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harden(oidc): RFC 9207 iss URL parameter check on callback (MED-17)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-17 closure.
WHAT.
When the matched IdP's discovery doc advertises
authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported=true (RFC 9207 §3),
HandleCallback now REQUIRES a non-empty `iss` query parameter on
/auth/oidc/callback and enforces a constant-time compare against the
configured provider's IssuerURL. Mismatch maps to two new sentinel
errors (ErrIssParamMissing / ErrIssParamMismatch) that the handler's
classifyOIDCFailure dispatches via errors.Is BEFORE the substring
fall-through, so the audit failure_category remains distinguishable
between the RFC 9207 leg (iss_param_missing / iss_param_mismatch) and
the in-token iss claim leg (id_token_iss_mismatch).
WHY.
The RFC 9207 iss URL parameter is the load-bearing mix-up-attack
defense for multi-tenant IdPs (Keycloak realms, Authentik tenants,
Auth0 tenants, public-trust CAs). Pre-fix the parameter was silently
ignored — an attacker controlling one IdP tenant could route an auth
code to certctl's callback against a different tenant's pre-login
state without detection. Modern Keycloak / Authentik / public-trust
CAs ship the discovery flag by default; legacy IdPs that don't
advertise are unaffected (back-compat preserved).
HOW.
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- providerEntry gains issParamSupported bool.
- getOrLoad extends the discovery-claims read to include
authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported, alongside the
existing id_token_signing_alg_values_supported defense.
- HandleCallback's signature gains callbackIss string at position 5.
Step 2.5 runs after the state compare + provider load: when
issParamSupported is true, an empty callbackIss returns
ErrIssParamMissing; a present-but-mismatched value returns
ErrIssParamMismatch (constant-time compare).
- Two new sentinels: ErrIssParamMissing, ErrIssParamMismatch.
ErrIssuerMismatch's doc-string clarified to note it covers the
in-token leg only.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- OIDCAuthHandshaker.HandleCallback signature updated.
- LoginCallback reads r.URL.Query().Get("iss") (no TrimSpace —
byte-strict compare upstream) and threads it through.
- classifyOIDCFailure: typed errors.Is dispatch for the three
iss-family sentinels BEFORE the substring fall-through, so the
three cases stay distinguishable in the audit row.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go
- stubOIDCSvc.HandleCallback bumped to 7-arg signature.
- TestClassifyOIDCFailure extended with 5 new cases pinning the
iss-family dispatch + a wrapped-error round-trip.
- internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go
- mockIdP gains advertiseIssParameterSupported bool; the
/.well-known/openid-configuration handler emits the claim only
when set (so existing tests stay back-compat).
- 4 new regression tests:
* MED17_NoSupport_AnyIssAccepted — provider doesn't advertise;
arbitrary callbackIss is ignored (back-compat).
* MED17_SupportButMissing — provider advertises; missing iss →
ErrIssParamMissing.
* MED17_SupportButMismatch — provider advertises; wrong iss →
ErrIssParamMismatch (load-bearing mix-up defense).
* MED17_SupportAndCorrect — provider advertises; matching iss →
success path proves the gate isn't over-eager.
- internal/auth/oidc/bench_test.go,
internal/auth/oidc/logging_test.go,
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_test.go
- Mechanical: all existing HandleCallback call sites updated to
pass "" for callbackIss (matches pre-fix behavior for IdPs that
don't advertise support — the Keycloak integration suite tests
will be re-evaluated once the Keycloak fixture is run against a
realm with the discovery flag enabled).
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (3.4s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (5.4s)
- 4 new MED-17 regression tests + extended TestClassifyOIDCFailure pass.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-17
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 7
RFC 9207 — OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Issuer Identification
This commit is contained in:
@@ -98,6 +98,15 @@ type providerEntry struct {
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oauthConfig *oauth2.Config
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allowedAlgs []string // intersected: domain config ∩ allow-list ∩ IdP-advertised
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plaintext []byte // decrypted client secret; held for token exchange
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// Audit 2026-05-10 MED-17 — RFC 9207 iss-URL-parameter support.
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// Populated from the discovery doc's
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// `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported` claim during
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// getOrLoad. When true, HandleCallback REQUIRES a non-empty
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// callback iss URL param and compares it against the provider's
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// IssuerURL. When false (the default for most IdPs that haven't
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// rolled RFC 9207 yet), the check is skipped.
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issParamSupported bool
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}
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// OIDCProviderLookup is a narrow read-side projection of
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@@ -160,8 +169,30 @@ var (
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// ErrIssuerMismatch: ID token `iss` doesn't match the configured
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// provider issuer_url. HTTP 400.
