValue("id")) so
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// the underlying permission check can match a profile- or issuer-
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// scoped role-permission grant. When scopeFn returns an empty scope
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// id the gate falls back to global checking — consistent with the
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// rbacGate semantics — so unscoped grants continue to authorize.
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//
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// Used for path-bound state-changing routes such as
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// PUT /api/v1/profiles/{id} (scope_type=profile, scope_id=<path id>)
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// and PUT /api/v1/issuers/{id} (scope_type=issuer, scope_id=<path id>).
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//
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// When checker is nil the wrap is a no-op (test / demo path).
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func rbacGateScoped(checker auth.PermissionChecker, perm, scopeType string,
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scopeFn func(*http.Request) string, h http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {
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if checker == nil {
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return h
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}
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return auth.RequirePermission(checker, perm, func(r *http.Request) (string, *string) {
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id := scopeFn(r)
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if id == "" {
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return "global", nil
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}
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return scopeType, &id
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})(h)
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}
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// pathScope returns a scope extractor that reads a path parameter
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// directly. Helper to keep the route registration block readable:
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// rbacGateScoped(checker, "profile.edit", "profile", pathScope("id"), h).
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func pathScope(param string) func(*http.Request) string {
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return func(r *http.Request) string { return r.PathValue(param) }
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}
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// Router wraps http.ServeMux and manages route registration with middleware.
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type Router struct {
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mux *http.ServeMux
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@@ -307,23 +349,25 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
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middleware.ContentType,
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))
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// RBAC management routes (Bundle 1 Phase 4). Permission gates are
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// enforced inside each handler via the service layer; the Phase 3
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// auth.RequirePermission middleware factory will wrap these in a
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// Phase 3.5 router-level pass once the legacy admin handlers are
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// converted in lockstep.
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// RBAC management routes (Bundle 1 Phase 4 + audit 2026-05-10 CRIT-1
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// closure). Permission gates are now ALSO enforced at the router
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// level via rbacGate — Bundle 1 Phase 4 left these handler-only
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// (service-layer Authorizer check), which was a defense-in-depth
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// gap (HIGH-9 of the 2026-05-10 audit). /api/v1/auth/me and
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// /api/v1/auth/permissions remain ungated because every authenticated
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// caller is allowed to read their own identity / catalogue.
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/me", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.Me))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/permissions", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.ListPermissions))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/roles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.ListRoles))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/roles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.CreateRole))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.GetRole))
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r.Register("PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.UpdateRole))
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r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.DeleteRole))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.AddRolePermission))
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r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.RemoveRolePermission))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/keys", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.ListKeys))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.AssignRoleToKey))
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r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.RevokeRoleFromKey))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/roles", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.role.list", reg.Auth.ListRoles))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/roles", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.role.create", reg.Auth.CreateRole))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.role.list", reg.Auth.GetRole))
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r.Register("PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.role.edit", reg.Auth.UpdateRole))
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r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.role.delete", reg.Auth.DeleteRole))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.role.edit", reg.Auth.AddRolePermission))
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r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.role.edit", reg.Auth.RemoveRolePermission))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/keys", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.key.list", reg.Auth.ListKeys))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.role.assign", reg.Auth.AssignRoleToKey))
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r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.role.revoke", reg.Auth.RevokeRoleFromKey))
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// =========================================================================
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// Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — OIDC + session HTTP surface.
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@@ -434,22 +478,23 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
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// Same handler instance + same admin gate; the BulkRevokeEST method
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// pins Source=EST so the operation only affects EST-issued certs.
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/est/certificates/bulk-revoke", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.bulk_revoke", reg.BulkRevocation.BulkRevokeEST))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-renew", http.HandlerFunc(reg.BulkRenewal.BulkRenew))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-reassign", http.HandlerFunc(reg.BulkReassignment.BulkReassign))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.ListCertificates))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.CreateCertificate))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.GetCertificate))
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r.Register("PUT /api/v1/certificates/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.UpdateCertificate))
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r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/certificates/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.ArchiveCertificate))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/versions", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.GetCertificateVersions))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deployments", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.GetCertificateDeployments))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/renew", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.TriggerRenewal))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deploy", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.TriggerDeployment))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.RevokeCertificate))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-renew", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.issue", reg.BulkRenewal.BulkRenew))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-reassign", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.edit", reg.BulkReassignment.BulkReassign))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.read", reg.Certificates.ListCertificates))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.issue", reg.Certificates.CreateCertificate))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.read", reg.Certificates.GetCertificate))
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r.Register("PUT /api/v1/certificates/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.edit", reg.Certificates.UpdateCertificate))
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r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/certificates/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.delete", reg.Certificates.ArchiveCertificate))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/versions", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.read", reg.Certificates.GetCertificateVersions))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deployments", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.read", reg.Certificates.GetCertificateDeployments))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/renew", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.issue", reg.Certificates.TriggerRenewal))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/deploy", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.edit", reg.Certificates.TriggerDeployment))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.revoke", reg.Certificates.RevokeCertificate))
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// Export endpoints: /api/v1/certificates/{id}/export/{format}
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/export/pem", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Export.ExportPEM))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/export/pkcs12", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Export.ExportPKCS12))
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// Export endpoints: /api/v1/certificates/{id}/export/{format}.
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// Reading bytes — gated by cert.read.
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/export/pem", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.read", reg.Export.ExportPEM))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/export/pkcs12", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.read", reg.Export.ExportPKCS12))
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// NOTE: RFC 5280 CRL and RFC 6960 OCSP endpoints are registered separately
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// via RegisterPKIHandlers under /.well-known/pki/ so relying parties can
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@@ -457,20 +502,24 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
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// /api/v1/crl and /api/v1/ocsp paths have been retired (see M-006).
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// Issuers routes: /api/v1/issuers
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/issuers", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Issuers.ListIssuers))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/issuers", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Issuers.CreateIssuer))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/issuers/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Issuers.GetIssuer))
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r.Register("PUT /api/v1/issuers/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Issuers.UpdateIssuer))
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r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/issuers/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Issuers.DeleteIssuer))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/issuers/{id}/test", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Issuers.TestConnection))
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// Path-scoped: PUT / DELETE / test on /{id} honor per-issuer
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// scope-bound role-permission grants. Operators who grant
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// issuer.edit scope_type=issuer scope_id=iss-internal-ca only
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// authorize edits to that specific issuer.
