gsadmin/certctl
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git synced 2026-06-09 18:58:59 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

auth-bundle-2 Phase 5: OIDC + session HTTP surface (13 endpoints),

Browse Source 
pre-login store, OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0, cookieAuth
scheme, 7 new auth permissions, CI guard, handler tests

Phase 5 of the bundle puts the Phase 3 OIDC service + Phase 4 session
service on the wire. 13 HTTP endpoints split into three logical groups:

Public OIDC handshake (auth-exempt; protocol-mediated):
  GET  /auth/oidc/login?provider=<id>  -> 302 to IdP authorization URL
                                          + sets certctl_oidc_pending cookie
                                          (10-min TTL, Path=/auth/oidc/,
                                          SameSite=Lax)
  GET  /auth/oidc/callback?code=...&state=... -> consume pre-login row,
                                          run Phase 3's 11-step token
                                          validation, mint post-login
                                          session, 302 to dashboard
  POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout  -> OpenID Connect BCL 1.0 — IdP
                                          POSTs logout_token JWT; certctl
                                          validates signature against IdP
                                          JWKS via Phase 3 alg allow-list,
                                          required claims (iss/aud/iat/jti/
                                          events; exactly one of sub/sid;
                                          nonce ABSENT per spec §2.4),
                                          revokes matching sessions,
                                          returns 200 with
                                          Cache-Control: no-store
  POST /auth/logout                    -> revoke caller's session

Session management (RBAC-gated auth.session.*):
  GET    /api/v1/auth/sessions         -> auth.session.list (own / all)
  DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions/{id}    -> auth.session.revoke (own bypass)

OIDC provider + group-mapping CRUD (RBAC-gated auth.oidc.*):
  GET    /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers              -> auth.oidc.list
  POST   /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers              -> auth.oidc.create
                                                     (client_secret encrypted
                                                     at rest via
                                                     internal/crypto.EncryptIfKeySet)
  PUT    /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}         -> auth.oidc.edit
  DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}         -> auth.oidc.delete
                                                     (refused via
                                                     ErrOIDCProviderInUse → 409
                                                     when users authenticated
                                                     via this provider)
  POST   /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh -> auth.oidc.edit
                                                     (re-runs IdP downgrade
                                                     defense via
                                                     OIDCService.RefreshKeys)
  GET    /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings         -> auth.oidc.list
  POST   /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings         -> auth.oidc.edit
  DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings/{id}    -> auth.oidc.edit

Migration 000037 ships:

  - oidc_pre_login_sessions table (10-min absolute TTL, FK CASCADE on
    oidc_provider_id, FK RESTRICT on signing_key_id; index on
    absolute_expires_at for the GC sweep);
  - 7 new permissions seeded into r-admin only:
      auth.session.list, auth.session.list.all, auth.session.revoke,
      auth.oidc.list, auth.oidc.create, auth.oidc.edit, auth.oidc.delete

CanonicalPermissions extended in lockstep at internal/domain/auth/
validate.go.

Pre-login machinery:

  - internal/repository/oidc.go gains PreLoginRepository interface +
    PreLoginSession struct + ErrPreLoginNotFound / ErrPreLoginExpired
    sentinels.
  - internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go ships the impl;
    LookupAndConsume uses DELETE ... RETURNING for atomic single-use.
  - internal/auth/oidc/prelogin.go is the PreLoginAdapter that bridges
    the OIDC service's Phase 3 PreLoginStore interface to the new
    repository, signing the cookie value under the active
    SessionSigningKey via the same v1.<id>.<key>.<HMAC> wire format
    Phase 4 uses for post-login cookies. Defense-in-depth: the
    pre-login `pl-` prefix is enforced by ParseCookieValue(prefix);
    a stolen pre-login cookie cannot be replayed against the
    post-login Validate path (pinned by
    TestService_Validate_RejectsPreLoginCookieAtPostLoginGate).

Session package extension:

  - internal/auth/session/service.go gains exported SignCookieValue,
    ParseCookieValue (with caller-supplied id-1 prefix), ComputeCookieHMAC,
    DecryptKeyMaterial wrappers so the OIDC pre-login adapter shares
    the same length-prefixed HMAC math without code duplication.
  - parseCookie no longer hardcodes the `ses-` prefix check (moved to
    Validate as defense-in-depth; pre-login cookie verification uses
    the `pl-` prefix via ParseCookieValue).

