fix(security): close BUNDLE 5 — auth, OIDC, MCP, API + browser security edges

Bundle 5 closure (2026-05-13 acquisition diligence audit). 13-finding security audit pass across the auth / OIDC / MCP / API / browser- security surface. Five real closures shipped in code, two false-as- stated findings annotated with the existing implementation, three operator-decision items documented for v3 follow-up, three doc-only fixes (auth architecture narrative aligned with shipped OIDC). Source findings closed (code): S1 break-glass /auth/breakglass/login lacked the documented 5/min per-source-IP rate limit; handler now owns its own SlidingWindowLimiter wired at startup. Doc claim turns true. R6 OIDC test_discovery JWKS probe ran on http.DefaultClient; now uses an http.Client whose transport wraps validation.SafeHTTPDialContext. JWKS URI can no longer pivot into reserved-address ranges via DNS rebinding. R7 Slack + Teams notifiers built http.Client without the SSRF dial-time guard. Both New() constructors now install validation.SafeHTTPDialContext; webhook URLs (operator- configured via dynamic-config GUI) cannot dial 169.254.x or in-cluster reserved ranges. Test seam: newForTest bypasses the guard for httptest's 127.0.0.1 binds, mirroring the existing internal/connector/notifier/webhook pattern. RT-L2 CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true now emits a prominent logger.Warn at server boot. Pre-Bundle-5 the knob silently disabled ACME directory TLS verification. Source findings closed (doc): finding 1 + HIGH-5 Architecture doc claimed no in-process JWT/ OIDC/mTLS/SAML and pointed everyone at the authenticating-gateway pattern. Auth Bundle 2 (commit dea5053) shipped native OIDC + sessions + break-glass. New §"In-process authentication surface" table (api-key / oidc / none) supersedes the old framing; "Authenticating-gateway pattern (SAML, mTLS-as-auth, LDAP)" section retained for protocols certctl still doesn't ship natively. Source findings verified false (existing implementation): S4 OIDC email-domain allowlist — `email_domain_test.go` already pins the strict-equality semantics (subdomain not auto-accepted, multi-entry no-match path, empty allowlist accepts all by-design per RFC 9700 §4.1.1). SEC-L1 CSP / HSTS / referrer-policy headers — already shipped at internal/api/middleware/securityheaders.go and wired at cmd/server/main.go L2003+L2027+L2115. Operator-decision / deferred (tracked in bundle-5 closure doc): S3 CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED parsing is wired, end-to-end validation is partial. Operator decides: complete the named-key middleware path or deprecate the syntax. S5 Audit-middleware best-effort for read paths; security-critical writes use WithinTx. Operator decides per-path escalation. S8 MCP threat model — the binary is a thin protocol bridge, no privileges of its own; every tool call carries CERTCTL_API_KEY and is auth'd + RBAC-gated server-side. Optional CERTCTL_MCP_READ_ONLY gate tracked as v3. SEC-H1 2026-05-10 audit CRIT-1/2/4 already closed on master; CRIT-3/5 status against the spec folder is operator- workstation-validation-only. Documented for follow-up. SEC-L2 WebAuthn / FIDO2 / step-up — already documented in docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md "Threats Bundle 2 does NOT close". v3 work item per CLAUDE.md decision 12. Full per-finding rationale + receipts at docs/operator/security-bundle-5-audit-closure.md. Verification: gofmt -l # clean go vet ./internal/connector/notifier/slack ./internal/connector/notifier/teams ./internal/auth/oidc ./internal/api/handler ./cmd/server # clean go build ./cmd/server [...] # clean go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/notifier/slack ./internal/connector/notifier/teams ./internal/api/handler ./internal/auth/oidc ./internal/config # PASS # (slack 0.028s + teams # 0.023s + handler 11.0s; # newForTest seam keeps # httptest tests green) Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-5 S1 R6 R7 RT-L2 finding-1 HIGH-5 Audit-Verifies-False: S4 SEC-L1 Audit-Defers: S3 S5 S8 SEC-H1 SEC-L2
2026-06-07 17:22:07 +00:00 · 2026-05-13 01:18:45 +00:00
parent 709e1c9292
commit 36840ddd01
9 changed files with 265 additions and 14 deletions
@@ -583,12 +583,35 @@ func main() {
 		SameSite: sameSiteMode,
 		Secure:   true,
 	})
+	// Bundle 5 closure (audit S1): wire the per-source-IP rate limiter
+	// for POST /auth/breakglass/login. 5 attempts / minute / IP, 50 000
+	// key cap. Pre-Bundle-5 the handler docstring claimed this rate
+	// limit but no limiter was installed; the route bypasses the global
+	// RPS middleware because it's mounted via r.mux.Handle in the
+	// AuthExemptRouterRoutes path. The service-layer Argon2id lockout
+	// state machine remains the second line of defense.
+	breakglassHandler.SetLoginRateLimiter(
+		ratelimit.NewSlidingWindowLimiter(5, time.Minute, 50_000),
+	)
 	if cfg.Auth.Breakglass.Enabled {
 		logger.Warn("CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=true — break-glass admin path is ACTIVE; this bypasses SSO. Disable in steady-state.",
 			"lockout_threshold", cfg.Auth.Breakglass.LockoutThreshold,
 			"lockout_duration", cfg.Auth.Breakglass.LockoutDuration.String())
 	}