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/issuers", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "issuer.read", reg.Issuers.ListIssuers))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/issuers", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "issuer.edit", reg.Issuers.CreateIssuer))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/issuers/{id}", rbacGateScoped(reg.Checker, "issuer.read", "issuer", pathScope("id"), reg.Issuers.GetIssuer))
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r.Register("PUT /api/v1/issuers/{id}", rbacGateScoped(reg.Checker, "issuer.edit", "issuer", pathScope("id"), reg.Issuers.UpdateIssuer))
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r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/issuers/{id}", rbacGateScoped(reg.Checker, "issuer.delete", "issuer", pathScope("id"), reg.Issuers.DeleteIssuer))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/issuers/{id}/test", rbacGateScoped(reg.Checker, "issuer.edit", "issuer", pathScope("id"), reg.Issuers.TestConnection))
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// Targets routes: /api/v1/targets
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/targets", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Targets.ListTargets))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/targets", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Targets.CreateTarget))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/targets/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Targets.GetTarget))
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r.Register("PUT /api/v1/targets/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Targets.UpdateTarget))
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r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/targets/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Targets.DeleteTarget))
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/targets/{id}/test", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Targets.TestTargetConnection))
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r.Register("GET /api/v1/targets", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "target.read", reg.Targets.ListTargets))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/targets", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "target.edit", reg.Targets.CreateTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/targets/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "target.read", reg.Targets.GetTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/targets/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "target.edit", reg.Targets.UpdateTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/targets/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "target.delete", reg.Targets.DeleteTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/targets/{id}/test", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "target.edit", reg.Targets.TestTargetConnection))
|
||||
|
||||
// Agents routes: /api/v1/agents
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -483,31 +532,31 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
|
||||
// * DELETE /api/v1/agents/{id} — RetireAgent. Replaces the pre-I-004
|
||||
// hard-delete; the underlying repo does a soft-retire with
|
||||
// optional cascade.
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agents", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Agents.ListAgents))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agents", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Agents.RegisterAgent))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agents/retired", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Agents.ListRetiredAgents))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agents/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Agents.GetAgent))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/agents/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Agents.RetireAgent))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/heartbeat", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Agents.Heartbeat))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/csr", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Agents.AgentCSRSubmit))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agents/{id}/certificates/{cert_id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Agents.AgentCertificatePickup))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agents/{id}/work", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Agents.AgentGetWork))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/jobs/{job_id}/status", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Agents.AgentReportJobStatus))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agents", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.read", reg.Agents.ListAgents))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agents", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.edit", reg.Agents.RegisterAgent))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agents/retired", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.read", reg.Agents.ListRetiredAgents))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agents/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.read", reg.Agents.GetAgent))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/agents/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.retire", reg.Agents.RetireAgent))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/heartbeat", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.heartbeat", reg.Agents.Heartbeat))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/csr", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.job.poll", reg.Agents.AgentCSRSubmit))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agents/{id}/certificates/{cert_id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.read", reg.Agents.AgentCertificatePickup))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agents/{id}/work", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.job.poll", reg.Agents.AgentGetWork))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/jobs/{job_id}/status", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.job.complete", reg.Agents.AgentReportJobStatus))
|
||||
|
||||
// Jobs routes: /api/v1/jobs
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/jobs", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Jobs.ListJobs))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/jobs/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Jobs.GetJob))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/jobs/{id}/cancel", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Jobs.CancelJob))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/jobs/{id}/approve", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Jobs.ApproveJob))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/jobs/{id}/reject", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Jobs.RejectJob))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/jobs", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "job.read", reg.Jobs.ListJobs))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/jobs/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "job.read", reg.Jobs.GetJob))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/jobs/{id}/cancel", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "job.cancel", reg.Jobs.CancelJob))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/jobs/{id}/approve", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "approval.approve", reg.Jobs.ApproveJob))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/jobs/{id}/reject", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "approval.reject", reg.Jobs.RejectJob))
|
||||
|
||||
// Policies routes: /api/v1/policies
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/policies", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Policies.ListPolicies))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/policies", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Policies.CreatePolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/policies/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Policies.GetPolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/policies/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Policies.UpdatePolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/policies/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Policies.DeletePolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/policies/{id}/violations", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Policies.ListViolations))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/policies", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "policy.read", reg.Policies.ListPolicies))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/policies", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "policy.edit", reg.Policies.CreatePolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/policies/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "policy.read", reg.Policies.GetPolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/policies/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "policy.edit", reg.Policies.UpdatePolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/policies/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "policy.delete", reg.Policies.DeletePolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/policies/{id}/violations", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "policy.read", reg.Policies.ListViolations))
|
||||
|
||||
// Renewal Policies routes: /api/v1/renewal-policies
|
||||
// G-1: fixes frontend FK drift — OnboardingWizard + CertificatesPage dropdowns
|
||||
@@ -515,44 +564,52 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
|
||||
// rules, pol-* IDs), violating FK managed_certificates.renewal_policy_id →
|
||||
// renewal_policies(id) ON DELETE RESTRICT. This block is the backend half; the
|
||||
// frontend half swaps getPolicies → getRenewalPolicies at 3 call sites.
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/renewal-policies", http.HandlerFunc(reg.RenewalPolicies.ListRenewalPolicies))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/renewal-policies", http.HandlerFunc(reg.RenewalPolicies.CreateRenewalPolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/renewal-policies/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.RenewalPolicies.GetRenewalPolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/renewal-policies/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.RenewalPolicies.UpdateRenewalPolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/renewal-policies/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.RenewalPolicies.DeleteRenewalPolicy))
|
||||
// Reuses the policy.* permission catalogue entry (renewal policies are a
|
||||
// subtype of policy from the operator's perspective).
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/renewal-policies", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "policy.read", reg.RenewalPolicies.ListRenewalPolicies))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/renewal-policies", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "policy.edit", reg.RenewalPolicies.CreateRenewalPolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/renewal-policies/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "policy.read", reg.RenewalPolicies.GetRenewalPolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/renewal-policies/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "policy.edit", reg.RenewalPolicies.UpdateRenewalPolicy))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/renewal-policies/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "policy.delete", reg.RenewalPolicies.DeleteRenewalPolicy))
|
||||
|
||||
// Profiles routes: /api/v1/profiles
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/profiles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Profiles.ListProfiles))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/profiles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Profiles.CreateProfile))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/profiles/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Profiles.GetProfile))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/profiles/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Profiles.UpdateProfile))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/profiles/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Profiles.DeleteProfile))
|
||||
// Path-scoped: PUT / DELETE on /{id} honor per-profile scope-bound
|
||||
// role-permission grants. Operators who grant profile.edit
|
||||
// scope_type=profile scope_id=p-finance only authorize edits to
|
||||
// that specific profile.