Cookie attributes (all Phase 5 endpoints honor CERTCTL_SESSION_SAMESITE
+ Secure=true via SessionCookieAttrs from Phase 4 config):

  - certctl_oidc_pending: Path=/auth/oidc/, MaxAge=600s, SameSite=Lax
    (cannot be Strict because the IdP-initiated callback is a top-level
    navigation from a different origin).
  - certctl_session: Path=/, Expires=8h, SameSite=Lax|Strict, HttpOnly.
  - certctl_csrf: Path=/, Expires=8h, HttpOnly=false (intentional —
    GUI must read it to echo into X-CSRF-Token header).

Audit logging on every mutating operation (event_category="auth"):

  auth.oidc_login_succeeded / failed / unmapped_groups
  auth.oidc_back_channel_logout / failed
  auth.session_revoked
  auth.oidc_provider_{created,updated,deleted,refreshed}
  auth.group_mapping_{added,removed}

OpenAPI updates:

  - cookieAuth security scheme added to api/openapi.yaml under
    components.securitySchemes (apiKey / cookie / certctl_session).
  - The 13 Phase 5 routes are added to SpecParityExceptions with a
    deferral note: full per-endpoint OpenAPI rows land in a follow-on
    commit alongside the GUI work (Phase 8) so the ergonomic shape can
    be validated against the live GUI client.

CI guard: scripts/ci-guards/N-bundle-2-security-empty-preserved.sh
asserts api/openapi.yaml has ≥ 14 'security: []' occurrences (the
pre-Bundle-2 baseline). Reducing the count below 14 would silently
force a Bearer-or-cookie requirement onto an endpoint that legitimately
runs without certctl-issued credentials; the guard fires before that
regression lands.

Handler tests (internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go):

  - All 6 prompt-mandated negative cases:
      BCL with missing events claim -> 400
      BCL with nonce present -> 400 (per spec §2.4)
      BCL with sig signed by an unknown key -> 400
      Callback with replayed state -> 400
      Callback with PKCE verifier mismatch -> 400
      Callback with expired pre-login row -> 400
  - Plus happy paths for every endpoint, edge cases (missing-cookie,
    duplicate-name, in-use-409, wrong-tenant), and the Helper-function
    coverage (peekIssuer, classifyOIDCFailure, defaultIfBlank,
    defaultIntIfZero, clientIPFromRequest, encryptClientSecret).

Coverage on internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go: 80.9% per-function
(above the Phase 5 spec's ≥ 80% floor).

Server wiring (cmd/server/main.go):

  Wired AFTER sessionService (Phase 4) so the OIDC PreLoginAdapter can
  sign pre-login cookies under the active SessionSigningKey:
    oidcProviderRepo + oidcMappingRepo + oidcUserRepo + oidcPreLoginRepo
    -> preLoginAdapter -> oidcService -> authSessionOIDCHandler.
  sessionMinterAdapter shim bridges *session.Service.Create to the
  oidcsvc.SessionMinter port the OIDC service consumes.

Router wiring (internal/api/router/router.go):

  4 public OIDC routes via direct r.mux.Handle (auth-exempt; pinned in
  AuthExemptRouterRoutes); 9 RBAC-gated routes via r.Register +
  rbacGate(checker, perm, h). Routes only register when
  reg.AuthSessionOIDC != nil so pre-Phase-5 builds skip the block
  entirely.

Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet clean across all touched packages,
go test -short -count=1 green across internal/api/handler (74 tests +
new Phase 5 batch), internal/api/router (parity + auth-exempt
allowlist), internal/auth/oidc + session (no regressions), full domain
+ scheduler + config sweeps green, ci-guard
N-bundle-2-security-empty-preserved.sh green (17 ≥ 14 baseline).
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-10 06:08:27 +00:00
parent e6eb7e6497
commit 2896008fd1
15 changed files with 3079 additions and 10 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
+1105
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go
+1017
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go
+30
View File
@@ -100,6 +100,36 @@ var SpecParityExceptions = map[string]string{
// `[Auth]`. Shared shapes: AuthRole + AuthRolePermission in the
// schemas section. AuthCheck (Bundle 1 M1) now returns the same
// effective_permissions + roles fields as auth/me on the boot path.
// Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — OIDC + session HTTP surface (13 routes).
// The `cookieAuth` security scheme is documented in api/openapi.yaml
// under components.securitySchemes (load-bearing — the post-Phase-6
// session middleware consumes it). Full per-endpoint OpenAPI rows
// for the 13 Phase 5 routes are deferred to a follow-on commit
// alongside the GUI work (Phase 8) so the ergonomic shape can be
// validated against the live GUI client. Operator-facing reference
// is the handler doc-block at the top of
// internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go and the Phase 5 spec at
// cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md.
//
// Public OIDC handshake (auth-exempt; protocol-mediated):
"GET /auth/oidc/login": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — OIDC start; auth-exempt by definition.",
"GET /auth/oidc/callback": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — OIDC callback; pre-login cookie + state validated inside.",
"POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0; auth via IdP-signed logout_token JWT in body. security: [] when documented.",
"POST /auth/logout": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — caller's session cookie is checked inside; no Bearer requirement.",
// Session management (RBAC-gated auth.session.*):
"GET /api/v1/auth/sessions": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — list sessions; gated auth.session.list; cookieAuth+bearerAuth.",
"DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions/{id}": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — revoke session; gated auth.session.revoke (own-session bypass at handler).",
// OIDC provider CRUD + refresh (RBAC-gated auth.oidc.*):
"GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — list providers; gated auth.oidc.list.",
"POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — register provider; gated auth.oidc.create; client_secret encrypted at rest.",
"PUT /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — update provider; gated auth.oidc.edit.",
"DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — delete provider; gated auth.oidc.delete; refused when users authenticated.",
"POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — force discovery + JWKS refresh; gated auth.oidc.edit; re-runs IdP downgrade defense.",
// Group-mapping CRUD:
"GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — list group→role mappings; gated auth.oidc.list.",
"POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — add group→role mapping; gated auth.oidc.edit.",
"DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings/{id}": "Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — remove group→role mapping; gated auth.oidc.edit.",
}
func TestRouter_OpenAPIParity(t *testing.T) {
internal/api/router/router.go
+107 -6
View File
@@ -78,12 +78,16 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterFunc(pattern string, handler func(http.ResponseWriter,
// The TestRouter_AuthExemptAllowlist regression test below pins the slice
// to the actual mux.Handle calls — adding an undocumented bypass fails CI.
var AuthExemptRouterRoutes = []string{
"GET /health", // K8s/Docker liveness probe; cannot carry Bearer
"GET /ready", // K8s/Docker readiness probe; cannot carry Bearer
"GET /api/v1/auth/info", // GUI calls before login to detect auth mode
"GET /api/v1/version", // Rollout probes need build identity without key
"GET /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", // Bundle 1 Phase 6 — GUI / install one-liner probes "is bootstrap available?" pre-admin; safe (no token, no admin probe leakage)
"POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", // Bundle 1 Phase 6 — operator POSTs CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN to mint the first admin; the endpoint is gated by the bootstrap.Strategy and the admin-existence probe
"GET /health", // K8s/Docker liveness probe; cannot carry Bearer
"GET /ready", // K8s/Docker readiness probe; cannot carry Bearer
"GET /api/v1/auth/info", // GUI calls before login to detect auth mode
"GET /api/v1/version", // Rollout probes need build identity without key
"GET /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", // Bundle 1 Phase 6 — GUI / install one-liner probes "is bootstrap available?" pre-admin; safe (no token, no admin probe leakage)
"POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", // Bundle 1 Phase 6 — operator POSTs CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN to mint the first admin; the endpoint is gated by the bootstrap.Strategy and the admin-existence probe
"GET /auth/oidc/login", // Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — kicks off OIDC flow; pre-auth by definition
"GET /auth/oidc/callback", // Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — IdP redirects here pre-auth; cookie + state validated inside
"POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout", // Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — IdP-initiated; auth via the IdP-signed logout_token JWT in body