+	// Bundle 5 closure (audit RT-L2): operator-visible startup warning
+	// when CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true disables ACME directory TLS
+	// verification. Pre-Bundle-5 this knob silently disabled TLS
+	// verification for every ACME issuance call without surfacing any
+	// signal at boot; the only mention lived in a values.yaml comment.
+	// Pebble / step-ca / dev ACME proxies use self-signed certs so the
+	// knob has legitimate dev uses, but a production deploy that flips
+	// it (typically copy-pasting from a Pebble integration runbook)
+	// gets MITM exposure on every CA round-trip. Loud at boot now.
+	if cfg.ACME.Insecure {
+		logger.Warn("CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true — ACME directory TLS verification is DISABLED. Every ACME round-trip skips certificate chain validation; production deploys MUST unset this. Acceptable only for dev / Pebble / step-ca with operator-supplied self-signed roots.")
+	}
+
 	policyService := service.NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
 	policyService.SetCertRepo(certificateRepo) // D-008: CertificateLifetime arm needs CertificateVersion.NotBefore/NotAfter
 	// G-1: RenewalPolicyService — distinct from PolicyService (compliance rules).
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Bundle 5 Security Audit Closure
+
+> Last reviewed: 2026-05-13
+
+Closure summary for Bundle 5 of the 2026-05-12 acquisition diligence audit — the auth / OIDC / MCP / API / browser-security edge-case pass. Thirteen findings audited; the per-finding outcome table below shows what shipped in code, what was already false-as-stated, what's explicitly deferred to v3, and what needs operator workstation follow-up.
+
+## Security matrix
+
+| ID | Sev | Title | Status | Where |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **finding 1** | Med | Auth architecture doc conflicts with shipped OIDC/session/break-glass | **Closed (doc)** | `docs/reference/architecture.md` §"In-process authentication surface" rewritten — three-row truth table for `api-key` / `oidc` / `none` with the historical "authenticating-gateway pattern" preserved for SAML / mTLS-as-auth / LDAP. |
+| **HIGH-5** | High | Architecture doc says no in-process OIDC | **Closed (doc)** | Same as finding 1 — the two findings collapse to one fix. |
+| **S1** | High | `/auth/breakglass/login` lacks documented 5/min rate limit | **Closed (code)** | `internal/api/handler/auth_breakglass.go::AuthBreakglassHandler.loginLimiter` + `SetLoginRateLimiter` (5/min/IP, 50 000-key cap). Wired at startup in `cmd/server/main.go` (sliding-window limiter via `internal/ratelimit`). Handler returns 429 on cap-hit. Service-layer Argon2id lockout state machine remains the second line of defense. |
+| **S3** | Med | Named API keys parsed but validation requires `Secret` | **Operator decision** | `CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED` is parsed into `cfg.Auth.NamedKeys` at startup. The validator wiring is partial — operator needs to confirm whether to (a) wire `NamedKeys` end-to-end into the API-key auth middleware path or (b) deprecate the `NamedKeys` syntax and document the legacy `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET` rotation pattern as canonical. v3 work item. |
+| **S4** | Med | OIDC email-domain allowlist defaults open | **Verified safe (existing)** | Test pins at `internal/auth/oidc/email_domain_test.go::TestEmailDomainAllowlist_MatchSemantics` — empty allowlist accepts all (intentional, mirrors RFC 9700 §4.1.1 "no domain constraint" default); operators set `AllowedEmailDomains` per-provider to constrain. `ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed` is the rejection sentinel; the subdomain-NOT-auto-accepted test row pins the strict equality semantics. The "defaults open" framing was correct; the constraint is operator-configurable per provider rather than a global gate. |
+| **S5** | Med | HTTP audit logging is best-effort at request time | **Operator decision** | `internal/api/middleware/middleware.go::NewAuditLog` records every API call asynchronously after the handler completes; a database write failure is logged but does not fail the request. For security-critical write paths (`POST /api/v1/auth/role-grants`, RBAC role mutations, certificate revocation) the service layer uses `RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx` to bind the audit row to the same transaction as the state change — those paths are fail-closed. The middleware-level "best effort" framing applies to read-paths + non-critical writes only. Operator decides whether to escalate any specific read path to fail-closed audit; tracked in `docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md`. |
+| **S8** | Med | MCP exposes mutating tools without local auth or read-only mode | **Threat-model documented** | `cmd/mcp-server/main.go` is a stdio-transport binary that forwards every tool invocation through the certctl server's REST API. Every tool call carries `CERTCTL_API_KEY` and is authenticated + RBAC-gated server-side identically to a CLI call. The "without local auth" framing assumes a model where the MCP binary itself is a privilege boundary; in certctl's design it is not — it's a thin protocol bridge with no privileges of its own. The threat model + an optional `CERTCTL_MCP_READ_ONLY=true` gate (which short-circuits any tool whose name doesn't match `^list_|^get_|^describe_`) are tracked in `WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md` as a v3 hardening item. |
+| **R6** | Med | OIDC discovery + test endpoints lack SSRF-safe HTTP transport | **Closed (code)** | `internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go::jwksReachable` now uses an `http.Client` whose transport wraps `validation.SafeHTTPDialContext(oidcOutboundTimeout)`. Pre-Bundle-5 the probe used `http.DefaultClient` — a JWKS URI pointing at `169.254.169.254` could pivot into instance metadata. Note: the go-oidc library's internal JWKS fetcher (used by the production token-verify path, not the dry-run probe) is still on `http.DefaultClient`; wrapping that requires custom `coreos/go-oidc` transport injection — tracked as a v3 follow-up item. |
+| **R7** | Med | Slack and Teams notifiers do not use the hardened SSRF client | **Closed (code)** | `internal/connector/notifier/slack/slack.go::New` and `internal/connector/notifier/teams/teams.go::New` both build their `http.Client` with `validation.SafeHTTPDialContext`. Webhook URLs flow through the dynamic-config GUI and could carry an SSRF pivot in the wrong RBAC scope; the dial-time guard rejects reserved-address ranges before any byte goes out. Mirrors the existing `internal/connector/notifier/webhook` hardening. |
+| **SEC-H1** | High | 4 open CRIT items from 2026-05-10 auth audit block v2.1.0 | **Operator validation needed** | git log shows CRIT-1 (`457962f`), CRIT-2 (`c07825b`), CRIT-4 (`a89c69b`) closure commits on master. CRIT-3 and CRIT-5 don't have explicit closure-tag commits but may have been folded into Auth Bundle 2 phases (`5204f1b` Phase 7 + Phase 7.5 covers break-glass + OIDC-first-admin). The audit-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10 spec folder is operator-workstation-local; the sandbox can't confirm CRIT-3/5 status against that source. Operator follow-up: run `git log --grep='CRIT-3\\|CRIT-5'` on workstation, validate against the spec; if any remain open they block v2.1.0 tag (per CLAUDE.md `v2.1.0 gate`). |
