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target(awsacm): SDK-driven AWS Certificate Manager target connector
Closes Rank 5 (AWS half) of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research
deliverable (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5).
Pre-fix, certctl had no path to deploy certs to AWS-managed TLS-
termination endpoints (ALB / CloudFront / API Gateway / App Runner)
— operators terminating TLS at AWS had to use Infisical secret-sync,
manual aws-cli imports, or external automation. This commit lands
the SDK-driven AWS Certificate Manager target connector that closes
the gap end-to-end.
Architecture:
- internal/connector/target/awsacm/awsacm.go — Connector wraps
*acm.Client behind the ACMClient interface seam (mirrors
awsacmpca's ACMPCAClient pattern from the issuer side).
LoadDefaultConfig handles the standard AWS credential chain
(IRSA / EC2 instance profile / SSO / env vars); no embedded
creds in connector Config.
- Pre-deploy snapshot via DescribeCertificate + GetCertificate so
on-import-failure rollback restores the previous cert. Mirrors
the Bundle 5 IIS pattern + the Bundle 7/8 WinCertStore /
JavaKeystore patterns. Surfaces rollback success/failure via
the existing certctl_deploy_rollback_total Prometheus counter
label set.
- Provenance tags: certctl-managed-by=certctl + certctl-
certificate-id=<mc-id> set automatically on every import. ACM
strips tags on re-import, so the connector calls
AddTagsToCertificate post-import to keep the provenance pair
fresh. Operators looking up a cert ARN by managed-cert ID
(Terraform data source, CloudFormation output) match against
these tags.
- DeploymentRequest.KeyPEM held in agent memory only — never
written to disk. Aligns with the pull-only deployment model
documented in CLAUDE.md.
Tests:
- awsacm_test.go: 15-subtest happy-path + validation matrix
covering ValidateConfig (success / missing-region / malformed-
region / malformed-ARN / reserved-tag rejection),
DeployCertificate (fresh import / rotate-in-place / rollback-
on-serial-mismatch / rollback-also-fails / empty-key-rejected /
no-client-rejected), ValidateOnly (returns sentinel),
ValidateDeployment (serial match / mismatch / no-ARN-yet).
- awsacm_failure_test.go: 5 per-error-class contract tests
mirroring the awsacmpca_failure_test.go shape (commit
60dce0b) — AccessDeniedException (smithy.GenericAPIError),
ResourceNotFoundException (typed), ThrottlingException
(smithy.GenericAPIError, FaultServer preserved),
InvalidArgsException (typed, terminal), RequestInProgress
Exception (typed). All assert errors.As against the SDK type +
operator-actionable substring + connector-side wrap framing.
- Coverage on awsacm.go: 54.9% of statements (matches the K8s-
Secret + IIS connectors' 50-65% range; rollback-failure paths
contribute most of the un-covered surface — those exercise
only when the rollback's SDK call also returns an error).
- go test -race -count=10 green; no goroutine leaks.
Wiring:
- internal/domain/connector.go: TargetTypeAWSACM = "AWSACM".
- internal/service/target.go: validTargetTypes set extended.
- cmd/agent/main.go::createTargetConnector: AWSACM case arm
mirroring the KubernetesSecrets shape exactly. Calls
awsacm.New(context.Background(), &cfg, a.logger) — the
SDK-loading happens here, not lazily, so config errors
surface at agent boot.
- cmd/agent/agent_test.go::TestCreateTargetConnector_AllSupported
Types: AWSACM added to the type matrix + the InvalidJSON
matrix.
go.mod / go.sum:
- github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm v1.38.3 (direct).
aws-sdk-go-v2 + service/acmpca + smithy-go were already direct
from the awsacmpca issuer; this is the distribution-side
companion package.
Documentation:
- docs/connectors.md "AWS Certificate Manager (ACM)" section:
config table, IAM policy JSON (5 actions on
arn:aws:acm:*:*:certificate/*), IRSA / EC2 instance-profile /
SSO auth recipes, atomic-rollback contract, Terraform ALB-
attachment snippet, threat model carve-outs (no disk writes,
mandatory provenance tags, no long-lived creds in Config),
procurement checklist crib (5 bullets paste-able into a
security review).
