auth-bundle-1 Phase 0-5 closure: demo-mode wire, named-key backfill, AuthCheck enrichment, OpenAPI schema, intermediate-ca comment refresh

Closes the 5 gaps the post-Phase-5 audit flagged on dev/auth-bundle-1.

C1: cmd/server/main.go now selects auth.NewDemoModeAuth() when
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none and falls back to auth.NewAuthWithNamedKeys
otherwise. Pre-closure, the no-op pass-through that
NewAuthWithNamedKeys returns for empty keys would have left
ActorIDKey / ActorTypeKey / TenantIDKey unpopulated and 401'd
every Phase-3.5 rbacGate-wrapped admin route + every Phase-4
RBAC handler in demo deployments. NewDemoModeAuth injects the
synthetic 'actor-demo-anon' actor seeded by migration 000029,
which holds r-admin at global scope.

C2: backfillNamedKeyActorRoles startup hook (cmd/server/auth_backfill.go)
iterates CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED entries (and legacy
CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET synthesized fallbacks) and grants r-admin
or r-viewer to each via authActorRoleRepo.Grant before the
HTTP server starts accepting requests. Idempotent via
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING in the repo. Failures log a warning but
are non-fatal — the server still starts and the operator can
fix grants via /v1/auth/keys. Helper extracted from main.go so
the role-mapping invariant is pinned by 4 focused unit tests
(admin->r-admin, non-admin->r-viewer, empty no-op,
grant-error non-fatal, nil-logger safe).

M1: HealthHandler.AuthCheck now returns actor_id, actor_type,
tenant_id, roles, effective_permissions, and admin_via_role
when the optional AuthCheckResolver is wired (production path:
authCheckResolverAdapter wraps the postgres ActorRoleRepository
in main.go). Nil resolver preserves the legacy {status, user,
admin} contract for back-compat with pre-Bundle-1 GUIs and
test fixtures. Adds 2 regression tests + 1 fake resolver shim.

M2: refreshes the stale 'Admin gate: every method calls
auth.IsAdmin first' comment on IntermediateCAHandler — the gate
moved to router.go::rbacGate via auth.RequirePermission
middleware in Phase 3.5; the new comment block points readers
there.

M4: 11 RBAC routes (auth/me, auth/permissions, 5 role lifecycle,
2 role-permission grant/revoke, 2 actor-role grant/revoke) added
to api/openapi.yaml under the [Auth] tag with operationIds and
shared AuthRole / AuthRolePermission schemas. AuthCheck path
extended with the Bundle-1 enrichment fields. The 11 entries
removed from openapi_parity_test.go::SpecParityExceptions.

Tests: go vet + staticcheck + go test -short -count=1 green
across cmd/server/, internal/auth/, internal/api/router/, and
internal/api/handler/. New tests: 4 backfill unit tests,
2 AuthCheck M1 enrichment tests, 1 demo-mode + rbacGate chain
integration test (TestRBACGate_DemoModeChainReachesHandler).

