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ci(codeql): teach analyzer about ValidateSafeURL SSRF barrier
Closes CodeQL alert #23 (go/request-forgery, Critical) at the structural level — by telling CodeQL what the runtime code already does — rather than via per-line `// codeql[...]` suppressions. Background. internal/service/scep_probe.go:232 calls client.Do(req) where the request URL is built from operator-supplied input. The runtime defense is two-layer: 1. validation.ValidateSafeURL(rawURL) at scep_probe.go:86 rejects non-http(s) schemes, empty hosts, literal-IP hosts in reserved ranges (loopback, link-local incl. cloud metadata 169.254.169.254, multicast, broadcast, unspecified, IPv6 link-local), and DNS names whose A/AAAA resolution returns any reserved IP. RFC 1918 is intentionally NOT blocked — see internal/validation/ssrf.go:17-21 for the design rationale. 2. validation.SafeHTTPDialContext on the http.Transport (line 254) re-resolves at dial time, applies the same reserved-IP set, and pins the dial to a literal non-reserved IP — defeating DNS rebinding between validate and dial. CodeQL's go/request-forgery query is a syntactic taint-tracking rule with no built-in knowledge of either validator, so it reports the finding even though the runtime is correctly defended. The fix. Add a Models-as-Data (MaD) extension at .github/codeql/ declaring ValidateSafeURL as a request-forgery barrier. The barrier applies to Argument[0] (the URL parameter), which means the analyzer treats every URL flowing through ValidateSafeURL as sanitized for the request-forgery taint set. After this lands: - Alert #23 dismisses at scep_probe.go:232. - The same model applies to the second site of this exact shape — webhook notifier's outbound client.Do (internal/connector/ notifier/webhook/webhook.go) — without per-line annotations. - Future code that flows operator URLs through ValidateSafeURL inherits the barrier automatically. This is the structural fix, not a band-aid: - Band-aid (rejected): `// codeql[go/request-forgery]` suppression on line 232. Suppresses one alert; doesn't teach the analyzer. Webhook notifier would need the same comment when its sibling rule landing fires. - Structural (this change): teach CodeQL via models-as-data, in config checked into the repo, that lives next to the workflow that uses it. The validators ARE sanitizers in the runtime — this PR makes the analyzer's model match reality. Files: - .github/codeql/qlpack.yml — local model pack manifest, declares extensionTargets: codeql/go-all: '*' - .github/codeql/models/request-forgery-sanitizers.model.yml — barrierModel row for validation.ValidateSafeURL Argument[0] / request-forgery taint kind / manual provenance - .github/codeql/codeql-config.yml — references the local pack + keeps security-and-quality query suite scope - .github/workflows/codeql.yml — Initialize CodeQL step picks up config-file: ./.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml. The existing `queries: security-and-quality` line stays so even if the config file fails to load, the suite scope is preserved. - docs/architecture.md::Input Validation and SSRF Protection — extended to name the egress validators (ValidateSafeURL + SafeHTTPDialContext) and the call sites (SCEP probe + webhook notifier). Closes the docs gap surfaced during the audit; the egress threat-model previously lived only in source comments. Requires CodeQL CLI ≥ 2.25.2 for the barrierModel extensible predicate (Go MaD support added 2026-04-21). github/codeql-action@v3 ships a recent enough CLI by default; if a future analysis fails with "unknown extensible predicate barrierModel", the action's CLI has regressed below 2.25.2 — pin a newer action version rather than reverting this pack. Documented inline in qlpack.yml. References: - https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-go/ - https://github.blog/changelog/2026-04-21-codeql-now-supports-sanitizers-and-validators-in-models-as-data/
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# CodeQL analysis config for certctl.
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#
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# Loaded by .github/workflows/codeql.yml's `Initialize CodeQL` step via
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# `config-file:`. Two responsibilities:
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#
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# 1. Re-declare the query suite the workflow runs (security-and-quality)
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# so that disabling the action's default suite via `disable-default-
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# queries: true` doesn't accidentally drop coverage.
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#
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# 2. Load the local model pack at .github/codeql/, which adds project-
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# specific Models-as-Data extensions (sanitizers, sinks, summaries)
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# for the standard Go queries. See ./qlpack.yml for the full motivation.
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#
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# Path-ignore is intentionally empty — every path that ships with the
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# repo is in scope. Test files are NOT excluded; if a vulnerability
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# regresses in a test fixture and is later promoted to production, we
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# want CodeQL to catch it on first appearance.
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name: certctl-codeql
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# Run the same query suite the workflow has been running pre-config-file:
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# security-and-quality (security findings + maintainability/correctness).
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# Listing it here ensures the suite stays in scope even if the action's
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# default behavior shifts.
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queries:
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- uses: security-and-quality
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# Load the local model pack. This is what makes the SSRF sanitizer
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# barrier rows in models/request-forgery-sanitizers.model.yml apply to
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# the standard go/request-forgery query.
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#
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# `${{ }}` is not used here — the path is relative to the config file's
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# directory, not to the repo root, per CodeQL action docs.
