Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001)

Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
5c01c7f. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.

M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
  * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
    principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
    credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
    opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
  * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
    constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
    an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
    bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
    now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
    audit_events row.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
        principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
        unauthenticated endpoints.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
        job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.

M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
  * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
    when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
  * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
    viewers receive 403.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
        TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
        TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.

M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
  * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
    authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
    revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
    '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
        GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
            Content-Type: application/pkix-crl   (RFC 5280 §5)
        GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
            Content-Type: application/ocsp-response  (RFC 6960)
  * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
  * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
    CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
  * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
    in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
    SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
        type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
      - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
        access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
      - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
        that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
        mounted on the unauthenticated branch.

M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
  EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
  'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
  internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
  adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.

Verification (all gates green):
  * go vet ./...                                           — clean
  * go build ./...                                         — ok
  * go test -short ./... (55+ packages)                    — all pass
  * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests)                     — all pass
  * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit                                — clean
  * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
    all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.

Documentation:
  * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
    Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
    test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
  * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
    closure note.
  * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
    docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
    docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
    — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
    API keys.
  * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
    and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.

.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.

internal/api/handler/jobs.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package handler
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
 )
 
 // JobService defines the service interface for job operations.
@@ -17,8 +19,13 @@ type JobService interface {
 	ListJobs(ctx context.Context, status, jobType string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.Job, int64, error)
 	GetJob(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Job, error)
 	CancelJob(ctx context.Context, id string) error
-	ApproveJob(ctx context.Context, id string) error
-	RejectJob(ctx context.Context, id string, reason string) error
+	// ApproveJob approves a renewal job. actor is the named-key identity
+	// resolved from the auth middleware; the service returns ErrSelfApproval
+	// (mapped to 403) when actor matches the certificate owner.
+	ApproveJob(ctx context.Context, id, actor string) error
+	// RejectJob rejects a renewal job. actor is the named-key identity
+	// recorded for audit attribution; no not-self restriction.
+	RejectJob(ctx context.Context, id, reason, actor string) error
 }
 
 // JobHandler handles HTTP requests for job operations.
@@ -150,7 +157,16 @@ func (h JobHandler) ApproveJob(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 	jobID := parts[0]
 
-	if err := h.svc.ApproveJob(r.Context(), jobID); err != nil {
+	actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
+
+	if err := h.svc.ApproveJob(r.Context(), jobID, actor); err != nil {
+		// M-003: self-approval by the certificate owner is forbidden.
+		if errors.Is(err, service.ErrSelfApproval) {
+			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusForbidden,
+				"Self-approval is forbidden: the certificate owner cannot approve their own renewal",
+				requestID)
+			return
+		}
 		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
 			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Job not found", requestID)
 			return
@@ -194,7 +210,9 @@ func (h JobHandler) RejectJob(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	if err := h.svc.RejectJob(r.Context(), jobID, body.Reason); err != nil {
+	actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
+
+	if err := h.svc.RejectJob(r.Context(), jobID, body.Reason, actor); err != nil {
 		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
 			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Job not found", requestID)
 			return