Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001)

Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
5c01c7f. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.

M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
  * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
    principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
    credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
    opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
  * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
    constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
    an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
    bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
    now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
    audit_events row.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
        principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
        unauthenticated endpoints.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
        job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.

M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
  * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
    when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
  * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
    viewers receive 403.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
        TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
        TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.

M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
  * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
    authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
    revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
    '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
        GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
            Content-Type: application/pkix-crl   (RFC 5280 §5)
        GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
            Content-Type: application/ocsp-response  (RFC 6960)
  * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
  * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
    CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
  * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
    in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
    SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
        type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
      - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
        access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
      - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
        that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
        mounted on the unauthenticated branch.

M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
  EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
  'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
  internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
  adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.

Verification (all gates green):
  * go vet ./...                                           — clean
  * go build ./...                                         — ok
  * go test -short ./... (55+ packages)                    — all pass
  * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests)                     — all pass
  * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit                                — clean
  * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
    all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.

Documentation:
  * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
    Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
    test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
  * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
    closure note.
  * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
    docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
    docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
    — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
    API keys.
  * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
    and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.

.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.

internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go

@@ -247,26 +247,30 @@ func TestGetCertificateVersions_MultiSegment(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // TestHandleOCSP_MultiSegment exercises the OCSP responder's 2-segment path
-// parser (/api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}). Each leg is attacker-
-// controlled and the serial can be arbitrary length. This is a key adversarial
-// surface because the serial is passed directly to the CA-operations service,
-// which is expected to treat it as an opaque identifier.
+// parser (/.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}). Each leg is
+// attacker-controlled and the serial can be arbitrary length. This is a key
+// adversarial surface because the serial is passed directly to the
+// CA-operations service, which is expected to treat it as an opaque
+// identifier.
+//
+// M-006 relocation: these paths were previously served at /api/v1/ocsp/*;
+// under RFC 8615 and RFC 6960 they now live under /.well-known/pki/ocsp/*.
 func TestHandleOCSP_MultiSegment(t *testing.T) {
 	cases := []struct {
 		name string
 		path string
 	}{
-		{"missing_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local"},
-		{"missing_both", "/api/v1/ocsp/"},
-		{"empty_issuer", "/api/v1/ocsp//01ABCDEF"},
-		{"empty_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/"},
-		{"traversal_issuer", "/api/v1/ocsp/..%2F..%2Fetc/passwd/01"},
-		{"null_byte_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/01\x00FF"},
-		{"sql_injection_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/01'; DROP TABLE--"},
-		{"negative_hex_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/-1"},
-		{"unicode_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/01\u2010FF"},
-		{"extremely_long_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/" + strings.Repeat("F", 10000)},
-		{"extra_segments", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/01FF/extra/segments"},
+		{"missing_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local"},
+		{"missing_both", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/"},
+		{"empty_issuer", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp//01ABCDEF"},
+		{"empty_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/"},
+		{"traversal_issuer", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/..%2F..%2Fetc/passwd/01"},
+		{"null_byte_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/01\x00FF"},
+		{"sql_injection_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/01'; DROP TABLE--"},
+		{"negative_hex_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/-1"},
+		{"unicode_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/01\u2010FF"},
+		{"extremely_long_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/" + strings.Repeat("F", 10000)},
+		{"extra_segments", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/01FF/extra/segments"},
 	}
 
 	for _, tc := range cases {
@@ -301,7 +305,9 @@ func TestHandleOCSP_MultiSegment(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestGetDERCRL_IssuerPathInjection exercises /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id}.
+// TestGetDERCRL_IssuerPathInjection exercises
+// /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id} (RFC 5280 CRL; M-006 relocation from
+// /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id}).
 func TestGetDERCRL_IssuerPathInjection(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tc := range adversarialPathInputs() {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -316,8 +322,8 @@ func TestGetDERCRL_IssuerPathInjection(t *testing.T) {
 				return nil, ErrMockNotFound
 			}
 
-			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/crl/x", nil)
-			req.URL.Path = "/api/v1/crl/" + tc.input
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/pki/crl/x", nil)
+			req.URL.Path = "/.well-known/pki/crl/" + tc.input
 			req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
 
 			w := httptest.NewRecorder()