Branch SECURITY.md (cowork/auth-bundle-1-SECURITY.md, not part
of this commit) captures the full posture of dev/auth-bundle-1
as of this closure for the operator's pre-merge review.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-09 19:33:07 +00:00
parent 7ff2e2de08
commit 60a589ab96
9 changed files with 889 additions and 27 deletions
+92 -2
View File
@@ -7,8 +7,33 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// AuthCheckResolver is the optional dependency HealthHandler uses to enrich
// the /v1/auth/check response with the caller's standing roles and
// effective permission set. The auth handler's /v1/auth/me endpoint
// returns the same shape; we duplicate it here so the GUI can render the
// auth gate from a single round-trip on app boot. main.go wires this
// from the same authsvc.ActorRoleService used by AuthHandler; tests pass
// nil and AuthCheck degrades to the legacy minimal payload.
//
// Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (M1): pre-closure, /v1/auth/check returned
// only {status, user, admin}. The GUI had to second-fetch /v1/auth/me to
// know which buttons to render — and Me is gated by the rbacGate on
// auth.role.list which the GUI's pre-render path may not yet hold (chicken-
// and-egg with the role-list affordance). Folding the same payload into
// AuthCheck keeps the GUI's boot path single-shot.
type AuthCheckResolver interface {
// ListRoles returns the actor's standing role grants.
ListRoles(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
// EffectivePermissions returns the deduplicated (perm, scope) triples
// the actor holds across all of its roles.
EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType, tenantID string) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error)
}
// HealthHandler handles health and readiness check endpoints.
//
// Bundle-5 / Audit H-006 / CWE-754 (Improper Check for Unusual or
@@ -45,6 +70,13 @@ type HealthHandler struct {
// ReadyProbeTimeout is the per-probe ceiling for the DB ping. Defaults
// to 2s when zero. Exposed so tests can shorten it.
ReadyProbeTimeout time.Duration
// AuthCheck (M1) — optional. When set, AuthCheck includes the caller's
// standing roles + effective permissions in the response so the GUI
// can gate affordances from a single fetch. Nil resolver degrades to
// the legacy {status, user, admin} payload (preserves test fixtures
// and the no-db deploy path).
Resolver AuthCheckResolver
}
// NewHealthHandler creates a new HealthHandler.
@@ -53,6 +85,10 @@ type HealthHandler struct {
// Ready returns 200 with {"db":"not_configured"} — preserves backwards
// compatibility for the call sites that haven't wired the dependency yet.
// Production main.go always passes a non-nil pool.
//
// Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (M1): the resolver is wired separately via
// HealthHandler.Resolver after construction so existing call sites
// (legacy tests, no-db deploys) keep compiling without churn.
func NewHealthHandler(authType string, db *sql.DB) HealthHandler {
return HealthHandler{
AuthType: authType,
@@ -145,15 +181,69 @@ func (h HealthHandler) AuthInfo(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// that would otherwise 403 at the server. This is a hint for UX only —
// authorization remains enforced at the handler layer (bulk_revocation.go).
//
// Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (M1): when HealthHandler.Resolver is wired,
// the response is enriched with the caller's standing roles and effective
// permissions. This mirrors the /v1/auth/me payload but lives on /auth/check
// so the GUI can gate affordance rendering with a single fetch on app
// boot. Resolver lookups are best-effort: failures fall back to the
// legacy minimal payload rather than 500-ing the GUI's auth probe.
//
// The auth middleware runs before this handler, so reaching here means auth
// passed. `user` falls back to an empty string when auth is disabled
// (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none).
// GET /api/v1/auth/check
func (h HealthHandler) AuthCheck(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
response := map[string]interface{}{
"status": "authenticated",
"user": auth.GetUser(r.Context()),
"admin": auth.IsAdmin(r.Context()),
"user": auth.GetUser(ctx),
"admin": auth.IsAdmin(ctx),
}
if h.Resolver != nil {
actorID, _ := ctx.Value(auth.ActorIDKey{}).(string)
actorType, _ := ctx.Value(auth.ActorTypeKey{}).(string)
tenantID, _ := ctx.Value(auth.TenantIDKey{}).(string)
if tenantID == "" {
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
}
if actorID != "" && actorType != "" {
at := domain.ActorType(actorType)
roles, rerr := h.Resolver.ListRoles(ctx, actorID, at, tenantID)
perms, perr := h.Resolver.EffectivePermissions(ctx, actorID, at, tenantID)
if rerr == nil && perr == nil {
roleIDs := make([]string, 0, len(roles))
hasAdmin := false
for _, role := range roles {
roleIDs = append(roleIDs, role.RoleID)
if role.RoleID == authdomain.RoleIDAdmin {
hasAdmin = true
}
}
permPayload := make([]map[string]interface{}, 0, len(perms))
for _, p := range perms {
entry := map[string]interface{}{
"permission": p.PermissionName,
"scope_type": string(p.ScopeType),
}
if p.ScopeID != nil {
entry["scope_id"] = *p.ScopeID
}
permPayload = append(permPayload, entry)
}
response["actor_id"] = actorID
response["actor_type"] = actorType
response["tenant_id"] = tenantID
response["roles"] = roleIDs
response["effective_permissions"] = permPayload
// Authoritative admin signal: the standing-roles list. The
// legacy `admin` boolean above is preserved for back-compat
// (in-handler IsAdmin for non-rbacGate routes), but the
// rbacGate-gated routes now key off effective_permissions.
response["admin_via_role"] = hasAdmin
}
}
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
}
+117
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
_ "github.com/lib/pq" // Bundle-5 / H-006: postgres driver for /ready DB-probe regression test
)
@@ -338,6 +341,120 @@ func TestAuthCheck_NoAuthContext_DefaultsToEmptyUserAndFalseAdmin(t *testing.T)
}
}
// fakeAuthCheckResolver is a tiny in-memory stand-in for the postgres