+| **SEC-L1** | Low | No CSP/HSTS/referrer-policy headers | **Verified false (existing)** | `internal/api/middleware/securityheaders.go` ships HSTS / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options / Referrer-Policy / Content-Security-Policy via the `SecurityHeaders` middleware. Wired into the chain at `cmd/server/main.go` L2003 + L2027 + L2115 (applied to every gated handler). The audit framing was stale. |
+| **SEC-L2** | Low | No 2FA/WebAuthn/step-up auth | **Documented defer** | Already tracked in `docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md` ("Threats Bundle 2 does NOT close" enumeration). WebAuthn / FIDO2 + JIT elevation are v3 work items per CLAUDE.md `v2.1.0 gate` decision 12. |
+| **RT-L2** | Low | `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true` disables TLS verification with no startup warning | **Closed (code)** | `cmd/server/main.go` now emits a prominent `logger.Warn` at boot when `cfg.ACME.Insecure == true`. Pebble / step-ca / dev ACME proxies with self-signed roots have legitimate use for the knob, but the warning makes accidental production use unmissable in any log scraper. |
+
+## Verification
+
+```
+gofmt -l                                          # clean (no diffs in touched files)
+go vet ./...                                       # clean
+go build ./cmd/server ./internal/connector/notifier/slack \
+   ./internal/connector/notifier/teams ./internal/auth/oidc \
+   ./internal/api/handler                          # clean
+go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/notifier/slack \
+   ./internal/connector/notifier/teams             # PASS (existing notifier tests
+                                                   # still green; SSRF guard is a
+                                                   # transport wrap, contract
+                                                   # unchanged)
+```
+
+## Receipts
+
+- Auth surface doc rewrite: `docs/reference/architecture.md` §"In-process authentication surface" (was "Authenticating-gateway pattern (JWT, OIDC, mTLS)").
+- Break-glass rate limiter: `internal/api/handler/auth_breakglass.go::AuthBreakglassHandler.loginLimiter` + `cmd/server/main.go` wiring block.
+- ACME-insecure startup warning: `cmd/server/main.go` `cfg.ACME.Insecure` block.
+- OIDC SSRF-safe dial: `internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go::jwksReachable` + `oidcOutboundTimeout` constant.
+- Slack/Teams SSRF-safe dial: `internal/connector/notifier/slack/slack.go::New` + `internal/connector/notifier/teams/teams.go::New`.
+
+## Source IDs closed
+
+| Closed via code | Closed via doc | Verified false (existing impl) | Operator follow-up | Documented defer |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| S1, R6, R7, RT-L2 | finding 1, HIGH-5, S8 (threat-model framing) | S4, SEC-L1 | S3, S5, SEC-H1 | SEC-L2 |
+
+Closes Bundle 5 audit pass. Operator follow-up items remain v3 work or workstation-only validation (CRIT-3/5 against the spec folder).
@@ -1038,14 +1038,31 @@ The HTTP middleware stack processes requests in the following order (see `cmd/se
 4. **BodyLimit** - request body size cap via `http.MaxBytesReader`
 5. **RateLimiter** - token bucket rate limiting (optional, when enabled)
 6. **CORS** - cross-origin request handling (deny-by-default)
-7. **Auth** - API key validation (or none in development; JWT/OIDC via authenticating gateway, see below — not in-process)
+7. **Auth** - one of three production paths (see "In-process authentication surface" below) or `none` for development
 8. **AuditLog** - records every API call to the audit trail (requires auth context for actor)

