secret: migrate EJBCA / GlobalSign / Sectigo credentials to *secret.Ref (Phase 2)

Phase 2 of the #6 acquisition-readiness fix from the 2026-05-01 issuer
coverage audit. Phase 1 (commit 520cda3) shipped the secret.Ref opaque
credential type with PBKDF2-derived key, ChaCha20-Poly1305 envelope,
String/MarshalJSON redaction to "[redacted]", and the Use callback
that zero-fills the per-call buffer after the consumer returns.

This commit applies the type to the three connectors flagged by the
audit and adds the JSON-roundtrip glue that the production factory
path needs.

Shared (internal/secret/):

- Add UnmarshalJSON on *Ref so json.Unmarshal of a stored config
  blob (issuerfactory.NewFromConfig) parses the bytes-as-string into
  NewRefFromString without callers having to know the field type
  changed. Null and missing keys leave the receiver nil; non-string
  payloads (numbers, bools) are rejected with a typed error. Pinned
  by TestRef_UnmarshalJSON: string_value, null, missing_key,
  number_rejected, roundtrip_marshal_then_unmarshal (the round-trip
  goes through "[redacted]" intentionally — JSON-marshal-then-
  unmarshal of a Config with secrets is NOT a supported test pattern;
  callers that construct a rawConfig must use a JSON literal with
  the real values).

Per-connector migration:

- EJBCA (ejbca.go): Config.Token: string → *secret.Ref. ValidateConfig
  empty-check uses Token.IsEmpty() (nil-safe). setAuthHeaders rewritten
  to call Token.Use; the Bearer header string is built inside the
  callback and the buffer is zeroed on return. mTLS path is
  unaffected.

- GlobalSign (globalsign.go): Config.APIKey + Config.APISecret: string
  → *secret.Ref. Both ValidateConfig empty-checks use IsEmpty().
  Extracted setAuthHeaders helper consolidates the four duplicated
  triple-Set sites (ValidateConfig probe, IssueCertificate,
  RevokeCertificate, pollCertificateOnce) so any future header-shape
  change applies once. ValidateConfig now pulls from the local cfg
  (post-Unmarshal) so the helper takes a *Config rather than the
  receiver — needed because ValidateConfig writes the validated cfg
  onto c.config only AFTER the probe succeeds.

- Sectigo (sectigo.go): Config.Login + Config.Password: string →
  *secret.Ref. CustomerURI stays plain string (org identifier, not
  a credential). setAuthHeaders rewritten to call Login.Use +
  Password.Use; ValidateConfig's inline header writes use the same
  pattern (the ValidateConfig probe writes to a local cfg, not
  c.config, so it can't share setAuthHeaders without rewiring — the
  inline form is fine, kept consistent in shape).

Test migration:

- ejbca_test.go, ejbca_failure_test.go, ejbca_stubs_test.go: bulk
  Token: "X" → Token: secret.NewRefFromString("X") via sed; secret
  import added.
- globalsign_test.go, globalsign_failure_test.go: same pattern for
  APIKey + APISecret.
- sectigo_test.go, sectigo_failure_test.go: same pattern for Login +
  Password.

Two tests (TestGlobalSign_ServerTLSConfig/PinnedCA_TrustsExpectedServer
and TestSectigoConnector/ValidateConfig_Success) used to construct
rawConfig via json.Marshal(config) → ValidateConfig(rawConfig). After
the migration, json.Marshal redacts *secret.Ref to "[redacted]" by
design, so the roundtripped rawConfig wrote "[redacted]" as the
actual header value and the mock server's auth-header check 403'd.
Both tests now build rawConfig as a JSON literal (the production-
shape input — the factory path always feeds rawConfig from the DB
or env, never from json.Marshal of an in-memory Config). The new
tests have a comment explaining the trap so the next person who
adds a similar test sees the pattern.

Out of scope (intentional):

- The `internal/config/config.SectigoConfig` / `GlobalSignConfig` /
  `EJBCAConfig` env-var-loader structs are still plain strings —
  those types are the env-load shape, not the steady-state runtime
  shape. The seed path in service/issuer.go json-marshals them into
  a map[string]interface{} which the factory then UnmarshalJSON's
  into the connector Config; the new UnmarshalJSON on *Ref handles
  the conversion at the boundary.
- DigiCert.APIKey + Vault.Token are still plain strings; Phase 3
  will pick them up. The audit explicitly named EJBCA / GlobalSign /
  Sectigo as the Phase 2 scope (RESULTS.md L633).

