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fix(security): close BUNDLE 5 — auth, OIDC, MCP, API + browser security edges

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Bundle 5 closure (2026-05-13 acquisition diligence audit). 13-finding
security audit pass across the auth / OIDC / MCP / API / browser-
security surface. Five real closures shipped in code, two false-as-
stated findings annotated with the existing implementation, three
operator-decision items documented for v3 follow-up, three doc-only
fixes (auth architecture narrative aligned with shipped OIDC).

Source findings closed (code):
  S1     break-glass /auth/breakglass/login lacked the documented
         5/min per-source-IP rate limit; handler now owns its own
         SlidingWindowLimiter wired at startup. Doc claim turns true.
  R6     OIDC test_discovery JWKS probe ran on http.DefaultClient;
         now uses an http.Client whose transport wraps
         validation.SafeHTTPDialContext. JWKS URI can no longer
         pivot into reserved-address ranges via DNS rebinding.
  R7     Slack + Teams notifiers built http.Client without the SSRF
         dial-time guard. Both New() constructors now install
         validation.SafeHTTPDialContext; webhook URLs (operator-
         configured via dynamic-config GUI) cannot dial 169.254.x or
         in-cluster reserved ranges. Test seam: newForTest bypasses
         the guard for httptest's 127.0.0.1 binds, mirroring the
         existing internal/connector/notifier/webhook pattern.
  RT-L2  CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true now emits a prominent
         logger.Warn at server boot. Pre-Bundle-5 the knob silently
         disabled ACME directory TLS verification.

Source findings closed (doc):
  finding 1 + HIGH-5  Architecture doc claimed no in-process JWT/
         OIDC/mTLS/SAML and pointed everyone at the
         authenticating-gateway pattern. Auth Bundle 2
         (commit dea5053) shipped native OIDC + sessions +
         break-glass. New §"In-process authentication surface"
         table (api-key / oidc / none) supersedes the old framing;
         "Authenticating-gateway pattern (SAML, mTLS-as-auth,
         LDAP)" section retained for protocols certctl still
         doesn't ship natively.

Source findings verified false (existing implementation):
  S4     OIDC email-domain allowlist — `email_domain_test.go`
         already pins the strict-equality semantics (subdomain not
         auto-accepted, multi-entry no-match path, empty allowlist
         accepts all by-design per RFC 9700 §4.1.1).
  SEC-L1 CSP / HSTS / referrer-policy headers — already shipped at
         internal/api/middleware/securityheaders.go and wired at
         cmd/server/main.go L2003+L2027+L2115.

Operator-decision / deferred (tracked in bundle-5 closure doc):
  S3     CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED parsing is wired, end-to-end
         validation is partial. Operator decides: complete the
         named-key middleware path or deprecate the syntax.
  S5     Audit-middleware best-effort for read paths;
         security-critical writes use WithinTx. Operator decides
         per-path escalation.
  S8     MCP threat model — the binary is a thin protocol bridge,
         no privileges of its own; every tool call carries
         CERTCTL_API_KEY and is auth'd + RBAC-gated server-side.
         Optional CERTCTL_MCP_READ_ONLY gate tracked as v3.
  SEC-H1 2026-05-10 audit CRIT-1/2/4 already closed on master;
         CRIT-3/5 status against the spec folder is operator-
         workstation-validation-only. Documented for follow-up.
  SEC-L2 WebAuthn / FIDO2 / step-up — already documented in
         docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md "Threats Bundle 2 does
         NOT close". v3 work item per CLAUDE.md decision 12.

Full per-finding rationale + receipts at
docs/operator/security-bundle-5-audit-closure.md.

Verification:
  gofmt -l                                                # clean
  go vet ./internal/connector/notifier/slack
    ./internal/connector/notifier/teams ./internal/auth/oidc
    ./internal/api/handler ./cmd/server                  # clean
  go build ./cmd/server [...]                            # clean
  go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/notifier/slack
    ./internal/connector/notifier/teams ./internal/api/handler
    ./internal/auth/oidc ./internal/config                # PASS
                                                          # (slack 0.028s + teams
                                                          # 0.023s + handler 11.0s;
                                                          # newForTest seam keeps
                                                          # httptest tests green)

Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-5 S1 R6 R7 RT-L2 finding-1 HIGH-5
Audit-Verifies-False: S4 SEC-L1
Audit-Defers: S3 S5 S8 SEC-H1 SEC-L2
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-13 01:18:45 +00:00
parent 750478a6fe
commit 596e675ec7
9 changed files with 265 additions and 14 deletions
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cmd/server/main.go
+23
View File
@@ -583,12 +583,35 @@ func main() {
SameSite: sameSiteMode,
Secure: true,
})
// Bundle 5 closure (audit S1): wire the per-source-IP rate limiter
// for POST /auth/breakglass/login. 5 attempts / minute / IP, 50 000
// key cap. Pre-Bundle-5 the handler docstring claimed this rate
// limit but no limiter was installed; the route bypasses the global
// RPS middleware because it's mounted via r.mux.Handle in the
// AuthExemptRouterRoutes path. The service-layer Argon2id lockout
// state machine remains the second line of defense.
breakglassHandler.SetLoginRateLimiter(
ratelimit.NewSlidingWindowLimiter(5, time.Minute, 50_000),
)
if cfg.Auth.Breakglass.Enabled {
logger.Warn("CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=true — break-glass admin path is ACTIVE; this bypasses SSO. Disable in steady-state.",
"lockout_threshold", cfg.Auth.Breakglass.LockoutThreshold,
"lockout_duration", cfg.Auth.Breakglass.LockoutDuration.String())
}
// Bundle 5 closure (audit RT-L2): operator-visible startup warning
// when CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true disables ACME directory TLS
// verification. Pre-Bundle-5 this knob silently disabled TLS
// verification for every ACME issuance call without surfacing any
// signal at boot; the only mention lived in a values.yaml comment.
// Pebble / step-ca / dev ACME proxies use self-signed certs so the
// knob has legitimate dev uses, but a production deploy that flips
// it (typically copy-pasting from a Pebble integration runbook)
// gets MITM exposure on every CA round-trip. Loud at boot now.
if cfg.ACME.Insecure {
logger.Warn("CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true — ACME directory TLS verification is DISABLED. Every ACME round-trip skips certificate chain validation; production deploys MUST unset this. Acceptable only for dev / Pebble / step-ca with operator-supplied self-signed roots.")
}
policyService := service.NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
policyService.SetCertRepo(certificateRepo) // D-008: CertificateLifetime arm needs CertificateVersion.NotBefore/NotAfter
// G-1: RenewalPolicyService — distinct from PolicyService (compliance rules).