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Bundle B: Auth & transport surface tightening — 5 findings closed
Closes M-001 + M-002 + M-013 + M-018 + M-025 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25.
M-001 (CWE-916) — PBKDF2 100k -> 600k via v3 blob format
internal/crypto/encryption.go:
- New v3Magic (0x03), pbkdf2IterationsV3 (600,000 — OWASP 2024
Password Storage Cheat Sheet floor), v3SaltSize (16 bytes),
deriveKeyWithSaltV3 helper.
- EncryptIfKeySet now unconditionally writes v3:
magic(0x03) || salt(16) || nonce(12) || ciphertext+tag
- DecryptIfKeySet falls through v3 -> v2 -> v1 with AEAD verification
at each step. Wrong-passphrase v3 reads cannot be silently
misattributed to v2/v1.
- IsLegacyFormat updated to recognize 0x03 as non-legacy.
internal/crypto/encryption_v3_test.go (NEW, 7 tests):
V3 round-trip / V2 read-fallback against deterministic v2 fixture /
V3 wrong-passphrase fails / V3-vs-V2 dispatch order / V2 vs V3 keys
differ for same (passphrase, salt) / iteration-count pin at OWASP
2024 floor / IsLegacyFormat-recognises-V3.
Coverage internal/crypto: 86.7% -> 88.2%.
M-002 (CWE-862) — Auth-exempt allowlist constants + AST regression test
Recon found auth-exempt surface spans TWO layers (audit's claim was
incomplete):
Layer 1 (router.go direct r.mux.Handle):
GET /health, GET /ready, GET /api/v1/auth/info, GET /api/v1/version
Layer 2 (cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler URL-prefix dispatch):
/.well-known/pki/*, /.well-known/est/*, /scep[/...]*
internal/api/router/router.go:
- New AuthExemptRouterRoutes constant with per-entry justifications.
- New AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes constant.
internal/api/router/auth_exempt_test.go (NEW, 2 tests):
AST-walks router.go for every direct mux.Handle call and asserts
set equals AuthExemptRouterRoutes; reads source bytes of Register /
RegisterFunc and asserts they still wrap with middleware.Chain.
cmd/server/auth_exempt_test.go (NEW, 2 tests):
14-case table test on buildFinalHandler asserting documented
prefixes route to noAuthHandler and authenticated routes route to
apiHandler; inverse-overlap pin proves no documented bypass shadows
an authenticated prefix.
M-013 (CWE-942) — CORS deny-by-default verified-already-clean + pin
Audit claim 'default allows all origins if env-var unset' was WRONG.
internal/api/middleware/middleware.go::NewCORS already denies cross-
origin requests when len(cfg.AllowedOrigins) == 0 (no
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header is emitted, same-origin policy
applies).
internal/api/middleware/cors_test.go: +TestNewCORS_NilOriginsDeniesAll
+ TestNewCORS_M013_ContractDocumentedInOrder (5-case table test
pinning the 3-arm dispatch contract).
M-018 (CWE-319 / PCI-DSS Req 4) — Postgres TLS opt-in toggle
deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: new postgresql.tls.{mode,caSecretRef}
operator-facing knobs. Default 'disable' preserves in-cluster pod-
network behavior; PCI-scoped operators set verify-full.
deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl: certctl.databaseURL helper
pipes postgresql.tls.mode into ?sslmode=.
deploy/helm/certctl/templates/server-secret.yaml: uses the helper
instead of hardcoded sslmode=disable.
deploy/docker-compose.yml: CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL is now
${CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL:-...} so operators override without editing.
docs/database-tls.md (NEW): operator runbook covering 4 deployment
shapes, RDS verify-full example with PGSSLROOTCERT mount, and
pg_stat_ssl verification query.
helm template + helm lint clean.
M-025 (OWASP ASVS L2 §11.2.1) — Per-key rate limiting
internal/api/middleware/middleware.go::NewRateLimiter rewritten from
a single global tokenBucket to a keyedRateLimiter map keyed on
'user:'+GetUser(ctx) for authenticated callers
'ip:'+RemoteAddr-host for unauthenticated
- Empty UserKey strings treated as unauthenticated.