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packs:
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go:
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- ./
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# Models-as-Data sanitizer rows for the go/request-forgery query.
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#
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# Each row in `data` is a 9-tuple matching the `barrierModel` extensible
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# predicate signature for Go:
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#
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# (package, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, output, kind, provenance)
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#
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# Where:
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# - package — Go import path of the sanitizer
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# - type — receiver type ("" for package-level functions)
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# - subtypes — false for non-method functions; true to apply to subtypes
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# - name — function/method name
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# - signature — empty for Go (the column is not used)
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# - ext — empty (reserved)
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# - output — access path that becomes the barrier; "Argument[N]" means
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# the Nth argument is sanitized after the call
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# - kind — taint kind the barrier applies to ("request-forgery" for
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# the go/request-forgery query)
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# - provenance — origin tag for the model row ("manual" — hand-authored)
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#
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# References:
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# - https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-go/
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# - https://github.blog/changelog/2026-04-21-codeql-now-supports-sanitizers-and-validators-in-models-as-data/
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extensions:
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# validation.ValidateSafeURL — primary egress URL validator.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Signature: func ValidateSafeURL(rawURL string) error
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#
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# Rejects (returns non-nil error for):
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# - non-http/https schemes (file://, gopher://, ftp://, data:, etc.)
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# - URLs missing a host
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# - literal-IP hosts in: 127/8 + ::1 (loopback), 169.254.0.0/16 (link-
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# local incl. AWS/Azure/GCP cloud metadata at 169.254.169.254),
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# 224.0.0.0/4 + ff00::/8 (multicast), 255.255.255.255 (broadcast),
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# 0.0.0.0 + :: (unspecified), fe80::/10 (IPv6 link-local)
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# - DNS names whose A/AAAA resolution returns any IP in the set above
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#
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# Source of truth: internal/validation/ssrf.go (ValidateSafeURL +
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# IsReservedIP + isReservedIPForDial). RFC 1918 (10/8, 172.16/12,
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# 192.168/16) is intentionally NOT blocked — see the comment block at
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# ssrf.go:17-21 for the design rationale.
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#
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# The companion runtime defense is SafeHTTPDialContext (installed on the
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# http.Transport via http.Transport.DialContext) which re-resolves the
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# host at dial time and pins the dial to a literal non-reserved IP,
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# defeating DNS rebinding. SafeHTTPDialContext returns a closure rather
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# than acting as a direct sanitizer in dataflow terms, so it isn't
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# modeled here — but ValidateSafeURL alone is sufficient to dismiss the
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# request-forgery alerts at the call sites that use it (scep_probe.go,
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# webhook.go).
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- addsTo:
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pack: codeql/go-all
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extensible: barrierModel
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data:
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- ["github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/validation", "", false, "ValidateSafeURL", "", "", "Argument[0]", "request-forgery", "manual"]
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# certctl CodeQL model pack — extends the standard Go queries with project-
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# specific data-flow knowledge (sanitizers, sinks, summaries).
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#
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# Why this exists: CodeQL's standard `go/request-forgery` query is a syntactic
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# taint-tracking rule. It traces operator-supplied URLs into HTTP egress sinks
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# (`http.Client.Do`) and reports — but it has no built-in knowledge of
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# certctl's `internal/validation.ValidateSafeURL` SSRF guard. The validator
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# IS a sanitizer (rejects loopback, link-local incl. cloud metadata
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# 169.254.169.254, multicast, broadcast, unspecified, IPv6 link-local;
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# rejects DNS names whose A/AAAA records resolve into any of those ranges)
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# but CodeQL doesn't know that, so the analyzer reports a finding the
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# runtime defense already mitigates.
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#
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# This pack uses Models-as-Data (MaD) extensions to declare the validator as
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# a barrier for the request-forgery query. After this pack is loaded:
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# - The alert at internal/service/scep_probe.go:232 (CodeQL #23) is
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# dismissed at source, not via per-line `// codeql[...]` suppression.
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# - The same model applies to the second site of this shape — webhook
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# notifier's outbound `client.Do` (internal/connector/notifier/webhook/
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# webhook.go) — without per-line annotations.
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# - Future code that flows operator URLs through ValidateSafeURL gets the
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# same treatment automatically.
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#
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# Loading: codeql-config.yml's `packs:` field references this pack by its
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# `name` below. The `extensionTargets:` map declares which upstream pack the
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# extension data plugs into (codeql/go-all is the Go standard library pack).
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# The `dataExtensions:` glob matches the .model.yml files in models/.
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#
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# MaD `barrierModel` extension was added for Go in CodeQL 2.25.2 (2026-04-21).
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# `github/codeql-action@v3` (pinned in .github/workflows/codeql.yml) pulls a
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# CLI version >= 2.25.2 by default. If a future analysis fails with
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# "unknown extensible predicate barrierModel", the action's CLI version has
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# regressed below 2.25.2 — pin a newer action version rather than reverting
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# this pack.
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name: shankar0123/certctl-codeql-models
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version: 0.0.1
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library: true
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extensionTargets:
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codeql/go-all: '*'
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dataExtensions:
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- models/*.model.yml
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