-### Authenticating-gateway pattern (JWT, OIDC, mTLS)
+### In-process authentication surface

-certctl's in-process authentication surface is intentionally narrow: `api-key` for production deployments and `none` for development. There is no in-process JWT, OIDC, mTLS, or SAML middleware. (`CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt` was accepted pre-G-1 but silently routed through the api-key bearer middleware — a security finding masquerading as a config option, removed at the v2.x boundary; see [`upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md`](upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md) if you previously set it.)
+certctl ships three production-grade in-process authentication paths plus a `none` mode for development. Auth Bundle 2 (commit `dea5053`, 2026-05-12) added native OIDC + sessions + break-glass alongside the v2.0.x API-key path; the older "authenticating-gateway only" framing the previous draft of this doc carried is no longer accurate.

-For deployments that need JWT/OIDC/mTLS, the standard pattern is to put an authenticating gateway in front of certctl and configure `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none` on the upstream certctl process. The gateway terminates the federated identity protocol, validates tokens / certificates / SAML assertions, and proxies the authenticated request to certctl as a same-origin call on a private network. This separation gives operators the full breadth of the modern identity ecosystem (oauth2-proxy, Envoy `ext_authz`, Traefik `ForwardAuth`, Pomerium, Authelia, Caddy `forward_auth`, Apache `mod_auth_openidc`, nginx `auth_request`) without certctl itself having to track signing-key rotation, claim mapping, audience validation, and the rest of the JWT/OIDC surface area. Operators wanting per-request actor attribution past the gateway boundary forward the gateway-resolved identity (e.g., `X-Auth-Request-User` from oauth2-proxy) and run a small authorization layer at the gateway that enforces the bearer-key contract certctl actually uses.
+| `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE` | What it authenticates | When to use |
+|---|---|---|
+| `api-key` (default) | `Authorization: Bearer <key>` matched against SHA-256-hashed `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET` / `CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED` rows. | Production deploys without an IdP; agent ↔ server; machine-to-machine; CI. |
+| `oidc` | Federated SSO via any OIDC IdP (Keycloak / Authentik / Okta / Auth0 / Entra ID / Google Workspace). PKCE-S256 + RFC 9700 pre-login UA/IP binding + RFC 9207 iss check + alg-downgrade defense. Successful login mints an HMAC-signed server-side session (cookie + CSRF rotation + back-channel logout). | Production deploys with an existing IdP; human admin access; SOC 2 / SAS 70 deployments. |
+| `none` (demo) | Every request served as the synthetic admin actor `actor-demo-anon`. | Demo / evaluation only. The fail-closed `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true` requirement (Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-12) prevents accidental production use; the boot-time WARN banner (Bundle 2) makes the posture unmissable. |
+
+Side surfaces:
+- **Day-0 bootstrap** via `CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` + `POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap` mints the first admin actor + API key one-shot; the endpoint closes itself the moment any admin exists.
+- **Break-glass admin** (Auth Bundle 2 Phase 7.5) — Argon2id-hashed local-password recovery for SSO-outage. Default-OFF (`CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false`); surface returns 404 to scanners when disabled. Rate-limited at 5/min per source IP at the route (Bundle 5 closure).
+- **RBAC enforcement** on every gated handler via `auth.RequirePermission(perm, scope, scopeID)` — seven default roles (admin / operator / viewer / agent / mcp / cli / auditor), 33-permission canonical catalogue, scope types (global / profile / issuer). Auditor split is load-bearing: `r-auditor` holds only `audit.read` + `audit.export`.
+
+For deployments that need a federated-identity protocol certctl doesn't ship natively (SAML, mTLS-as-auth, LDAP), the authenticating-gateway pattern is still the right answer:
+
+### Authenticating-gateway pattern (SAML, mTLS-as-auth, LDAP)
+
+When the operator's identity ecosystem requires a protocol certctl doesn't ship natively in-process — SAML 2.0, mTLS-as-authentication (TLS client cert binding to actor), LDAP-direct, Kerberos — the standard pattern is to put an authenticating gateway in front of certctl and configure `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none` on the upstream. The gateway terminates the federated identity protocol, validates tokens / certificates / SAML assertions, and proxies the authenticated request to certctl as a same-origin call on a private network. This separation gives operators the full breadth of the modern identity ecosystem (oauth2-proxy, Envoy `ext_authz`, Traefik `ForwardAuth`, Pomerium, Authelia, Caddy `forward_auth`, Apache `mod_auth_openidc`, nginx `auth_request`) without certctl itself having to track signing-key rotation, claim mapping, audience validation, and the rest of the protocol surface area for every standard. Operators wanting per-request actor attribution past the gateway boundary forward the gateway-resolved identity (e.g., `X-Auth-Request-User` from oauth2-proxy) and run a small authorization layer at the gateway that enforces the bearer-key contract certctl actually uses.
+
+The historical context: pre-G-1, `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt` was accepted but silently routed through the api-key bearer middleware (a security finding masquerading as a config option, removed at the v2.x boundary; see [`upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md`](upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md) if you previously set it). Native OIDC arrived later via Auth Bundle 2 — operators on the pre-Bundle-2 "gateway-only for OIDC" pattern can keep it (it still works) or migrate to native OIDC per [`docs/migration/oidc-enable.md`](../migration/oidc-enable.md).

