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https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001)
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.
M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
* Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
* Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
audit_events row.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
unauthenticated endpoints.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.
M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
* Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
* Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
viewers receive 403.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.
M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
* Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
'/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
Content-Type: application/pkix-crl (RFC 5280 §5)
GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
Content-Type: application/ocsp-response (RFC 6960)
* Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
* Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
* Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
- internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
- internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
mounted on the unauthenticated branch.
M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.
Verification (all gates green):
* go vet ./... — clean
* go build ./... — ok
* go test -short ./... (55+ packages) — all pass
* web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests) — all pass
* web/ : npx tsc --noEmit — clean
* grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.
Documentation:
* coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
* CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
closure note.
* docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
— refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
API keys.
* api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.
.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
@@ -195,16 +195,11 @@ type metricsResponse struct {
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Uptime float64 `json:"uptime_seconds"`
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}
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// crlResponse for the CRL endpoint.
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type crlResponse struct {
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Version int `json:"version"`
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Total int `json:"total"`
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Entries []struct {
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Serial string `json:"serial_number"`
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Reason string `json:"reason"`
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RevokedAt string `json:"revoked_at"`
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} `json:"entries"`
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}
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// M-006: The non-standard JSON CRL endpoint (`GET /api/v1/crl`) was removed.
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// RFC 5280 §5 defines only the DER wire format, which is now served
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// unauthenticated at `/.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}` per RFC 8615.
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// The `crlResponse` Go struct that used to decode the JSON envelope is gone;
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// Phase 7 parses the DER bytes directly via `x509.ParseRevocationList`.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// PostgreSQL test helper
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@@ -728,18 +723,41 @@ func TestIntegrationSuite(t *testing.T) {
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t.Fatalf("revocation response unexpected: %s", body)
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}
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// Check CRL
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t.Run("CRL", func(t *testing.T) {
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resp, err := c.Get("/api/v1/crl")
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// Check DER CRL served unauthenticated under /.well-known/pki/ per
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// RFC 5280 §5 + RFC 8615 (M-006). Use a plain http.Get — no Bearer
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// token — to prove the endpoint is reachable by relying parties that
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// have no certctl API credentials.
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t.Run("CRL_DER_Unauthenticated", func(t *testing.T) {
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resp, err := http.Get(serverURL + "/.well-known/pki/crl/iss-local")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("GET CRL: %v", err)
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t.Fatalf("GET DER CRL: %v", err)
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}
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var crl crlResponse
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if err := decodeJSON(resp, &crl); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode CRL: %v", err)
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("unexpected status: got %d, want 200 (body=%s)", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
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}
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if crl.Total < 1 {
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t.Fatalf("CRL total: got %d, want >= 1", crl.Total)
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if ct := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/pkix-crl" {
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t.Errorf("Content-Type: got %q, want %q", ct, "application/pkix-crl")
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}
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body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("read CRL body: %v", err)
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}
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if len(body) == 0 {
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t.Fatal("CRL body empty")
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}
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// Parse the DER bytes as an X.509 CRL (RFC 5280) and verify the
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// just-revoked certificate is listed.
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crl, err := x509.ParseRevocationList(body)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("parse DER CRL: %v", err)
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}
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if len(crl.RevokedCertificateEntries) < 1 {
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t.Fatalf("CRL entries: got %d, want >= 1", len(crl.RevokedCertificateEntries))
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}
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})
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+31
-6
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
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package integration_test
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import (
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"crypto/x509"
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"database/sql"
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"encoding/json"
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"io"
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@@ -596,13 +597,37 @@ func TestQA(t *testing.T) {
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}
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})
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t.Run("CRL_JSON", func(t *testing.T) {
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code, body := c.bodyStr(t, "GET", "/api/v1/crl", "")
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if code != 200 {
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t.Fatalf("CRL = %d", code)
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// M-006: The non-standard JSON CRL endpoint was removed. RFC 5280 §5
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// defines only the DER wire format, now served unauthenticated at
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// `/.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}` per RFC 8615. Use a plain
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// http.Get — no Bearer — to prove the endpoint is reachable by
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// relying parties with no API credentials.
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t.Run("CRL_DER_Unauthenticated", func(t *testing.T) {
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resp, err := http.Get(qaServerURL + "/.well-known/pki/crl/iss-local")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("GET DER CRL: %v", err)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(body, "entries") {
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t.Fatalf("CRL response missing entries field")
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
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b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("CRL = %d (body=%s)", resp.StatusCode, string(b))
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}
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if ct := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/pkix-crl" {
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t.Errorf("Content-Type: got %q, want %q", ct, "application/pkix-crl")
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}
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body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("read CRL body: %v", err)
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}
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if len(body) == 0 {
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t.Fatal("CRL body empty")
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}
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crl, err := x509.ParseRevocationList(body)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("parse DER CRL: %v", err)
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}
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if len(crl.RevokedCertificateEntries) < 1 {
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t.Fatalf("CRL entries: got %d, want >= 1", len(crl.RevokedCertificateEntries))
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}
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})
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})
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+15
-6
@@ -608,13 +608,22 @@ else
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fail "Revocation failed" "$REVOKE_RESP"
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fi
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info "Checking CRL..."
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CRL_RESP=$(api_get "/api/v1/crl" 2>/dev/null || echo '{"total":0}')
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CRL_TOTAL=$(echo "$CRL_RESP" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('total',0))" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
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if [ "$CRL_TOTAL" -ge 1 ]; then
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pass "CRL contains $CRL_TOTAL revoked certificate(s)"
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info "Checking DER CRL under /.well-known/pki (RFC 5280 §5, RFC 8615)..."
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# The JSON CRL endpoint (`GET /api/v1/crl`) was removed in M-006. RFC 5280
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# defines only the DER wire format, now served unauthenticated at
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# `/.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}`. Fetch without the Bearer header to
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# prove the endpoint is reachable by relying parties with no API key.
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CRL_TMP=$(mktemp)
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CRL_HEADERS=$(mktemp)
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CRL_HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o "$CRL_TMP" -D "$CRL_HEADERS" -w "%{http_code}" "${API_URL}/.well-known/pki/crl/iss-local" 2>/dev/null || echo "000")
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CRL_SIZE=$(wc -c < "$CRL_TMP" | tr -d ' ')
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CRL_CONTENT_TYPE=$(awk 'tolower($1)=="content-type:" { sub(/\r$/,"",$2); print tolower($2) }' "$CRL_HEADERS" | head -n1)
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rm -f "$CRL_TMP" "$CRL_HEADERS"
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if [ "$CRL_HTTP_CODE" = "200" ] && [ "$CRL_CONTENT_TYPE" = "application/pkix-crl" ] && [ "$CRL_SIZE" -gt 0 ]; then
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pass "DER CRL served unauthenticated (HTTP 200, Content-Type application/pkix-crl, ${CRL_SIZE} bytes)"
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else
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fail "CRL empty after revocation"
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fail "DER CRL fetch failed: HTTP=$CRL_HTTP_CODE Content-Type=$CRL_CONTENT_TYPE size=$CRL_SIZE"
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fi
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CERT_STATUS=$(api_get "/api/v1/certificates/mc-local-test" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('status',''))" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
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