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docs: Phase 14 — Last reviewed line sweep across docs/
Per Phase 1 audit at cowork/docs-overhaul-phase-1-audit-2026-05-04/. Adds a `> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05` line right after the H1 heading of every doc that didn't already have one (41 files). This dates the freshness clock for the future Phase 4 per-doc review. The discipline going forward: when a doc's content gets a meaningful edit, bump the date. When the date gets old (e.g., >6 months), the doc earns a freshness-review pass. Mechanical insertion via awk one-liner, applied to every docs/*.md that didn't already match `grep -q 'Last reviewed:'`. Files that already carried the line from earlier Phase 2 work (the navigation index, the new connector docs, the new SCEP server / legacy-clients- TLS-1.2 / release-verification docs, and the 5 per-connector deep dives) were skipped to avoid duplicate insertion. Net: every doc in docs/ now has a Last reviewed line.
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# Issuance approval workflow
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> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
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certctl can gate certificate issuance + renewal on a per-profile, two-person-integrity check. Compliance customers (PCI-DSS Level 1, FedRAMP Moderate / High, SOC 2 Type II, HIPAA) configure this on production-tier `CertificateProfile` rows so every renewal-loop tick or manual `POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/renew` blocks at `JobStatusAwaitingApproval` until a different actor approves.
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Closes the procurement-checklist question "How do you enforce two-person integrity on cert issuance?" — without this surface the answer is "we don't"; with `requires_approval=true` on the profile, the answer is "here's the RBAC contract + here's the audit query that proves bypass mode is off in production."
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# Database TLS — Postgres Transport Encryption
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> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
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**Audit reference:** Bundle B / M-018. PCI-DSS v4.0 Req 4 §2.2.5; CWE-319.
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certctl talks to Postgres over a single connection-string URL controlled by the
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# Runbook: cloud-target deployment connectors (AWS ACM + Azure Key Vault)
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> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
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This runbook covers the SDK-driven cloud target connectors that ship in
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certctl post-2026-05-03 (Rank 5 of the Infisical deep-research
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deliverable). It complements the operator-facing
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# Disaster recovery runbook
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> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
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> **Status (this document):** Production hardening II Phase 10
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> deliverable. Codifies the fail-safe behaviors that already exist in
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> the codebase and the operator procedures for recovering from
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# Runbook: certificate-expiry alerts (multi-channel)
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> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
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This runbook covers the per-policy multi-channel expiry-alert dispatch
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path that ships in certctl post-2026-05-03 (Rank 4 of the Infisical
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deep-research deliverable). It complements the operator-facing
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# certctl Security Posture & Operator Guidance
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> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
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This document collects the operator-facing security guidance that the source
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code's per-finding comment blocks reference. Each section names the audit
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finding it closes, the threat model, and the operator action required (if
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# TLS on the Control Plane
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> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
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certctl's control plane is HTTPS-only as of v2.2. There is no plaintext `http://` listener, no `auto` mode, no dual-listener bridge, no TLS 1.2 escape hatch. The server refuses to start without a cert+key pair, the agent/CLI/MCP clients reject `http://` URLs at startup, and the Helm chart refuses to render without either an operator-supplied Secret or a cert-manager Certificate CR.
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This doc covers four cert provisioning patterns, SIGHUP-based cert rotation, and the client-side CA-trust configuration agents and the CLI need to talk to the server. If you are upgrading from a pre-HTTPS release and want the step-by-step cutover procedure, read [`upgrade-to-tls.md`](upgrade-to-tls.md) first and come back here for reference.
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