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/profiles", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "profile.read", reg.Profiles.ListProfiles))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/profiles", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "profile.edit", reg.Profiles.CreateProfile))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/profiles/{id}", rbacGateScoped(reg.Checker, "profile.read", "profile", pathScope("id"), reg.Profiles.GetProfile))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/profiles/{id}", rbacGateScoped(reg.Checker, "profile.edit", "profile", pathScope("id"), reg.Profiles.UpdateProfile))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/profiles/{id}", rbacGateScoped(reg.Checker, "profile.delete", "profile", pathScope("id"), reg.Profiles.DeleteProfile))
|
||||
|
||||
// Teams routes: /api/v1/teams
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/teams", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Teams.ListTeams))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/teams", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Teams.CreateTeam))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/teams/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Teams.GetTeam))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/teams/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Teams.UpdateTeam))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/teams/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Teams.DeleteTeam))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/teams", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "team.read", reg.Teams.ListTeams))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/teams", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "team.edit", reg.Teams.CreateTeam))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/teams/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "team.read", reg.Teams.GetTeam))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/teams/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "team.edit", reg.Teams.UpdateTeam))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/teams/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "team.delete", reg.Teams.DeleteTeam))
|
||||
|
||||
// Owners routes: /api/v1/owners
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/owners", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Owners.ListOwners))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/owners", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Owners.CreateOwner))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/owners/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Owners.GetOwner))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/owners/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Owners.UpdateOwner))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/owners/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Owners.DeleteOwner))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/owners", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "owner.read", reg.Owners.ListOwners))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/owners", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "owner.edit", reg.Owners.CreateOwner))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/owners/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "owner.read", reg.Owners.GetOwner))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/owners/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "owner.edit", reg.Owners.UpdateOwner))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/owners/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "owner.delete", reg.Owners.DeleteOwner))
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent Groups routes: /api/v1/agent-groups
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agent-groups", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AgentGroups.ListAgentGroups))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agent-groups", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AgentGroups.CreateAgentGroup))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agent-groups/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AgentGroups.GetAgentGroup))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/agent-groups/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AgentGroups.UpdateAgentGroup))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/agent-groups/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AgentGroups.DeleteAgentGroup))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agent-groups/{id}/members", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AgentGroups.ListAgentGroupMembers))
|
||||
// Reuses agent.* permissions (agent-groups are an organizational
|
||||
// view on top of the agent resource).
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agent-groups", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.read", reg.AgentGroups.ListAgentGroups))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agent-groups", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.edit", reg.AgentGroups.CreateAgentGroup))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agent-groups/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.read", reg.AgentGroups.GetAgentGroup))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/agent-groups/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.edit", reg.AgentGroups.UpdateAgentGroup))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/agent-groups/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.edit", reg.AgentGroups.DeleteAgentGroup))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/agent-groups/{id}/members", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "agent.read", reg.AgentGroups.ListAgentGroupMembers))
|
||||
|
||||
// Audit routes: /api/v1/audit
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/audit", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Audit.ListAuditEvents))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/audit/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Audit.GetAuditEvent))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/audit", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "audit.read", reg.Audit.ListAuditEvents))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/audit/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "audit.read", reg.Audit.GetAuditEvent))
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 5: admin observability for the
|
||||
// scheduler-driven CRL pre-generation cache. Admin-gated inside
|
||||
@@ -571,23 +628,24 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/admin/est/reload-trust", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "est.admin", reg.AdminEST.ReloadTrust))
|
||||
|
||||
// Notifications routes: /api/v1/notifications
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/notifications", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Notifications.ListNotifications))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/notifications/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Notifications.GetNotification))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/notifications/{id}/read", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Notifications.MarkAsRead))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/notifications", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "notification.read", reg.Notifications.ListNotifications))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/notifications/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "notification.read", reg.Notifications.GetNotification))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/notifications/{id}/read", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "notification.read", reg.Notifications.MarkAsRead))
|
||||
// I-005: requeue a dead notification back to pending so the retry sweep
|
||||
// picks it up again. Go 1.22 ServeMux resolves the literal /requeue segment
|
||||
// before falling back to the {id} path-variable route above.
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/notifications/{id}/requeue", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Notifications.RequeueNotification))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/notifications/{id}/requeue", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "notification.edit", reg.Notifications.RequeueNotification))
|
||||
|
||||
// Approvals routes: /api/v1/approvals (Rank 7).
|
||||
// Same Go 1.22 ServeMux precedence as the notifications block — literal
|
||||
// /approve and /reject segments resolve before the {id} pattern-var
|
||||
// route. Same-actor RBAC enforced at the service layer; the handler
|
||||
// surfaces ErrApproveBySameActor as HTTP 403.
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/approvals", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Approvals.ListApprovals))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/approvals/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Approvals.GetApproval))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/approvals/{id}/approve", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Approvals.Approve))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/approvals/{id}/reject", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Approvals.Reject))
|
||||
// surfaces ErrApproveBySameActor as HTTP 403. Router-level gates
|
||||
// added in the 2026-05-10 audit CRIT-1 closure (defense in depth).
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/approvals", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "approval.read", reg.Approvals.ListApprovals))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/approvals/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "approval.read", reg.Approvals.GetApproval))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/approvals/{id}/approve", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "approval.approve", reg.Approvals.Approve))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/approvals/{id}/reject", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "approval.reject", reg.Approvals.Reject))
|
||||
|
||||
// IntermediateCA hierarchy routes (Rank 8). Admin-gated inside the
|
||||
// handler (M-003 pattern); non-admin Bearer callers get 403. The
|
||||
@@ -600,57 +658,55 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/intermediates/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "ca.hierarchy.manage", reg.IntermediateCAs.Get))
|
||||
|
||||
// Stats routes: /api/v1/stats
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/stats/summary", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Stats.GetDashboardSummary))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/stats/certificates-by-status", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Stats.GetCertificatesByStatus))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/stats/expiration-timeline", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Stats.GetExpirationTimeline))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/stats/job-trends", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Stats.GetJobTrends))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/stats/issuance-rate", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Stats.GetIssuanceRate))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/stats/summary", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "stats.read", reg.Stats.GetDashboardSummary))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/stats/certificates-by-status", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "stats.read", reg.Stats.GetCertificatesByStatus))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/stats/expiration-timeline", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "stats.read", reg.Stats.GetExpirationTimeline))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/stats/job-trends", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "stats.read", reg.Stats.GetJobTrends))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/stats/issuance-rate", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "stats.read", reg.Stats.GetIssuanceRate))
|
||||
|
||||
// Metrics routes: /api/v1/metrics
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/metrics", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Metrics.GetMetrics))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/metrics/prometheus", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Metrics.GetPrometheusMetrics))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/metrics", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "metrics.read", reg.Metrics.GetMetrics))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/metrics/prometheus", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "metrics.read", reg.Metrics.GetPrometheusMetrics))
|
||||
|
||||
// Discovery routes: /api/v1/discovered-certificates, /api/v1/discovery-scans
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/discoveries", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Discovery.SubmitDiscoveryReport))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/discovered-certificates", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Discovery.ListDiscovered))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/discovered-certificates/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Discovery.GetDiscovered))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/discovered-certificates/{id}/claim", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Discovery.ClaimDiscovered))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/discovered-certificates/{id}/dismiss", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Discovery.DismissDiscovered))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/discovery-scans", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Discovery.ListScans))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/discovery-summary", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Discovery.GetDiscoverySummary))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/discoveries", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "discovery.run", reg.Discovery.SubmitDiscoveryReport))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/discovered-certificates", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "discovery.read", reg.Discovery.ListDiscovered))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/discovered-certificates/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "discovery.read", reg.Discovery.GetDiscovered))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/discovered-certificates/{id}/claim", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "discovery.claim", reg.Discovery.ClaimDiscovered))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/discovered-certificates/{id}/dismiss", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "discovery.claim", reg.Discovery.DismissDiscovered))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/discovery-scans", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "discovery.read", reg.Discovery.ListScans))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/discovery-summary", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "discovery.read", reg.Discovery.GetDiscoverySummary))
|
||||
|
||||
// Network scan routes: /api/v1/network-scan-targets
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/network-scan-targets", http.HandlerFunc(reg.NetworkScan.ListNetworkScanTargets))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/network-scan-targets", http.HandlerFunc(reg.NetworkScan.CreateNetworkScanTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/network-scan-targets/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.NetworkScan.GetNetworkScanTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/network-scan-targets/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.NetworkScan.UpdateNetworkScanTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/network-scan-targets/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.NetworkScan.DeleteNetworkScanTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/network-scan-targets/{id}/scan", http.HandlerFunc(reg.NetworkScan.TriggerNetworkScan))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/network-scan-targets", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "network_scan.read", reg.NetworkScan.ListNetworkScanTargets))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/network-scan-targets", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "network_scan.edit", reg.NetworkScan.CreateNetworkScanTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/network-scan-targets/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "network_scan.read", reg.NetworkScan.GetNetworkScanTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/network-scan-targets/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "network_scan.edit", reg.NetworkScan.UpdateNetworkScanTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/network-scan-targets/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "network_scan.edit", reg.NetworkScan.DeleteNetworkScanTarget))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/network-scan-targets/{id}/scan", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "network_scan.run", reg.NetworkScan.TriggerNetworkScan))
|
||||
// SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 11.5 — SCEP probe.
