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auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split

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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap

* internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface +
  EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption
  via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC-
  first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy.
* BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's
  CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API
  key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin
  via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just-
  minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and
  records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth.
* internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface +
  StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore
  (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth
  middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can
  extend the lookup table at runtime.
* migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with
  (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by,
  created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent.
* /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both
  routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes
  allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap;
  the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body.
* Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND
  admin actors already exist (config drift signal).
* Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong
  token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption,
  admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor-
  name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps
  guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status
  201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog +
  audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects
  slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope.

# Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI

* GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by
  ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per
  (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold.
  Permission: auth.role.list.
* internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown
  (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config),
  AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The
  synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive /
  bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly.
* SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of
  audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role
  (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason.
  Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP
  → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent;
  otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications.
* CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys
  scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'.
* CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
  call-out + four flow examples.

# Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column

* migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE
  audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT
  'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config)
  + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes
  for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration
  000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is
  not blocked).
* domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty);
  domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants.
* AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent;
  legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle).
  Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService)
  switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...).
* GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query
  param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value),
  dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated
  with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema.
* Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category;
  AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory
  gates the WHERE clause.
* Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing,
  back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values
  accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the
  field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly
  audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from
  viewer except audit.read).

# Cross-phase wiring

* HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires
  the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted
  assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the
  keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos).
* AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys
  to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated.
* fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain
  RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing
  tests untouched.

# Verifications

* gofmt -l: clean across every modified file.
* go vet ./...: clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched
  package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler,
  internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth,
  internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres,
  cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware,
  cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-09 20:15:43 +00:00
parent 60a589ab96
commit 3ef45e2ad4
38 changed files with 3159 additions and 140 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
internal/auth/middleware.go
+23 -40
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package auth
import (
"context"
"crypto/subtle"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
@@ -44,27 +43,23 @@ func NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys []NamedAPIKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handl
return next
}
}
// Pre-compute hashes of all valid keys for constant-time comparison.
type keyEntry struct {
hash string
name string
admin bool
}
var entries []keyEntry
for _, nk := range namedKeys {
entries = append(entries, keyEntry{
hash: HashAPIKey(nk.Key),
name: nk.Name,
admin: nk.Admin,
})
}
// Warn if only one key is configured in production mode
if len(entries) == 1 {
if len(namedKeys) == 1 {
slog.Warn("only one API key configured — consider adding a rotation key for zero-downtime rotation")
}
return NewAuthWithKeyStore(NewStaticKeyStore(namedKeys))
}
// NewAuthWithKeyStore is the Bundle-1 Phase-6 entry point. It builds a
// Bearer-token middleware whose lookup table is supplied by the caller
// instead of being baked into the closure. Production wiring passes a
// MutableKeyStore so the bootstrap path can mint new admin keys at
// runtime; tests pass a StaticKeyStore for the immutable case. A nil
// store yields the demo-mode pass-through (matches NewAuthWithNamedKeys
// with an empty slice).
func NewAuthWithKeyStore(store KeyStore) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
if store == nil {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler { return next }
}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
@@ -74,8 +69,6 @@ func NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys []NamedAPIKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handl
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Authorization header required"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Extract Bearer token
if len(authHeader) < 8 || authHeader[:7] != "Bearer " {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid Authorization header format, expected: Bearer <token>"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
@@ -83,30 +76,20 @@ func NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys []NamedAPIKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handl
}
token := authHeader[7:]
tokenHash := HashAPIKey(token)
// Check against all valid keys using constant-time comparison
var matched *keyEntry
for i := range entries {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(tokenHash), []byte(entries[i].hash)) == 1 {
matched = &entries[i]
break
}
}
if matched == nil {
matched, ok := store.LookupByHash(HashAPIKey(token))
if !ok {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid API key"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Store the authenticated identity and admin flag in context.
// Bundle 1 Phase 0: legacy UserKey + AdminKey for back-compat.
// Bundle 1 Phase 3: new ActorIDKey + ActorTypeKey + TenantIDKey
// for RBAC-aware downstream code (RequirePermission, etc.).
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserKey{}, matched.name)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, matched.admin)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorIDKey{}, matched.name)
// Bundle 1 Phase 0 legacy UserKey/AdminKey + Phase 3 RBAC
// ActorIDKey/ActorTypeKey/TenantIDKey are populated on every
// authenticated request so downstream RequirePermission +
// audit-attribution code see a consistent actor.
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserKey{}, matched.Name)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, matched.Admin)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorIDKey{}, matched.Name)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorTypeKey{}, ActorTypeAPIKey)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, TenantIDKey{}, DefaultTenantID)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))