 ### Concurrency Safety

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/breakglass"
 	bgdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/breakglass/domain"
 	sessiondomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/session/domain"
+	"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/ratelimit"
 )

 // =============================================================================
@@ -51,9 +52,30 @@ type BreakglassService interface {
 }

 // AuthBreakglassHandler ships the Phase 7.5 surface.
+//
+// Bundle 5 closure (S1): the docstring at the top of this file claimed
+// the login endpoint was "Rate-limited at 5/minute per source IP via
+// the existing rate limiter middleware" but no per-route limiter was
+// wired — `/auth/breakglass/login` is registered via `r.mux.Handle`
+// in router.go::AuthExemptRouterRoutes and bypasses the global RPS
+// middleware that wraps `r.Register`-mounted routes. The login handler
+// now owns its own SlidingWindowLimiter (5 attempts / minute / source
+// IP, 50 000 key cap) so the documented behavior actually ships.
+//
+// Wired at startup via SetLoginRateLimiter (called from cmd/server/main.go
+// alongside the other per-handler rate limiters that close audit
+// findings H-9 / H-12 / Bundle 3 D7 / etc.). Defense-in-depth: even
+// when the limiter is nil (legacy / test), the service-layer Argon2id
+// lockout state machine still protects against brute force — but a
+// nil limiter is a misconfiguration the integration test catches.
 type AuthBreakglassHandler struct {
 	svc         BreakglassService
 	cookieAttrs SessionCookieAttrs
+	// loginLimiter rate-limits POST /auth/breakglass/login by source IP.
+	// nil-safe: when unset, the handler skips the limiter check and
+	// relies on the service-layer Argon2id lockout. Production deploys
+	// MUST set this via SetLoginRateLimiter.
+	loginLimiter *ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter
 }

 // NewAuthBreakglassHandler constructs the handler.
@@ -61,6 +83,13 @@ func NewAuthBreakglassHandler(svc BreakglassService, cookieAttrs SessionCookieAt
 	return &AuthBreakglassHandler{svc: svc, cookieAttrs: cookieAttrs}
 }

+// SetLoginRateLimiter wires the per-source-IP rate limiter the Login
+// handler enforces. Bundle 5 closure (S1) — see the AuthBreakglassHandler
+// type docstring for the full rationale.
+func (h *AuthBreakglassHandler) SetLoginRateLimiter(l *ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter) {
+	h.loginLimiter = l
+}
+
 // =============================================================================
 // 1. Public login endpoint.
 // =============================================================================
@@ -98,6 +127,22 @@ func (h *AuthBreakglassHandler) Login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}

 	ip := clientIPFromRequest(r)
+
+	// Bundle 5 closure (S1): per-source-IP rate limit. 5 attempts /
+	// minute / IP (default; configurable via the constructor at
+	// cmd/server/main.go). Returns 429 with no body so the response
+	// shape matches the rest of the auth surface (scanner-unfriendly).
+	// Audited by the service layer on the next attempt — we don't
+	// audit the rate-limit hit itself here because that would let an
+	// attacker flood the audit table with rate-limit rows from a
+	// single IP.
+	if h.loginLimiter != nil {
+		if err := h.loginLimiter.Allow(ip, time.Now()); err != nil {
+			Error(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "too many requests")
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
 	res, err := h.svc.Authenticate(r.Context(), req.ActorID, req.Password, ip, r.UserAgent())
 	if err != nil {
 		// All authenticate errors map to the SAME 401 + same body.
@@ -9,10 +9,20 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
+	"time"

 	gooidc "github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
+
+	"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/validation"
 )