|
||||
// Bearer-auth gated by the standard middleware chain; not admin-
|
||||
// only because the probe is read-only against operator-supplied
|
||||
// URLs and reuses the existing SafeHTTPDialContext SSRF defense.
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/network-scan/scep-probe", http.HandlerFunc(reg.NetworkScan.ProbeSCEP))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/network-scan/scep-probes", http.HandlerFunc(reg.NetworkScan.ListSCEPProbes))
|
||||
// Now RBAC-gated by network_scan.run (was Bearer-only pre-audit).
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/network-scan/scep-probe", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "network_scan.run", reg.NetworkScan.ProbeSCEP))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/network-scan/scep-probes", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "network_scan.read", reg.NetworkScan.ListSCEPProbes))
|
||||
|
||||
// Verification routes: /api/v1/jobs/{id}/verify and /api/v1/jobs/{id}/verification
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/jobs/{id}/verify", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Verification.VerifyDeployment))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/jobs/{id}/verification", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Verification.GetVerificationStatus))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/jobs/{id}/verify", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "verification.run", reg.Verification.VerifyDeployment))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/jobs/{id}/verification", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "verification.read", reg.Verification.GetVerificationStatus))
|
||||
|
||||
// Digest routes: /api/v1/digest
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/digest/preview", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Digest.PreviewDigest))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/digest/send", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Digest.SendDigest))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/digest/preview", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "digest.read", reg.Digest.PreviewDigest))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/digest/send", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "digest.send", reg.Digest.SendDigest))
|
||||
|
||||
// Health check routes: /api/v1/health-checks
|
||||
// Summary endpoint must be registered before {id} routes
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/health-checks/summary", http.HandlerFunc(reg.HealthChecks.GetHealthCheckSummary))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/health-checks", http.HandlerFunc(reg.HealthChecks.ListHealthChecks))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/health-checks", http.HandlerFunc(reg.HealthChecks.CreateHealthCheck))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/health-checks/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.HealthChecks.GetHealthCheck))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/health-checks/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.HealthChecks.UpdateHealthCheck))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/health-checks/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.HealthChecks.DeleteHealthCheck))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/health-checks/{id}/history", http.HandlerFunc(reg.HealthChecks.GetHealthCheckHistory))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/health-checks/{id}/acknowledge", http.HandlerFunc(reg.HealthChecks.AcknowledgeHealthCheck))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/health-checks/summary", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "healthcheck.read", reg.HealthChecks.GetHealthCheckSummary))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/health-checks", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "healthcheck.read", reg.HealthChecks.ListHealthChecks))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/health-checks", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "healthcheck.edit", reg.HealthChecks.CreateHealthCheck))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/health-checks/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "healthcheck.read", reg.HealthChecks.GetHealthCheck))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/health-checks/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "healthcheck.edit", reg.HealthChecks.UpdateHealthCheck))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/health-checks/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "healthcheck.delete", reg.HealthChecks.DeleteHealthCheck))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/health-checks/{id}/history", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "healthcheck.read", reg.HealthChecks.GetHealthCheckHistory))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/health-checks/{id}/acknowledge", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "healthcheck.acknowledge", reg.HealthChecks.AcknowledgeHealthCheck))
|
||||
|
||||
// ACME (RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI) server endpoints. Phase 1a wires
|
||||
// directory + new-nonce only; Phases 1b-4 extend with the JWS-
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
|
||||
package router
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"go/ast"
|
||||
"go/parser"
|
||||
"go/token"
|
||||
"sort"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRouterRBACGateCoverage AST-walks router.go and asserts that every
|
||||
// state-changing handler registration goes through rbacGate or
|
||||
// rbacGateScoped, excepting (a) protocol endpoints (ACME / SCEP / EST /
|
||||
// CRL / OCSP) that authenticate via their own protocol primitives,
|
||||
// (b) the bootstrap endpoint which is auth-exempt by design,
|
||||
// (c) auth-info / login / logout / break-glass-login / health surfaces
|
||||
// that establish identity rather than carry it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This is the ratchet that prevents 2026-05-10 audit CRIT-1 from
|
||||
// regressing. A developer who registers a new state-changing handler
|
||||
// (or a list endpoint) without rbacGate / rbacGateScoped fails this
|
||||
// test. Update authExemptRoutes ONLY when registering a new
|
||||
// auth-exempt surface, and document the addition in the commit body.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// See cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md CRIT-1 for the closure
|
||||
// history.
|
||||
func TestRouterRBACGateCoverage(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Routes whose handlers MUST stay ungated. Every entry here is a
|
||||
// surface that establishes identity or is RFC-mandated unauth.
|
||||
// Adding a new entry requires a justification comment.
|
||||
authExemptRoutes := map[string]string{
|
||||
// Identity-bearing surfaces (the gate would be circular):
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/me": "every caller may read their own identity",
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/permissions": "every caller may read the global permission catalogue",
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/check": "identity-probe; gating would be circular",
|
||||
|
||||
// Auth handshake surfaces (no identity at request time):
|
||||
"GET /auth/oidc/login": "OIDC handshake start; no Bearer at this point",
|
||||
"GET /auth/oidc/callback": "IdP redirects here pre-auth; cookie+state validated inside",
|
||||
"POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout": "IdP-initiated; auth via IdP-signed logout_token in body",
|
||||
"POST /auth/logout": "caller session-cookie is checked inside the handler",
|
||||
"POST /auth/breakglass/login": "local-password recovery; surface invisible when disabled",
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/bootstrap": "day-0 admin probe; pre-admin by definition",
|
||||
"POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap": "consumes one-shot bootstrap token from body",
|
||||
|
||||
// Health / version / info:
|
||||
"GET /health": "K8s/Docker liveness probe; cannot carry Bearer",
|
||||
"GET /ready": "K8s/Docker readiness probe; cannot carry Bearer",
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/info": "GUI reads before login to detect auth mode",
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/version": "rollout probes; pre-auth allowed",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Protocol-endpoint prefixes — every r.Register against one of these
|
||||
// is intentionally ungated (protocol-level auth via JWS / mTLS / CSR-
|
||||
// embedded credentials). Mirrors AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes plus the
|
||||
// in-router ACME paths.
