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Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001)

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Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.

M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
  * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
    principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
    credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
    opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
  * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
    constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
    an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
    bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
    now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
    audit_events row.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
        principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
        unauthenticated endpoints.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
        job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.

M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
  * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
    when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
  * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
    viewers receive 403.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
        TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
        TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.

M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
  * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
    authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
    revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
    '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
        GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
            Content-Type: application/pkix-crl   (RFC 5280 §5)
        GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
            Content-Type: application/ocsp-response  (RFC 6960)
  * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
  * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
    CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
  * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
    in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
    SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
        type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
      - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
        access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
      - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
        that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
        mounted on the unauthenticated branch.

M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
  EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
  'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
  internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
  adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.

Verification (all gates green):
  * go vet ./...                                           — clean
  * go build ./...                                         — ok
  * go test -short ./... (55+ packages)                    — all pass
  * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests)                     — all pass
  * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit                                — clean
  * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
    all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.

Documentation:
  * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
    Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
    test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
  * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
    closure note.
  * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
    docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
    docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
    — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
    API keys.
  * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
    and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.

.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-04-18 18:17:41 +00:00
parent a53a4b845b
commit 3287e174dc
45 changed files with 1468 additions and 526 deletions
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docs/compliance-pci-dss.md
+12 -11
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@@ -92,10 +92,10 @@ Your QSA will request evidence that your certificate and key management systems
- **Certificate Status Tracking** — Four statuses: Active (deployed, not yet expired), Expiring (within threshold, awaiting renewal), Expired (past not-after date), Revoked (revoked via RFC 5280 revocation API). Dashboard charts show status distribution.
- **Revocation Infrastructure** (M15a, M15b):
- **Revocation Infrastructure** (M15a, M15b, M-006):
- Revocation API: `POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke` with RFC 5280 reason codes
- CRL endpoint: `GET /api/v1/crl` (JSON format) or `GET /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id}` (DER X.509 CRL, 24h validity, signed by issuing CA)
- OCSP responder: `GET /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}` (returns DER-encoded OCSP response: good/revoked/unknown)
- CRL endpoint: `GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}` — DER X.509 CRL, 24h validity, signed by issuing CA, served unauthenticated (RFC 5280 §5, RFC 8615, `Content-Type: application/pkix-crl`)
- OCSP responder: `GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}` — DER-encoded OCSP response (good/revoked/unknown), served unauthenticated (RFC 6960, `Content-Type: application/ocsp-response`)
- Bulk revocation (V2.2): `POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke` with filter criteria (profile, owner, agent, issuer) for fleet-wide incident response
- Short-lived cert exemption: certs with TTL < 1 hour skip CRL/OCSP (expiry is sufficient revocation)
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Your QSA will request evidence that your certificate and key management systems
- Discovered certificate report: `GET /api/v1/discovered-certificates` JSON export showing all certs on systems, fingerprints, and status.
- Managed certificate inventory: `GET /api/v1/certificates` with filters (`?status=Expiring` for upcoming renewals).
- Expiration alert configuration: policy JSON showing `alert_thresholds_days` for each environment.
- CRL/OCSP availability proof: HTTP GET requests to `/api/v1/crl` and `/api/v1/ocsp/{issuer}/{serial}` with signed responses.
- CRL/OCSP availability proof: unauthenticated HTTP GET requests to `/.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}` (DER, `application/pkix-crl`) and `/.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}` (DER, `application/ocsp-response`) with signed responses.