// ActorRoleRepository so the M1 enrichment can be tested without a DB.
type fakeAuthCheckResolver struct {
roles []*authdomain.ActorRole
perms []repository.EffectivePermission
err error
}
func (f fakeAuthCheckResolver) ListRoles(_ context.Context, _ string, _ domain.ActorType, _ string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
return f.roles, f.err
}
func (f fakeAuthCheckResolver) EffectivePermissions(_ context.Context, _ string, _ domain.ActorType, _ string) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
return f.perms, f.err
}
// TestAuthCheck_M1_ResolverEnrichesResponseWithRolesAndPerms is the
// Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (M1) regression: when HealthHandler.Resolver
// is wired, the response includes actor_id / actor_type / tenant_id /
// roles / effective_permissions / admin_via_role. The legacy `admin`
// boolean is preserved for back-compat with pre-Bundle-1 GUIs.
func TestAuthCheck_M1_ResolverEnrichesResponseWithRolesAndPerms(t *testing.T) {
handler := NewHealthHandler("api-key", nil)
scopeID := "profile-prod"
handler.Resolver = fakeAuthCheckResolver{
roles: []*authdomain.ActorRole{
{ActorID: "alice", RoleID: authdomain.RoleIDAdmin, TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID},
{ActorID: "alice", RoleID: authdomain.RoleIDOperator, TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID},
},
perms: []repository.EffectivePermission{
{PermissionName: "cert.bulk_revoke", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal},
{PermissionName: "cert.issue", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ScopeID: &scopeID},
},
}
ctx := context.Background()
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorIDKey{}, "alice")
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorTypeKey{}, "APIKey")
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.TenantIDKey{}, "t-default")
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "alice")
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/check", nil).WithContext(ctx)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.AuthCheck(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
var result map[string]any
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if result["actor_id"] != "alice" {
t.Errorf("actor_id = %v, want alice", result["actor_id"])
}
if result["actor_type"] != "APIKey" {
t.Errorf("actor_type = %v, want APIKey", result["actor_type"])
}
if result["tenant_id"] != "t-default" {
t.Errorf("tenant_id = %v, want t-default", result["tenant_id"])
}
if result["admin_via_role"] != true {
t.Errorf("admin_via_role = %v, want true (alice holds r-admin)", result["admin_via_role"])
}
roles, ok := result["roles"].([]any)
if !ok || len(roles) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("roles = %v, want 2-element slice", result["roles"])
}
perms, ok := result["effective_permissions"].([]any)
if !ok || len(perms) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("effective_permissions = %v, want 2-element slice", result["effective_permissions"])
}
first := perms[0].(map[string]any)
if first["permission"] != "cert.bulk_revoke" || first["scope_type"] != "global" {
t.Errorf("perm[0] = %v, want cert.bulk_revoke/global", first)
}
second := perms[1].(map[string]any)
if second["permission"] != "cert.issue" || second["scope_type"] != "profile" || second["scope_id"] != "profile-prod" {
t.Errorf("perm[1] = %v, want cert.issue/profile/profile-prod", second)
}
}
// TestAuthCheck_M1_NilResolverPreservesLegacyShape pins backwards
// compatibility: when no resolver is wired, the response keeps the
// original {status, user, admin} contract that pre-Bundle-1 GUIs key
// off. New keys (actor_id, roles, ...) must be absent.
func TestAuthCheck_M1_NilResolverPreservesLegacyShape(t *testing.T) {
handler := NewHealthHandler("api-key", nil) // Resolver left nil
ctx := context.Background()
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorIDKey{}, "alice")
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorTypeKey{}, "APIKey")
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "alice")
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/check", nil).WithContext(ctx)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.AuthCheck(w, req)
var result map[string]any
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
for _, k := range []string{"actor_id", "actor_type", "tenant_id", "roles", "effective_permissions", "admin_via_role"} {
if _, present := result[k]; present {
t.Errorf("%s should be absent in legacy (nil resolver) response, got %v", k, result[k])
}
}
if result["admin"] != true || result["user"] != "alice" {
t.Errorf("legacy fields not preserved: admin=%v user=%v", result["admin"], result["user"])
}
}
// --- Bundle-5 / H-006: /ready DB-probe regression coverage ---
// TestReady_DBPingSuccess_Returns200WithReachable confirms that when the
+9 -6
View File
@@ -37,12 +37,15 @@ type IntermediateCAServicer interface {
// All routes are pinned at /api/v1/issuers/{id}/intermediates and
// /api/v1/intermediates/{id}.
//
// Admin gate: every method calls auth.IsAdmin first and surfaces
// HTTP 403 for non-admin Bearer callers (M-003 admin-gating pattern,
// matches AdminCRLCacheHandler / AdminESTHandler / AdminSCEPIntuneHandler).
// CA hierarchy management is a high-blast-radius surface — adding a
// child CA mints a new sub-CA cert that becomes a trust root for every
// downstream leaf. Operators expect this gated behind admin role.
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: the admin gate moved from in-handler auth.IsAdmin
// checks to router-level auth.RequirePermission middleware (rbacGate
// wraps the handler with the ca.hierarchy.manage permission gate before
// the handler body runs — non-admin Bearer callers get 403 from the
// middleware layer instead of from each handler method). CA hierarchy
// management is a high-blast-radius surface — adding a child CA mints a
// new sub-CA cert that becomes a trust root for every downstream leaf.
// The router gate guarantees the only callers reaching this handler
// hold the admin role at global scope.
type IntermediateCAHandler struct {
svc IntermediateCAServicer
}