|
||||
protocolPrefixes := []string{
|
||||
"/acme/",
|
||||
"/scep",
|
||||
"/.well-known/pki",
|
||||
"/.well-known/est",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fset := token.NewFileSet()
|
||||
f, err := parser.ParseFile(fset, "router.go", nil, parser.ParseComments)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("parse router.go: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var unguarded []string
|
||||
ast.Inspect(f, func(n ast.Node) bool {
|
||||
call, ok := n.(*ast.CallExpr)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
sel, ok := call.Fun.(*ast.SelectorExpr)
|
||||
if !ok || sel.Sel.Name != "Register" {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Reject calls that aren't r.Register (e.g. mux.Handle is filtered out
|
||||
// by the SelectorExpr.X check below). The router type is `*Router`;
|
||||
// we accept any selector since RegisterFunc also wraps Register.
|
||||
_ = sel
|
||||
if len(call.Args) < 2 {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
routeLit, ok := call.Args[0].(*ast.BasicLit)
|
||||
if !ok || routeLit.Kind != token.STRING {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
route := strings.Trim(routeLit.Value, `"`)
|
||||
// Only inspect routes that should be gated: state-changing
|
||||
// (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) or any read endpoint (GET).
|
||||
if !isHTTPMethodRoute(route) {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Auth-exempt allowlist?
|
||||
if _, ok := authExemptRoutes[route]; ok {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Protocol prefix?
|
||||
if hasProtocolPrefix(route, protocolPrefixes) {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Inspect arg 1: must be rbacGate(...) or rbacGateScoped(...).
|
||||
wrap, ok := call.Args[1].(*ast.CallExpr)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
unguarded = append(unguarded, route)
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
wrapName := ""
|
||||
switch fn := wrap.Fun.(type) {
|
||||
case *ast.Ident:
|
||||
wrapName = fn.Name
|
||||
case *ast.SelectorExpr:
|
||||
wrapName = fn.Sel.Name
|
||||
}
|
||||
if wrapName != "rbacGate" && wrapName != "rbacGateScoped" {
|
||||
unguarded = append(unguarded, route)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
if len(unguarded) > 0 {
|
||||
sort.Strings(unguarded)
|
||||
t.Fatalf("router.go: %d routes registered without rbacGate / rbacGateScoped (and not in authExemptRoutes / protocolPrefixes):\n %s\n\n"+
|
||||
"If a new auth-exempt surface is intentional, add it to authExemptRoutes (or protocolPrefixes) "+
|
||||
"with a justification comment. Otherwise wrap with rbacGate(reg.Checker, \"<perm>\", <handler>).\n\n"+
|
||||
"This test pins the 2026-05-10 audit CRIT-1 closure. Removing an existing rbacGate wrap requires "+
|
||||
"either (a) moving the route to authExemptRoutes here, or (b) demonstrating the new approach in "+
|
||||
"the commit body.",
|
||||
len(unguarded), strings.Join(unguarded, "\n "))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func isHTTPMethodRoute(route string) bool {
|
||||
for _, prefix := range []string{"GET ", "POST ", "PUT ", "PATCH ", "DELETE ", "HEAD "} {
|
||||
if strings.HasPrefix(route, prefix) {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func hasProtocolPrefix(route string, prefixes []string) bool {
|
||||
// Strip the method token to compare against URL prefixes.
|
||||
idx := strings.Index(route, " ")
|
||||
if idx == -1 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
urlPart := route[idx+1:]
|
||||
for _, p := range prefixes {
|
||||
if strings.HasPrefix(urlPart, p) {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -30,22 +30,31 @@ const (
|
||||
// actor: the API rejects mutations / deletions targeting this id.
|
||||
const DemoAnonActorID = "actor-demo-anon"
|
||||
|
||||
// CanonicalPermissions is the canonical Bundle 1 permission catalog,
|
||||
// seeded by migration 000029_rbac.up.sql. Bundle 2 extends with
|
||||
// auth.session.* and auth.oidc.* permissions (those land in Bundle 2
|
||||
// Phase 5's migration).
|
||||
// CanonicalPermissions is the canonical permission catalog seeded by
|
||||
// migrations 000029 / 000030 / 000037 / 000038 / 000039. Bundle 2
|
||||
// extended with auth.session.* and auth.oidc.* permissions; the
|
||||
// 2026-05-10 audit (CRIT-1 closure) seeded the legacy-CRUD perms
|
||||
// (policy/team/owner/job/approval/notification/discovery/network_scan/
|
||||
// healthcheck/digest/verification/stats/metrics + cert.edit) via
|
||||
// migration 000039.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Naming convention: <namespace>.<verb>. Read permissions use
|
||||
// `<resource>.read`; mutations use `.create`, `.edit`, `.delete`,
|
||||
// `.assign`, `.revoke`, `.use`, `.export`, etc. The catalog is the
|
||||
// single source of truth referenced by:
|
||||
// - migration 000029_rbac.up.sql (seeds the rows)
|
||||
// - migration 000029_rbac.up.sql + 000030 + 000037 + 000038 + 000039 (seed the rows)
|
||||
// - service layer (RoleService.Create rejects unknown permissions)
|
||||
// - handler layer (auth.RequirePermission perm string)
|
||||
// - router layer (rbacGate(reg.Checker, "<perm>", ...) at every
|
||||
// state-changing route + read endpoints)
|
||||
//
|
||||
// TestRouterRBACGateCoverage in internal/api/router/router_test.go is
|
||||
// the AST-level CI guard that pins router enforcement to this catalogue.
|
||||
var CanonicalPermissions = []string{
|
||||
// Certificate lifecycle
|
||||
"cert.read",
|
||||
"cert.issue",
|
||||
"cert.edit", // metadata updates, deploy triggers, bulk-reassign (Audit CRIT-1)
|
||||
"cert.revoke",
|
||||
"cert.delete",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -129,22 +138,101 @@ var CanonicalPermissions = []string{
|
||||
// (Service.Enabled() short-circuits every operation when false).
|
||||
"auth.breakglass.admin",
|
||||
"auth.breakglass.login",
|
||||
|
||||
// Audit 2026-05-10 CRIT-1 closure — legacy-CRUD permission set.
|
||||
// Seeded by migration 000039 + wrapped at the router level by
|
||||
// rbacGate / rbacGateScoped on every state-changing + read route.
|
||||
// Job lifecycle.
|
||||
"job.read",
|
||||
"job.cancel",
|
||||
|
||||
// Approval workflow (Rank 7 primitive — was previously ungated).