- Audit trail for certificate creation/renewal/revocation: `GET /api/v1/audit?type=certificate_issued,certificate_renewed,certificate_revoked`.
- Dashboard charts showing expiration timeline, renewal success trends, status distribution.
@@ -328,9 +328,10 @@ This requirement covers key generation, storage, rotation, and destruction. Cert
- Issuer notified (best-effort; ACME lacks standard revocation, Local CA skips issuer step).
- Revocation notifications sent to owner via email/webhook/Slack/Teams/PagerDuty.
- **CRL and OCSP Publication** (M15b) — Revoked certificates published in:
- CRL: `GET /api/v1/crl` (JSON format) or `GET /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id}` (DER X.509, signed by CA, 24h validity)
- OCSP: `GET /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}` (returns revoked status for clients validating certificate chain)
- **CRL and OCSP Publication** (M15b, M-006) — Revoked certificates published in:
- CRL: `GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}` (DER X.509 signed by CA, 24h validity, RFC 5280 §5 + RFC 8615, `Content-Type: application/pkix-crl`)
- OCSP: `GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}` (returns revoked status for clients validating certificate chain, RFC 6960, `Content-Type: application/ocsp-response`)
- Both endpoints are served unauthenticated so relying parties (browsers, TLS appliances) without certctl API keys can verify revocation — this is the RFC-compliant PKI model.
- Clients checking certificate status via OCSP or CRL see revoked status within 24 hours.
- **Bulk Revocation for Incident Response** (V2.2) — `POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke` with filter criteria (profile, owner, agent, issuer) revokes all matching certificates in a single operation. PCI-DSS Req 4 requires rapid response to data transmission security incidents — bulk revocation enables operators to revoke an entire certificate set (e.g., all certs used by a compromised team or endpoint) in minutes rather than hours.
@@ -342,8 +343,8 @@ This requirement covers key generation, storage, rotation, and destruction. Cert
**Evidence You Can Provide**:
- Revocation requests: `GET /api/v1/audit?type=certificate_revoked` with RFC 5280 reason codes.
- CRL publication: HTTP GET `/api/v1/crl` and parse JSON to show revoked serial numbers and timestamps.
- OCSP responder validation: Query `GET /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer}/{serial}` for a known-revoked cert; response includes `revoked` status.
- CRL publication: HTTP GET `/.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}` (unauthenticated) returns a DER X.509 CRL — parse with `openssl crl -inform der -noout -text` to show revoked serial numbers, reasons, and timestamps.
- OCSP responder validation: Query `GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}` (unauthenticated) for a known-revoked cert; response includes `revoked` status and can be parsed with `openssl ocsp` tooling.
- Audit trail: Certificate status transitions (Active → Revoked) recorded in `audit_events`.
**Operator Responsibility**:
@@ -721,12 +722,12 @@ This requirement covers key generation, storage, rotation, and destruction. Cert
| PCI-DSS Requirement | certctl Feature | API/UI Evidence | Database/Config | Audit Trail | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **4.2.1** Strong Crypto | TLS cert issuance, ACME/step-ca/Local CA, RSA 2048+/ECDSA P-256 | `GET /api/v1/certificates` (key_type, key_size) | Certificate profiles | `GET /api/v1/audit?type=certificate_issued` | Available |
| **4.2.2** Cert Inventory & Validation | Managed cert CRUD, discovery (M18b), expiration alerting, CRL/OCSP | `GET /api/v1/certificates`, `GET /api/v1/discovered-certificates`, `GET /api/v1/crl`, `GET /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer}/{serial}` | `managed_certificates`, `discovered_certificates` tables | `GET /api/v1/audit?type=certificate_*` | Available |
| **4.2.2** Cert Inventory & Validation | Managed cert CRUD, discovery (M18b), expiration alerting, CRL/OCSP | `GET /api/v1/certificates`, `GET /api/v1/discovered-certificates`, `GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}`, `GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}` (both unauthenticated, RFC 5280 / RFC 6960) | `managed_certificates`, `discovered_certificates` tables | `GET /api/v1/audit?type=certificate_*` | Available |
| **3.6** Key Documentation | Profiles, owner/team tracking, issuer config, audit trail | `GET /api/v1/profiles`, `GET /api/v1/issuers`, certificate detail with owner/team | Profiles, certificate owner/team fields, issuer config | `GET /api/v1/audit?resource_type=certificate` | Available |
| **3.7.1** Key Generation | Agent-side ECDSA P-256, server keygen (demo only) | Agent logs, renewal job detail, CSR audit | `CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE=agent` (config), job_type=AwaitingCSR | `GET /api/v1/audit?type=certificate_issued` with CSR hash | Available |
| **3.7.2** Key Storage | Agent `/var/lib/certctl/keys` (0600), env var secrets, .env excluded | Deployment manifest (env var refs), agent key dir listing | `.env` file (git-ignored), `CERTCTL_KEY_DIR`, `CERTCTL_CA_KEY_PATH` | No API audit (keys off-platform) | Available |
| **3.7.3** Key Rotation | Auto renewal, expiration thresholds, renewal jobs | Dashboard renewal trends, `GET /api/v1/jobs?type=Renewal`, certificate versions | Renewal policies, certificate version history | `GET /api/v1/audit?type=certificate_renewed` | Available |
| **3.7.4** Key Destruction | Revocation API (RFC 5280), CRL/OCSP, private key cleanup | `POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke`, `GET /api/v1/crl`, OCSP endpoint | `certificate_revocations` table, CRL publication | `GET /api/v1/audit?type=certificate_revoked` | Available |
| **3.7.4** Key Destruction | Revocation API (RFC 5280), CRL/OCSP, private key cleanup | `POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke`, unauthenticated `GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}` and `GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}` | `certificate_revocations` table, CRL publication | `GET /api/v1/audit?type=certificate_revoked` | Available |
| **8.3** Strong Authentication | API key (SHA-256 hash, TLS), GUI login, 401 redirect | GUI login screenshot, API key auth header, TLS cert | API key hash in database | `GET /api/v1/audit` showing API calls | Available |
| **8.6** Acct Management | Credentials out of source, .env excluded, env var config | Code review (no hardcoded secrets), `.gitignore` check | Deployment manifests showing env var refs only | No account lifecycle audit (outside scope) | Available in part |
| **10.2** Audit Logging | API audit middleware (M19), certificate lifecycle events | `GET /api/v1/audit` with filter/pagination | `audit_events` table (every API call) | Real-time via API | Available |