Out of scope (intentional, flagged in V3-Pro forward path):
- CloudFront / ALB auto-attach (UpdateDistribution requires a
different IAM scope than ACM ImportCertificate).
- Cross-region ACM replication (ACM is regional; CloudFront
forces us-east-1).
- Tag-filtered ARN discovery (V2 uses operator-pinned
Config.CertificateArn after first deploy; tag-scan path
requires acm:ListTagsForCertificate which we deliberately
keep off the minimum-IAM-policy surface).
- Azure Key Vault (separate cloud, separate connector — Azure
half of Rank 5 ships in a follow-on commit).
Verified locally:
- gofmt clean.
- go vet ./internal/connector/target/awsacm/...
./internal/domain/... ./internal/service/...
./cmd/agent/... clean.
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/target/awsacm/...
./internal/domain/... ./cmd/agent/... green (15 + 5 awsacm
subtests; all 15 supported target types instantiate via the
agent factory).
- go test -race -count=10 ./internal/connector/target/awsacm/...
green.
Reference: cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5 Rank 5.
Acquisition prompt:
cowork/rank-5-aws-acm-azure-kv-target-adapters-prompt.md.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1409,6 +1409,101 @@ The Kubernetes Secrets connector deploys certificates as `kubernetes.io/tls` Sec
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Location: `internal/connector/target/k8ssecret/k8ssecret.go`
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### AWS Certificate Manager (ACM)
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The AWS ACM target connector deploys certificates into AWS Certificate Manager — the public AWS service that ALB / CloudFront / API Gateway / App Runner consume by ARN. Closes the "we terminate TLS at AWS, how do we get certctl-issued certs to ALB?" question for cloud-first deployments. Rank 5 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research deliverable.
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```json
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{
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"region": "us-east-1",
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"certificate_arn": "arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-ef0123456789",
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"tags": {"env": "production", "app": "api-gateway"}
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}
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```
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| Field | Type | Default | Description |
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|-------|------|---------|-------------|
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| `region` | string | *(required)* | AWS region for the ACM endpoint (e.g., `us-east-1`). CloudFront-attached certs MUST live in `us-east-1`; ALB / API Gateway use the same region as the load balancer. |
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| `certificate_arn` | string | | ARN of an existing ACM certificate to rotate in place. Empty on first deploy — the adapter creates a new ACM cert via `ImportCertificate` and the deployment record's Metadata captures the resulting ARN. Operators can also pre-create the ARN out-of-band (Terraform, CloudFormation) and pin it here. |
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| `tags` | object | | Tags applied to the ACM cert at first import + re-applied via `AddTagsToCertificate` on every subsequent import (ACM strips tags on re-import). The reserved keys `certctl-managed-by` and `certctl-certificate-id` are set automatically and cannot be overridden. |
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**IAM policy (minimum permissions):**
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```json
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{
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"Version": "2012-10-17",
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"Statement": [{
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"Effect": "Allow",
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"Action": [
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"acm:ImportCertificate",
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"acm:GetCertificate",
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"acm:DescribeCertificate",
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"acm:ListCertificates",
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"acm:AddTagsToCertificate"
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],
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"Resource": "arn:aws:acm:*:*:certificate/*"
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}]
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}
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```
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**Auth recipes:**
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- **IRSA (IAM Roles for Service Accounts) — recommended for K8s deploys.** Annotate the agent's ServiceAccount with `eks.amazonaws.com/role-arn=arn:aws:iam::<account>:role/certctl-acm-deployer`. The role's trust policy allows the cluster's OIDC provider; permission policy is the JSON above. Short-lived STS credentials are auto-rotated by EKS — no long-lived access keys.
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- **EC2 instance profile — recommended for VM-based agents.** Attach an instance profile referencing the same role. SDK's `LoadDefaultConfig` picks credentials up via the IMDS metadata service.
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- **AWS SSO / `aws configure sso` — recommended for operator workstations.** SDK reads `~/.aws/config` for the SSO profile and refreshes tokens via the existing CLI session.
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- **Long-lived access keys are NOT supported in connector Config** — the credential chain is configured at the SDK level, not the connector level. This is a procurement-readability decision: a security reviewer reading the deployment_targets table should never find an access key.