|
||||
"approval.read",
|
||||
"approval.approve",
|
||||
"approval.reject",
|
||||
|
||||
// Policy management (compliance rules).
|
||||
"policy.read",
|
||||
"policy.edit",
|
||||
"policy.delete",
|
||||
|
||||
// Team management.
|
||||
"team.read",
|
||||
"team.edit",
|
||||
"team.delete",
|
||||
|
||||
// Owner management.
|
||||
"owner.read",
|
||||
"owner.edit",
|
||||
"owner.delete",
|
||||
|
||||
// Notifications.
|
||||
"notification.read",
|
||||
"notification.edit", // mark-read, requeue
|
||||
|
||||
// Discovery (agent-submitted + cloud-secret-store scans).
|
||||
"discovery.read",
|
||||
"discovery.run", // agents submit discovery reports
|
||||
"discovery.claim", // claim/dismiss discovered certs
|
||||
|
||||
// Network scan + SCEP probing.
|
||||
"network_scan.read",
|
||||
"network_scan.edit",
|
||||
"network_scan.run",
|
||||
|
||||
// Health checks (uptime monitors).
|
||||
"healthcheck.read",
|
||||
"healthcheck.edit",
|
||||
"healthcheck.delete",
|
||||
"healthcheck.acknowledge",
|
||||
|
||||
// Digest (operator-summary emails).
|
||||
"digest.read",
|
||||
"digest.send",
|
||||
|
||||
// Verification (post-deploy probe).
|
||||
"verification.read",
|
||||
"verification.run",
|
||||
|
||||
// Read-only observability.
|
||||
"stats.read",
|
||||
"metrics.read",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DefaultRoles describes the seven default roles seeded by the
|
||||
// migration, mapped to the permissions each role holds at global
|
||||
// scope. Permissions not in CanonicalPermissions cause the migration
|
||||
// to fail-closed.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// r-auditor is invariant: exactly {audit.read, audit.export} per the
|
||||
// auditor_test.go pin. Adding a new permission here that ends up in
|
||||
// r-auditor breaks the pin — by design.
|
||||
var DefaultRoles = map[string][]string{
|
||||
RoleIDAdmin: CanonicalPermissions, // admin gets every permission
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDOperator: {
|
||||
"cert.read", "cert.issue", "cert.revoke", "cert.delete",
|
||||
// Cert lifecycle (full)
|
||||
"cert.read", "cert.issue", "cert.edit", "cert.revoke", "cert.delete",
|
||||
// Profile / issuer / target / agent — read + edit (no delete on issuer)
|
||||
"profile.read", "profile.edit",
|
||||
"issuer.read", "issuer.edit",
|
||||
"target.read", "target.edit", "target.delete",
|
||||
"agent.read", "agent.edit",
|
||||
// Audit read
|
||||
"audit.read",
|
||||
// New CRIT-1 perms — operator-level CRUD
|
||||
"job.read", "job.cancel",
|
||||
"approval.read", "approval.approve", "approval.reject",
|
||||
"policy.read", "policy.edit", "policy.delete",
|
||||
"team.read", "team.edit", "team.delete",
|
||||
"owner.read", "owner.edit", "owner.delete",
|
||||
"notification.read", "notification.edit",
|
||||
"discovery.read", "discovery.run", "discovery.claim",
|
||||
"network_scan.read", "network_scan.edit", "network_scan.run",
|
||||
"healthcheck.read", "healthcheck.edit", "healthcheck.delete", "healthcheck.acknowledge",
|
||||
"digest.read", "digest.send",
|
||||
"verification.read", "verification.run",
|
||||
"stats.read", "metrics.read",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDViewer: {
|
||||
@@ -154,6 +242,20 @@ var DefaultRoles = map[string][]string{
|
||||
"target.read",
|
||||
"agent.read",
|
||||
"audit.read",
|
||||
// New CRIT-1 read-only perms
|
||||
"job.read",
|
||||
"approval.read",
|
||||
"policy.read",
|
||||
"team.read",
|
||||
"owner.read",
|
||||
"notification.read",
|
||||
"discovery.read",
|
||||
"network_scan.read",
|
||||
"healthcheck.read",
|
||||
"digest.read",
|
||||
"verification.read",
|
||||
"stats.read",
|
||||
"metrics.read",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDAgent: {
|
||||
@@ -162,37 +264,66 @@ var DefaultRoles = map[string][]string{
|
||||
"agent.job.poll",
|
||||
"agent.job.complete",
|
||||
"agent.job.report",
|
||||
// Agents submit discovery reports.
|
||||
"discovery.run",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDMCP: {
|
||||
// MCP gets operator-equivalent minus destructive ops.
|
||||
// Defense in depth for Claude / IDE integrations where
|
||||
// destructive verbs warrant additional scrutiny.
|
||||
"cert.read", "cert.issue", "cert.revoke",
|
||||
"cert.read", "cert.issue", "cert.edit", "cert.revoke",
|
||||
"profile.read", "profile.edit",
|
||||
"issuer.read", "issuer.edit",
|
||||
"target.read", "target.edit",
|
||||
"agent.read",
|
||||
"audit.read",
|
||||
// New CRIT-1 — read + non-destructive verbs
|
||||
"job.read", "job.cancel",
|
||||
"approval.read", "approval.approve", "approval.reject",
|
||||
"policy.read",
|
||||
"team.read", "owner.read",
|
||||
"notification.read", "notification.edit",
|
||||
"discovery.read", "discovery.claim",
|
||||
"network_scan.read", "network_scan.run",
|
||||
"healthcheck.read", "healthcheck.acknowledge",
|
||||
"digest.read",
|
||||
"verification.read", "verification.run",
|
||||
"stats.read", "metrics.read",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDCLI: {
|
||||
// CLI = operator-equivalent. Operators can scope down via
|
||||
// `certctl auth keys scope-down` if they want narrower CLI
|
||||
// access in production.
|
||||
"cert.read", "cert.issue", "cert.revoke", "cert.delete",
|
||||
"cert.read", "cert.issue", "cert.edit", "cert.revoke", "cert.delete",
|
||||
"profile.read", "profile.edit",
|
||||
"issuer.read", "issuer.edit",
|
||||
"target.read", "target.edit", "target.delete",
|
||||
"agent.read", "agent.edit",
|
||||
"audit.read",
|
||||
"auth.key.list", "auth.key.create", "auth.key.rotate",
|
||||
// New CRIT-1 — CLI gets operator-tier
|
||||
"job.read", "job.cancel",
|
||||
"approval.read", "approval.approve", "approval.reject",
|
||||
"policy.read", "policy.edit", "policy.delete",
|
||||
"team.read", "team.edit",
|
||||
"owner.read", "owner.edit",
|
||||
"notification.read", "notification.edit",
|
||||
"discovery.read", "discovery.run", "discovery.claim",
|
||||
"network_scan.read", "network_scan.edit", "network_scan.run",
|
||||
"healthcheck.read", "healthcheck.edit", "healthcheck.acknowledge",
|
||||
"digest.read", "digest.send",
|
||||
"verification.read", "verification.run",
|
||||
"stats.read", "metrics.read",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDAuditor: {
|
||||
// Phase 8 ships the auditor split. Phase 1 reserves the
|
||||
// role id + the read-only permission set so subsequent
|
||||
// phases don't have to renumber.