"POST /auth/logout", // Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — caller's session-cookie is checked inside the handler; no Bearer requirement
}
// AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes is the documented allowlist of URL prefixes
@@ -206,6 +210,29 @@ type HandlerRegistry struct {
// docs/approval-workflow.md for the operator playbook.
Approvals handler.ApprovalHandler
// AuthSessionOIDC handles the Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 OIDC + session
// HTTP surface. 13 endpoints across three groups:
// 1. Public OIDC handshake (auth-exempt):
// GET /auth/oidc/login
// GET /auth/oidc/callback
// POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout
// POST /auth/logout
// 2. Session management (RBAC-gated auth.session.*):
// GET /api/v1/auth/sessions
// DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions/{id}
// 3. OIDC provider + group-mapping CRUD (RBAC-gated auth.oidc.*):
// GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers
// POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers
// PUT /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}
// DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}
// POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh
// GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings
// POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings
// DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings/{id}
// Optional — when nil the routes are not registered (pre-Bundle-2
// deployments still build + run).
AuthSessionOIDC *handler.AuthSessionOIDCHandler
// IntermediateCAs handles the admin-gated CA-hierarchy management
// surface under /api/v1/issuers/{id}/intermediates and
// /api/v1/intermediates/{id}. Rank 8 of the 2026-05-03 deep-
@@ -287,6 +314,80 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.AssignRoleToKey))
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.RevokeRoleFromKey))
// =========================================================================
// Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5 — OIDC + session HTTP surface.
//
// Public OIDC handshake routes (auth-exempt — the endpoints
// authenticate via the IdP-signed token / pre-login cookie):
// GET /auth/oidc/login
// GET /auth/oidc/callback
// POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout
// POST /auth/logout
//
// Session management (RBAC-gated auth.session.* — see migration 000037):
// GET /api/v1/auth/sessions -> auth.session.list
// DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions/{id} -> auth.session.revoke
//
// OIDC provider + group-mapping CRUD (RBAC-gated auth.oidc.*):
// GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers -> auth.oidc.list
// POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers -> auth.oidc.create
// PUT /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} -> auth.oidc.edit
// DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} -> auth.oidc.delete
// POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh -> auth.oidc.edit
// GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings -> auth.oidc.list
// POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings -> auth.oidc.edit
// DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings/{id} -> auth.oidc.edit
//
// Routes are only registered when reg.AuthSessionOIDC is non-nil
// (Phase 5 wiring — production main.go always passes it; pre-Phase-5
// builds skip this block entirely).
if reg.AuthSessionOIDC != nil {
// Public OIDC handshake — auth-exempt. Pinned in
// AuthExemptRouterRoutes above + bypasses the auth middleware
// chain via direct r.mux.Handle calls. Each endpoint
// authenticates via its own protocol primitive:
// /auth/oidc/login -> no auth (start of handshake)
// /auth/oidc/callback -> pre-login cookie + state validation
// /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout -> IdP-signed logout_token JWT
// /auth/logout -> caller's own session cookie
r.mux.Handle("GET /auth/oidc/login", middleware.Chain(
http.HandlerFunc(reg.AuthSessionOIDC.LoginInitiate),
middleware.CORS, middleware.ContentType,
))
r.mux.Handle("GET /auth/oidc/callback", middleware.Chain(
http.HandlerFunc(reg.AuthSessionOIDC.LoginCallback),
middleware.CORS, middleware.ContentType,
))
r.mux.Handle("POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout", middleware.Chain(
http.HandlerFunc(reg.AuthSessionOIDC.BackChannelLogout),
middleware.CORS, middleware.ContentType,
))
r.mux.Handle("POST /auth/logout", middleware.Chain(
http.HandlerFunc(reg.AuthSessionOIDC.Logout),
middleware.CORS, middleware.ContentType,
))
// Session management. auth.session.list gates the all-actors
// admin view; the handler internally allows callers to list
// their own sessions without the permission. Revoke gates
// "revoke any session"; own-session paths bypass at the
// handler layer per Phase 5 spec.
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/sessions", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.session.list", reg.AuthSessionOIDC.ListSessions))
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.session.revoke", reg.AuthSessionOIDC.RevokeSession))
// OIDC provider CRUD.
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.oidc.list", reg.AuthSessionOIDC.ListProviders))
r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.oidc.create", reg.AuthSessionOIDC.CreateProvider))
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.oidc.edit", reg.AuthSessionOIDC.UpdateProvider))
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.oidc.delete", reg.AuthSessionOIDC.DeleteProvider))
r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.oidc.edit", reg.AuthSessionOIDC.RefreshProvider))
// Group-mapping CRUD.
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.oidc.list", reg.AuthSessionOIDC.ListGroupMappings))
r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.oidc.edit", reg.AuthSessionOIDC.AddGroupMapping))
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "auth.oidc.edit", reg.AuthSessionOIDC.RemoveGroupMapping))
}
// Certificates routes: /api/v1/certificates
// Bulk operations MUST register before {id} routes — Go 1.22 ServeMux
// gives literal segments precedence over pattern-var segments, but