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**Atomic-rollback contract:**
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Every `DeployCertificate` snapshots the existing cert via `DescribeCertificate` + `GetCertificate` BEFORE calling `ImportCertificate` with the new bytes. After import, the connector re-fetches the cert metadata and compares serial numbers. On serial-mismatch (post-verify failure), the connector calls `ImportCertificate` again with the snapshotted bytes to restore the previous cert. The rollback path emits a `WARN`-level slog entry; the rollback's own success or failure is exposed via `certctl_deploy_rollback_total{target_type="AWSACM",outcome="restored"|"also_failed"}` per the deploy-hardening I Phase 10 metric exposer. Mirrors the Bundle 5+ pre-deploy-snapshot pattern shipped for IIS / WinCertStore / JavaKeystore.
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**ALB attachment recipe:**
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certctl creates / rotates the ACM cert; the operator (or Terraform / CloudFormation) attaches it to the ALB listener separately. For Terraform-driven deployments, look up the ARN by tag:
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```hcl
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data "aws_acm_certificate" "certctl_managed" {
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domain = "api.example.com"
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most_recent = true
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# Filter by certctl provenance tags so an unrelated ACM cert with
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# the same SAN doesn't get picked up.
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tags = {
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"certctl-managed-by" = "certctl"
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"certctl-certificate-id" = "mc-api-prod"
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}
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}
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resource "aws_lb_listener" "https" {
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load_balancer_arn = aws_lb.api.arn
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port = 443
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protocol = "HTTPS"
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certificate_arn = data.aws_acm_certificate.certctl_managed.arn
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# ...
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}
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```
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The ARN updates in place across renewals (ACM `ImportCertificate` is upsert-style when given an ARN), so the ALB listener's `certificate_arn` reference doesn't change. CloudFront / API Gateway distributions can reference the same ARN via their respective Terraform resources.
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**Threat model carve-outs:**
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- **Cert key bytes never written to disk on the agent.** `DeployCertificate` reads `request.KeyPEM` from memory and passes it to the SDK's `ImportCertificate` call. No temp file. No swap-out window.
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- **Provenance tags are mandatory.** The reserved `certctl-managed-by=certctl` + `certctl-certificate-id=<mc-id>` pair is set automatically on every import. Operators identifying a stray ACM cert in their account can match against `certctl-managed-by` to confirm it was certctl-issued (or NOT — the absence of the tag means a manual import).
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- **No long-lived AWS credentials in `Config`.** `Config` carries region + ARN + operator tags only. AWS auth is the SDK credential chain (IRSA / instance profile / SSO).
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- **`ListCertificates` IAM permission is required for the V2 ARN-discovery dance to work.** Operators who pin `Config.CertificateArn` after the first deploy can drop this permission; the V2 fallback emits a warning and reverts to "always create new ARN" if the operator forgets to update `certificate_arn` post-first-deploy.
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**Procurement checklist crib (paste into security review):**
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- certctl uses short-lived IAM-role credentials via IRSA / instance profile, not long-lived access keys.
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- The cert key is held only in agent memory during the import call; never written to disk.
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- Every imported ACM cert is tagged with `certctl-managed-by=certctl` + `certctl-certificate-id=<mc-id>` for forensic traceability.
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- Failed imports trigger automatic rollback to the snapshotted previous cert; both outcomes are surfaced via Prometheus.
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- The minimum IAM policy is 5 actions on `arn:aws:acm:*:*:certificate/*`; CloudTrail captures every API call for compliance audits.
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**ValidateOnly contract.** ACM has no dry-run API for `ImportCertificate`; `ValidateOnly` returns `target.ErrValidateOnlyNotSupported` per the deploy-hardening I Phase 3 sentinel contract. Operators preview deploys via `ValidateConfig` + `aws acm describe-certificate --certificate-arn <arn>` against the current ARN.
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Location: `internal/connector/target/awsacm/awsacm.go` + `internal/connector/target/awsacm/awsacm_failure_test.go` (per-error-class contract tests for `AccessDeniedException` / `ResourceNotFoundException` / `ThrottlingException` / `InvalidArgsException` / `RequestInProgressException`).
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## Notifier Connector
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Notifier connectors send alerts about certificate lifecycle events (expiration warnings, renewal success/failure, deployment status, policy violations).
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