|
||||
// phases don't have to renumber. Audit 2026-05-10 CRIT-1
|
||||
// closure intentionally adds NOTHING here — auditor pins
|
||||
// stay invariant at audit.read + audit.export.
|
||||
"audit.read",
|
||||
"audit.export",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
-- 000039_audit_crit1_perms.down.sql
|
||||
-- Reverse of 000039_audit_crit1_perms.up.sql.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- role_permissions.permission_id is ON DELETE RESTRICT, so the down
|
||||
-- migration explicitly removes the role grants first, then the
|
||||
-- permission rows themselves. Wrapped in a single transaction.
|
||||
|
||||
BEGIN;
|
||||
|
||||
DELETE FROM role_permissions WHERE permission_id IN (
|
||||
'p-cert-edit',
|
||||
'p-job-read', 'p-job-cancel',
|
||||
'p-approval-read', 'p-approval-approve', 'p-approval-reject',
|
||||
'p-policy-read', 'p-policy-edit', 'p-policy-delete',
|
||||
'p-team-read', 'p-team-edit', 'p-team-delete',
|
||||
'p-owner-read', 'p-owner-edit', 'p-owner-delete',
|
||||
'p-notification-read', 'p-notification-edit',
|
||||
'p-discovery-read', 'p-discovery-run', 'p-discovery-claim',
|
||||
'p-network-scan-read', 'p-network-scan-edit', 'p-network-scan-run',
|
||||
'p-healthcheck-read', 'p-healthcheck-edit', 'p-healthcheck-delete', 'p-healthcheck-acknowledge',
|
||||
'p-digest-read', 'p-digest-send',
|
||||
'p-verification-read', 'p-verification-run',
|
||||
'p-stats-read', 'p-metrics-read'
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
DELETE FROM permissions WHERE id IN (
|
||||
'p-cert-edit',
|
||||
'p-job-read', 'p-job-cancel',
|
||||
'p-approval-read', 'p-approval-approve', 'p-approval-reject',
|
||||
'p-policy-read', 'p-policy-edit', 'p-policy-delete',
|
||||
'p-team-read', 'p-team-edit', 'p-team-delete',
|
||||
'p-owner-read', 'p-owner-edit', 'p-owner-delete',
|
||||
'p-notification-read', 'p-notification-edit',
|
||||
'p-discovery-read', 'p-discovery-run', 'p-discovery-claim',
|
||||
'p-network-scan-read', 'p-network-scan-edit', 'p-network-scan-run',
|
||||
'p-healthcheck-read', 'p-healthcheck-edit', 'p-healthcheck-delete', 'p-healthcheck-acknowledge',
|
||||
'p-digest-read', 'p-digest-send',
|
||||
'p-verification-read', 'p-verification-run',
|
||||
'p-stats-read', 'p-metrics-read'
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
COMMIT;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
|
||||
-- 000039_audit_crit1_perms.up.sql
|
||||
-- Audit 2026-05-10 CRIT-1 closure: legacy-CRUD permission set.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- The Bundle 1 + Bundle 2 audit surfaced that the RBAC permission
|
||||
-- catalogue declared at internal/domain/auth/validate.go was being
|
||||
-- enforced on roughly 24 admin-only routes — the bulk of state-
|
||||
-- changing routes (POST /api/v1/certificates, PUT /api/v1/profiles/{id},
|
||||
-- DELETE /api/v1/issuers/{id}, POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/csr, even
|
||||
-- POST /api/v1/auth/roles and POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles) were
|
||||
-- registered as plain http.HandlerFunc with no rbacGate wrap. A
|
||||
-- r-viewer Bearer was essentially r-admin minus five fine-grained
|
||||
-- verbs at the wire layer. CWE-862.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- This migration adds the 30 missing catalogue permissions and seeds
|
||||
-- them into the default roles per internal/domain/auth/validate.go's
|
||||
-- DefaultRoles map. The router-level enforcement lands in the same
|
||||
-- commit via rbacGate / rbacGateScoped on every state-changing route
|
||||
-- + every list/read endpoint. An AST-level CI guard
|
||||
-- (TestRouterRBACGateCoverage) pins the enforcement going forward.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Auditor pin (audit.read + audit.export ONLY) preserved — the
|
||||
-- TestAuditorRoleHoldsExactlyAuditReadAndExport regression test
|
||||
-- continues to pass.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- All operations idempotent. Wrapped in a single transaction.
|
||||
|
||||
BEGIN;
|
||||
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Catalogue additions (30 permissions across 12 namespaces)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
INSERT INTO permissions (id, name, namespace) VALUES
|
||||
-- Cert metadata edit (PUT, deploy trigger, bulk-reassign)
|
||||
('p-cert-edit', 'cert.edit', 'cert'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Job lifecycle
|
||||
('p-job-read', 'job.read', 'job'),
|
||||
('p-job-cancel', 'job.cancel', 'job'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Approval workflow (Rank 7 primitive — was ungated pre-fix)
|
||||
('p-approval-read', 'approval.read', 'approval'),
|
||||
('p-approval-approve', 'approval.approve', 'approval'),
|
||||
('p-approval-reject', 'approval.reject', 'approval'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Policies (compliance rules)
|
||||
('p-policy-read', 'policy.read', 'policy'),
|
||||
('p-policy-edit', 'policy.edit', 'policy'),
|
||||
('p-policy-delete', 'policy.delete', 'policy'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Teams
|
||||
('p-team-read', 'team.read', 'team'),
|
||||
('p-team-edit', 'team.edit', 'team'),
|
||||
('p-team-delete', 'team.delete', 'team'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Owners
|
||||
('p-owner-read', 'owner.read', 'owner'),
|
||||
('p-owner-edit', 'owner.edit', 'owner'),
|
||||
('p-owner-delete', 'owner.delete', 'owner'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Notifications
|
||||
('p-notification-read', 'notification.read', 'notification'),
|
||||
('p-notification-edit', 'notification.edit', 'notification'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Discovery (agent + cloud-secret-store)
|
||||
('p-discovery-read', 'discovery.read', 'discovery'),
|
||||
('p-discovery-run', 'discovery.run', 'discovery'),
|
||||
('p-discovery-claim', 'discovery.claim', 'discovery'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Network scan + SCEP probing
|
||||
('p-network-scan-read', 'network_scan.read', 'network_scan'),
|
||||
('p-network-scan-edit', 'network_scan.edit', 'network_scan'),
|
||||
('p-network-scan-run', 'network_scan.run', 'network_scan'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Health checks (uptime monitors)
|
||||
('p-healthcheck-read', 'healthcheck.read', 'healthcheck'),
|
||||
('p-healthcheck-edit', 'healthcheck.edit', 'healthcheck'),
|
||||
('p-healthcheck-delete', 'healthcheck.delete', 'healthcheck'),
|
||||
('p-healthcheck-acknowledge', 'healthcheck.acknowledge', 'healthcheck'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Digest (operator-summary emails)
|
||||
('p-digest-read', 'digest.read', 'digest'),
|
||||
('p-digest-send', 'digest.send', 'digest'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Verification (post-deploy probe)
|
||||
('p-verification-read', 'verification.read', 'verification'),
|
||||
('p-verification-run', 'verification.run', 'verification'),
|
||||
|
||||
-- Read-only observability
|
||||
('p-stats-read', 'stats.read', 'stats'),
|
||||
('p-metrics-read', 'metrics.read', 'metrics')
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING;
|
||||
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Role grants
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- r-admin: every new permission (admin gets all catalogued perms).