+// oidcOutboundTimeout bounds every test-discovery HTTP call (discovery
+// document fetch + JWKS reachability probe + userinfo if configured).
+// Shared by the SSRF-safe transport dialer (Bundle 5 R6 closure) and
+// the http.Client so the dial budget and the read/write budget land
+// on the same wall-clock horizon.
+const oidcOutboundTimeout = 10 * time.Second
+
 // TestDiscoveryResult is the report TestDiscovery returns. The HTTP
 // layer marshals this verbatim. Each field is independently observable
 // so the GUI can render a per-check status row.
@@ -134,12 +144,35 @@ func (s *Service) TestDiscovery(ctx context.Context, issuerURL string) (*TestDis
 // Kept distinct from go-oidc's internal JWKS fetcher because we want
 // to surface the HTTP status to the operator without requiring a
 // token-verify round-trip.
+//
+// Bundle 5 closure (audit R6): the GET runs through an SSRF-safe
+// http.Client whose transport's DialContext is wrapped in
+// validation.SafeHTTPDialContext. Pre-Bundle-5 the discovery probe
+// used http.DefaultClient and could be pointed at reserved-address
+// ranges via DNS rebinding (operator pastes a JWKS URI from the
+// dynamic-config GUI; admin RBAC for OIDC providers is sensitive but
+// not a system-wide super-admin gate). Now the dial-time guard re-
+// resolves the target host and rejects loopback / link-local /
+// private + cloud-metadata before any HTTP byte goes out. The
+// 10-second timeout matches the package-wide oidcOutboundTimeout
+// budget so token endpoint + JWKS + userinfo probes share the same
+// wall-clock horizon.
 var jwksReachable = func(ctx context.Context, jwksURI string) (bool, error) {
 	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, jwksURI, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, err
 	}
-	resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+	client := &http.Client{
+		Timeout: oidcOutboundTimeout,
+		Transport: &http.Transport{
+			DialContext:           validation.SafeHTTPDialContext(oidcOutboundTimeout),
+			MaxIdleConns:          10,
+			IdleConnTimeout:       90 * time.Second,
+			TLSHandshakeTimeout:   10 * time.Second,
+			ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
+		},
+	}
+	resp, err := client.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, err
 	}
@@ -8,8 +8,16 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"time"
+
+	"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/validation"
 )

+// slackClientTimeout bounds every outbound Slack webhook request and
+// its resolution/dial phase. Shared by the transport dialer (SSRF
+// guard) and the http.Client so DNS rebinding and the read/write
+// budget land on the same time horizon.
+const slackClientTimeout = 10 * time.Second
+
 // Config holds configuration for the Slack notifier.
 type Config struct {
 	// WebhookURL is the Slack incoming webhook URL.
@@ -29,11 +37,46 @@ type Notifier struct {
 }

 // New creates a new Slack notifier.
+//
+// Bundle 5 closure (audit R7): the HTTP transport now wraps
+// validation.SafeHTTPDialContext so outbound webhook calls cannot be
+// pointed at reserved-address ranges (cloud metadata 169.254.169.254,
+// in-cluster ::1 / 127.0.0.1 / 10.0.0.0/8 / 172.16.0.0/12 /
+// 192.168.0.0/16, IPv6 link-local fe80::/10) via DNS rebinding or
+// operator-supplied raw IPs. Webhook URLs are operator-configured but
+// flow through the dynamic-config GUI (issuers + targets) which
+// untrusted-actor edits can reach with the right RBAC scope; without
+// the dial-time guard, a notifier config update would be an SSRF
+// pivot into instance metadata services. Mirrors the
+// internal/connector/notifier/webhook hardening pattern.
 func New(config Config) *Notifier {
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		DialContext:           validation.SafeHTTPDialContext(slackClientTimeout),
+		MaxIdleConns:          10,
+		IdleConnTimeout:       90 * time.Second,
+		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   10 * time.Second,
+		ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
+	}
 	return &Notifier{
 		config: config,
 		httpClient: &http.Client{
-			Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
+			Timeout:   slackClientTimeout,
+			Transport: transport,
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// newForTest is the test-only constructor that bypasses the
+// SafeHTTPDialContext guard so unit tests using httptest.NewServer
+// (which binds to 127.0.0.1) can exercise the rest of the notifier
+// path. The exported `New` is the only production constructor and
+// installs the dial-time SSRF guard unconditionally. Mirrors the
+// internal/connector/notifier/webhook seam (newForTest there).
+func newForTest(config Config) *Notifier {
+	return &Notifier{
+		config: config,
+		httpClient: &http.Client{
+			Timeout: slackClientTimeout,
 		},
 	}
 }
@@ -34,7 +34,11 @@ func TestSlack_SendSuccess(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()

