235c9c0706
security: implement Phase 0-3 remediation (deps, SQL ident, JWT, CSP, suite)
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Bump axios/multer and npm overrides; add safeSqlIdent and multer cleanup;
harden JWT aud/iss/nbf; CSP without unsafe-eval via static protobuf build
and data-bd-call delegation; ship Security Test Suite v1.2.0 and docs.
Ignore generated RdClient protobuf artifacts (~40k lines) — rebuild locally
with npm run protocols:rdclient.
Thanks: INSOLVE (Honorary); Marco Jakobs (@jacotec); MyNameisStitch (@MyNameisStitch); Redspin (@playerumpknow); muopc (@muopc)
2026-10-17 15:33:48 +02:00
d03129cf8f
feat(security): integrate reviewed contributor fixes on dev
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Integrate focused, reviewed contributor fixes on dev: bounded transport framing, live peer-ID rename, explicit enrollment precedence, lazy file-transfer compatibility, focused tests, and provenance/attribution documentation.
Refs #346
Thanks: INSOLVE (Honorary); Marco Jakobs (@jacotec); MyNameisStitch (@MyNameisStitch); Redspin (@playerumpknow)
2026-09-17 03:44:18 +02:00
648a8d4f8a
security(3.4): harden console and Go server for pre-release audit
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Commit web-nodejs lockfile with tar override; CI uses npm ci and moderate npm audit.
Add LOG_LEVEL filtering and log redaction in Node console and Go server.
Validate WS tokens on bd-signal; require single-use token for remote-agent relay.
Limit active relay sessions per IP and block open enrollment without TLS.
2026-07-12 20:44:46 +02:00
8da6f8c9fd
security: fix 3 critical + 3 high findings from production audit
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Critical:
- C-01: WebSocket Origin validation (CSWSH protection) via new middleware/wsOrigin.js, applied to wsRelay, chatRelay, remoteRelay, bdRelay, cdapTerminalProxy, cdapMediaProxy
- C-02: Remove Tauri Origin-based CSRF bypass in server.js; only /api/bd/* skipped
- C-03: Update vulnerable deps (express 4.21.2, multer 2.0.0, protobufjs 7.4.0, helmet 7.2.0, axios 1.9.0, cookie-parser 1.4.7, express-session 1.18.1)
High:
- H-01: Disable auto-create-local-user on login by default; opt-in via BETTERDESK_AUTH_AUTOCREATE=true (does not affect ensureDefaultAdmin fresh-install bootstrap)
- H-02: Bearer-only auth for /api/bd/*; session cookie fallback removed; tokens redacted in logs
- H-05: Replace custom PBKDF2 with golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2; 600k iterations; new format pbkdf2-sha256\\\ with backward-compat for legacy salt:hash
Backward compatibility: legacy password hashes still verify; CSRF tokens still obtainable via csrfTokenProvider; fresh-install admin bootstrap (.admin_credentials flow) unchanged.
Audit report: docs/security/AUDIT_PRODUCTION_2026-04-10.md
This commit was made possible thanks to Insolve.
2026-05-26 13:35:12 +02:00
ab6adff56f
fix(security): harden login and audit endpoints
2026-04-26 02:09:44 +02:00
95f2beb744
feat: organizations, desktop mode, i18n (ja/ko/ru), security docs, client i18n integration
2026-03-25 20:27:04 +01:00
UNITRONIX