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auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
@@ -388,6 +388,61 @@ func (r *ActorRoleRepository) Revoke(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorT
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return nil
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}
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func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListDistinctActors(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]repository.ActorWithRoles, error) {
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if tenantID == "" {
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tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
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}
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rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
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SELECT actor_id, actor_type,
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array_agg(role_id ORDER BY role_id) AS role_ids
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FROM actor_roles
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WHERE tenant_id = $1
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AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())
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GROUP BY actor_id, actor_type
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ORDER BY actor_id ASC
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`, tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.listDistinctActors: %w", err)
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var out []repository.ActorWithRoles
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for rows.Next() {
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var a repository.ActorWithRoles
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var actorType string
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// pq.StringArray decodes the postgres array_agg result.
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var roles pq.StringArray
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if err := rows.Scan(&a.ActorID, &actorType, &roles); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.listDistinctActors scan: %w", err)
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}
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a.ActorType = authdomain.ActorTypeValue(actorType)
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a.TenantID = tenantID
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a.RoleIDs = []string(roles)
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out = append(out, a)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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func (r *ActorRoleRepository) AdminExists(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (bool, error) {
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if tenantID == "" {
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tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
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}
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// Exclude the seeded synthetic demo actor so a demo deploy that
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// later switches to api-key mode can still bootstrap the first
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// real admin. Matches the carve-out documented on the interface.
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var count int
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err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
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SELECT COUNT(*) FROM actor_roles
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WHERE role_id = $1
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AND tenant_id = $2
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AND actor_id != $3
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AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())
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`, authdomain.RoleIDAdmin, tenantID, authdomain.DemoAnonActorID).Scan(&count)
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if err != nil {
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return false, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.adminExists: %w", err)
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}
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return count > 0, nil
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}
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func (r *ActorRoleRepository) EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
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rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
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SELECT DISTINCT p.name, rp.scope_type, rp.scope_id
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@@ -440,3 +495,115 @@ func scanActorRoles(rows *sql.Rows) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// APIKeyRepository (Bundle 1 Phase 6 — bootstrap path)
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// =============================================================================
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// APIKeyRepository is the postgres implementation of
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// repository.APIKeyRepository. Stores SHA-256 hashes only; the
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// plaintext key value is never persisted.
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type APIKeyRepository struct {
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db *sql.DB
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}
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// NewAPIKeyRepository constructs an APIKeyRepository.
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func NewAPIKeyRepository(db *sql.DB) *APIKeyRepository {
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return &APIKeyRepository{db: db}
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}
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func (r *APIKeyRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, k *authdomain.APIKey) error {
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if k.ID == "" {
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k.ID = "ak-" + uuid.NewString()
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}
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if k.TenantID == "" {
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k.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
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}
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if k.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
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k.CreatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
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}
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var expires interface{}
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if k.ExpiresAt != nil {
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expires = *k.ExpiresAt
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}
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_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO api_keys (id, name, key_hash, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)
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`, k.ID, k.Name, k.KeyHash, k.TenantID, k.Admin, k.CreatedBy, k.CreatedAt, expires)
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if err != nil {
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// Translate UNIQUE-constraint violations to the canonical
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// auth sentinel so the service layer can return 409.
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if pqErr, ok := err.(*pq.Error); ok && pqErr.Code == "23505" {
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return repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("apiKey.create: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (r *APIKeyRepository) GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.APIKey, error) {
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row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
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SELECT id, name, key_hash, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at
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FROM api_keys WHERE name = $1
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`, name)
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var k authdomain.APIKey
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var expires, lastUsed sql.NullTime
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if err := row.Scan(&k.ID, &k.Name, &k.KeyHash, &k.TenantID, &k.Admin, &k.CreatedBy, &k.CreatedAt, &expires, &lastUsed); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("apiKey.getByName: %w", err)
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}
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if expires.Valid {
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t := expires.Time
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k.ExpiresAt = &t
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}
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if lastUsed.Valid {
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t := lastUsed.Time
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k.LastUsedAt = &t
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}
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return &k, nil
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}
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func (r *APIKeyRepository) List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.APIKey, error) {
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if tenantID == "" {
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tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
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}
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rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
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SELECT id, name, key_hash, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at
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FROM api_keys WHERE tenant_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at DESC
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`, tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("apiKey.list: %w", err)
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var out []*authdomain.APIKey
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for rows.Next() {
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var k authdomain.APIKey
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var expires, lastUsed sql.NullTime
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if err := rows.Scan(&k.ID, &k.Name, &k.KeyHash, &k.TenantID, &k.Admin, &k.CreatedBy, &k.CreatedAt, &expires, &lastUsed); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("apiKey.list scan: %w", err)
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}
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if expires.Valid {
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t := expires.Time
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k.ExpiresAt = &t
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}
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if lastUsed.Valid {
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t := lastUsed.Time
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k.LastUsedAt = &t
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}
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out = append(out, &k)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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func (r *APIKeyRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error {
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res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM api_keys WHERE name = $1`, name)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("apiKey.delete: %w", err)
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}
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if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n == 0 {
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return repository.ErrAuthNotFound
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}
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return nil
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}
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