Addresses the gaps identified in the last audit.
Restore (was a stub returning "not yet implemented"). Every repository shares
one connection pool, so the database cannot be swapped underneath a live
server. Restore is therefore two-phase: RestoreBackup validates the file and
stages it beside the database; db.New applies it before the pool is opened,
which is the only safe moment. The database being replaced is preserved as
<db>.replaced-<timestamp>, and stale -wal/-shm are removed so SQLite cannot
replay the old journal over the restored file. Validation is strict — SQLite
integrity_check plus a schema probe — because applying an unrelated file
would destroy the install. GET/DELETE /api/v1/backups/restore inspect and
cancel a staged restore. The CLI does both phases at once, since it runs
standalone; `orchestrad backup` was also a stub and now works.
Secret key. With nothing configured the key is generated once and persisted
to <data>/secret.key, so restarts reuse it and moving the stack to another
server is a matter of copying the data directory. Upgrades are handled: if a
database already exists the install was silently running on the legacy
built-in default, so that value is adopted and written out rather than
replaced — generating a fresh key there would make every stored credential
undecryptable. The file is owner-only (ACL-restricted on Windows).
Multi-arch image: buildx now emits linux/amd64 + linux/arm64, matching the
architectures the release binaries already covered. The Dockerfile
cross-compiles via TARGETARCH rather than emulating, so arm64 costs little.
CSRF: the middleware previously checked only that a header was *present* and
was never wired up, and /auth/csrf returned "csrf-token-placeholder". Tokens
are now nonce + HMAC-SHA256 signed with the application secret, validated
properly, and the middleware is mounted on /api/v1. Bearer and API-key
requests are not CSRF-reachable and pass through untouched, so this is
transparent to the SPA and to API clients.
Also: the Windows store import drops CRYPT_EXPORTABLE (the store copy is not
the source of truth — <data>/tls holds the key, so portability is unaffected
and a non-exportable server key is the better posture), the PFX password is
written to server.pfx.password beside the bundle so an operator importing it
by hand does not have to hunt for a password they never chose, and the
"renewed" log line now reflects whether a leaf was actually issued instead of
guessing from its age.
Verified live: backup -> stage -> restart applies and preserves the previous
database; secret key generated, adopted, and read back across restarts with
the credential check confirming decryptability; CSRF endpoint issues real
signed tokens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The OpenAPI spec and Swagger UI were public. Put them behind the same
authentication as the rest of the API, and add a compact route list so a
client can ask "what can I call?" without opening dev tools.
Access:
- /api/openapi.json and /api/routes require a bearer token or API key.
- /api/docs additionally accepts a session cookie set at login, so a
signed-in operator can open the docs in a new tab; an anonymous browser
is redirected to /login?redirect=... and returned afterwards.
- The cookie is HttpOnly and path-scoped to /api/docs, so it is never sent
to /api/v1/* and cannot authenticate an API call (no CSRF surface).
Verified: cookie-only request to /api/v1/rules returns 401.
Discovery: both the spec and GET /api/routes accept ?method=get,post and
?path=<substring> (comma-separated, case-insensitive). The route list
returns method, path, summary, tag, public, and `allowed` — false when a
read-scoped API key cannot invoke that route. /api/docs passes the same
query through to the spec it loads.
UI: a </> icon in the header (both layouts) and an Administration → API
Docs menu entry, opened in a new tab via a new `external` nav-item flag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
API keys were never validated — the middleware only checked session tokens,
so an X-API-Key request always 401'd. Add auth.Service.ValidateAPIKey (looks
up the key hash, enforces enabled/revoked/expiry, loads the user + roles,
stamps last_used_utc) and route X-API-Key / bearer auth through it.
Add per-key scopes (migration 006): "read" (GET/HEAD only) or "readwrite"
(full access, default). The middleware rejects mutating requests from a
read-scoped key with 403. Create accepts a scope; list and create responses
include it; the UI create dialog has a scope selector and the list shows a
scope chip. Disable/re-enable and revoke (permanent) were already correct.
Verified live: RW key GET/POST ok; read key GET ok, POST 403; disable→401,
re-enable→200; revoke→401 and re-enable blocked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- API response helpers and error codes
- Authentication handlers (login, logout, me, csrf)
- Auth middleware (session validation, role checks, CSRF)
- LDAP client with TLS/StartTLS support
- LDAP filter construction from conditions
- AD operations (group membership, move, create group/OU)
- Credentials repository (CRUD, test results, usage check)
- AD connections repository (CRUD, test results)
- Schedules repository (CRUD, next run tracking)
- Rules repository with nested condition groups and actions
- go-ldap/ldap/v3 dependency added
Alphaeus Mote