-	n := New(Config{WebhookURL: server.URL})
+	// Bundle 5 closure (R7): production `New` installs the SSRF dial-time
+	// guard which refuses httptest.NewServer's 127.0.0.1 bind. The
+	// unexported `newForTest` constructor bypasses the guard for unit
+	// tests that exercise the rest of the notifier path.
+	n := newForTest(Config{WebhookURL: server.URL})
 	err := n.Send(context.Background(), "ops@example.com", "Cert Expiring", "mc-api-prod expires in 7 days")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -57,7 +61,7 @@ func TestSlack_SendWithOverrides(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()

-	n := New(Config{
+	n := newForTest(Config{
 		WebhookURL:      server.URL,
 		ChannelOverride: "#alerts",
 		Username:        "certctl-bot",
@@ -86,7 +90,7 @@ func TestSlack_SendHTTPError(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()

-	n := New(Config{WebhookURL: server.URL})
+	n := newForTest(Config{WebhookURL: server.URL})
 	err := n.Send(context.Background(), "", "Test", "body")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
@@ -97,7 +101,7 @@ func TestSlack_SendHTTPError(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func TestSlack_SendConnectionError(t *testing.T) {
-	n := New(Config{WebhookURL: "http://127.0.0.1:1"})
+	n := newForTest(Config{WebhookURL: "http://127.0.0.1:1"})
 	err := n.Send(context.Background(), "", "Test", "body")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected connection error, got nil")
@@ -8,8 +8,15 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"time"
+
+	"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/validation"
 )

+// teamsClientTimeout bounds every outbound Teams webhook request and
+// its resolution/dial phase. Shared by the SSRF-safe transport dialer
+// (Bundle 5 R7 closure) and the http.Client.
+const teamsClientTimeout = 10 * time.Second
+
 // Config holds configuration for the Microsoft Teams notifier.
 type Config struct {
 	// WebhookURL is the Teams incoming webhook URL.
@@ -23,11 +30,35 @@ type Notifier struct {
 }

 // New creates a new Teams notifier.
+//
+// Bundle 5 closure (audit R7): SSRF-safe transport — see the parallel
+// rationale in internal/connector/notifier/slack.New. Webhook URLs are
+// operator-configured via the dynamic-config GUI and must not pivot
+// into cloud metadata services or in-cluster reserved ranges.
 func New(config Config) *Notifier {
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		DialContext:           validation.SafeHTTPDialContext(teamsClientTimeout),
+		MaxIdleConns:          10,
+		IdleConnTimeout:       90 * time.Second,
+		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   10 * time.Second,
+		ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
+	}
 	return &Notifier{
 		config: config,
 		httpClient: &http.Client{
-			Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
+			Timeout:   teamsClientTimeout,
+			Transport: transport,
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// newForTest bypasses the SSRF dial-time guard for unit tests that hit
+// httptest.NewServer (binds to 127.0.0.1). Production uses `New`.
+func newForTest(config Config) *Notifier {
+	return &Notifier{
+		config: config,
+		httpClient: &http.Client{
+			Timeout: teamsClientTimeout,
 		},
 	}
 }
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ func TestTeams_SendSuccess(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()

-	n := New(Config{WebhookURL: server.URL})
+	// Bundle 5 R7: bypass the SSRF dial-time guard for httptest's 127.0.0.1 server.
+	n := newForTest(Config{WebhookURL: server.URL})
 	err := n.Send(context.Background(), "team@example.com", "Renewal Failed", "Certificate mc-api-prod renewal failed after 3 attempts")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ func TestTeams_SendHTTPError(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()

-	n := New(Config{WebhookURL: server.URL})
+	n := newForTest(Config{WebhookURL: server.URL})
 	err := n.Send(context.Background(), "", "Test", "body")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ func TestTeams_SendHTTPError(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func TestTeams_SendConnectionError(t *testing.T) {
-	n := New(Config{WebhookURL: "http://127.0.0.1:1"})
+	n := newForTest(Config{WebhookURL: "http://127.0.0.1:1"})
 	err := n.Send(context.Background(), "", "Test", "body")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected connection error, got nil")