ci(codeql): teach analyzer about ValidateSafeURL SSRF barrier

Closes CodeQL alert #23 (go/request-forgery, Critical) at the
structural level — by telling CodeQL what the runtime code already
does — rather than via per-line `// codeql[...]` suppressions.

Background. internal/service/scep_probe.go:232 calls client.Do(req)
where the request URL is built from operator-supplied input. The
runtime defense is two-layer:

  1. validation.ValidateSafeURL(rawURL) at scep_probe.go:86 rejects
     non-http(s) schemes, empty hosts, literal-IP hosts in reserved
     ranges (loopback, link-local incl. cloud metadata
     169.254.169.254, multicast, broadcast, unspecified, IPv6
     link-local), and DNS names whose A/AAAA resolution returns any
     reserved IP. RFC 1918 is intentionally NOT blocked — see
     internal/validation/ssrf.go:17-21 for the design rationale.

  2. validation.SafeHTTPDialContext on the http.Transport (line 254)
     re-resolves at dial time, applies the same reserved-IP set, and
     pins the dial to a literal non-reserved IP — defeating DNS
     rebinding between validate and dial.

CodeQL's go/request-forgery query is a syntactic taint-tracking rule
with no built-in knowledge of either validator, so it reports the
finding even though the runtime is correctly defended.

The fix. Add a Models-as-Data (MaD) extension at .github/codeql/
declaring ValidateSafeURL as a request-forgery barrier. The barrier
applies to Argument[0] (the URL parameter), which means the analyzer
treats every URL flowing through ValidateSafeURL as sanitized for the
request-forgery taint set. After this lands:

  - Alert #23 dismisses at scep_probe.go:232.
  - The same model applies to the second site of this exact shape —
    webhook notifier's outbound client.Do (internal/connector/
    notifier/webhook/webhook.go) — without per-line annotations.
  - Future code that flows operator URLs through ValidateSafeURL
    inherits the barrier automatically.

This is the structural fix, not a band-aid:

  - Band-aid (rejected): `// codeql[go/request-forgery]` suppression
    on line 232. Suppresses one alert; doesn't teach the analyzer.
    Webhook notifier would need the same comment when its sibling
    rule landing fires.

  - Structural (this change): teach CodeQL via models-as-data, in
    config checked into the repo, that lives next to the workflow
    that uses it. The validators ARE sanitizers in the runtime —
    this PR makes the analyzer's model match reality.

Files:

  - .github/codeql/qlpack.yml — local model pack manifest, declares
    extensionTargets: codeql/go-all: '*'

  - .github/codeql/models/request-forgery-sanitizers.model.yml —
    barrierModel row for validation.ValidateSafeURL Argument[0] /
    request-forgery taint kind / manual provenance

  - .github/codeql/codeql-config.yml — references the local pack +
    keeps security-and-quality query suite scope

  - .github/workflows/codeql.yml — Initialize CodeQL step picks up
    config-file: ./.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml. The existing
    `queries: security-and-quality` line stays so even if the config
    file fails to load, the suite scope is preserved.

  - docs/architecture.md::Input Validation and SSRF Protection —
    extended to name the egress validators (ValidateSafeURL +
    SafeHTTPDialContext) and the call sites (SCEP probe + webhook
    notifier). Closes the docs gap surfaced during the audit; the
    egress threat-model previously lived only in source comments.

Requires CodeQL CLI ≥ 2.25.2 for the barrierModel extensible
predicate (Go MaD support added 2026-04-21). github/codeql-action@v3
ships a recent enough CLI by default; if a future analysis fails
with "unknown extensible predicate barrierModel", the action's CLI
has regressed below 2.25.2 — pin a newer action version rather than
reverting this pack. Documented inline in qlpack.yml.

References:
  - https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-go/
  - https://github.blog/changelog/2026-04-21-codeql-now-supports-sanitizers-and-validators-in-models-as-data/

.github/codeql/models/request-forgery-sanitizers.model.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Models-as-Data sanitizer rows for the go/request-forgery query.
+#
+# Each row in `data` is a 9-tuple matching the `barrierModel` extensible
+# predicate signature for Go:
+#
+#   (package, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, output, kind, provenance)
+#
+# Where:
+#   - package    — Go import path of the sanitizer
+#   - type       — receiver type ("" for package-level functions)
+#   - subtypes   — false for non-method functions; true to apply to subtypes
+#   - name       — function/method name
+#   - signature  — empty for Go (the column is not used)
+#   - ext        — empty (reserved)
+#   - output     — access path that becomes the barrier; "Argument[N]" means
+#                  the Nth argument is sanitized after the call
+#   - kind       — taint kind the barrier applies to ("request-forgery" for
+#                  the go/request-forgery query)
+#   - provenance — origin tag for the model row ("manual" — hand-authored)
+#
+# References:
+#   - https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-go/
+#   - https://github.blog/changelog/2026-04-21-codeql-now-supports-sanitizers-and-validators-in-models-as-data/
+
+extensions:
+  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  # validation.ValidateSafeURL — primary egress URL validator.
+  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  # Signature: func ValidateSafeURL(rawURL string) error
+  #
+  # Rejects (returns non-nil error for):
+  #   - non-http/https schemes (file://, gopher://, ftp://, data:, etc.)
+  #   - URLs missing a host
+  #   - literal-IP hosts in: 127/8 + ::1 (loopback), 169.254.0.0/16 (link-
+  #     local incl. AWS/Azure/GCP cloud metadata at 169.254.169.254),
+  #     224.0.0.0/4 + ff00::/8 (multicast), 255.255.255.255 (broadcast),
+  #     0.0.0.0 + :: (unspecified), fe80::/10 (IPv6 link-local)
+  #   - DNS names whose A/AAAA resolution returns any IP in the set above
+  #
+  # Source of truth: internal/validation/ssrf.go (ValidateSafeURL +
+  # IsReservedIP + isReservedIPForDial). RFC 1918 (10/8, 172.16/12,
+  # 192.168/16) is intentionally NOT blocked — see the comment block at
+  # ssrf.go:17-21 for the design rationale.
+  #
+  # The companion runtime defense is SafeHTTPDialContext (installed on the
+  # http.Transport via http.Transport.DialContext) which re-resolves the
+  # host at dial time and pins the dial to a literal non-reserved IP,
+  # defeating DNS rebinding. SafeHTTPDialContext returns a closure rather
+  # than acting as a direct sanitizer in dataflow terms, so it isn't
+  # modeled here — but ValidateSafeURL alone is sufficient to dismiss the
+  # request-forgery alerts at the call sites that use it (scep_probe.go,
+  # webhook.go).
+  - addsTo:
+      pack: codeql/go-all
+      extensible: barrierModel
+    data:
+      - ["github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/validation", "", false, "ValidateSafeURL", "", "", "Argument[0]", "request-forgery", "manual"]