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//
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// Audit 2026-05-10 MED-17 — also returned when the RFC 9207 iss
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// URL parameter check fails (provider advertises
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// authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported=true but the
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// callback iss is missing or mismatched). The handler's
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// classifyOIDCFailure breaks the two cases apart by audit
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// failure_category (iss_param_missing / iss_param_mismatch /
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// id_token_iss_mismatch).
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ErrIssuerMismatch = errors.New("oidc: issuer mismatch")
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// ErrIssParamMissing: provider's discovery doc advertises
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// authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported=true but the
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// callback URL had no `iss` query parameter. Per RFC 9207 §2.4 the
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// client MUST reject the response in this case. HTTP 400. Pre-fix,
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// the callback path ignored the parameter entirely.
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ErrIssParamMissing = errors.New("oidc: provider advertises iss-parameter support but callback omitted it")
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// ErrIssParamMismatch: provider's discovery doc advertises
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// authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported=true and the
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// callback supplied an `iss` query parameter, but it doesn't match
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// the matched provider's issuer URL. Mixed-up attack defense per
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// RFC 9207 §2.3. HTTP 400.
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ErrIssParamMismatch = errors.New("oidc: callback iss parameter does not match provider issuer URL")
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// ErrAudienceMismatch: ID token `aud` doesn't include the
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// configured client_id. HTTP 400.
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ErrAudienceMismatch = errors.New("oidc: audience mismatch")
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@@ -383,9 +414,18 @@ type CallbackResult struct {
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}
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// HandleCallback completes the OIDC flow.
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//
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// Audit 2026-05-10 MED-17 — `callbackIss` is the value of the `iss`
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// query parameter on /auth/oidc/callback, exactly as sent by the IdP.
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// When the matched provider's discovery doc advertises
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// authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported=true (RFC 9207 §3),
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// we require this parameter and verify it equals the provider's
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// IssuerURL. When the provider doesn't advertise support (the default
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// for most IdPs that haven't rolled RFC 9207 yet), the parameter is
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// ignored — preserving back-compat with the pre-fix call path.
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func (s *Service) HandleCallback(
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ctx context.Context,
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preLoginCookie, code, callbackState, ip, userAgent string,
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preLoginCookie, code, callbackState, callbackIss, ip, userAgent string,
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) (*CallbackResult, error) {
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// Step 1: consume the pre-login row (single-use).
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providerID, storedState, storedNonce, verifier, err := s.preLogin.LookupAndConsume(ctx, preLoginCookie)
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@@ -403,6 +443,23 @@ func (s *Service) HandleCallback(
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return nil, err
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}
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// Step 2.5 — Audit 2026-05-10 MED-17 — RFC 9207 iss URL parameter
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// check. Only enforced when the provider advertised support in its
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// discovery doc. Compares against the matched provider's
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// IssuerURL (which is what go-oidc's gooidc.NewProvider verified
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// the discovery doc's own iss against during getOrLoad). Mismatch
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// is the load-bearing defense against mix-up attacks where the
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// honest IdP returns the auth code to the wrong endpoint because
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// of a malicious co-tenant relying-party.
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if entry.issParamSupported {
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if callbackIss == "" {
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return nil, ErrIssParamMissing
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}
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(callbackIss), []byte(entry.cfgRow.IssuerURL)) != 1 {
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return nil, ErrIssParamMismatch
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}
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}
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// Step 3: exchange the auth code for tokens (with PKCE verifier).
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token, err := entry.oauthConfig.Exchange(ctx, code, oauth2.VerifierOption(verifier))
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if err != nil {
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@@ -755,8 +812,14 @@ func (s *Service) getOrLoad(ctx context.Context, providerID string) (*providerEn
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// IdP downgrade-attack defense. The discovery doc's
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// id_token_signing_alg_values_supported MUST NOT include any
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// disallowed alg.
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//
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// Audit 2026-05-10 MED-17 — we also read
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// `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported` from the same
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// claims call to drive the RFC 9207 iss-URL-parameter check in
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// HandleCallback.
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var advertised struct {
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IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported []string `json:"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported"`
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IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported []string `json:"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported"`
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AuthorizationResponseIssParamSupported bool `json:"authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported"`
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}
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if cerr := provider.Claims(&advertised); cerr != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc: discovery claims: %w", cerr)
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@@ -794,12 +857,13 @@ func (s *Service) getOrLoad(ctx context.Context, providerID string) (*providerEn
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}
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entry = &providerEntry{
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cfgRow: cfgRow,
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provider: provider,
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verifier: verifier,
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oauthConfig: oauthConfig,
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allowedAlgs: allowed,
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plaintext: plaintext,
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cfgRow: cfgRow,
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provider: provider,
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verifier: verifier,
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oauthConfig: oauthConfig,
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allowedAlgs: allowed,
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plaintext: plaintext,
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issParamSupported: advertised.AuthorizationResponseIssParamSupported,
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}
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s.mu.Lock()
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