|
||||
-- r-operator: full new CRUD set (operator-tier).
|
||||
-- r-viewer: read-only set + audit.read (already held).
|
||||
-- r-mcp: operator-equivalent minus destructive ops (delete / config delete).
|
||||
-- r-cli: operator-tier with policy CRUD + notification edit.
|
||||
-- r-agent: just discovery.run (agents submit discovery reports).
|
||||
-- r-auditor: NOTHING new — pinned at {audit.read, audit.export}.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
-- r-admin: every new perm.
|
||||
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id)
|
||||
SELECT 'r-admin', id, 'global', NULL
|
||||
FROM permissions
|
||||
WHERE id IN (
|
||||
'p-cert-edit',
|
||||
'p-job-read', 'p-job-cancel',
|
||||
'p-approval-read', 'p-approval-approve', 'p-approval-reject',
|
||||
'p-policy-read', 'p-policy-edit', 'p-policy-delete',
|
||||
'p-team-read', 'p-team-edit', 'p-team-delete',
|
||||
'p-owner-read', 'p-owner-edit', 'p-owner-delete',
|
||||
'p-notification-read', 'p-notification-edit',
|
||||
'p-discovery-read', 'p-discovery-run', 'p-discovery-claim',
|
||||
'p-network-scan-read', 'p-network-scan-edit', 'p-network-scan-run',
|
||||
'p-healthcheck-read', 'p-healthcheck-edit', 'p-healthcheck-delete', 'p-healthcheck-acknowledge',
|
||||
'p-digest-read', 'p-digest-send',
|
||||
'p-verification-read', 'p-verification-run',
|
||||
'p-stats-read', 'p-metrics-read'
|
||||
)
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
|
||||
|
||||
-- r-operator: full operator-tier set.
|
||||
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id)
|
||||
SELECT 'r-operator', id, 'global', NULL
|
||||
FROM permissions
|
||||
WHERE id IN (
|
||||
'p-cert-edit',
|
||||
'p-job-read', 'p-job-cancel',
|
||||
'p-approval-read', 'p-approval-approve', 'p-approval-reject',
|
||||
'p-policy-read', 'p-policy-edit', 'p-policy-delete',
|
||||
'p-team-read', 'p-team-edit', 'p-team-delete',
|
||||
'p-owner-read', 'p-owner-edit', 'p-owner-delete',
|
||||
'p-notification-read', 'p-notification-edit',
|
||||
'p-discovery-read', 'p-discovery-run', 'p-discovery-claim',
|
||||
'p-network-scan-read', 'p-network-scan-edit', 'p-network-scan-run',
|
||||
'p-healthcheck-read', 'p-healthcheck-edit', 'p-healthcheck-delete', 'p-healthcheck-acknowledge',
|
||||
'p-digest-read', 'p-digest-send',
|
||||
'p-verification-read', 'p-verification-run',
|
||||
'p-stats-read', 'p-metrics-read'
|
||||
)
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
|
||||
|
||||
-- r-viewer: read-only across the new surface (+ already-held audit.read).
|
||||
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id)
|
||||
SELECT 'r-viewer', id, 'global', NULL
|
||||
FROM permissions
|
||||
WHERE id IN (
|
||||
'p-job-read',
|
||||
'p-approval-read',
|
||||
'p-policy-read',
|
||||
'p-team-read',
|
||||
'p-owner-read',
|
||||
'p-notification-read',
|
||||
'p-discovery-read',
|
||||
'p-network-scan-read',
|
||||
'p-healthcheck-read',
|
||||
'p-digest-read',
|
||||
'p-verification-read',
|
||||
'p-stats-read', 'p-metrics-read'
|
||||
)
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
|
||||
|
||||
-- r-mcp: operator-equivalent minus destructive ops.
|
||||
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id)
|
||||
SELECT 'r-mcp', id, 'global', NULL
|
||||
FROM permissions
|
||||
WHERE id IN (
|
||||
'p-cert-edit',
|
||||
'p-job-read', 'p-job-cancel',
|
||||
'p-approval-read', 'p-approval-approve', 'p-approval-reject',
|
||||
'p-policy-read',
|
||||
'p-team-read',
|
||||
'p-owner-read',
|
||||
'p-notification-read', 'p-notification-edit',
|
||||
'p-discovery-read', 'p-discovery-claim',
|
||||
'p-network-scan-read', 'p-network-scan-run',
|
||||
'p-healthcheck-read', 'p-healthcheck-acknowledge',
|
||||
'p-digest-read',
|
||||
'p-verification-read', 'p-verification-run',
|
||||
'p-stats-read', 'p-metrics-read'
|
||||
)
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
|
||||
|
||||
-- r-cli: operator-tier (matches r-operator new perms).
|
||||
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id)
|
||||
SELECT 'r-cli', id, 'global', NULL
|
||||
FROM permissions
|
||||
WHERE id IN (
|
||||
'p-cert-edit',
|
||||
'p-job-read', 'p-job-cancel',
|
||||
'p-approval-read', 'p-approval-approve', 'p-approval-reject',
|
||||
'p-policy-read', 'p-policy-edit', 'p-policy-delete',
|
||||
'p-team-read', 'p-team-edit',
|
||||
'p-owner-read', 'p-owner-edit',
|
||||
'p-notification-read', 'p-notification-edit',
|
||||
'p-discovery-read', 'p-discovery-run', 'p-discovery-claim',
|
||||
'p-network-scan-read', 'p-network-scan-edit', 'p-network-scan-run',
|
||||
'p-healthcheck-read', 'p-healthcheck-edit', 'p-healthcheck-acknowledge',
|
||||
'p-digest-read', 'p-digest-send',
|
||||
'p-verification-read', 'p-verification-run',
|
||||
'p-stats-read', 'p-metrics-read'
|
||||
)
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
|
||||
|
||||
-- r-agent: agents submit discovery reports (network scan + cert findings).
|
||||
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id)
|
||||
SELECT 'r-agent', id, 'global', NULL
|
||||
FROM permissions
|
||||
WHERE id IN (
|
||||
'p-discovery-run'
|
||||
)
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
|
||||
|
||||
-- r-auditor: NOTHING new. Pin enforced by TestAuditorRoleHoldsExactly...
|
||||
|
||||
COMMIT;
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user