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Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001)

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Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.

M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
  * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
    principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
    credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
    opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
  * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
    constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
    an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
    bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
    now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
    audit_events row.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
        principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
        unauthenticated endpoints.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
        job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.

M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
  * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
    when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
  * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
    viewers receive 403.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
        TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
        TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.

M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
  * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
    authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
    revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
    '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
        GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
            Content-Type: application/pkix-crl   (RFC 5280 §5)
        GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
            Content-Type: application/ocsp-response  (RFC 6960)
  * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
  * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
    CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
  * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
    in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
    SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
        type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
      - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
        access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
      - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
        that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
        mounted on the unauthenticated branch.

M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
  EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
  'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
  internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
  adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.

Verification (all gates green):
  * go vet ./...                                           — clean
  * go build ./...                                         — ok
  * go test -short ./... (55+ packages)                    — all pass
  * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests)                     — all pass
  * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit                                — clean
  * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
    all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.

Documentation:
  * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
    Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
    test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
  * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
    closure note.
  * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
    docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
    docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
    — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
    API keys.
  * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
    and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.

.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-04-18 18:17:41 +00:00
parent a53a4b845b
commit 3287e174dc
45 changed files with 1468 additions and 526 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
cmd/server/main.go
+71 -7
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"os"
"os/signal"
"strconv"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
@@ -223,7 +224,7 @@ func main() {
renewalService := service.NewRenewalService(certificateRepo, jobRepo, renewalPolicyRepo, profileRepo, auditService, notificationService, issuerRegistry, cfg.Keygen.Mode)
renewalService.SetTargetRepo(targetRepo)
deploymentService := service.NewDeploymentService(jobRepo, targetRepo, agentRepo, certificateRepo, auditService, notificationService)
jobService := service.NewJobService(jobRepo, renewalService, deploymentService, logger)
jobService := service.NewJobService(jobRepo, certificateRepo, ownerRepo, renewalService, deploymentService, logger)
agentService := service.NewAgentService(agentRepo, certificateRepo, jobRepo, targetRepo, auditService, issuerRegistry, renewalService)
agentService.SetProfileRepo(profileRepo)
issuerService := service.NewIssuerService(issuerRepo, auditService, issuerRegistry, encryptionKey, logger)
@@ -552,13 +553,63 @@ func main() {
"endpoints", "/scep?operation={GetCACaps,GetCACert,PKIOperation}")
}
// Register RFC 5280 CRL and RFC 6960 OCSP handlers under /.well-known/pki/.
// These are always enabled (no config gate) — revocation data must be
// reachable to relying parties for any cert certctl issues. The finalHandler
// routing gate below strips auth middleware for this prefix so browsers,
// OpenSSL, OCSP stapling sidecars, and mTLS clients can fetch without
// presenting certctl Bearer tokens.
apiRouter.RegisterPKIHandlers(certificateHandler)
logger.Info("PKI endpoints registered",
"endpoints", "/.well-known/pki/{crl/{issuer_id},ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}}")
logger.Info("registered all API handlers")
// Build middleware stack
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAuth(middleware.AuthConfig{
Type: cfg.Auth.Type,
Secret: cfg.Auth.Secret,
})
// Build middleware stack.
//
// Authentication unification (M-002): every authenticated request now
// carries a named actor in the request context so audit events record
// the real key identity instead of the hardcoded "api-key-user" string.
// Named keys come from CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED (preferred). For backward
// compatibility CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET is synthesized into legacy-key-N
// entries with Admin=false.
var namedKeys []middleware.NamedAPIKey
if cfg.Auth.Type != "none" {
// Translate typed config.NamedAPIKey -> middleware.NamedAPIKey. The
// two structs are field-compatible but live in different packages to
// preserve the config→middleware dependency direction.
for _, nk := range cfg.Auth.NamedKeys {
namedKeys = append(namedKeys, middleware.NamedAPIKey{
Name: nk.Name,
Key: nk.Key,
Admin: nk.Admin,
})
}
// Back-compat: if no named keys but legacy Secret is configured,
// synthesize named entries so the audit trail still attributes the
// action (instead of falling back to "api-key-user" / "anonymous").
if len(namedKeys) == 0 && cfg.Auth.Secret != "" {
parts := strings.Split(cfg.Auth.Secret, ",")
idx := 0
for _, p := range parts {
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
if p == "" {
continue
}
namedKeys = append(namedKeys, middleware.NamedAPIKey{
Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
Key: p,
Admin: false,
})
idx++
}
if len(namedKeys) > 0 {
logger.Warn("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET is deprecated — set CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED for named actor attribution and admin gating",
"synthesized_keys", len(namedKeys))
}
}
}
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys)
corsMiddleware := middleware.NewCORS(middleware.CORSConfig{
AllowedOrigins: cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins,
})
@@ -654,6 +705,14 @@ func main() {
noAuthHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// RFC 5280 CRL and RFC 6960 OCSP live under /.well-known/pki/ and
// MUST be served unauthenticated — relying parties (browsers,
// OpenSSL, OCSP stapling sidecars, mTLS clients) cannot present
// certctl Bearer tokens. See router.RegisterPKIHandlers.
if len(path) >= 16 && path[:16] == "/.well-known/pki" {
noAuthHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// All other API and EST routes go through the full middleware stack (with auth)
if (len(path) >= 8 && path[:8] == "/api/v1/") ||
(len(path) >= 16 && path[:16] == "/.well-known/est") {
@@ -670,13 +729,18 @@ func main() {
})
logger.Info("dashboard available at /", "web_dir", webDir)
} else {
// No dashboard: route health/auth-info without auth, everything else through full stack
// No dashboard: route health/auth-info and /.well-known/pki without
// auth, everything else through full stack.
finalHandler = http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
path := r.URL.Path
if path == "/health" || path == "/ready" || path == "/api/v1/auth/info" {
noAuthHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
if len(path) >= 16 && path[:16] == "/.well-known/pki" {
noAuthHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
apiHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
logger.Info("dashboard directory not found, serving API only")