- X-Forwarded-For intentionally NOT consulted (header-spoofing risk).
- Create-on-demand bucket allocation under sync.RWMutex with double-
check pattern.
RateLimitConfig.PerUserRPS / PerUserBurstSize fields with env vars
CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS / CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST
allow per-user budgets distinct from per-IP.
internal/api/middleware/ratelimit_keyed_test.go (NEW, 5 tests):
TwoIPsHaveIndependentBuckets / SameUserDifferentIPsShareBucket /
TwoUsersHaveIndependentBuckets / PerUserBudgetOverride /
EmptyUserKeyTreatedAsAnonymous.
Coverage internal/api/middleware: 82.1% -> 83.7%.
Audit deliverables:
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md: score
25/55 -> 30/55 closed (High 7/9, Medium 7/27 -> 12/27, Low 8/19).
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml: 5 status flips
open -> closed with closure notes citing the Bundle B mechanism.
certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle B section under [unreleased].
Verification:
go test -count=1 -short ./... all green
staticcheck on changed packages no new SA*/ST* hits
(the 4 pre-existing SA1019 sites in cmd/server/main_test.go are
Bundle 9 / M-028 partial closure leftovers tracked in Bundle C)
helm template + helm lint clean
internal/repository/postgres setup-fail sandbox disk pressure,
same on master HEAD before this branch — environmental, not Bundle B
This commit is contained in:
@@ -924,13 +924,21 @@ type AuthConfig struct {
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}
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// RateLimitConfig contains rate limiting configuration.
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//
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// Bundle B / Audit M-025 (OWASP ASVS L2 §11.2.1): pre-bundle the rate
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// limiter was global (a single token bucket shared across every request);
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// post-bundle it is per-key with separate budgets for IP-keyed and
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// user-keyed buckets. RPS / BurstSize are PER-KEY budgets.
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type RateLimitConfig struct {
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// Enabled controls whether rate limiting is enforced on API endpoints.
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// Default: true. Set to false to disable rate limits (not recommended for production).
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// Setting: CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED environment variable.
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Enabled bool
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// RPS is the target requests per second allowed per client (token bucket rate).
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// RPS is the target requests per second allowed PER KEY (token bucket
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// rate). For unauthenticated callers the key is the source IP; for
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// authenticated callers the key is the API-key name (UserKey context
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// value populated by NewAuthWithNamedKeys).
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// Default: 50. Higher values allow burst throughput; lower values restrict load.
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// Setting: CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_RPS environment variable.
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RPS float64
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@@ -940,6 +948,18 @@ type RateLimitConfig struct {
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// Must be at least as large as RPS. Higher = more lenient burst handling.
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// Setting: CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BURST environment variable.
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BurstSize int
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// PerUserRPS overrides RPS for authenticated callers. When zero, RPS is
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// used for both keying dimensions. Set this higher than RPS to grant
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// authenticated clients a more generous budget than anonymous probes.
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// Default: 0 (use RPS).
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// Setting: CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS environment variable.
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PerUserRPS float64
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// PerUserBurstSize overrides BurstSize for authenticated callers. When
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// zero, BurstSize is used. Default: 0 (use BurstSize).
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// Setting: CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST environment variable.
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PerUserBurstSize int
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}
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// CORSConfig contains CORS configuration.
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@@ -1011,9 +1031,11 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
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AgentBootstrapToken: getEnv("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN", ""),
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},
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RateLimit: RateLimitConfig{
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Enabled: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED", true),
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RPS: getEnvFloat("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_RPS", 50),
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BurstSize: getEnvInt("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BURST", 100),
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Enabled: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED", true),
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RPS: getEnvFloat("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_RPS", 50),
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BurstSize: getEnvInt("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BURST", 100),
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PerUserRPS: getEnvFloat("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS", 0),
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PerUserBurstSize: getEnvInt("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST", 0),
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},
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CORS: CORSConfig{
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AllowedOrigins: getEnvList("CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS", nil),
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