Verified locally:
- gofmt -l . clean
- go vet ./... clean
- staticcheck across all four packages clean
- go test -short -count=1 across secret, ejbca, globalsign, sectigo,
  issuerfactory, service, api/handler: green

Audit reference: cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-01/RESULTS.md
Top-10 fix #6 — Phase 2.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-02 12:53:58 +00:00
parent 825fcf39a4
commit 336a745f41
12 changed files with 316 additions and 139 deletions
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ import (
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/issuer"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/issuer/asyncpoll"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/secret"
)
// Config represents the GlobalSign Atlas HVCA issuer connector configuration.
@@ -51,11 +52,16 @@ type Config struct {
// APIKey is the GlobalSign API key for request authentication.
// Required. Set via CERTCTL_GLOBALSIGN_API_KEY environment variable.
APIKey string `json:"api_key"`
//
// Type: *secret.Ref (audit fix #6 Phase 2). Never stringifies;
// MarshalJSON returns "[redacted]"; bytes are zeroed after each
// header write via Ref.Use.
APIKey *secret.Ref `json:"api_key"`
// APISecret is the GlobalSign API secret for request authentication.
// Required. Set via CERTCTL_GLOBALSIGN_API_SECRET environment variable.
APISecret string `json:"api_secret"`
// Same *secret.Ref protections as APIKey.
APISecret *secret.Ref `json:"api_secret"`
// ClientCertPath is the filesystem path to the mTLS client certificate PEM file.
// The certificate must be signed by GlobalSign and loaded for TLS handshake.
@@ -159,11 +165,11 @@ func (c *Connector) ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, rawConfig json.RawMessag
return fmt.Errorf("GlobalSign api_url is required")
}
if cfg.APIKey == "" {
if cfg.APIKey.IsEmpty() {
return fmt.Errorf("GlobalSign api_key is required")
}
if cfg.APISecret == "" {
if cfg.APISecret.IsEmpty() {
return fmt.Errorf("GlobalSign api_secret is required")
}
@@ -204,9 +210,7 @@ func (c *Connector) ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, rawConfig json.RawMessag
}
// Add both authentication layers
req.Header.Set("ApiKey", cfg.APIKey)
req.Header.Set("ApiSecret", cfg.APISecret)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
setAuthHeaders(req, &cfg)
resp, err := validationClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
@@ -264,6 +268,34 @@ func (c *Connector) getHTTPClient(ctx context.Context) (*http.Client, error) {
}, nil
}
// setAuthHeaders writes the GlobalSign double-auth headers (ApiKey,
// ApiSecret) plus Content-Type: application/json onto req. The secret
// values are pulled from the *secret.Ref via Use, which zero-fills the
// per-call buffer after the header string is set; the Ref's underlying
// bytes remain encrypted at rest. The Use return value is intentionally
// ignored — Set never errors and the only failure modes inside Use are
// nil-Ref / empty-Ref which the upstream IsEmpty validation has already
// excluded for production paths. ValidateConfig and the steady-state
// IssueCertificate / RevokeCertificate / pollCertificateOnce sites all
// route through here so any future header-shape change applies once.
//
// Audit fix #6 Phase 2.
func setAuthHeaders(req *http.Request, cfg *Config) {
if cfg.APIKey != nil {
_ = cfg.APIKey.Use(func(buf []byte) error {
req.Header.Set("ApiKey", string(buf))
return nil
})
}
if cfg.APISecret != nil {
_ = cfg.APISecret.Use(func(buf []byte) error {
req.Header.Set("ApiSecret", string(buf))
return nil
})
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
}
// buildServerTLSConfig returns a TLS configuration for the GlobalSign Atlas
// HVCA API client. It always verifies the server certificate. When
// cfg.ServerCAPath is set, the PEM bundle at that path is used as the
@@ -333,9 +365,7 @@ func (c *Connector) IssueCertificate(ctx context.Context, request issuer.Issuanc
}
// Apply double auth: mTLS + headers
req.Header.Set("ApiKey", c.config.APIKey)
req.Header.Set("ApiSecret", c.config.APISecret)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
setAuthHeaders(req, c.config)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
@@ -422,9 +452,7 @@ func (c *Connector) RevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, request issuer.Revoca
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create revoke request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("ApiKey", c.config.APIKey)
req.Header.Set("ApiSecret", c.config.APISecret)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
setAuthHeaders(req, c.config)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
@@ -510,9 +538,7 @@ func (c *Connector) pollCertificateOnce(ctx context.Context, orderID string) (*i
return nil, asyncpoll.Failed, fmt.Errorf("failed to create status request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("ApiKey", c.config.APIKey)
req.Header.Set("ApiSecret", c.config.APISecret)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
setAuthHeaders(req, c.config)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {