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auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split

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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap

* internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface +
  EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption
  via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC-
  first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy.
* BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's
  CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API
  key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin
  via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just-
  minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and
  records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth.
* internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface +
  StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore
  (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth
  middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can
  extend the lookup table at runtime.
* migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with
  (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by,
  created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent.
* /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both
  routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes
  allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap;
  the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body.
* Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND
  admin actors already exist (config drift signal).
* Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong
  token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption,
  admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor-
  name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps
  guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status
  201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog +
  audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects
  slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope.

# Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI

* GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by
  ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per
  (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold.
  Permission: auth.role.list.
* internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown
  (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config),
  AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The
  synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive /
  bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly.
* SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of
  audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role
  (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason.
  Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP
  → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent;
  otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications.
* CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys
  scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'.
* CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
  call-out + four flow examples.

# Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column

* migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE
  audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT
  'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config)
  + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes
  for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration
  000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is
  not blocked).
* domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty);
  domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants.
* AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent;
  legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle).
  Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService)
  switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...).
* GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query
  param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value),
  dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated
  with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema.
* Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category;
  AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory
  gates the WHERE clause.
* Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing,
  back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values
  accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the
  field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly
  audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from
  viewer except audit.read).

# Cross-phase wiring

* HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires
  the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted
  assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the
  keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos).
* AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys
  to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated.
* fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain
  RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing
  tests untouched.

# Verifications

* gofmt -l: clean across every modified file.
* go vet ./...: clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched
  package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler,
  internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth,
  internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres,
  cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware,
  cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-09 20:15:43 +00:00
parent 60a589ab96
commit 3ef45e2ad4
38 changed files with 3159 additions and 140 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
internal/api/router/router.go
+29 -4
View File
@@ -78,10 +78,12 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterFunc(pattern string, handler func(http.ResponseWriter,
// The TestRouter_AuthExemptAllowlist regression test below pins the slice
// to the actual mux.Handle calls — adding an undocumented bypass fails CI.
var AuthExemptRouterRoutes = []string{
"GET /health", // K8s/Docker liveness probe; cannot carry Bearer
"GET /ready", // K8s/Docker readiness probe; cannot carry Bearer
"GET /api/v1/auth/info", // GUI calls before login to detect auth mode
"GET /api/v1/version", // Rollout probes need build identity without key
"GET /health", // K8s/Docker liveness probe; cannot carry Bearer
"GET /ready", // K8s/Docker readiness probe; cannot carry Bearer
"GET /api/v1/auth/info", // GUI calls before login to detect auth mode
"GET /api/v1/version", // Rollout probes need build identity without key
"GET /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", // Bundle 1 Phase 6 — GUI / install one-liner probes "is bootstrap available?" pre-admin; safe (no token, no admin probe leakage)
"POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", // Bundle 1 Phase 6 — operator POSTs CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN to mint the first admin; the endpoint is gated by the bootstrap.Strategy and the admin-existence probe
}
// AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes is the documented allowlist of URL prefixes
@@ -131,6 +133,13 @@ type HandlerRegistry struct {
// PermissionService dependencies. Phase 5 ships the CLI mirror.
Auth handler.AuthHandler
// Bootstrap (Bundle 1 Phase 6) handles the day-0 admin path under
// /api/v1/auth/bootstrap. GET probes availability without revealing
// state; POST consumes CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN once and mints the
// first admin API key. Both routes are auth-exempt (the endpoint
// itself authenticates via the bootstrap token).
Bootstrap handler.BootstrapHandler
// Checker is the load-bearing auth.PermissionChecker that
// auth.RequirePermission middleware uses to gate the legacy admin
// handlers (Bundle 1 Phase 3.5). cmd/server wires the postgres
@@ -245,6 +254,21 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
// Auth check endpoint (uses full middleware chain via r.Register)
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/check", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Health.AuthCheck))
// Bundle 1 Phase 6 — bootstrap routes. Auth-exempt because the
// endpoint itself authenticates via the CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN
// (see internal/auth/bootstrap). Both routes are pinned in the
// AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist above.
r.mux.Handle("GET /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", middleware.Chain(
http.HandlerFunc(reg.Bootstrap.Available),
middleware.CORS,
middleware.ContentType,
))
r.mux.Handle("POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", middleware.Chain(
http.HandlerFunc(reg.Bootstrap.Mint),
middleware.CORS,
middleware.ContentType,
))
// RBAC management routes (Bundle 1 Phase 4). Permission gates are
// enforced inside each handler via the service layer; the Phase 3
// auth.RequirePermission middleware factory will wrap these in a
@@ -259,6 +283,7 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.DeleteRole))
r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.AddRolePermission))
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.RemoveRolePermission))
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/keys", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.ListKeys))
r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.AssignRoleToKey))
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.RevokeRoleFromKey))