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auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split

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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap

* internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface +
  EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption
  via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC-
  first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy.
* BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's
  CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API
  key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin
  via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just-
  minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and
  records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth.
* internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface +
  StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore
  (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth
  middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can
  extend the lookup table at runtime.
* migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with
  (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by,
  created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent.
* /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both
  routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes
  allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap;
  the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body.
* Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND
  admin actors already exist (config drift signal).
* Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong
  token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption,
  admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor-
  name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps
  guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status
  201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog +
  audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects
  slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope.

# Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI

* GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by
  ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per
  (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold.
  Permission: auth.role.list.
* internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown
  (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config),
  AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The
  synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive /
  bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly.
* SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of
  audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role
  (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason.
  Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP
  → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent;
  otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications.
* CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys
  scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'.
* CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
  call-out + four flow examples.

# Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column

* migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE
  audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT
  'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config)
  + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes
  for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration
  000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is
  not blocked).
* domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty);
  domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants.
* AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent;
  legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle).
  Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService)
  switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...).
* GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query
  param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value),
  dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated
  with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema.
* Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category;
  AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory
  gates the WHERE clause.
* Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing,
  back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values
  accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the
  field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly
  audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from
  viewer except audit.read).

# Cross-phase wiring

* HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires
  the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted
  assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the
  keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos).
* AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys
  to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated.
* fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain
  RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing
  tests untouched.

# Verifications

* gofmt -l: clean across every modified file.
* go vet ./...: clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched
  package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler,
  internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth,
  internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres,
  cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware,
  cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-09 20:15:43 +00:00
parent 99826c11e6
commit 3c605d5618
38 changed files with 3159 additions and 140 deletions
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api/openapi.yaml
+132
View File
@@ -220,6 +220,80 @@ paths:
# lifecycle, `auth.key.*` for key management. Read endpoints require
# `auth.role.list`. The /v1/auth/me endpoint has no permission gate
# (every authenticated caller can read their own permissions).
/api/v1/auth/bootstrap:
get:
tags: [Auth]
summary: Probe whether the day-0 bootstrap endpoint is callable
description: |
Returns `{available: true}` when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set
AND no admin-roled actor exists yet; otherwise `{available: false}`.
Auth-exempt because it serves the GUI / install one-liner before
the first admin key has been minted. Bundle 1 Phase 6.
security: []
operationId: getAuthBootstrap
responses:
"200":
description: Bootstrap availability
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object
required: [available]
properties:
available:
type: boolean
post:
tags: [Auth]
summary: Mint the first admin API key from a one-shot bootstrap token
description: |
Operator POSTs the CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN value plus the desired
admin-key name. Returns the freshly minted plaintext key value
once; the server stores only the SHA-256 hash. Subsequent calls
return 410 Gone (the strategy is one-shot AND the admin-existence
probe re-closes the door once the new admin lands). Auth-exempt
because the endpoint authenticates via the bootstrap token
itself. Bundle 1 Phase 6.
security: []
operationId: postAuthBootstrap
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object
required: [token, actor_name]
properties:
token:
type: string
description: The CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN value (constant-time compared server-side).
actor_name:
type: string
description: 3-64 chars, lowercase alphanumeric + hyphen + underscore.
pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{2,63}$"
responses:
"201":
description: Admin key minted
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object
required: [actor_id, api_key_id, key_value, created_at, message]
properties:
actor_id: { type: string }
api_key_id: { type: string }
key_value:
type: string
description: The plaintext API key. Capture this — it is shown only once.
created_at: { type: string, format: date-time }
message: { type: string }
"400": { description: Invalid actor_name or malformed body }
"401": { description: Bootstrap token mismatch }
"410":
description: |
Endpoint disabled. Either CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is unset,
an admin actor already exists, or the strategy was already
consumed by a successful prior call.
/api/v1/auth/me:
get:
tags: [Auth]
@@ -462,6 +536,43 @@ paths:
"403": { description: Forbidden }
"404": { description: Role or permission grant not found }
/api/v1/auth/keys:
get:
tags: [Auth]
summary: List actors with role grants in the active tenant
description: |
Returns every distinct (actor_id, actor_type) pair in the
tenant that holds at least one role grant. Bundle 1 Phase 7
ships this so the CLI's `auth keys list` and scope-down helper
can enumerate the operator-key population without joining
against the env-var-loaded namedKeys directly. Permission
`auth.role.list`.
operationId: listAuthKeys
responses:
"200":
description: Actor list with role assignments
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object
properties:
keys:
type: array
items:
type: object
required: [actor_id, actor_type, tenant_id, role_ids]
properties:
actor_id: { type: string }
actor_type:
type: string
enum: [User, System, Agent, APIKey, Anonymous]
tenant_id: { type: string }
role_ids:
type: array
items: { type: string }
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
"403": { description: Forbidden }
/api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles:
post:
tags: [Auth]
@@ -3057,10 +3168,22 @@ paths:
get:
tags: [Audit]
summary: List audit events
description: |
Bundle 1 Phase 8 adds the optional `category` query parameter
for auditor-role filtering. Allowed values: `cert_lifecycle`
(cert/agent/deployment events), `auth` (role/key/bootstrap
mutations), `config` (issuer/target/settings edits). Omitting
the parameter returns every category.
operationId: listAuditEvents
parameters:
- $ref: "#/components/parameters/page"
- $ref: "#/components/parameters/per_page"
- in: query
name: category
schema:
type: string
enum: [cert_lifecycle, auth, config]
description: Filter to events of this event_category. (Bundle 1 Phase 8)
responses:
"200":
description: Paginated list of audit events
@@ -3075,6 +3198,8 @@ paths:
type: array
items:
$ref: "#/components/schemas/AuditEvent"
"400":
description: Invalid `category` value
"500":
$ref: "#/components/responses/InternalError"
@@ -5699,6 +5824,13 @@ components:
timestamp:
type: string
format: date-time
event_category:
type: string
enum: [cert_lifecycle, auth, config]
description: |
Bundle 1 Phase 8: classifies the event for auditor-role
filtering. Empty / absent on rows from pre-Phase-8
deployments (the migration backfills "cert_lifecycle").
# ─── Notifications ───────────────────────────────────────────────
NotificationType: